

Calculating Damages In An Example Criminal Corruption Case

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**Santa Clara University
Legal Seminar Discussion Notes**

In a political, or corporate, corruption case, the inefficiency and boondoggle-nature of portions of the government process often lead to the government spending many times as much money fighting, and covering up, an embarrassing case than it would cost the government to simply settle the case with the whistle-blower or harmed citizen.

Congressional laws and government accounting standards require the government to accept the least expensive option in such a matter.

‘Settling’ with the Plaintiff seems to be the least expensive option in the case example herein.

We discuss the pros and cons of the Defendants settling the case with Plaintiff.

Claim Dynamics In This Example Case Matter, For Discussion

In this example, demand is made for payments, to the Plaintiff, to include:

- Damages due to the reprisal and civil rights violations efforts by government employees, listed by name, in the complaint filing document.
- Damages equivalent to the award in the related Walter Tamosaitis whistle-blower case (<https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-hanford-whistleblower-settlement-20150813-story.html>)
- Damages equivalent to the related Terry Bollea hired defamation attackers case (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bollea_v._Gawker) wherein government staff worked cooperatively in the brand damage attacks on Plaintiff.
- Repayment for loss of homestead due to reprisal attacks by government officials.
- Damages equal to the last 3 years average court awards for the proven CAUSES OF ACTION: Abuse of process; FTCA violations; account stated; breach of contract; conversion; defamation; fraudulent misrepresentation; fraudulent concealment; injurious falsehood, product disparagement and trade libel; civil rights violations and violations of the US Constitution; misappropriation of trade secrets; prima facie tort; quantum meruit; tortious interference including a.) Tortious interference with an existing contract, b.) Tortious interference with prospective, c.) Tortious interference with business relations contractual relations; patent infringement; personal injury; unjust enrichment; anti-trust law violations; labor law violations and other causes as stipulated.
- Provision of government-provided lawyers per stated qualifications for provision of equitable qualified counsel. Application under [Department of Justice](#) regulation 28 cfr part 600 is also hereby stated.
- Whistle-blower payments from FTC, FBI, SEC, GAO, FEC, Congress, DOJ and related agencies; informant fees and witness fees equal to, at least, the last 3 years of historical average awards by federal law enforcement, IG and regulatory agencies in other case matters.

- SSDI Payments from the original claimed date, prior to any whistle-blower reprisal manipulations of filing data by public officials implicated in the corruption probes.
- SSA retirement benefits payments assuming an age 72 retirement but beginning at early retirement age due to SSA forcing Plaintiff to take early retirement because of reprisal via government officials with-holding of payments for 35+ years of work for national and community interests.
- Such other payments as are standard in such matters where civil rights and Constitutional rights were violated, public agencies used for political bias attacks and discrimination against Plaintiff's race, disability and social standing were deployed and in relation to the awards in the stated case numbers in this, and supplied, evidence documents.
- Losses of income calculated by the profits that Tesla, Google, Facebook, Netflix, et al, gained (...as 1.) competitors and 2.) political campaign financiers and 3.) government financial beneficiaries and 4.) operators of the companies owned the the government officials in question) during the time period in question.
- And such other payments as set by previous legal precedent matters.

The White House has now publicly asserted and verified such claims. The White House has stated, in the news media, that major government officials during the example period, *"have undermined and politicized... benefits, terminated the agency's telework policy that was utilized by up to 25 percent of the agency's workforce, not repaired ...relationships with relevant Federal employee unions including in the context of COVID-19 workplace safety planning, reduced due process protections for benefits appeals hearings, and taken other actions that run contrary to the mission of the agency and the President's policy agenda,"* a White House official said in a public statement.

There are now thousands of court cases, public news reports and Congressional that affirm the assertions of corruption and the targeting of citizens, in reprisal, for reporting crimes.

When one uses these facts, along with FBI-grade investigation materials, and hundreds of letters of support from famous individuals, to verify and substantiate the related claims of abuse, civil rights harms and retaliation/reprisal uses of government resources by public officials to harm Plaintiff, and others, in retaliation for helping law enforcement, the need for justice compensation is clear.

Harms Demands Calculation Metrics are legal industry standard based on past comps: The damages amounts in the attached report are based on fully verified, government reported values from carbon credit sales, revenues, stock market exploitation of DOE funding matters and other profit GAAP reported amounts and FBI revealed sums, from the prime date to today, that the crony competitors and their investors made in documented profits, revenues, tax write-offs, tax waivers and other upsides that Plaintiff lost because of the corruption damages, rights blockades and reprisal attacks.

Additionally, damages from benefit funds blockades, black-lists and other losses of revenue are incorporated in those standards-based, court precedent comps. Additionally, monies owed for whistle-

blower and federal informant fees are calculated per industry precedents and the known annual budget for FBI informant payments provided to Congress in previous budget reports).

Plaintiff provided the documented case evidence to federal investigators for a period of time as a federal witness. Additionally, salary losses based on the averaged CEO salaries of the CEO of Tesla Motors, Fisker Motors, Bloom Energy, Solyndra and General Motors are included as industry standards for the energy and automotive market in the same time-frame. Additionally, standard pain and suffering inclusions are incorporated. All of Plaintiff back benefits payments are also demanded.

The dictionary defines an **Omerta** (*ō-mûr'tə, ō"mĕr-tä'*) as: ► *n.*, *A rule or code that prohibits speaking or divulging information about certain activities, especially the activities of a criminal organization; Alternative spelling of omertà.*(<https://www.wordnik.com/words/omertà>); *a code of silence practiced by the Mafia; a refusal to give evidence to the police about criminal activities.* This case is about an Omerta practiced by well-known public officials who operated an “enterprise” as defined by **RICO laws**. Over 2 million pages of confirming evidence documents and over 60 hours of documentary and surveillance videos are already provided to, or by, government investigators. This massive volume of evidence provides indisputable proof of the assertions herein by the people who were “*in the room*” and who witnessed these crimes! Additional evidence is available for those with a federal “**Q-Sensitive**” security rating.

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Discussion Notes

In this example the “Plaintiff” is a natural born United States citizen(s) residing in California who previously worked for, and with, the State and Federal government as contractor/employees in technology, intelligence and/or law enforcement roles and had relationships with White House, Mayoral, Senate and Congressional executives (and their financiers) who provided knowledge of the stated crimes.

Plaintiff was a contractor and employee of the government.

Plaintiff is not associated with any political party and self-identifies as an “independent” voter.

This case is not about political ideologies. It is about racketeering, insider trading and organized crime.

Plaintiff suffered harms and damages from a felony organized crime operated by County, State and Federal public officials, per forensic investigators, FBI, Congressional reports and filed federal FOIA request responses pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), (5 U.S.C. § 552 et seq.) and the implementing regulations of the United States government, and applicable laws. Plaintiff seeks to acquire compensation for their damages and expose and curtail this type of corruption for all of time.

As an example, and for reference, the Energy Department government loan program was a “*stimulus fund*” authorized under section 136 of the [Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Energy_Independence_and_Security_Act_of_2007), (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Energy_Independence_and_Security_Act_of_2007) which provided the program with \$25 billion in loan authority, supported by a \$7.5 billion appropriation to fund the credit subsidy. It was *designed by lobbyists* to benefit corrupt politicians and their billionaire financiers and to kill off their competitors.

Recent reports, such as: <https://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Inside-eBay-s-Cockroach-Cult-The-Ghastly-Story-15599604.php> prove that tech Cartel members: Ebay, Amazon, Tesla, [Facebook](http://popurls.com/go/pop/lbae924f6b574ffcc129f0f361e411de8) (<http://popurls.com/go/pop/lbae924f6b574ffcc129f0f361e411de8>), Google, Netflix, et al; maintain para-military attack and surveillance geek armies, *within* their organizations, to go after competitors, whistle-blowers and those that their owners dislike. These “*Kill Teams*” have CIA-like tools and funding to “target and destroy” any member of the public. Many of the leaders of these political assassination teams were hired from the previous White House administration. Obama PR Director Jay Carney, who now works for Amazon, was documenting suggesting a hit on employees who spoke out about warehouse safety. Congressional leader Devin Nunes was targeted by six of these companies. The Tesla ‘Intimidation Director ‘ was documented in court records running attack vectors against Tesla employee Martin Tripp because he reported safety cover-ups ([Watch This Pedestrian](http://popurls.com/go/pop/194e3e600c2346835275b4ca0ceac31ad) <http://popurls.com/go/pop/194e3e600c2346835275b4ca0ceac31ad>) at the Tesla factory. A murder in the Fremont Tesla factory and the deaths of Rajeev Motwani and Gary D. Conley may be related. The documents provided prove that [techs billionaires](http://popurls.com/go/pop/1e7bddc602d893b8ebdc36ea1357df4ad) (<http://popurls.com/go/pop/1e7bddc602d893b8ebdc36ea1357df4ad>) hire, and partner with, White House staff to destroy the lives of American citizens who compete with, or report the crimes of those entities.

The Department of Energy worked closely with these **Kill Teams** in order to sabotage competitors of their insiders. [Explosive New FBI Texts](https://www.allsides.com/news/2020-09-25-1011/trump-was-right-explosive-new-fbi-texts-detail-internal-furor-over-handling) (<https://www.allsides.com/news/2020-09-25-1011/trump-was-right-explosive-new-fbi-texts-detail-internal-furor-over-handling>) prove that even the highest levels of law enforcement help put hit-jobs on those they disagree with! Corrupt government officials used a process, known in intelligence community trade craft circles as a “**Vendetta Cycle**”, to ‘kill’ citizens. The process involves cutting off every outside source of income, running defamation media campaigns to forestall any future income, forcing the targets to be exclusively reliant on government funds **but** making the funds so minimal that the citizens could not afford to pay lawyers to help fight the attacks. The ‘Vendetta Cycle’ process blocks the targets from their money, their legal rights and their freedom. The process is repeated endlessly, and the government funds reduced, over time, until the victim is terminated. This reprisal revenge process can be operated by just a handful of Senators and White House staff but the results are always lethal. It is 100% illegal and a vast violation of the United States Constitution but it is used constantly by political sociopath Senators. The process is described in leaked CIA, Russian and British spy manuals and widely covered by Glenn Greenwald and ICIJ reporters.

Even though the law in California (Cal. Lab. Code § § 1050 to 1053) says that an entity can't prevent or attempt to prevent former workers from getting work through misrepresentation, knowingly permit or fail to take reasonable steps to prevent blacklisting, or make a statement about why an employee was discharged or left employment, implying something other than what is explicitly said, or providing information that was not requested: It is done every day in Silicon Valley. The "*Silicon Valley No Poaching Black-List*" class-action lawsuit was about this issue. Federal FAR Section 9.104-1 (d), and related laws, apply. Blacklisting is a key part of the IC Vendetta Cycle attacks. The victims also suffered damage to their rights under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) (29 USC Sec. 621, et seq.); the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 USC Sec. 12181, et seq.); the Civil Rights Acts - (42 USC Sec. 2000, et seq.); the Davis-Bacon Act (40 USC Sec. 276a, et seq.); the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) (29 USC Sec. 1001, et seq.); the Equal Pay Act (29 USC Sec. 206[d]) and other violations.

There is a precedent that was set in the US Supreme Court case: *Gideon v. Wainwright*, (1963) that clarifies that you have a right to a lawyer even if you don't have money for one. The Sixth Amendment, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause gives one their Due Process rights. You need to kill someone, though, to most easily get your free lawyer, since the court-appointed lawyer is rarely ever appointed, on citizens behalf, in a case like this. Even if a defendant is represented by an attorney of his or her choosing, he or she may be entitled to relief on appeal if the attorney did not provide adequate representation. A defendant must demonstrate that the attorney's performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and that this was prejudicial to the case. [Strickland v. Washington](https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/466/668/case.html) (<https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/466/668/case.html>) , 466 U.S. 668, 688-92 (1984). A few “free lawyers”, that victims had tried, turned out to be working for the opposition side. The federal organization: <https://www.lsc.gov> is required to help but has refused because it's administrators were friends with, and appointed by, the public officials charged with corruption in this case.

Causes of Action include: ABUSE OF PROCESS; FTCA VIOLATIONS; ACCOUNT STATED; BREACH OF CONTRACT; CONVERSION; DEFAMATION; FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION; FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT; INJURIOUS FALSEHOOD, PRODUCT DISPARAGEMENT AND TRADE LIBEL; CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND VIOLATIONS OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION; MISAPPROPRIATION OF TRADE SECRETS;

PRIMA FACIE TORT; QUANTUM MERUIT; TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE INCLUDING a.) Tortious interference with an existing contract, b.) Tortious interference with prospective, c.) Tortious interference with business relations contractual relations; PATENT INFRINGEMENT; PERSONAL INJURY; UNJUST ENRICHMENT; ANTI-TRUST LAW VIOLATIONS; LABOR LAW VIOLATIONS AND OTHER CAUSES.

Whereas the lawyers for the tech oligarchs argue that they should be sued separately from the government entities and the politicians, those tech oligarchs and politicians invalidated that assertion by exchanging billions of dollars of (NOT reported to the FEC) cash, stock market stocks, real estate, search engine manipulations, insider trading algorithm manipulation sharing, and other compensations, which, thereby, made them business partners with each other, combined them as a RICO racketeering compliant “Cartel”, in the eyes of the law, and joined them legally as a group organized for “unjust gains”.

To clarify, criminally corrupt Senators changed federal laws so that they could say that such bribery ‘was only not illegal for themselves’. Whether this contrivance by these corrupt insider-trading Senators will stand, remains to be seen. The fact that these political figures conspired with each other and their financier/beneficiaries leaves no cloudy issues relative to the law! **They broke the law under racketeering and organized crime rules!**

To qualify for Department of Energy funds, automakers and eligible component manufacturers had to promise to increase the fuel economy of their products by 25% over the average fuel economy of similar 2005 models, and apply the loans to future investments "reasonably related to the reequipping, expanding, or establishing a manufacturing facility in the U.S." Plaintiff vehicles had the highest calculated fuel efficiency in the world, the lowest cost-to-manufacture, the lowest selling price, the most attractive debt-ratio, the highest safety factor, the most hires of laid off Detroit factory workers and executives and the biggest volume of sales order requests! Plaintiff had refused to pay the bribes so they got ***black-listed!*** Even though these rules were supposed to be “law”, Department of Energy officials constantly and illicitly changed the rules and criteria, every time that it looked like an outsider was getting close to winning the funds. In this way, **no applicant who was not a White House or U.S. Senator’s political campaign financier could ever get the money.**

Bright Automotive, ZAP, XP, EcoMotors and Elio have famously published national letters confirming that the entire Department of Energy funding programs are a shell game operated with constantly shifting gauntlets designed to only allow insiders in and destroy all of their competitors. DOE staff will make up any excuse to keep non-crony applicants out, including faking reviews of applicants and shredding their data. A large majority of DOE staff are still “left-over” from the previous corrupt Administration and believe that their income is still based on lying and providing a cover-up of the criminal corruption described herein.

Non-crony applicants were ***DEFRAUDED*** into thinking that they had a chance. Outsider applicants were falsely ***INDUCED*** to spend millions of their dollars via false government promises. This resulted in part, but not all, of the massive damages to Plaintiff s. In distributing the loans, the DOE was supposed to fairly support technologies that are promising and deserving of assistance. Alas, recent

lawsuits, GAO and Treasury examinations and Congressional investigations have revealed that the Department of Energy has been “*infected with corruption*” and only administered these funds to benefit friends and harm their competitors.

Loan recipients must also be “financially viable” for the length of the loan. Plaintiff stayed viable through the projected life of the loan, under the most dire circumstances possible, even though most other crony “winners” of ANY DOE funds were forced into bankruptcy by the lies and frauds operated by the White House and Department of Energy and the “unjust-gain” (Per the U.S. Treasury) schemes to intentionally crash companies like Solyndra and Abound for “Windfall tax write-off profits and VC/I-Bank skims” [2]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Technology_Vehicles_Manufacturing_Loan_Program#cite_note-csmonitor.com-2

Tesla borrowed cash from Arabs, Warren Buffet and Detroit to cook it’s books to make it look financially viable on paper, but Tesla was anything but “OK”. Tesla is a sham. Musk can cycle the original DOE funding for stock market pump-and-dumps for the next 100 years but Tesla is will always be a company forged in corruption, ‘book-cooking’, bribes and payola. Musk and his scams exist because over a thousand insiders at **Goldman Sachs** (<https://www.businessinsider.com/matt-taibbis-vampire-squid-take-down-of-goldman-sachs-is-finally-online-2009-7?op=1>), The NVCA and **Deutsche Bank** (<https://www.db.com/company/index.htm>) spend all day manipulating the stock market with massive automated computer trading arrays. Also, four big U.S. Senators (who are his investors) spend a large part of their days covering his ass in order to keep their insider trading schemes going.

Given 60 days by congressional statute to issue an interim final rule, the **Department of Energy** (DOE https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Department_of_Energy),[3] responsible for overseeing the program, finalized the rule 36 days later on November 5, 2008 (compared to 18 months usually needed for such rule making). Over 1000 public officials and applicants can testify that the money was planned to have been distributed by Dec. 30, 2008. This program is related to the **United States Treasury Department**’ (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Treasury_Department)s **Troubled Asset Relief Program** (TARP - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Troubled_Asset_Relief_Program) “**stimulus fund**” which has been providing contrived **bailout** (<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bailout>)funding to two of the big three U.S. automakers to give the impression of reducing the **effects of the 2008–10 automotive industry crisis on the United States** (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Effects_of_the_2008–10_automotive_industry_crisis_on_the_United_States). The two “**stimulus funds**” programs were enacted during the **Automotive industry crisis of 2008–10** (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Automotive_industry_crisis_of_2008–10), in order to pay off political favors[4] Obama Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel is notorious for saying that you should ‘*never let a good crisis go to waste*’, by which he meant that politicians should create “**stimulus funds**”, to hand out taxpayer money to their friends, every chance they get. (ie: See the internal Treasury, GAO and OMB notes on the current “**COVID Stimulus**” investigations and negotiations re: payola and crony schemes).

The stark reality is that *no politician screaming about “climate change” and “immigrants”, etc. is not making tens of millions of dollars in stock market profits from “climate change” and “immigration” services providers*. They have a traceable financial incentive to lie about these issues for their own profiteering schemes. They get paid by Eric Schmidt, Elon Musk, Reid Hoffman and the Cartel to say

these things and they own stock in the Tesla cars and Warren Buffet windmills. You can follow the money, quite easily, with modern AI technology, but the mainstream media hides that fact.

While climate change may be bad for crops, the only “green” thing that these crooked Senators care about is the “green” cash in their stock market accounts. They only need that taxpayer Department of Energy “ATVM” or “LGP” money to appear in an outside account for a few minutes while their Goldman Sachs insiders and their Sandhill Road VC’s scoop the “skims”. The *skims* are billions of dollars of fake “*management fees*” off-the-top, electronically captured with the push of a button. The Plaintiff helped get the FBI to raid Solyndra, not because Solyndra’s indium-based solar tubes caught on fire all the time or because of the real estate scams involved, but because crooked money was made off of the skims and the manipulated windfall tax write-off profits. Solyndra never had to sell a thing for the scams to work. Department of Energy staff, especially PR staff, will lie, shred, deny, defer and obfuscate to cover-up these crimes. DOE policy is to “deny any and all past political failures, *no matter what*”.

In this case, Plaintiff has filed charges, criminal referrals and requests-for-investigation with the FBI, DOJ, FTC, SEC, SFPD, Inspector Generals, and other offices. Plaintiff won previous historical, precedent-setting, federal lawsuits proving that Plaintiff funding and agency decisions were manipulated by reprisal, vendetta, revenge hit-jobs operated against him by government officials exposed in an active federal corruption investigation. FBI officials Patricia Ritch, Christopher Wray, John F. Bennett, Craig D. Fair, the duty officers, and their predecessors, at the San Francisco and Washington DC offices should be familiar with this case as building logs and videos show that Plaintiff has been to the 450 Golden Gate Ave, 13th Floor FBI offices on multiple occasions to file reports. Plaintiff has active SEC, SFPD, OSC, etc. case numbers. Plaintiff are also actively participating in the promotion of current DOJ and FTC lawsuits against the perpetrators including Google/Alphabet and other large parties who influenced government process, illicitly, in this corruption matter.

While Plaintiff has asked the Department of Justice to execute and collect these funds on their behalf, they have reserved their rights to have any commercially licensed collection agency legally acquire these funds, under law. These particular funds and these particular government bank accounts are like no other in the world and they offer novel collection opportunities and challenges.

The Plaintiff has, for years, implored The U.S. Department of Justice to take up Plaintiff case in order to expedite the matter. United States Attorney Generals and FBI bosses keep getting indicted, fired and investigated over this very same matter of corruption, so this ask has been a long row to hoe.

Plaintiff has demanded an immediate settlement to the claim so that all parties can be spared further pain in this matter. Getting a response from the feds, though, is like pulling teeth. Hollow, ineffective form letters from law enforcement and regulatory agencies, for a case this compelling, ring of insincerity and underscore the frustration every citizen has with the modern justice system.

It would not be a total loss for the federal bankers, though. The federal government is free to seek reimbursement from the State Of California for these funds, to replenish the DOE account that Plaintiff intend to garnish. Why? Because over 40 major California public officials, known to federal investigators, participated in the referenced corruption in a manner which inured to their personal and family bank accounts and damaged all of the Plaintiff in this matter (as well as the taxpayers). That fact is easily proven by the forensic accounting of those politicians family investment bank accounts, from

2007 to today, and their email communications, all of which the NSA and other agencies have recorded (and outside hackers may have acquired). Those public officials engaged in this corruption on an interstate basis which, also, makes this matter of interest to the FBI.

This is about one of the largest criminal stock market and payola manipulations in American history! It is happening again with the [COVID “stimulus funds”](#)

(<https://www.zerohedge.com/political/house-moderates-hammer-out-152-trillion-bipartisan-compromise-pandemic-relief>)!

The 2008 “Stimulus” ended up being \$2 trillion dollars. Ironically, the 2020 COVID “stimulus” plan is for the same amount. All of the players are the the same and the insider trading schemes are quite similar. Those who do not learn from the past are doomed to repeat it!

Plaintiff has reported this, in writing, to every known law enforcement and regulatory entity. They have a vast archive of crime report receipts and case numbers **but** zero productive results on their behalf. Each agency finger-points to another agency because they are either too lazy to do the work or their bosses are implicated in the crime benefits. The Plaintiff will no longer wait for those responsible for enforcement to do their jobs. Everyone has seen, in the news, the shocking number of Inspector General top brass indicted for corruption. It is clear that IG offices can no longer be counted on for justice.

So: U.S. Senators and their staff and financiers as well as White House executives, their staff and financiers and government agency executives and their staff and beneficiaries have been charged, fired and/or arrested in this matter. It has been irrefutably proven that those parties, could, have and may again, quite easily, manipulate federal records, decisions and processes in order to harm, punish, defund, and reprisal-blockade Plaintiff rights, benefits and legal options. Silicon Valley oligarchs partnered with the politicians to operate these crimes. Over 1000 news broadcasts and hundreds of thousands of news articles discuss the case and those media clippings have been provided to every federal office in on-line, cloud internet, repositories. The feature films “**Too Big To Fail**”, “**Omerta**” and over four different **CBS News 60 Minutes** episodes deal with this matter. San Francisco City Hall officials have started to be arrested in the associated corruption issues. Washington DC and Marin County officials are under investigation, by federal authorities, in this active case matter.

Crony Insider Payola Is The Bread And Butter Of The Department Of Energy

Cronyism is still prevalent in the energy sector, and the government allocates special benefits to the well-connected instead of fostering a playing field that provides opportunity for all to compete. California politicians had stock market and revolving door job benefits from the Cleantech Crash DOE funds "winners" and helped to sabotage the competitors of their friends that got handed Crony Cash. Forensic FBI-class accounting proves this! These people were supposed to be Plaintiff leaders but they chose to cheat rather than compete!

Corruption cannot be fixed in America until it is illegal for ANY politician, or their family members, to own stock market stocks!

The Department of Energy's crony-exclusive subsidies obstruct the long-term success and viability of the technologies and energy sources that they are intended to promote by distorting the actual costs of energy production and interfering with the price signals by which businesses monitor supply and demand. This is clearly covered in the feature films: "***Too Big To Fail***" and "***Omerta***".

In order to keep competitors (of the California Senator's friends) from getting access to the funding, White House and Department of Energy (DOE) goons, under Secretary of Energy Steven Chu, resorted to the following vendetta and blockade tactics:

- Plaintiff were first-to-file DOE applications. Plaintiff had been invited by the government to participate. DOE refused to follow the "*First Come, First Served*" rule of the Section 136 funding law and moved those Applicant's who had their act together, to the back of the line when it was discovered that they were ahead of Tesla and Fisker, who had lackadaisically not even filed applications. Tesla and Fisker knew they were going to just be handed the funds, without review, based on White House insider say-so. DOE then arbitrarily published an illegal rule change press release saying that the "First-Come, First-Served" rule was suddenly no longer in effect after DOE realized that insider Tesla and Fisker had not had their acts together and that their competitors had filed first and could get money ahead of White House favorites Fisker and Tesla. Micheal Carr, one of the authors of the 136 Bill, personally told Plaintiff s, in his Washington DC office, that Tesla and Fisker were not intending to even submit applications because funding was "in the bag" for them. Washington DC research firm: Eye On Washington, spoke with Dianne Feinstein's Chief Of Staff, who threatened them and Plaintiff over the Fremont California NUMMI factory. The Plaintiff were the first party to approach the NUMMI factory owners to take over the factory. Elon Musk had already gone on the news to say that the "NUMMI factory had no value to Tesla". Feinstein then talked Musk into back-tracking and taking the building because her husband ran CBRE realty which had interests in that and the Solyndra property (later raided by the FBI) next door. Her relative: Herb Newman, got the HR work and a construction contractor with Feinstein family connections got construction work. Some of her staff then went to

work for Tesla. Feinstein's daughter used to stay at Plaintiff home and had often complained about her mother's ethics in recorded get-togethers. Her best friend lived with Plaintiff and her mother worked at the Feinstein office. The 60 Minutes "Cleantech Crash" episode reveals that most of the Plaintiff technologies were acquired by China and forced ultra-cheap rates and Chinese spies have been found to be working for the Feinstein's. Tesla's China deal was facilitated by Feinstein intermediaries. Feinstein's hubby's business partner: Mart Bailey, is China's top deal maker. China is considered, by the Pentagon, to be America's biggest current global adversary.

- Once an applicant applied for DOE funds, they were locked out of all other bank or venture funding worldwide, by design. The National Venture Capital Association and major banks cooperated with this scheme. No other funding outlet could match the DOE finance rate, so nobody would fund an applicant until AFTER an applicant had been funded... but DOE would not fund any applicants except the 5 companies who paid the biggest bribes, and made the largest campaign PAC payments, to the Obama campaign. The DOE funds were a catch-22 to make sure that indie tech companies could NOT get funded unless they were crony insiders.

- DOE "bottom-drawer" outsiders, especially the Plaintiff s, applications and stuck them at the bottom of a file cabinet, in Lachlan Seward's DOE office, for months without even looking at them in order to run-out-the-clock on those who competed with campaign-finance front facades: Tesla and Fisker. Tesla and Fisker had agreed to take the taxpayer money, stuff it in their company account, then move it to PAC's who then moved it to Obama, Feinstein, Harris and Pelosi political election campaigns. That process is called "Dark Money Obfuscation". When the New York Mafia did it they got put in prison. When Elon Musk does it, he gets more free taxpayer cash.

- DOE told Plaintiff s, that competed with Tesla, that DOE would not approve the loan for their 100% electric car because the applicant's car "**DID NOT USE ENOUGH GASOLINE**"...! or that an applicant "was not going to make enough cars from the outset"..when it is widely known that any manufacturing effort requires a ramp-up curve.

- Every, so called, 'DOE reviewer' of the DOE applications was either a direct competitor of the Plaintiff or had stock market holdings in Tesla, Fisker, Solyndra, etc. or later went to work for them. The review process was the most rigged, crony deal anyone had ever seen in Washington DC.

- Insider (and bribe paying) Tesla Motors had hundreds of meetings and phone calls with DOE staff, many at DOE HQ, in order to hand-walk Tesla through the process and babysit their application on orders from the Obama White House. Competing applicants received no phone calls, no meetings and no help. DOE's Carol Battershal, refused to return most phone calls from applicants who were in competition with Tesla because she was a "*Tesla Fan Girl*".

- DOE lawyer Cohen, refused to respond to any questions from applicants competing with Tesla, yet spent many hours helping Tesla get their paperwork configured. He was terminated for conflict issues.

- Oval Office White House car czar: Steven Rattner, refused to assist or respond to any applicants and told a number of members of Congress that he was just focused on trading "votes-for-DOE-funds with Detroit auto unions". He said that small electric car start-ups "don't offer enough vote trades to make a

discussion valuable". ***Rattner was later indicted in New York for Stock market fraud.*** His indictment provided key initial clues that the entire Cleantech "green energy" program was about pumping stock market holdings that DOE and White House insiders exclusively controlled for their own profiteering.

- The DOE was so overt in their industrial monopoly operations and sabotage efforts that Tesla's own marketing boss wrote an article about it because they were so obvious in their manipulations of an industry: <https://www.wired.com/2009/12/doe-loans-stifle-innovation/>

- DOE never once called, or returned calls from CEO's of the companies applying. DOE particularly refused to talk to Plaintiff because all of Plaintiff technology obsoleted all of Tesla's business model and technologies.

- One of the White House staff that communicated between agencies was caught taking pictures up girls skirts and his case was reduced because of White House intervention. Barack Obama later became part of NETFLIX and helped bring the notorious pedo film "Cuties" to the screen. Sex trades between White House staff, DOE staff and lobbyists had become common-place by 2010.

- Applicant Bright Automotive famously published a nationwide open letter confirming all of these crimes and abuses by DOE

- ZAP Motors, Elio Motors, Brammo and almost every other applicant confirmed these charges.

- The GAO, Congress and yet-to-be-seen FBI documents and NSA recordings confirm all of these assertions.

- Plaintiff hand delivered more written customer order letters to Congress and DOE in Washington DC than ALL of the other applicant's combined yet Lachlan Seward at DOE "lost them" (like Lois Lerner lost her IRS hard drives). The applicants re-sent them, yet the DOE office refused to review them or contact the customers that had submitted them because they proved that Tesla was faking customer order volume and other applicants were not.

- DOE staff Matt Rogers, Steve Spinner and other Steven Chu buddies, who were manipulated into DOE jobs by McKinsey/Covington and Burling, flew back and forth to California, on the taxpayers dime, to go to parties and baseball games each weekend, yet DOE could not find the time or resources for any in-person meetings with anyone but insider Tesla Motors. They were reported-on by green energy CEO Gary D. Conley. Conley was later found with a bullet in his head behind Beale Air Force base in Northern California. Conley had written and talked to a number of applicants stating that a major Silicon Valley crime mob was "after him". Kamala Harris refused to investigate the matter when she was the Attorney General of California. Harris is financed by the Silicon Valley oligarchs suspected of being complicit in the deaths of Conley, Rajeev Motwani, Seth Rich and others.

- Applicant XP Vehicles had applied for a loan under the DOE "LGP" program. DOE wanted a cash payment of many tens of thousands of dollars from them in order to look at that application. DOE told XP that "DOE does not have an application form so just make up your own". XP acquired an investor to fund the "review payment", which DOE maintained was not a bribe. Tesla Motors was not required to make such a payment in advance of review. Tesla only had to make the payment later, after other

applicant's complained that Tesla was getting "crony insider favors". Secretary of Energy Steven Chu's top man had committed, in a recorded call, to speak to XP's outside investor's in one phone call, per the request of XP's investors to confirm that the money was being used as a DOE fee. The DOE official refused to return all calls, emails, FEDEX letters and personal messenger requests to respond. He was recorded in conversations in the next room while his secretary said he was "not in the building" and also when he told his secretary to "hang up" on the callers. The investors had become concerned that the promised reply from DOE was being blocked. After a massive number of attempts, a few minutes after the deadline to pay the "review fee" had passed, the senior official at DOE finally responded with a communication. He sent an email stating that XP had missed the deadline and was not eligible to apply. He had specifically and overtly sabotaged XP by not giving the one sentence response to XP's investors, ever!, and then waiting until the moment the deadline passed to say "HA, we f*cked you!" In a recorded conference call and Congressional meetings, Steven Chu had offered to waive the fee, as DOE had set a precedent of doing for this with other, applicants. XP, which beat every other applicant on comparative metrics, lost millions of dollars because of the lies and machinations of DOE.

- Steven Chu's buddies at McKinsey Consulting flooded Congress and the White House with "helpful" "White Papers" that all seemed to reach the ironically similar conclusion that only Tesla Motors could be the "green company" that could solve "green energy". [Raj Gupta Went to jail for rigging McKinsey](https://www.indiawest.com/blogs/former-mckinsey-ceo-rajat-gupta-s-10-tall-claims-short-shrifted/article_e7e88b8c-9c58-11e9-9d18-03143accc78a.html) and (https://www.indiawest.com/blogs/former-mckinsey-ceo-rajat-gupta-s-10-tall-claims-short-shrifted/article_e7e88b8c-9c58-11e9-9d18-03143accc78a.html) stock market manipulations. The Silicon Valley oligarchs had hired all of McKinsey to push this narrative that would only hype Tesla stock. Mckinsey pushed lithium mining and lithium batteries like there was no tomorrow. Google and Goldman Sachs held massive assets in lithium mining.

- DOE "Tesla Fan Boys" made up their own interpretations of applicants statements and re-wrote applicants intentions in order to create negative data for competitors of Tesla and make Tesla look better even though Tesla was: 1.) about to go bankrupt, 2.) bleeding cash, 3.) owner of the absolute worse debt ratio of any applicant, 4.) Trying to build new buildings, like Solyndra (for real estate holdings to benefit CBRE, Feinstein's husband's company), 5.) bleeding staff, 6.) operated by a sociopath drug abuser, 7.) reliant on Afghanistan war-based lithium battery mines that may never materialize, 8.) reliant on Congo cobalt mines that used child slave labor, 9.) reliant on Panasonic lithium batteries that were never intended for auto energy storage and widely documented to explode and release poison cancer-causing gas during fires, 10.) off budget PER CAR by over \$100,000.00 PER CAR, 11.) in a legal dispute with all of it's founders, 12.) fully conflicted with stock ownership by DOE, White House and Senate executives, and much, much more...The FBI and SEC have been provided with a list of nearly 1000 lies, deceptive actions, safety cover-ups, stock manipulations in association with Google owners, sex abuse issues, racism and frauds by Tesla Motors and Elon Musk.

- Department of Energy staff use lies, Lois Lerner-type manipulations, sabotage, third-party contracted media hit-jobs (operated by Fusion GPS, Gizmodo, Media Matters, Google, etc.), stone-walling and other dirty tricks tactics known as "Ratf*ucking", to harm and delay funding for any party who might compete with the crony insiders.

There are **thousands** of other hard-evidence case examples of the corruption in this case.

White House Staff including Rahm Emanuel, Bill Daley, Jay Carney, Robert Gibbs, Steve Rattner, David Axelrod, John Podesta, et al; and The Secretary of Energy Steven Chu and the Chief Counsel for the United States Department of Energy Daniel Cohen and Bill Cooper were, (from 2007 forward), either financed by, friends, with, sleeping with, dating the staff of, holding stock market assets in, promised a revolving door job or government service contracts from, partying with, personal friends with, photographed at private events with, exchanging emails with, business associates of or directed by; applicant's business adversaries, or the Senators and Department of Energy politicians that those business adversaries pay campaign finances to, or supply political digital search manipulation services to.

Criminal U.S. Senators coordinated and profited in these schemes. Their own family members have now supplied evidence against them. The facts prove that nobody is allowed to "win" government funds **unless** they are friends and stock market partners with certain U.S. Senators.

Even if your DOE application metrics beat every single other competing Applicant, you will get lied to and defrauded by Department of Energy and White House officials. You will be told that you have a "fair chance", **but** all of the money is secretly hard-wired to a business partner of a Pelosi or Feinstein and you will just waste your time, staff resources and payroll waiting for years on promised funds that will never come.

The awful truth is that Plaintiff were **DEFRAUDED** out of their life savings, their investors savings and years of their lives by the U.S. Government. The feds knew that the money was hard-wired to Fisker, Tesla and the crony insiders but they induced the other applicants to apply under false pretenses. They used the outsider applicants as a cover-up for their pass-through crony payola schemes to pay off Silicon Valley tech oligarchs for funding the Obama and Pelosi political campaigns and internet search rigging.

The White House, at the time, and the Department of Energy engaged in **FELONY, ORGANIZED CRIME** payola, worked with Jeffrey Epstein and his gang and operated massive stock market manipulation. The highest levels of law enforcement, including Eric Holder and James Comey, helped cover it up! Joe Biden's son has now been exposed running the same type of shenanigans with sketchy off-shore companies.

When the government plays favorites, valuable resources shift to less productive uses.

Removing the cronyism and corporate welfare that are pervasive in energy markets is no easy feat. The current administration's attempt to rescind unused funds in the U.S. Department of Energy Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing loan program provides a good case study.

In handing out only five crony loans, the program has wasted taxpayer dollars by subsidizing economic losers (Fisker) and has promoted corporate welfare by subsidizing well-off companies (Nissan and Ford). Tesla Motors was clearly awarded government funds based on bribes and cover-ups of its failed finances and deadly engineering defects. Additionally, Tesla acts as a campaign funding conduit to

Nancy Pelosi and Dianne Feinstein's election drives. The program has \$4.3 billion remaining but has been idle for more than eight years without a new loan administered by the department because the FBI is hot on the trail of this scheme. Funds still left in that account should be given to the Plaintiff who were the victims of this failed crony payola Cleantech Crash political payola scheme.

The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 authorizes the President to rescind funding previously enacted into law, and the White House appropriately offered a \$15 billion rescissions package that included the Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing loan program. The government owes the defrauded applicants their damages and that money should come from the \$4.3 billion still sitting around at DOE. The White should take the \$1.5 Billion out of the fund and provide it to these Plaintiff s.

The Pelosi Special Interests have, so far, prevailed, and the program remains in place. The money is just sitting there. A DOJ lawsuit is needed to expose the scam and shut down these crimes against the public. In the mean time, that money must be used to compensate those harmed, damaged, sabotaged and defrauded by DOE. No company will ever get that money again without a global crowd-sourced public FBI-class investigation being conducted against them. That money, must, therefore, be used to make up for the quantified past crimes and harms against the non-crony Applicant's!

Thus, the State of California and The Agencies Of The U.S. Government should consider Plaintiff demand. It is a legal '**Demand For Payment**' and the collection proceedings are in process!

Here is how the corruption process works:

[Crony capitalism - Wikipedia](#)

 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crony_capitalism

Crony capitalism is an economic system in which businesses thrive not as a result of risk, but rather as a return on money amassed through a nexus between a business class and the political class. This is often achieved by using state power rather than competition in managing permits, government grants, tax breaks, or other forms of state intervention over resources where the state exercises ...

[CRONY CAPITALISM | definition in the Cambridge English ...](#)

 <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/crony-capitalism>

crony capitalism meaning: an economic system in which family members and friends of government officials and business leaders.... Learn more.

[What is **crony capitalism**? definition and meaning ...](#)

 www.businessdictionary.com/definition/crony-capitalism.html

crony capitalism: An economy that is nominally free-market, but allows for preferential regulation and other favorable government intervention based on personal relationships. In such a system, the false appearance of "pure" **capitalism** is publicly maintained to preserve the exclusive influence of well-connected individuals.

[Capitalism Definition - Investopedia](#)

 <https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/capitalism.asp>

Capitalism is an economic system in which capital goods are owned by private individuals or businesses. The production of goods and services is based on supply and demand in the general market ...

[What is Crony Capitalism? | PragerU](#)

 <https://www.prageru.com/video/what-is-crony-capitalism/>

In **crony capitalism**, politicians spend the public's money not for the public interest but to reward friends, supporters, or themselves. In **crony capitalism**, government officials use taxpayer dollars to benefit their friends, supporters, or themselves, rather than using that money for the public interest as it is intended. View source

[Crony-capitalism index - Wikipedia](#)

 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crony-capitalism_index

The **crony-capitalism** index aims to indicate whether the livelihood of the people from certain country or city with a capitalist economy are easily affected by **crony capitalism**. It is not an internationally recognized index due to its limitations. It is a new measurement of **crony capitalism** designed by The Economist newspaper based on the "work by Ruchir Sharma of Morgan Stanley Investment ...

[Crony Capitalism | Definition of Crony Capitalism by ...](#)

 [https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/crony capitalism](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/crony%20capitalism)

Crony capitalism definition is - an economic system in which individuals and businesses with political connections and influence are favored (as through tax breaks, grants, and other forms of government assistance) in ways seen as suppressing open competition in a free market. How to use **crony capitalism** in a sentence.

[Where Does Crony Capitalism Come From?](#)

 <https://investorhour.com/episodes/where-does-crony-capitalism-come-from>

Nick Sorrentino is the co-founder of Against **Crony Capitalism** and the editor of AC2NEWS.com. A political and communications consultant whose clients have spanned the political spectrum, his work has been featured at Foreign Policy Magazine, Chief Executive Magazine, Reason.com, NPR.com, TownHall, The Daily Caller, and many other publications.

[Crony Capitalism in America | Mises Institute](#)

 <https://mises.org/library/crony-capitalism-america>

Hunter Lewis. Hunter Lewis is author of twelve books, including The Secular Saints: And Why Morals Are Not Just Subjective, Economics in Three Lessons & One Hundred Economic Laws, Where Keynes Went Wrong, and **Crony Capitalism** in America 2008-2012, and has contributed to the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Times of London, The Atlantic and many other magazines and web sites including ...

[AC2 News - "The Real Problem with the Economy"](#)

 <https://www.ac2news.com>

Crony Capitalism in America at IndieBound From Us to You Receive additional services from Against **Crony Capitalism** through email: Story updates, action alerts, free ebook, and more

[13 Examples of Crony Capitalism - Simplicable](#)

 <https://simplicable.com/en/crony-capitalism>

Crony capitalism is a society that allows an elite to profit from government resources in a way that doesn't benefit society. This is typically based on some form of political corruption whereby politicians personally benefit by granting the rent seeking demands of an elite. The following are illustrative examples.

[What is Crony Capitalism? - YouTube](#)

 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4DxXHh-p-O4>

This election season there's a lot of talk about corruption, about politicians being "bought and sold", and about "**crony capitalism**". What do those terms mea...

[Crony Capitalism in America: 2008-2012: Lewis, Hunter ...](#)

 <https://www.amazon.com/Crony-Capitalism-America-Hunter-Lewis/dp/0988726726>

Crony Capitalism is a companion volume to Hunter Lewis' other outstanding work, published at the same time, Free Prices Now! --Jeremy Hammond, Barrons, 11/2/13 ". . . What we have today is not the free market but '**crony capitalism**,' an altogether different matter.

["Crony Capitalism" | Capitalism.org](#)

 <https://www.capitalism.org/collectivism-statism/crony-capitalism/>

"**Crony capitalism**" is a contradiction in terms. **Capitalism** is a political-economic system based on the principle of individual rights, which means the separation of state and economics (just like the separation of church and state). Under **capitalism**, the government's sole purpose is to protect each individual's rights equally.

[Crony Capitalism - University of Chicago Press](#)

<https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdfplus/10.1086/686474>

Crony Capitalism Paul H. Rubin* This Article discusses "**crony capitalism**," a form of rent-seeking, and its sources. Although the term **crony capitalism** is generally applied to non-Western economies, any economy is susceptible to three primary sources of cronyism: standard special interest legislation, "bootlegger and Baptist"

The Mines Of Hell

How do you pay back the bribes, paid by Silicon Valley tech billionaires, to put Presidents in the White House to be your bitches?

You create payola out of holes in the ground! You use corrupt overseas “rare earth” mineral mines!

Meet the “*Russian Treasure Maps*” of Afghanistan. They were said to show where five trillion dollars worth of copper, *lithium for Tesla*, *indium for Solyndra* and other technology minerals were hidden in the Afghan plains. That lithium and indium could power Elon Musk’s cars and Solyndra tubes, (if only a certain group of Silicon Valley billionaires had a way to monopolize that...hmmmm?) But; were those “Treasure Maps” a trick or a treat?

To this day, controversy exists across the intelligence communities, of many nations, about whether, or not, those maps were a scam created to “trick the American’s” or the actual locations of trillions of dollars of mining deals that were “*antibody's for the taking*”. The papers that the CIA geologists pulled out of that archival library in Kabul, Afghanistan still read to be a bit too convenient for what happened next. CIA Boss Woolsey promoted lithium batteries until he was blue in the face. Did Woolsey own mining interests in the CIA manipulation efforts in Afghanistan? Secretary of Energy Steven Chu, after getting booted out of office for corruption, went to work at a lithium company. The USAID, staffed by Hillary Clinton associates, pushed white papers and power-points to tech VC’s pitching the “***trillions of dollars of electric car lithium in Afghanistan***” and ignoring the fact that it may not even exist and that everybody around it wants to kill you. Is Elon Musk responsible for the deaths of all of the American soldiers that went to Afghanistan to get him lithium for his expensive douche-bag cars? Maybe.

Decades later, after an invasion or two, and vast expenditures of cash, political capitol and lives, very little of the promised golden mining treasure has materialized. What has materialized is epic corruption, political payola, campaign secrets, deaths and controversy. By Pentagon audits, over SEVEN TRILLION dollars of U.S. taxpayer money disappeared down the hole in Afghanistan and the U.S. got nothing out of it.

Goldman Sachs, McKinsey Consulting and Deloitte helped a few rogue CIA buddies distribute a huge number of white papers and press releases which used the buzz words: “Trillions of dollars of lithium in Afghanistan” and “Afghanistan is the Saudi Arabia of Lithium”. Why would those particular companies put so much effort into hyping a pile of dirt on the other side of the planet? The answer lies in who they hyped it to and who took the bait. It turns out, most of the money that flowed through this (probable) scam financed the Obama campaign. It also turns out that those who skimmed profits from this vast flowing river of corruption sludge were Elon Musk, John Doerr, Eric Schmidt, Steve Jurvetson and the very pack of investors who co-funded the Obama campaign. They were also the very same people who, exclusively, got the only cash from the Obama Administration.

They are also the very same people who had partnered with the Russian mining companies who were standing by to go back into Afghanistan to dig up this magical dirt-pile. Where “covert mining deals” were never a big election deal, in 2016, thanks to some monumental document leaks, they became one of the biggest deals in U.S. history..and not in a good way.

In other mining scam news, the **Uranium One controversy** involves the sale of [Uranium One](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uranium_One) (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uranium_One) to [Rosatom](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rosatom) (<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rosatom>) as a \$145 million bribery scandal involving [Hillary Clinton](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hillary_Clinton) (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hillary_Clinton)and the [Clinton Foundation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clinton_Foundation) (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clinton_Foundation).

Since the 2015 publication of the book [Clinton Cash](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clinton_Cash) (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clinton_Cash) by [Breitbart News](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Breitbart_News) (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Breitbart_News) editor and [Steve Bannon](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steve_Bannon) (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steve_Bannon) collaborator [Peter Schweizer](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Schweizer) (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Schweizer) , as well as a 2015 *New York Times* article that Schweizer was involved with,[1] (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uranium_One_controversy#cite_note-1) allegations of a bribery scheme involving Hillary Clinton, the Clinton Foundation and the 2010 sale of Uranium One persisted. [Sean Hannity](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sean_Hannity) (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sean_Hannity) characterized it as "the biggest scandal — or, at least, one of them — in American history," while his frequent guest and former Trump advisor [Seb Gorka](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seb_Gorka) (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seb_Gorka) equated it with treason worthy of a death sentence.[2] (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uranium_One_controversy#cite_note-2) On June 29, 2010, [Renaissance Capital](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Renaissance_Capital), a Russian investment bank with ties to the [Kremlin](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kremlin) and which was promoting Uranium One stock, paid Bill Clinton \$500,000 for a speech in Moscow shortly after the Rosatom acquisition of Uranium One was announced.[20][21] (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uranium_One_controversy#cite_note-nyt042315-20) (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uranium_One_controversy#cite_note-yf042315-21)

The Clinton-Uranium One story is the "real" Russian scandal according to experts. [Frank Giustra](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frank_Giustra) (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frank_Giustra) donated \$31.3 million to the Clinton Foundation, to be followed in 2007 with a pledge of at least \$100 million. These amounts constituted the bulk of the \$145 million in supposed bribes paid to the Clinton Foundation.[8][9][10] (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uranium_One_controversy#cite_note-8) (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uranium_One_controversy#cite_note-9) (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uranium_One_controversy#cite_note-10)

In the Congo, Elon Musk’s rush to gather Cobalt for his exploding batteries has led to child slave labor, mass rape, genocide and machete mutilations.

The wars and political dirty tricks to gather the politically targeted rare earth mining payola which Google, Tesla, Facebook, Amazon (All sponsors and beneficiaries of the Obama campaigns) stuffed into their products were worth a supposed “\$18 trillion dollars” to the tech oligarchs. People kill other people and rig elections for that kind of money.

DOE "Tesla Fan Boys" made up their own interpretations of Department of Energy applicants statements and re-wrote applicants intentions in order to create negative data for competitors of Tesla and make Tesla look better even though Tesla was: 1.) about to go bankrupt, 2.) bleeding cash, 3.) owner of the absolute worse debt ratio of any applicant, 4.) Trying to build new buildings, like Solyndra (for real estate holdings to benefit CBRE, Feinstein's husband's company), 5.) bleeding staff, 6.) operated by a sociopath drug abuser, 7.) reliant on Afghanistan war-based lithium battery mines that may never materialize, 8.) reliant on Congo cobalt mines that used child slave labor, 9.) reliant on Panasonic lithium batteries that were never intended for auto energy storage and widely documented to explode and release poison cancer-causing gas during fires, 10.) off budget PER CAR by over \$100,000.00 PER CAR, 11.) in a legal dispute with all of it's founders, 12.) fully conflicted with stock ownership by DOE, White House and Senate executives, and much, much more...

The *Lithium, Indium, Cobalt and Uranium* mining deals, and their associated wars, were staged by the Obama Administration, through Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan for the nearly exclusive benefit of the Silicon Valley Obama political financiers. Obama's utter disaster of a war in Afghanistan was staged to help Elon Musk buy private jets and hang out at Jeffrey Epstein and Steve Jurvetson sex parties. How many child slaves died in holes in the ground digging for Musk's cobalt by hand? The "S" in "Model S" really stands for **Slave-labor!**

[\\$1 Trillion Motherlode of Lithium and Gold Discovered in ...](#)

<https://www.mining.com/1-trillion-motherlode-of-lithium-and-gold-discovered-in-afghanistan/>

A recently unearthed 2007 United States Geological Service survey appears to have discovered nearly \$1 **trillion** in mineral deposits in **Afghanistan**, far [...] \$1 **Trillion** Motherlode of **Lithium** and ...

[The Spoils of the War on Afghanistan, One Trillion Dollars ...](#)

<https://www.globalresearch.ca/the-spoils-of-the-war-on-afghanistan-one-trillion-dollars-of-lithium-the-future-of-silicon-valley-may-lie-in-the-mountains-of-afghanistan/5375266>

The vast discovery could very well propel **Afghanistan** — a war-ravaged land with a population of 31 million largely uneducated Pashtuns and Tajiks, and whose primary exports today are opium, hashish, and marijuana — into becoming the world's next "Saudi Arabia of **lithium**," according to an internal Pentagon memo cited by the New York Times. ...

[Afghanistan is sitting on mineral wealth worth over \\$3 ...](#)

<https://tfipost.com/2020/07/afghanistan-is-sitting-on-mineral-wealth-worth-over-3-trillion-and-its-future-depends-on-it/>

Lithium is also crucial in technological equipment like mobile phones and laptops. An even more encouraging study was conducted in the year 2017 by the Afghan Ministry of Mines and Petroleum. It

pegged **Afghanistan's** mineral wealth at 3 **trillion** US **dollars**. This is equivalent of some of the biggest world economies like India.

[Afghan Lithium Stock Scam - a Washington Dc Organized ...](#)

 <https://xyzcase.weebly.com/afghan-lithium-stock-scam.html>

As of today the Afghan war has cost the U.S. over one and a half **TRILLION dollars** and, according to sociologists and economists, yielded no known benefits. The **lithium**, the gas pipelines and global goodwill goals have all turned out to be false hopes. Yale University calculates that 80% of the cash sent to **Afghanistan** disappeared in corruption.

[Mining in Afghanistan - Wikipedia](#)

 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mining_in_Afghanistan


Mining in **Afghanistan** is controlled by the Ministry of Mines and Petroleum, which is headquartered in Kabul with regional offices in other parts of the country. **Afghanistan** has over 1,400 mineral fields, containing barite, chromite, coal, copper, gold, iron ore, lead, natural gas, petroleum, precious and semi-precious stones, salt, sulfur, talc, and zinc, among many other minerals.

[Rare Earth: Afghanistan Sits on \\$1 Trillion in Minerals](#)

 <https://www.nbcnews.com/science/science-news/rare-earth-afghanistan-sits-1-trillion-minerals-n196861>

Afghanistan may be sitting on one of the richest troves of minerals in the world, valued at nearly \$1 **trillion**, scientists say. ... zinc, mercury and **lithium**. ... while the Afghan government's ...

[The New Oil: Afghanistans Lithium Mines worth Trillions of ...](#)

 <https://totallyfreepress.wordpress.com/2011/03/15/the-new-oil-afghanistans-lithium-mines-worth-trillions-of-dollars/>

According to other reports the total mineral riches of **Afghanistan** may be worth over three **trillion** US **dollars**. ... similar to those necessary for the deposits in **Afghanistan** went out of production due to cheaper production from **lithium** containing brines. **Afghanistan** invited 200 global companies for the development of its mines.

[\\$1 Trillion Trove of Rare Minerals Revealed Under Afghanistan](#)

 <https://www.livescience.com/47682-rare-earth-minerals-found-under-afghanistan.html>

Despite being one of the poorest nations in the world, **Afghanistan** may be sitting on one of the richest troves of minerals in the world, valued at nearly \$1 **trillion**, according to U.S. scientists.

[Why is Afghanistan unable to extract its vast mineral ...](#)

 <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/afghanistan-unable-extract-vast-mineral-wealth-190527111748895.html>

Timory also criticised what he described as the overly politicised nature of decision making in the **mining** sector, as he warned of further **corruption**. In late 2018, **Afghanistan's** membership in ...

Minerals have become integral to conflict in Afghanistan ...

 <https://ariananews.af/mining-has-become-integral-to-conflict-in-afghanistan-undp/>

Mining financing conflict The report also stated **mining** has been financing conflict and that the control of minerals extraction by insurgent groups has meant that they have been financing and fuelling conflict while undermining the legitimacy of the Afghan government and further spreading **corruption** and violence.

Illegal mining costs Afghanistan millions annually: UN

 <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/illegal-mining-costs-afghanistan-millions-annually-un/1952838>

World, Asia - Pacific Illegal **mining** costs **Afghanistan** millions annually: UN UN report says control of mineral extraction by insurgents, local militia, and warlords causes **corruption**, violence

Corruption and Conflict in Afghanistan | Global Witness ...

 <https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/afghanistan/>

Afghanistan's new **mining** law risks falling short in the fight against **corruption** The worrying weaknesses in the new Afghan **mining** law must be revised if it is to allow the country's huge mineral wealth to benefit its people, rather than continue fuelling **corruption** and conflict

‘FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT’ FILING:

Sept 30, 2020 - Copies Filed With NARA.GOV and all public outlets.

Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552 et seq. and the implementing regulations of your office we make the following request for FOIA data.

PlaintiffOffice requests that your office produce the following within twenty business days and further seeks expedited review of this request for the reasons identified below:

1. All records discussing, referring, or relating to all meetings or communications between staff and related parties or their representatives including minutes of those meetings, or any memoranda written about these meetings by your employees and contractors who were present or have knowledge of these actions related to FST, Limnia, DCT or XP Vehicles proposals for their proven patented, trade secret and patent pending technologies to use domestic coal waste for plasma processing into clean energy storage systems on which the U.S. Department Of Energy has worked with Plaintiff Teams via Ameren Energy, Lawrence Livermore, Sandia and Department of Energy HQ efforts, and direct Department of Energy funding, support and advisory efforts since, at least, 2000 and which Department of Energy officials blockaded in order to

favor Tesla Motors, Solyndra and companies which acquired their energy minerals from Afghanistan, Bolivia and China (Assets of which are owned by corrupt U.S. Senators and Department of Energy staff via proven Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan and related investment bank accounts) and other corrupt regions through corrupt rare earth mining scams relative to the White House Executive Order Of September 30, 2020, per the following:

White House Executive Order Places U.S. Emphasis On Plaintiff Coal Waste Processing

Technology

"Executive Order on Addressing the Threat to the Domestic Supply Chain from Reliance on

Critical Minerals from Foreign Adversaries

[Economy & Jobs](#)

Issued on:

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) (NEA), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code,

I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States of America, find that a strong America cannot be dependent on imports from foreign adversaries for the critical minerals that are increasingly necessary to maintain Plaintiff economic and military strength in the 21st century. Because of the national importance of reliable access to critical minerals, I signed Executive Order 13817 of December 20, 2017 (A Federal Strategy To Ensure Secure and Reliable Supplies of Critical Minerals), which required the Secretary of the Interior to identify critical minerals and made it the policy of the Federal Government “to reduce the Nation’s vulnerability to disruptions in the supply of critical minerals.” Pursuant to my order, the Secretary of the Interior conducted a review with the assistance of other executive departments and agencies (agencies) that identified 35 minerals that (1) are “essential to the economic and national security of the United States,” (2) have supply chains that are “vulnerable to disruption,” and (3) serve “an essential function in the manufacturing of a product, the absence of which would have significant consequences for Plaintiff economy or Plaintiff national security.”

These critical minerals are necessary inputs for the products Plaintiff military, national infrastructure, and economy depend on the most. Plaintiff country needs critical minerals to make airplanes, computers, cell phones, electricity generation and transmission systems, and advanced electronics. Though these minerals are indispensable to Plaintiff country, we presently lack the capacity to produce them in processed form in the quantities we need. American producers depend on foreign countries to supply and process them. For 31 of the 35 critical minerals, the United States imports more than half of its annual consumption. The United States has no domestic production for 14 of the critical minerals and is completely dependent on imports to supply its demand. Whereas the United States recognizes the continued importance of cooperation on supply chain issues with international partners and allies, in many cases, the aggressive economic practices of certain non-market foreign producers of critical minerals have destroyed vital mining and manufacturing jobs in the United States.

Plaintiff dependence on one country, the People’s Republic of China (China), for multiple critical minerals is particularly concerning. The United States now imports 80 percent of its rare earth elements directly from China, with portions of the remainder indirectly sourced from China through other countries. In the 1980s, the United States produced more of these elements than any other country in the world, but China used aggressive economic practices to strategically flood the global market for rare earth elements and displace its competitors. Since gaining this advantage, China has exploited its position in the rare earth elements market by coercing industries that rely on these elements to locate their facilities, intellectual property, and technology in China. For instance, multiple companies were forced to add factory capacity in

China after it suspended exports of processed rare earth elements to Japan in 2010, threatening that country's industrial and defense sectors and disrupting rare earth elements prices worldwide.

The United States also disproportionately depends on foreign sources for barite. The United States imports over 75 percent of the barite it consumes, and over 50 percent of its barite imports come from China. Barite is of critical importance to the hydraulic fracturing ("fracking") industry, which is vital to the energy independence of the United States. The United States depends on foreign sources for 100 percent of its gallium, with China producing around 95 percent of the global supply. Gallium-based semiconductors are indispensable for cellphones, blue and violet light-emitting diodes (LEDs), diode lasers, and fifth-generation (5G) telecommunications. Like for gallium, the United States is 100 percent reliant on imports for graphite, which is used to make advanced batteries for cellphones, laptops, and hybrid and electric cars. China produces over 60 percent of the world's graphite and almost all of the world's production of high-purity graphite needed for rechargeable batteries.

For these and other critical minerals identified by the Secretary of the Interior, we must reduce Plaintiff vulnerability to adverse foreign government action, natural disaster, or other supply disruptions. Plaintiff national security, foreign policy, and economy require a consistent supply of each of these minerals.

I therefore determine that Plaintiff Nation's undue reliance on critical minerals, in processed or unprocessed form, from foreign adversaries constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States. I hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat.

In addition, I find that the United States must broadly enhance its mining and processing capacity, including for minerals not identified as critical minerals and not included within the national emergency declared in this order. By expanding and strengthening domestic mining and processing capacity today, we guard against the possibility of supply chain disruptions and future attempts by Plaintiff adversaries or strategic competitors to harm Plaintiff economy and military readiness. Moreover, additional domestic capacity will reduce United States and global dependence on minerals produced in countries that do not endorse and pursue appropriate minerals supply chain standards, leading to human rights violations, forced and child labor, violent conflict, and health and environmental damage. Finally, a stronger domestic mining and processing industry fosters a healthier and faster-growing economy for the United States. Mining and mineral processing provide jobs to hundreds of thousands of Americans whose daily work allows Plaintiff country and the world to "Buy American" for critical technology.

I hereby determine and order:

Section 1. (a) To address the national emergency declared by this order, and pursuant to subsection 203(a)(1)(B) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1702(a)(1)(B)), the Secretary of the Interior, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Commerce, and the heads of other agencies, as appropriate, shall investigate Plaintiff Nation's undue reliance on critical minerals, in processed or unprocessed form, from foreign adversaries. The Secretary of the Interior shall submit a report to the President, through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, and the Assistant to the President for Trade and Manufacturing Policy, within 60 days of the date of this order. That report shall summarize any conclusions from this investigation and recommend executive action, which may include the imposition of tariffs or quotas, other import restrictions against China and other non-market foreign adversaries whose economic practices threaten to undermine the health, growth, and resiliency of the United States, or other appropriate action, consistent with applicable law.

(b) By January 1, 2021, and every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary of the Interior, in consultation with the heads of other agencies, as appropriate, shall inform the President of the state of the threat posed by Plaintiff Nation's reliance on critical minerals, in processed or unprocessed form, from foreign adversaries and recommend any additional actions necessary to address that threat.

(c) The Secretary of the Interior, in consultation with the heads of other agencies, as appropriate, is hereby authorized to submit recurring and final reports to the Congress on the national emergency declared in this order, consistent with section 401(c) of the NEA (50 U.S.C. 1641(c)) and section 204(c) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1703(c)).

Sec. 2. (a) It is the policy of the United States that relevant agencies should, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law, prioritize the expansion and protection of the domestic supply chain for minerals and the establishment of secure critical minerals supply chains, and should direct agency resources to this purpose, such that:

(i) the United States develops secure critical minerals supply chains that do not depend on resources or processing from foreign adversaries;

(ii) the United States establishes, expands, and strengthens commercially viable critical minerals mining and minerals processing capabilities; and

(iii) the United States develops globally competitive, substantial, and resilient domestic commercial supply chain capabilities for critical minerals mining and processing.

(b) Within 30 days of the date of this order, the heads of all relevant agencies shall each submit a report to the President, through the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, that identifies all legal authorities and appropriations that the agency can use to meet the goals identified in subsection (a) of this section.

(c) Within 60 days of the date of this order, the heads of all relevant agencies shall each submit a report as provided in subsection (b) of this section that details the agency's strategy for using the legal authorities and appropriations identified pursuant to that subsection to meet the goals identified in subsection (a) of this section. The report shall explain how the agency's activities will be organized and how it proposes to coordinate relevant activities with other agencies.

(d) Within 60 days of the date of this order, the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy shall submit a report to the President, through the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, and the Assistant to the President for Trade and Manufacturing Policy, that describes the current state of research and development activities undertaken by the Federal Government that relate to the mapping, extraction, processing, and use of minerals and that identifies future research and development needs and funding opportunities to strengthen domestic supply chains for minerals.

(e) Within 45 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the United States Trade Representative, shall submit a report to the President, through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, and the Assistant to the President for Trade and Manufacturing Policy, that details existing and planned efforts and policy options to:

(i) reduce the vulnerability of the United States to the disruption of critical mineral supply chains through cooperation and coordination with partners and allies, including the private sector;

(ii) build resilient critical mineral supply chains, including through initiatives to help allies build reliable critical mineral supply chains within their own territories;

(iii) promote responsible minerals sourcing, labor, and business practices; and

(iv) reduce the dependence of the United States on minerals produced using methods that do not adhere to responsible mining standards.

Sec. 3. The Secretary of the Interior, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall consider whether the authority delegated at section 306 of Executive Order 13603 of March 16, 2012 (National Defense Resources Preparedness) can be used to establish a program to provide grants to procure or install production equipment for the production and processing of critical minerals in the United States.

Sec. 4. (a) Within 30 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Energy shall develop and publish guidance (and, as appropriate, shall revoke, revise, or replace prior guidance, including loan solicitations) clarifying the extent to which projects that support domestic supply chains for minerals are eligible for loan guarantees pursuant to Title XVII of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, as amended (42 U.S.C. 16511 et seq.) (“Title XVII”), and for funding awards and loans pursuant to the Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing incentive program established by section 136 of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, as amended (42 U.S.C. 17013) (“the ATVM statute”). In developing such guidance, the Secretary:

(i) shall consider whether the relevant provisions of Title XVII can be interpreted in a manner that better promotes the expansion and protection of the domestic supply chain for minerals (including the development of new supply chains and the processing, remediation, and reuse of materials already in interstate commerce or otherwise available domestically);

(ii) shall examine the meaning of the terms “avoid, reduce, or sequester” and other key terms in section 16513(a) of title 42, United States Code, which provides that the Secretary “may make guarantees under this section only for projects that — (1) avoid, reduce, or sequester air pollutants or anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases; and (2) employ new or significantly improved technologies as compared to commercial technologies in service in the United States at the time the guarantee is issued”;

(iii) shall consider whether relevant provisions of the ATVM statute may be interpreted in a manner that better promotes the expansion and protection of the domestic supply chain for minerals (including the development of new supply chains and the processing, remediation, and reuse of materials already in interstate commerce or otherwise available domestically), including in such consideration the application of these provisions to minerals determined to be components installed for the purpose of meeting the performance requirements of advanced technology vehicles; and

(iv) shall examine the meaning of the terms “qualifying components” and other key terms in subsection 17013(a) of title 42, United States Code.

(b) Within 30 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Energy shall review the Department of Energy’s regulations (including any preambles thereto) interpreting Title XVII and the ATVM statute, including the regulations published at 81 Fed. Reg. 90,699 (Dec. 15, 2016) and 73 Fed. Reg. 66,721 (Nov. 12, 2008), and shall identify all such regulations that may warrant revision or reconsideration in order to expand and protect the domestic supply chain for minerals (including the development of new supply chains and the processing, remediation, and reuse of materials already in interstate commerce or otherwise available domestically). Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Secretary shall propose for notice and comment a rule or rules to revise or reconsider any such regulations for this purpose, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law.

Sec. 5. The Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Commerce, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Secretary of the Army (acting through the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works), and the heads of all other relevant agencies shall, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law, use all available authorities to accelerate the issuance of permits and the completion of projects in connection with expanding and protecting the domestic supply chain for minerals.

Sec. 6. The Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Energy, and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency shall examine all available authorities of their respective agencies and identify any such authorities that could be used to accelerate and encourage the development and reuse of historic coal waste areas, material on historic mining sites, and abandoned mining sites for the recovery of critical minerals.

Sec. 7. Amendment. Executive Order 13817 is hereby amended to add the following sentence to the end of section 2(b): “This list shall be updated periodically, following the same process, to reflect current data on supply, demand, and concentration of production, as well as current policy priorities.”

Sec. 8. Definitions. As used in this order:

(a) the term "critical minerals" means the minerals and materials identified by the Secretary of the Interior pursuant to section 2(b) of Executive Order 13817, as amended by this order; and

(b) the term "supply chain," when used with reference to minerals, includes the exploration, mining, concentration, separation, alloying, recycling, and reprocessing of minerals.

Sec. 9. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or

(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.

(c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

DONALD J. TRUMP

THE WHITE HOUSE,
September 30, 2020."

As the Department of Energy Inspector General's office, The FBI, DOJ, OSC, FTC and FEC are aware, we have filed criminal referrals in this matter and demanded payment for Plaintiff damages in the state-financed corruption in this matter caused by government employees and contractors exposed in Congressional, FBI, DOJ, OSC, FTC and FEC investigations. This information has been publicly relayed to the news media and the voting population of America and Europe. Former White House executives, U.S. Senators and Department of Energy staff have been proven to have held financial interests in these off-shore mining efforts and federal investigators can swear, warrant, and certify to this fact. Presidential candidates have been proven to have, or now hold, vast assets in Chinese and other foreign corrupt rare-earth mining quid pro quo scams.

PlaintiffOffice seeks all responsive records regardless of format, medium, or physical characteristics. In conducting your search, please understand the terms "records," "communications," and "documents" in their broadest sense, to include any written, typed, recorded, graphic, printed, or audio material of any kind. We seek records of any kind, including electronic records, audiotapes, videotapes, and photographs, as well as letters, emails, facsimiles, telephone messages, voice mail messages and transcripts, notes, or minutes of any meetings, telephone conversations or discussions. Plaintiff request includes any attachments to these records.

No category of material should be omitted from search, collection, and production.

You may not exclude searches of files or emails in the personal custody of your officials, such as personal email accounts, which are known by Plaintiff investigators to have been used to attempt to avoid transparency.

Records of official business conducted using unofficial systems or stored outside of official files is subject to the Federal Records Act and FOIA. It is not adequate to rely on policies and procedures that require officials to move such information to official systems within a certain period of time; Plaintiff Office has a right to records contained in those files even if material has not yet been moved to official systems or if officials have, through negligence or willfulness, failed to meet their obligations.

Custodian searches are still required; agencies may not have direct access to files stored in .PST files, outside of network

drives, in paper format, or in personal email accounts. In addition, please note that in conducting a "reasonable search" as required by law, you must employ the most up-to-date technologies and tools available, in addition to searches by individual custodians likely to have responsive information. Recent technology may have rendered the your prior FOIA practices unreasonable. In light of the government-wide requirements to manage information electronically by the end of 2016, it is no longer reasonable to rely exclusively on custodian-driven searches.

Furthermore, agencies that have adopted the NARA Capstone program, or similar policies, now maintain emails in a form that is reasonably likely to be more complete than individual custodians' files. For example, a custodian may have deleted a responsive email from his or her email program, but the DOE's archiving tools would capture that email under Capstone. Accordingly, Plaintiff Office insists that the your offices use the most up-to-date technologies to search for responsive information and take steps to ensure that the most complete repositories of information are searched. If any potentially responsive records have been destroyed and/or transferred to other agencies or offices, such as the National Archives and Records Agency (NARA), then I request copies of the destruction or transfer slips as well as any other documentation relating to, mentioning or describing said transfer or destruction, to include but not be limited to confirmation that your offices have no other copies of said records. Under the FOIA Improvement Act of 2016, agencies must adopt a presumption of disclosure, withholding information "only if . . . disclosure would harm an interest protected by an exemption" or "disclosure is prohibited by law." If it is your position that any portion of the requested records is exempt from disclosure, please advise.

PlaintiffOffice requests that you provide an index of those documents as required under Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974). As you are aware, a Vaughn index must describe each document claimed as exempt with sufficient specificity "to permit a reasoned judgment as to whether the material is actually exempt under FOIA." Moreover, the Vaughn index "must describe each document or portion thereof withheld, and for each withholding it must discuss the consequences of disclosing the sought-after information." Further, "the withholding agency must supply 'a relatively detailed justification, specifically identifying the reasons why a particular exemption is relevant and correlating those claims with the particular part of a withheld document to which they apply.'"

See - Competitive Enter. Inst. v. Office of Sci. & Tech. Policy , 827 F.3d 145, 149-50 (D.C. Cir. 2016); cf. Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Kerry , 844 F.3d 952, 955-56 (D.C. Cir. 2016) Id. at 8 ("The Government argues that because the agency had a policy requiring [the official] to forward all of his emails from his [personal] account to his business email, the [personal] account only contains duplicate agency records at best. Therefore, the Government claims that any hypothetical deletion of the [personal account] emails would still leave a copy of those records intact in [the official's] work email. However, policies are rarely followed to perfection by anyone. At this stage of the case, the Court cannot assume that each and every work-related email in the [personal] account was duplicated in [the official's] work email account." (citations omitted))

See- Presidential Memorandum-Managing Government Records, 76 Fed. Reg. 75,423 (Nov. 28, 2011), <http://bit.ly/2qOnSLU>; Office of Mgmt. & Budget Exec. Office of the President, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments & Independent Agencies, "Managing Government Records Directive," M-12-18 (Aug. 24, 2012), <http://bit.ly/2raBimr>

See - FOIA Improvement Act of 2016 § 2 (Pub. L. No. 114-185)

See- Founding Church of Scientology v. Bell , 603 F.2d 945, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1979)

See - King v. U.S. Dep't of Justice , 830 F.2d 210, 223-24 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (emphasis in original)

See - Id. at 224 (citing Mead Data Central, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of the Air Force , 566 F.2d 242, 251 (D.C. Cir. 1977))

In the event some portions of the requested records are properly exempt from disclosure, please disclose any reasonably segregable nonexempt portions of the requested records. If it is your position that a document contains non-exempt segments, but that those non-exempt segments are so dispersed throughout the document as to make segregation impossible, please state what portion of the document is non-exempt, and how the material is dispersed throughout the document. Claims of non-segregability must be made with the same degree of detail as required for claims of exemptions

in a Vaughn index. If a request is denied in whole, please state specifically that it is not reasonable to segregate portions of the record for release. In addition to the records requested above, Plaintiff Office also requests records describing the processing of this request, including records sufficient to identify search terms used and locations and custodians searched and any tracking sheets used to track the processing of this request. If your offices use FOIA questionnaires or certifications completed by individual custodians or components to determine whether they possess responsive materials or to describe how they conducted searches, we also request any such records prepared in connection with the processing of this request.

You should institute a preservation hold on information responsive to this request.

Plaintiff Office intends to pursue all legal avenues to enforce its right of access under FOIA, including litigation and press conferences if necessary. Accordingly, your offices are on notice that litigation is reasonably possible and that Plaintiff offices have prevailed in past related federal litigation.

Where possible, please provide responsive material in electronic format by email in PDF format.

Plaintiff non-political, criminal investigation, non-commercial public interest Congressional investigation and distribution group requests rolling production of these records as they are located and reviewed. Please be aware that under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A), a FOIA request is considered constructively denied after twenty business days and is subject to an appeal on that basis.

Fee Waiver

In accordance with 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii), Plaintiff Office, and citizen complainants, request a waiver of fees associated with processing this request for records. The subject of this request concerns the operations of the federal government, and the disclosures will likely contribute to a better understanding of relevant government procedures by the general public in a significant way.

Moreover, Plaintiff Office provides research to major online news organizations viewed by millions of voters and therefore we are entitled to a fee waiver on the grounds that disclosure of the information sought is in the public interest because it is likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the government and is not primarily in the commercial interest of the requester. Regardless, we are willing to pay fees for this request up to \$50 without prior approval. If you estimate that the fees will exceed this limit, please notify us first.

Expedited Processing

Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(E)(1) and 43 C.F.R. § 2.20(a)(2), Plaintiff Office requests that your office expedite the processing of this request.

Requests shall receive expedited processing when a requester demonstrates "an urgency to inform the public about an actual or alleged Federal Government activity, if made by a person who is primarily engaged in disseminating information." First, Plaintiff Office is an organization "primarily engaged in disseminating information." (finding that Plaintiff Office is a "representative of the news media" because it "gathers information of potential interest to a segment of the public, uses its editorial skills to turn the raw material into distinct work, and distributes that work to an audience.")

We are also investigating criminal activity, for Plaintiff own litigation and law enforcement reporting, by employees and contractors of your offices, in that such activity harmed us.

See - Mead Data Central, 566 F.2d at 261

See - Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Department of Justice, 321 F. Supp.

2d 24, 29 n.5 (D.D. Cir. 200))

These records are urgently needed to inform the public about actual or alleged government activity. Specifically, Plaintiff Office contends there exists an urgency to inform the public about what matters of state that were discussed and that those disclosures are helpful to the current White House Administration and the American public in their efforts to end political corruption. The courts have found that the issue of news coverage to be especially critical in determining whether a "compelling need" exists for expedited FOIA processing. The Court have asserted that the "ultimate conclusion" with regards to expedited processing relies on important underlying facts, such as "the credibility of a claimant's allegations regarding government activity, the existence of a threat to physical safety, or whether an issue is the subject of news coverage."

Certification

The above information is true and correct to the best of Plaintiff knowledge.

Further Correspondence

To ensure that this request is properly construed, that searches are conducted in an adequate but efficient manner, and that extraneous costs are not incurred, Plaintiff Office welcomes an opportunity to discuss its request with you before you undertake your search or incur search or duplication costs. By working together at the outset, Plaintiff Office and your offices can decrease the likelihood of costly and time-consuming litigation, and public press conferences, in the future.

This matter affects every voting citizen because, if we can't get justice in America, then no voter will believe they can either.

We look forward to your response.

For additional confirmation of precedents confirming Plaintiff rights to this data, please review the following:

See - Al-Fayed v. Central Intelligence Agency, 254 F.3d 300, 306 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Al-Fayed) Id. at 308. (emphasis added)

See - : Wadelton v. Department of State, 13-0412 ESH, 2013 WL 1760853 (D.D. Cir. 2013) (Wadelton

See - Id. Document 10, Filed 04/25/13, Page 6 of 8 (citing ACLU-NC v.DOD , 2006 WL 1469418, at *1-2; Amer. Civil Liberties Union of N. Cal. v. Dep't of Justice , No. C 04-4447, 2005 WL 588354, at *5-7 (N.D. Cal Mar. 11, 2005))

See - Edmonds v. FBI , CIV.A. 02-1294 (ESH), 2002 WL 32539613 (D.D.C. Dec. 3, 2002)

See - U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(E)(v)(II)

Recap:

Lithium ion batteries are bad because they: Cause wars, rape and genocide in the Congo, Afghanistan and Bolivia from the corrupt mining deals involved with mining lithium and cobalt; are insider trading-owned by ex-CIA boss Woolsey and DOE Boss Chu; excrete chemicals that mutate fetuses when they burn; destroy your brain, lungs and nervous system when they burn; kill the factory workers who make them; cause Panasonic to be one of the most corrupt companies in the world; poison the Earth when disposed of; can't be extinguished by firemen; poison firemen when they burn; are based on criminally corrupt mining schemes like URANIUM ONE; Have over 61 toxic chemicals in them;

come from an industry that spends billions on internet trolls used to say all other forms of energy; are insider-trading owned by corrupt U.S. Senators who are running a SAFETY COVER-UP about their dangers. Apple products with lithium ion batteries have been exploding and setting people on fire; over time the chemical dendrites inside each battery grow worse and increase the chances of explosion as they age - LITHIUM ION BATTERIES BECOME MORE AND MORE LIKELY TO EXPLODE AS TIME GOES ON AND AS THEY AGE; "Bad Guys" have figured out how to make them explode remotely; have their dangers hidden by CNN and MSM because pretty much only the DNC people profit from them; are the heart of Elon Musk's stock market scam. The Obama Administration promised Silicon Valley oligarchs the market monopoly on lithium ion batteries and the sabotage of fuel cells in exchange for campaign financing and search engine rigging; United States Senators that are supposed to protect us from these deadly products own the stock market assets of them so they protect them and stop the FDA, OSHA, DOT & NHTSA from outlawing them. WRITE YOUR ELECTED REPRESENTATIVE AND DEMAND THAT LITHIUM ION BATTERIES BE MADE ILLEGAL TO SELL! NiCAD and Hundreds of other battery chemistries DO NOT have all of these problems but Lithium Ion batteries get a monopoly because of politician insider trading ownerships. A recent fire on U.S. Highway 101 near Mountain View, CA, burned the driver alive and killed him. In Florida two kids died in a Tesla, burned alive, screaming in agony. A man died in agony in a Tesla crash in Malibu that set Malibu Canyon on fire. A young woman, at the start of life, and her boyfriend were burned alive in their crashed Tesla. There are many more deaths and crashes than you have heard about. The deaths and the cover-ups are endless. Senators Dianne Feinstein, Harry Reid, Nancy Pelosi, Kamala Harris and their associates own the stock in Tesla Motors and/or its suppliers and mining companies and they cover-up and halt investigations and laws designed to save the public. They, and their crony's, spend over \$1B a year to still and troll hype about lithium ion batteries and cover-up the dangers. Lithium ion EVs are more prone to battery fires. Experts say that their lithium-ion batteries can fuel hotter fires that release toxic fumes and are more difficult to put out. Lithium ion fires keep reigniting which explains why it takes so long and requires copious amounts of water or foam (it is an electric fire, after all) to smother the flames. Tesla employee Bernard Tse and his team warned Elon Musk about these dangers in 2008 and they got fired and/or warned to "say nothing" by Musk. Three top Tesla engineers died in a plane crash next to Tesla offices in San Carlos after two of them agreed to become whistle-blowers. Elon Musk exists because he bribed DNC politicians and Senators Feinstein, Reid, Boxer, Harris, Clinton and Pelosi to give him free taxpayer cash and government resources from the Dept. of Energy and the Calif treasury. DOE has been covering-up organized crime activities at DOE in which DOE funds are being used as a slush-fund to pay off DNC campaign financiers and to pay for CIA/GPS Fusion-Class attacks on Silicon Valley business competitors of those DNC campaign financiers who DOE staff share stock market holdings with. Elon Musk is a criminal, a mobster, an asshole, a bald fake-hair wearing, plastic surgery-addicted, douchebag, woman-abusing, sex addicted, tax evader. Musk exploits poor people and child slaves in the Congo and Afghanistan to mine his lithium and Cobalt. Musk spends billions per year to hire Russian trolls, fake blogger fan-boys and buy fake news self-aggrandizement articles about himself. Musk thinks he is the 'Jesus' of Silicon Valley. Fake News manipulator Google is run by Larry Page and Larry is Musk's investor and bromance butt buddy. Musk uses massive numbers of shell companies

and trust funds to self-deal, evade the law and hide his bribes and stock market insider trading. A huge number of Tesla drivers have been killed; pedestrians and oncoming drivers have also been killed, and Musk covers it up. The DNC and the MSM refuse to allow any articles about Musk's crimes to be printed because they benefit from Musk's crimes. Musk has been professionally diagnosed as a 'psychotic narcissist.' A 'Silicon Valley Mafia; cartel of frat boy sociopath venture capitalists like Steve Jurvetson, Tim Draper, Eric Schmidt, et al; threaten those who do not support the cult of Tesla or their political candidates. In EVERY blog that you read that mentions 'Musk', at least 1/3 of the comments have been placed there by Musk's paid shills. Musk holds the record for getting sued for fraud by his investors, wives, former partners, employees, suppliers and co-founders. Elon Musk has gone out of his way to hire hundreds of ex-CIA staff and assign them to "dirty tricks teams" to attack his competitors and elected officials who Musk hates. Musk never founded his companies. Musk's "Starlink" satellites are domestic spy and political manipulation tools - never get your internet from one. Musk stole Tesla in a hostile ownership take-over from Marty the true inventor of the Tesla. The same kind of EMF radiation proven to cause cancer from cell phones exists in massive amounts in a Tesla. Musk can't fix a car or build a rocket and has almost no mechanical skills. If you pull a report of every VIN# of every Tesla ever built and cross reference that with insurance, repair and lawsuit records you will find that the "per volume" fire, crash, death and defect rate is THE WORST of any car maker in history! Musk is a lying con artist and partners with Goldman Sachs to rig the stock market. Sachs has a dedicated team of 18 men who rig stocks and valuation bumps for Musk. Over 1000 witnesses can prove every one of those claims in any live televised Congressional hearing! Senators Dianne Feinstein, Harry Reid, Nancy Pelosi, Kamala Harris and their associates own the stock in Tesla Motors and/or its suppliers and mining companies. That is why they criminally help cover-up investigations of Tesla! All of this was reported, in writing, to James Comey, Patricia Rich and David Johnson at the FBI. The DNC bosses own the stock in lithium, Solar and EV markets and use kickbacks from those markets (Especially via convoluted campaign finance laundering via Elon Musk) to finance the DNC. The DNC bosses use character assassination as their main political tool against any member of the public who speaks out against their felony stock market scams and PizzaGate-like scandals. The Harvey Weinstein reports by Ronan Farrow show that they have teams of hired goons that they pay to destroy people's lives. They use Black Cube, Mossad, In-Q-Tel, Stratfor, Gawker Media, Gizmodo Media, Media Matters, David Brock, Sid Blumenthal, NY Times, Google servers, Facebook servers, Podesta Group, Perkins Coie, Covington & Burling and a host of "assassins". It should be a felony to hire character assassins in the USA. DEMAND A LAW and DEMAND the termination of these attack services. IE: Gawker and Gizmodo Media sets-up the attack stories and, in paid partnership with Google, Google kicks their attack links around the globe, in front of 8 Billion people, forever. Google locks the attack articles of its enemies on the front top search results of Google search results forever, on purpose! That is why Google is being terminated in the largest, most well resourced anti-corruption public service take-down in history! Tesla and Musk are protected by shareholders Harris, Pelosi, Feinstein, Brown and Newsom. Panasonic (indicted for bribery and Musk's partner) spends billions of dollars annually cover-up lithium battery fires and battery defects. We can prove all of these assertions in any Congressional hearing or federal jury trial.

General Case Data

Every major federal investigator and intelligence officer has confirmed these facts. Many of them PROVIDED this evidence. Congressional hearings have also proven these facts. Thousands of experts can prove these facts in any equitable jury trial. Everyone has heard of [Mossack Fonseca](https://www.esquire.com/news-politics/politics/a29536656/panama-papers-mossack-fonseca-investigations-russia-trump-organization/) (<https://www.esquire.com/news-politics/politics/a29536656/panama-papers-mossack-fonseca-investigations-russia-trump-organization/>) and the [Panama Papers](https://www.icij.org/investigations/panama-papers/new-panama-papers-leak-reveals-mossack-fonseca-chaotic-scramble/) (<https://www.icij.org/investigations/panama-papers/new-panama-papers-leak-reveals-mossack-fonseca-chaotic-scramble/>) but there are 187+ other crooked CPA firms that Diane Feinstein, Elon Musk, Nancy Pelosi, Larry Page, John Doerr, Steve Westly, Reid Hoffman, et al, use with even [dirtier secrets](https://www.sec.gov/files/Algo_Trading_Report_2020.pdf) (https://www.sec.gov/files/Algo_Trading_Report_2020.pdf) about stock market rigging and money laundering. [Jeffrey Epstein's](https://www.businessinsider.com/jeffrey-epstein-politicians-connections-donations-2019-7?op=1) (<https://www.businessinsider.com/jeffrey-epstein-politicians-connections-donations-2019-7?op=1>) Political Mafia corruptions and perversions are the heart-and-soul of the Cartel that these people operate. The investigators at every federal agency now have this proof IN HAND and the public should demand prosecutions of the criminals or the resignations of any officials running the cover-ups. Plaintiffs stated that, [Since Before 2005, "Plaintiff Witnessed Social Media Companies Engage in Illegal Campaign Contributions With Their 'Algorithm' Censorship And Blacklisting"](http://testimony111.com/index.php?post/Since-Before-2005%2C-We-Witnessed-Social-Media-Companies-Engage-in-Illegal-Campaign-Contributions-With-Their-Algorithm-Censorship-And-Blacklisting) (<http://testimony111.com/index.php?post/Since-Before-2005%2C-We-Witnessed-Social-Media-Companies-Engage-in-Illegal-Campaign-Contributions-With-Their-Algorithm-Censorship-And-Blacklisting>). Thus the cover-ups are still going on.

The Plaintiff has requested, under FOIA law, that all agencies provide all records discussing, referring, or relating to all meetings or communications between staff and related parties or their representatives including minutes of those meetings, or any memoranda written about these meetings by their employees and contractors who were present or have knowledge of these actions related to the “ *The Obama Administration Vendetta, Reprisal, Revenge Manipulations Of Plaintiff Funding As Payback For Plaintiff Provision Of Support To A Criminal Investigation*” per the following facts as told to the FBI and DOJ and per filed FOIA Requests:

“Whereas, numerous Congressional reports, IT staff reports and security industry reports have verified that agency servers and files, including those upon which Plaintiff records were housed, have been hacked, moved, deleted and edited by outside third parties including Chinese and Russian hackers, bored teens and hired opposition research operatives and that the hardware level back-doors for SPECTRE and many other incursion sets still exist in agency Cisco, Intel, Juniper Networks and other Network devices now connected to government file networks at DOE, SSA, FEC, and other agencies and this fact is indisputable. (The supporting DOE files are neither lost nor unrecoverable. The supporting Kleiner Perkins and Greylock case files are neither lost nor unrecoverable. At the very least, China, Russian or Brazilian teen hackers have them up for sale on the Dark Web. The NSA certainly has copies of them.)

FOR THE RECORD:

Per the FBI, DOJ, FCC and Congressional investigators:

It is widely verified by the U.S. DOJ that hackers such as Wang Dong, Sun Kailiang, Wen Xinyu, Huang Zhenyu, and Gu Chunhui, who were officers in Unit 61398 of the Third Department of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) and Aleksei Sergeevich Morenets, 41, Evgenii Mikhaylovich, Serebriakov, 37, Ivan Sergeevich Yermakov, 32, Artem Andreyevich Malyshev, 30, and Dmitriy Sergeevich Badin, 27, who were each assigned to Military Unit 26165, and Oleg Mikhaylovich Sotnikov, 46, and Alexey Valerevich Minin, 46, who were also GRU officers, and hackers-for-hire including Kevin David Mitnick, Adrian Lamo, Albert Gonzalez, Matthew Bevan, Richard Pryce, Jeanson James Ancheta, Michael Calce, Kevin Poulsen, Jonathan James, The hacker known as ASTRA, The hacker known as GUCIFER, The hacker known as ANON 4CHAN and THOUSANDS of other individuals had free access and free reign throughout NSA, FBI, SSA, DOJ, OPM, CIA and other government servers via the SPECTRE, EMOTET, PRIME ROOTKIT, SERCOMM BACKDOOR, NOTPETYA, MELTDOWN, MASTERKEY, RYZENFALL, FALLOUT, CHIMERA, and hundreds of other back doors and penetration vulnerabilities in Cisco, Intel, Juniper Networks, AMD, and other equipment. Additionally, all of the core server penetration tools used by the CIA and the NSA were hacked by foreign nations and their core source code posted on the internet for all to use.

It is ludicrous for any agency to state that any government servers, prior to 2020, were not widely penetrated and manipulated. The hackers are all known to have sold, or provided the results of their work to famous politicians for use against their competitors.

Nancy Pelosi is an owner of the hacking manipulation firm: CROWDSTRIKE. Crowdstrike and famous California Senators had the easy means, the motivations, the staffing, the resources and the known engagement of services to manipulate SSA, DOJ, SEC, FTC and other agency decisions and filing records in order to harm Plaintiff s, reporters and whistle-blowers who reported their crimes and corruptions.

(<http://www.opensecrets.org/personal-finances/nancy-pelosi/net-worth?cid=N00007360&year=2011>)

(https://www.realclearinvestigations.com/articles/2020/10/09/pelosi_takes_big_stake_in_crowdstrike_democrat-tied_linchpin_of_russiagate_125557.html)

The hackers, daily, use the common tools of:

A. Injection. Injection flaws, such as SQL, NoSQL, OS, and LDAP injection, occur when untrusted data is sent to an interpreter as part of a command or query. The attacker's hostile data can trick the interpreter into executing unintended commands or accessing data without proper authorization.

B. Broken Authentication. Application functions related to authentication and session management are often implemented incorrectly, allowing attackers to compromise passwords, keys, or session tokens, or to exploit other implementation flaws to assume other users' identities temporarily or permanently.

C. Sensitive Data Exposure. Many web applications and APIs do not properly protect sensitive data, such as financial, healthcare, and PII. Attackers may steal or modify such weakly protected data to conduct credit card fraud, identity theft, or other crimes. Sensitive data may be compromised without extra protection, such as encryption at rest or in transit, and requires special precautions when exchanged with the browser.

D. XML External Entities (XXE). Many older or poorly configured XML processors evaluate external entity references within XML documents. External entities can be used to disclose internal files using the file URI handler, internal file shares, internal port scanning, remote code execution, and denial of service attacks.

E. Broken Access Control. Restrictions on what authenticated users are allowed to do are often not properly enforced. Attackers can exploit these flaws to access unauthorized functionality and/or data, such as access other users' accounts, view sensitive files, modify other users' data, change access rights, etc.

F. Security Misconfiguration. Security misconfiguration is the most commonly seen issue. This is commonly a result of insecure default configurations, incomplete or ad hoc configurations, open cloud storage, misconfigured HTTP headers, and verbose error messages containing sensitive information. Not only must all operating systems, frameworks, libraries, and applications be securely configured, but they must be patched/upgraded in a timely fashion.

G. Cross-Site Scripting XSS. XSS flaws occur whenever an application includes untrusted data in a new web page without proper validation or escaping, or updates an existing web page with user-supplied data using a browser API that can create HTML or JavaScript. XSS allows attackers to execute scripts in the victim's browser which can hijack user sessions, deface web sites, or redirect the user to malicious sites.

H. Insecure Deserialization. Insecure deserialization often leads to remote code execution. Even if deserialization flaws do not result in remote code execution, they can be used to perform attacks, including replay attacks, injection attacks, and privilege escalation attacks.

I. Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities. Components, such as libraries, frameworks, and other software modules, run with the same privileges as the application. If a vulnerable component is exploited, such an attack can facilitate serious data loss or server takeover. Applications and APIs using components with known vulnerabilities may undermine application defenses and enable various attacks and impacts.

J. Insufficient Logging & Monitoring. Insufficient logging and monitoring, coupled with missing or ineffective integration with incident response, allows attackers to further attack systems, maintain persistence, pivot to more systems, and tamper, extract, or destroy data. Most breach studies show time to detect a breach is over 200 days, typically detected by external parties rather than internal processes or monitoring.

Whereas, Staff within the Department of Energy, including those who worked directly with Lachlan Seward, Steven Chu and other top executives and at The White House have revealed the insider corruption schemes, at those offices, to Plaintiff and Plaintiff investigators.

Whereas, Plaintiff own elected Senate and Congressional representatives have had their staff arrested for spying for China and a shocking number of the companies in this scam now belong to Chinese interests via strange machinations, per CBS News, and this fact is indisputable.

Whereas, Plaintiff own elected Senate and Congressional representatives have had their staff engage the services of Fusion GPS and other spy agency-like services to attack Plaintiff and competitive adversaries who competed with their campaign financiers and this fact is indisputable.

Whereas, Silicon Valley has a "mafia-like" organization known in the news media as "*The PayPal Mafia*", AKA "*The Deep State*", AKA "*The Silicon Valley Tech Mafia*", which is known to exist by their shared communications to organize a private agenda; their shared use of the same banks, CPA's, lobbyists, corrupt tech law firms and political operatives; their shared statements of agenda at tech conferences; their shared black-lists on Venture Beat, Gust, Google Docs and "Angelgate" (Disclosed by the founder of Tech Crunch) collusion meeting venues; and FBI research. It is widely documented that member Reid Hoffman funds street riots and that boss Eric Schmidt manipulates intelligence agency resources for political and profiteering personal goals. The DOJ-produced "*Silicon Valley No Poaching*" class-action case deeply discusses this group and their collusion and these facts are indisputable.

Whereas, "*The Silicon Valley Tech Mafia*" bosses James Bronkema, Tom Perkins and members of Greylock Capital did disclose the existence of this active, organized, collusion-based "*Silicon Valley Tech Mafia*" organization, which is operating in violation of federal RICO laws, to Plaintiff and solicited their membership. Photographs of the members dressed as Mafia godfathers, to glorify their intent, and their emails and tech conference statements very clearly refer to their intent to emulate an organized crime entity. Steven Greer, a "*cover-up expert*" has multiple feature films on Netflix about a Cabal of these people setting out to control technology industries. Jeffrey Epstein was a favored member of this group. Over 10,000 news articles feature disturbing research about the actions and agenda of this group of sociopath frat boy billionaires and these facts are indisputable.

Whereas, Plaintiff own elected Senate and Congressional representatives family members have stayed at Plaintiff home and dated Plaintiff and obviously relayed deep operational information to Plaintiff about the activities of other family members and this fact is indisputable.

Whereas, Plaintiff own elected Senate and Congressional representatives have placed over \$100 Million of profits in their family bank accounts based on business investments in direct competition to Plaintiff and this fact is indisputable.

Whereas, Plaintiff properly filed Applications from 2007 forward were stalled, with-held, delayed, blocked, denied, manipulated and reprisal-distorted to revenge-punish Plaintiff for Plaintiff 2007 assistance to law enforcement in a major bribery and payola investigation involving State and Federal treasury funds and stock manipulations by Plaintiff own elected representatives and this fact is indisputable.

Whereas, Plaintiff own elected Senate and Congressional representatives engaged in a very public battle with the Central Intelligence Agency involving the hacking of each other's computers and this fact is indisputable.

Whereas, Plaintiff hired Covington and Burling, including Bruce Demming and Plaintiff associates, to describe "how it all works In Washington" and how Eric Holder and Steven Chu were placed in their positions by Covington and Burling.

Whereas, The President of The United States is currently engaged in a highly public battle with the FBI, CIA and third parties over the abuse of top spy agency and law enforcement agencies for political vendetta purposes and this fact is indisputable and proves, at the highest, level that federal agency bosses regularly use federal agency resources, such as DOE agency bosses, for harms against citizens.

Whereas, public news reports and Congressional Special Committee reports prove that previous White House staff and Plaintiff own elected Senate and Congressional representatives have engaged in tens of millions of dollars of spy agency-type harassment, defamation, opposition research, character assassination, hacking and decision manipulation using taxpayer and third-party contractor resources and this fact is indisputable.

Whereas, Jofi Joseph, and over 20 other Obama Administration officials, were whistle-blowers about activities within the Obama White House and exposed such activities voluminously on social media and in covert Google docs accounts. They, along with articles such as: <https://theintercept.com/2016/04/22/googles-remarkably-close-relationship-with-the-obama-white-house-in-two-charts/> and FBI and FTC reports revealed that fact that Google/YouTube/Alphabet/Et AI controlled and staffed most of the Obama White House. ***Google Boss Larry Page and Tesla Boss Elon Musk were co-investors, bromance boyfriends, collaborative lobbyists and had a shared agenda and controlled White House and DOE decisions.*** Google 'advised' McKinsey and Covington and Burling on the hiring for the White House and the Department of Energy with all of their friends. The Google global media control system hides any good news about Tesla's competitors, especially Plaintiff s, and authors defamation and attack videos and hit job articles and puts those attack media items at the top of all Google and Youtube search results. They openly bragged about it. (<https://truthstreammedia.com/2013/06/02/googles-regime-change-agent-jared-cohen/>). Google is a criminal empire that told the Obama White House and Department of Energy what to do!

Whereas, Plaintiff has no affiliation with any political party and Plaintiff only personal political agenda is to "end political corruption and crony capitalism via 100% legal innovation efforts".

Whereas, one of Plaintiff lawyers now works in the White House and sued DOE, and DOE and SSA staff knew of this and those staff ordered retribution holds or manipulations of Plaintiff rights and funding because they hate the current President of the United States for personal reasons as their emails, social media, voting records and events participation proves and this fact is indisputable.

Whereas, Plaintiff s, as part of a group of Plaintiff s, won a federal lawsuit against the U.S. Government and DOE proving that Plaintiff Applications for funding were manipulated by agencies infected with corruption, bias, favoritism and crony capitalism and this fact is indisputable.

Whereas, No known party within, or consulting to the U.S. Department of Energy, for Plaintiff application reviews, since 2007, is not politically opposed to any person opposing the Obama White House Administration and Plaintiff did participate in a successful lawsuit against corruption in the Obama White House and THUS each and EVERY DOE staffer who reviewed Plaintiff benefits applications was conflicted in their interests, including the DOE IG office, and unqualified to do so and this fact is indisputable.

Whereas, The IRS lost the very public legal "Lois Lerner" case which proved that the White House regularly uses its power to manipulate federal agencies in order to target those that are disliked in the public and that similar cases and IG reports have proven this across every agency and the DOE and this fact is indisputable.

Whereas, numerous Senate and White House letters on official letterhead and videos and press photography prove that Plaintiff has had a decades long relationship with White House, Department of Energy senior officials (Ranging from Warren Buffet, To Hillary Clinton, To Monica Lewinsky's hiring manager, to Mayor's of San Francisco to seated White House Vice Presidents , et al) and, thus, had adequate access to knowledge of deep operations and crimes within those offices and this fact is indisputable.

It is thus well known and proven that:

1. Plaintiff applications since 2007 were illegally stalled, with-held, delayed, blocked, denied, manipulated and reprisal-distorted to punish Plaintiff for their assistance to law enforcement in a major bribery and payola investigation involving State and Federal treasury funds and stock manipulations by Plaintiff own elected representatives and DOE staff beholden to those officials.
2. Plaintiff are Federal Witnesses and Whistle-blowers in an active, ongoing federal corruption investigation who has had their rights to a lawyer and other civil rights blocked. By blocking Plaintiff funds AND blocking their rights AND disabling Plaintiff with these attacks and subverting their access to federal Legal Services Corporation-provided legal support and by black-listing law-firms who sought to help Plaintiff s, a violation of Plaintiff State and Federal Constitutional Rights has been undertaken.
3. Operational command and control of hacking services, DOE decision procedures and practices, file manipulations, records deletions and related manipulations of Plaintiff applications are clearly proven and sourced to Plaintiff own elected Senate and Congressional representatives, DOE officials and White House staff.

Therefore:

It is demanded that Plaintiff full retroactive awards and global potential profits from their vehicle manufacturing and energy companies from 2007 forward, including damages, be provided at this time per the provided comparative calculation metrics document.

Plaintiff are seeking to settle this matter rapidly with an agreed upon financial amount to cover damages and back-monies owed but we will legally collect the funds from the DOE and federal accounts in any case. Since DOE has previously wired funds to Plaintiff projects, it should be a trivial matter to transfer those funds in order to finalize this matter.

Re: The **comparative calculation metrics**: The damages amounts in the attached report are based on fully verified, government reported values from carbon credit sales, revenues, stock market exploitation of DOE funding matters and other profit GAAP reported amounts and FBI revealed sums, from December 2008 to today, that the DOE-crony competitors and their investors made in documented profits, revenues, tax write-offs, tax waivers and other upsides that Plaintiff lost because of the corruption damages, rights blockades and reprisal attacks. Additionally, damages from benefit funds blockades, black-lists and other losses of revenue are incorporated in those standards-based, court precedent comps. Additionally, monies owed for whistle-blower and federal informant fees are calculated per industry precedents (such as the Walter T. Department of Energy whistle-blower award (<https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-hanford-whistleblower-settlement-20150813-story.html>) and the known annual budget for FBI informant payments provided to Congress in previous budget reports). Plaintiff provided the documented case evidence to federal investigators since 1986. Additionally, salary losses based on the averaged CEO salaries of the CEO of Tesla Motors, Fisker Motors, Bloom Energy, Solyndra and General Motors are included as industry standards for the energy and automotive market in the same time-frame. Additionally, standard pain and suffering inclusions are incorporated.

The filed FOIA's require that each agency provide all records of review of bias or conflict of interest, since 2007, in Plaintiff application and federal dispute processes.

The FOIA's seek all responsive records regardless of format, medium, or physical characteristics. In conducting your search, please understand the terms "records," "communications," and "documents" in their broadest sense, to include any written, typed, recorded, graphic, printed, or audio material of any kind. Plaintiff seek records of any kind, including electronic records, audiotapes, videotapes, and photographs, as well as letters, emails, facsimiles, telephone messages,

voice mail messages and transcripts, notes, or minutes of any meetings, telephone conversations or discussions. Plaintiff request includes any attachments to these records.

No category of material should be omitted from search, collection, and production. You may not exclude searches of files or emails in the personal custody of your officials, such as personal email accounts, which are known by Plaintiff investigators to have been used to attempt to avoid transparency.

Records of official business conducted using unofficial systems or stored outside of official files is subject to the Federal Records Act and FOIA. It is not adequate to rely on policies and procedures that require officials to move such information to official systems within a certain period of time; Plaintiff Office has a right to records contained in those files even if material has not yet been moved to official systems or if officials have, through negligence or willfulness, failed to meet their obligations.

Custodian searches are still required; agencies may not have direct access to files stored in .PST files, outside of network drives, in paper format, or in personal email accounts. In addition, please note that in conducting a "reasonable search" as required by law, you must employ the most up-to-date technologies and tools available, in addition to searches by individual custodians likely to have responsive information. Recent technology may have rendered the your prior FOIA practices unreasonable. In light of the government-wide requirements to manage information electronically by the end of 2016, it is no longer reasonable to rely exclusively on custodian-driven searches.

Furthermore, agencies that have adopted the NARA Capstone program, or similar policies, now maintain emails in a form that is reasonably likely to be more complete than individual custodians' files. For example, a custodian may have deleted a responsive email from Plaintiff or her email program, but the DOE's archiving tools would capture that email under Capstone. Accordingly, Plaintiff Office insists that the your offices use the most up-to-date technologies to search for responsive information and take steps to ensure that the most complete repositories of information are searched. If any potentially responsive records have been destroyed and/or transferred to other agencies or offices, such as the National Archives and Records Agency (NARA), then I request copies of the destruction or transfer slips as well as any other documentation relating to, mentioning or describing said transfer or destruction, to include but not be limited to confirmation that your offices have no other copies of said records. Under the FOIA Improvement Act of 2016, agencies must adopt a presumption of disclosure, withholding information "only if . . . disclosure would harm an interest protected by an exemption" or "disclosure is prohibited by law." If it is your position that any portion of the requested records is exempt from disclosure, please advise.

Plaintiff Office has requested that you provide an index of those documents as required under *Vaughn v. Rosen*, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974). As you are aware, a Vaughn index must describe each document claimed as exempt with sufficient specificity "to permit a reasoned judgment as to whether the material is actually exempt under FOIA." Moreover, the Vaughn index "must describe each document or portion thereof withheld, and for each withholding it must discuss the consequences of disclosing the sought-after information." Further, "the withholding agency must supply 'a relatively detailed justification, specifically identifying the reasons why a particular exemption is relevant and correlating those claims with the particular part of a withheld document to which they apply.'"

See - *Competitive Enter. Inst. v. Office of Sci. & Tech. Policy*, 827 F.3d 145, 149-50 (D.C. Cir. 2016); cf. *Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Kerry*, 844 F.3d 952, 955-56 (D.C. Cir. 2016) Id. at 8 ("The Government argues that because the agency had a policy requiring [the official] to forward all of his emails from his [personal] account to his business email, the [personal] account only contains duplicate agency records at best. Therefore, the Government claims that any hypothetical deletion of the [personal account] emails would still leave a copy of those records intact in [the official's] work email. However, policies are rarely followed to perfection by anyone. At this stage of the case, the Court cannot assume that each and every work-related email in the [personal] account was duplicated in [the official's] work email account." (citations omitted))

See- Presidential Memorandum-Managing Government Records, 76 Fed. Reg. 75,423 (Nov. 28, 2011), <http://bit.ly/2qOnSLU>; Office of Mgmt. & Budget Exec. Office of the President, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments & Independent Agencies, "Managing Government Records Directive," M-12-18 (Aug. 24, 2012), <http://bit.ly/2raBimr>

See - FOIA Improvement Act of 2016 § 2 (Pub. L. No. 114-185)

See- Founding Church of Scientology v. Bell , 603 F.2d 945, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1979)

See - King v. U.S. Dep't of Justice , 830 F.2d 210, 223-24 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (emphasis in original)

See - Id. at 224 (citing Mead Data Central, Inc. v. U.S. Dept of the Air Force , 566 F.2d 242, 251 (D.C. Cir. 1977))

In the event some portions of the requested records are properly exempt from disclosure, please disclose any reasonably segregable nonexempt portions of the requested records. If it is your position that a document contains non-exempt segments, but that those non-exempt segments are so dispersed throughout the document as to make segregation impossible, please state what portion of the document is non-exempt, and how the material is dispersed throughout the document. Claims of non-segregability must be made with the same degree of detail as required for claims of exemptions in a Vaughn index.

If a request is denied in whole, please state specifically that it is not reasonable to segregate portions of the record for release. In addition to the records requested above, Plaintiff Office also requests records describing the processing of this request, including records sufficient to identify search terms used and locations and custodians searched and any tracking sheets used to track the processing of this request.

If your offices use FOIA questionnaires or certifications completed by individual custodians or components to determine whether they possess responsive materials or to describe how they conducted searches, we also request any such records prepared in connection with the processing of this request.

You should institute a preservation hold on information responsive to this request.

Plaintiff Office intends to pursue all legal avenues to enforce its right of access under FOIA and damages recovery, including litigation and press conferences if necessary. Accordingly, your offices are on notice that litigation is reasonably possible and that Plaintiff offices have prevailed in past related federal litigation.

Where possible, please provide responsive material in electronic format by email in PDF format. Plaintiff non-political, criminal investigation, non-commercial public interest Congressional investigation and distribution group requests rolling production of these records as they are located and reviewed.

Please be aware that under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A), a FOIA request is considered constructively denied after twenty business days and is subject to an appeal on that basis.

Fee Waiver

In accordance with 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii), Plaintiff Office, and citizen complainants, request a waiver of fees associated with processing this request for records. The subject of this request concerns the operations of the federal government, and the disclosures will likely contribute to a better understanding of relevant government procedures by the general public in a significant way. Moreover, Plaintiff Office provides research to major online news organizations viewed by millions of voters and therefore we are entitled to a fee waiver on the grounds that disclosure of the information sought is in the public interest because it is likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the government and is not primarily in the commercial interest of the requester. Regardless, we are willing to pay fees for this request up to \$50 without prior approval. If you estimate that the fees will exceed this limit, please notify us first.

Expedited Processing

Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(E)(1) and 43 C.F.R. § 2.20(a)(2), Plaintiff Office requests that your office expedite the processing of this request.

Requests shall receive expedited processing when a requester demonstrates "an urgency to inform the public about an actual or alleged Federal Government activity, if made by a person who is primarily engaged in disseminating information." First, Plaintiff Office is an organization "primarily engaged in disseminating information." (finding that Plaintiff Office is a "representative of the news media" because it "gathers information of potential interest to a segment of the public, uses its editorial skills to turn the raw material into distinct work, and distributes that work to an audience.")

Plaintiff are also investigating criminal activity, for Plaintiff own litigation and law enforcement reporting, by employees and contractors of your offices, in that such activity harmed us.

See - Mead Data Central, 566 F.2d at 261

See - Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Department of Justice, 321 F. Supp. 2d 24, 29 n.5 (D.D. Cir. 200))

These records are urgently needed to inform the public about actual or alleged government activity. Specifically, Plaintiff Office contends there exists an urgency to inform the public about what matters of state that were discussed and that those disclosures are helpful to the current White House Administration and the American public in their efforts to end political corruption. The courts have found that the issue of news coverage to be especially critical in determining whether a "compelling need" exists for expedited FOIA processing. The Court have asserted that the "ultimate conclusion" with regards to expedited processing relies on important underlying facts, such as "the credibility of a claimant's allegations regarding government activity, the existence of a threat to physical safety, or whether an issue is the subject of news coverage."

Certification

The above information is true and correct to the best of Plaintiff knowledge.

Further Correspondence

To ensure that this request is properly construed, that searches are conducted in an adequate but efficient manner, and that extraneous costs are not incurred, Plaintiff Office welcomes an opportunity to discuss its request with you before you undertake your search or incur search or duplication costs. By working together at the outset, Plaintiff Office and your offices can decrease the likelihood of costly and time-consuming litigation, and public press conferences, in the future.

This matter affects every voting citizen because, if we can't get justice in America, then no voter will believe they can either. Plaintiff has made certain that every voters does know the facts of this matter via mass social media.

For additional confirmation of precedents confirming Plaintiff rights to this data, please review the following:

See - Al-Fayed v. Central Intelligence Agency, 254 F.3d 300, 306 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Al-Fayed) Id. at 308. (emphasis added)

See - : Wadelton v. Department of State, 13-0412 ESH, 2013 WL 1760853 (D.D. Cir. 2013) (Wadelton See - Id. Document 10, Filed 04/25/13, Page 6 of 8 (citing ACLU-NC v.DOD , 2006 WL 1469418, at

*1-2; Amer. Civil Liberties Union of N. Cal. v. Dep't of Justice , No. C 04-4447, 2005 WL 588354, at *5-7 (N.D. Cal Mar. 11, 2005))

See - Edmonds v. FBI , CIV.A. 02-1294 (ESH), 2002 WL 32539613 (D.D.C. Dec. 3, 2002)

See - U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(E)(v)(II)

Demand And Confirmation Of Intent:

To be clear, this is not simply a FOIA request. Many FOIA requests have already been filed.

This is a **DEMAND FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS DAMAGES PAYMENTS AND REINSTATEMENT OF BLOCKADED RIGHTS!**

THIS IS ALSO A DEMAND FOR STATE SPONSORED LEGAL COUNSEL AND FINANCIAL SERVICES SUPPORT AND/OR FOR DOJ TO TAKE ON THIS CASE AND REPRESENT Plaintiff s

Notes:

Every single person at the Department of Energy is familiar with this case, the cover-ups and Plaintiff ability to bring FBI and SEC-class investigations and punishments to bear. It is foolish for any party at DOE or DOJ to deny knowledge of this matter. Thousands of movies, newscasts, articles, FBI reports and Congressional reports cover this matter in great detail and they ALL reach the same conclusion that crimes were committed by DOE and White House staff and cover-ups are ongoing. It is a proven fact that EVERY major official and staffer at DOE is dedicated to operating a cover-up of these crimes and they intend to offer no resources or aid. They are shredding documents and deleting hard drives as fast as they can but hackers are widely known to have harvested all evidence from DOE servers years ago. Congressional IT reports confirm this. The evidence exists in the hands of third parties and often suddenly appears on Wikileaks and other repositories.

Federal, Congressional, Law enforcement and forensic experts have already begun collection/garnishment development for these funds. A settlement today will eliminate great pain and shame for EVERY person at agencies, later. Please expedite settlement proceedings for the sake of all concerned.

Due to the novel creation and construction of the Section 136 funds bank account, the government can neither move, remove, block off nor delay this effort. As you are aware, multiple Presidents and billionaires have tried to do so and none of them, from either party, could touch it, so no party should even think about trying to hide or redirect the money.

The largest number of search engine results, across the globe, on EVERY search engine, about ANY public agency have to do with the "***Department of Energy Green Corruption***". This reality will keep that legacy going for the rest of time. You can settle this now or watch what happens when millions of citizens crowd-source an anti-corruption process, 100% legally, using their home computers and cell phones. Do public officials really want their name right next to Steven Chu's black-stained profile for all of time?

Every SINGLE thing Plaintiff told DOE that was going to happen in 2008 HAS happened. The cases WERE payola. The batteries DID blow-up! Afghanistan WAS totally corrupt! Solyndra WAS a Scam! Chu DID blockade Fuel Cells to help Musk! DOE staff WERE hiding corruption plans in their private emails and text messages! The DOE servers WERE hacked over 200 times! The IBM Consulting Service WAS conducting manipulated reviews! Steve Rattner WAS a crook! Etc, etc, etc!...History and Congressional investigations have proven that DOE was wrong on 100% of the assumptions and Plaintiff has been proven 100% right.

The crimes, and the circumstances of the Plaintiff of these crimes, must be made right TODAY, or each politician, and their staff, will become what corrupt Steven Chu and indicted Eric Holder have become in the history books: ***Political Stains!*** What will the legacy be of those we are asking to resolve this be? Plaintiff asked Steven Chu that TO HIS FACE in 2009. Plaintiff all know the answer now.

If Plaintiff has to execute the garnishment taking of their funds and the shaming of each individual involved in the crimes and cover-ups, 100% legally, the headaches will last forever! Cancel culture is only a hint of it. Lawsuits are just a tiny part of it. Public shame, indictments and midnight visits from the FBI barely describe how bad it can get for the felon public agency staff that manipulate Democracy.

Some past efforts have been funded by anonymous billionaires who fund 501 C 3 and 501 C 4 charities by paying outside lawyers directly or requesting pro bono services. Steve Jobs widow and Bezo's ex wife, alone, have the financial resources to fund the largest lawsuits and private investigator teams in "*the history of the world*". There are now THOUSANDS of such activist billionaires. Plaintiff intend to go to every one, everywhere in the world, to get an anti-corruption program underway and agency offices who continue cover-ups may end up being VERY sad that they did not settle this when they could.

Do Defendants want to face that kind of legal warfare for the rest of their lives when this can all be settled, to Plaintiff satisfaction, with one check of far lower expense, TODAY?

It is a waste of taxpayer funds and resources to allow the hubris of crooked Senator's and insane Silicon Valley search engine billionaires to exacerbate this case endlessly because they are pissed off that they got caught doing crimes. Since Congress shows no interest in supporting the law, proposed by Plaintiff s, to curtail hit-jobs and collusion by billionaires, then one must assume that the opportunity to use those measures goes both ways.

This *human rights* and *legal rights* effort has been accomplished with an ad hoc CIA/FBI-type team of reporters, intelligence officers, FBI agents, lawyers, forensic researchers, AI corruption-hunting digital database engines, private investigators, inside whistle-blowers, ICIJ investigative reporters and any member of the public that wishes to join the crowd-sourced research and authoring efforts. Members of Congress helped create this effort. ANYBODY is allowed to help us. These are ad hoc common-interest parties who have assembled a forensic research team known as *The Advanced Voluntary Electronic National Group-Excellence Reinforcement Services*. Modern AI engines at Stanford, CERN and other universities hum all night long tracking down political crooks like a million XKEYSCORE (<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/XKeyscore>) DB engines on steroids. EVERY public official must ask themselves: "**What side of the chart do I want to be on when these algorithms spit out the results of every dime in all my secret accounts, anywhere on Earth, and covert stock market interests, I have transacted and taken through secret conduits, covert real estate scams and PACs**"? A large number of active FBI, CIA, DOJ, SEC and other agency personnel are supportive of Plaintiff 100% legal anti-corruption effort because they too disdain criminals operating within Plaintiff Democracy.

Plaintiffare available for any and all meetings with Senior White House, FBI, DOJ, SEC, Congressional and related agency staff who have federal "Q-Sensitive" security clearance, provided that the State has provided Plaintiff with an equitable law firm to represent him as counsel and appropriate financial representatives. Plaintiff must make certain that he is aware which side, any party who contacts him, is on. There are only two sides: 1.) *The Cover-up Operators* and 2.) *The Prosecutors*, each type proves their intent by their actions..."

The Elon Musk Example

When you peek behind the curtain in the magical fantasy technology world of Elon Musk you find that the entire emerald utopia is built out of bribes, payola and crony tech Illuminati stock market manipulations. Elon Musk's 'wizardry' is 20% other people's stolen technologies and 80% bullshit! He has purchased his internet PR facade with billions of dollars of the taxpayer's cash and keeps his self aggrandizing front going with extensive contracted off-shore troll farms and stock market "flashboy" algorithm computer hype engines.

Any tech person could do every single thing that Elon Musk has done with ONE THIRD LESS cash than Elon Musk has plowed through. So where does the rest of the money go?

It goes to political candidates in quid pro quo money laundering Dark Money conduits!

Taxpayer money taken by Tesla Motors, which politicians own interest in and also get secret PAC money from:

\$3B-CA Factory Subsidy

\$1.3B-NV tax incentive

\$45M-Discounted DOE Loan

\$90M-CA Alternative energy advanced trans. financing authority

\$517.2M-Sale of CA and other regulatory credits

\$284M-Federal income Tax credits for consumers of Model S Sedan

\$38M-CA rebate for CA buyers of Model S Sedan

\$126M-CA Self Generation incentive program

\$647,626-CA job training reimbursement

Total Subsidy=**\$5,355,847,626 BILLION AND COUNTING**

Taxpayer money taken by Elon Musk via SolarCity, which politicians own interest in and also get secret PAC money from:

\$750M-NY State cost to build solar panel factory

\$150M- to start NY Factory Operation

\$1.5B-Est. value of 30% subsidy for solar installation since 2006, including at least **\$497M**- in Treasury grants

\$5.6M-OR tax credits & rebates

\$260M- NY local property tax exemptions

Total Subsidy=**\$3,163,100,000 BILLION AND COUNTING**

Taxpayer money taken by Elon Musk via SpaceX, which politicians own interest in and also get secret PAC money from:

\$20M- TX state & local incentives & rebates for space launch facility near Brownsville

\$5.5B- Government Contracts

\$1.6B- NASA space taxi contract

Total Subsidy= **\$7,120,000,000 BILLION AND COUNTING**

[A Question for Tesla's Board: What Was Elon Musk's Mental State?](#)

By [James B. Stewart](#)

Mr. Musk's [tweet last week](#) — expressing his intent to take Tesla private and declaring that he had “funding secured” for the multibillion-dollar transaction — was so impulsive, potentially inaccurate, poorly worded and thought out, and with such potentially dire consequences for himself, Tesla and its shareholders, that the board now must ask a sensitive but vital question: What was Mr. Musk's state of mind when he wrote it?

“What does this say about the judgment of the person who set all this in motion?” said Charles M. Elson, director of the Weinberg Center for Corporate Governance at the University of Delaware.

“That's what the board has to find out.”

Read the full article [here](#)

The Bay Area Culture Of Political Corruption

A gunshot rang through the corridors of San Francisco City Hall.

A Mayor was dead and a new mayor was moved into position. The bullet that assassinated Mayor George Moscone on November 27, 1978 would lead to political corruption that would change the course of the world. Systematized political rigging had breached a new era. One of the victims of these crimes was on his way to City Hall to see the Mayor's office about a major new project. Everything changed that day.

The assassination of George Moscone was perfectly timed to place Dianne Feinstein into power as the new mayor of San Francisco and begin the next-generation of industrialized corruption on an epic scale. The new generation of corporation-backed pay-to-play was now being sponsored by the newly minted power known as *The Silicon Valley Cartel*.

As George Moscone lay dying on his desk in San Francisco, just south of there a man named John Doerr was looking at a folder that showed that his Silicon Valley "venture capitol" scheme had just broken the record at \$750 million dollars of negotiable funds that he could now control.

John Doerr, and a number of Silicon Valley venture capitalists, benefited from the death of George Moscone.

The assassination put Silicon Valley's number one crony in control of cronyism: Dianne Feinstein.

The massive number of elitist bribes paid to get the douche-bag children of the rich into Stanford University has been exposed. The Feinstein's, and their Silicon Valley VC buddies, were the biggest part of the manipulations. U.S. Sen. Dianne Feinstein's husband, University of California Regent Richard Blum, was named by the state auditor's office as one of the regents involved in admissions scandal where UC wrongly admitted dozens of wealthy, mostly white students as favors to well-connected people.

Among those "inappropriately admitted" were a student whose family was friends with a member of the Board of Regents, the child of a major donor and an applicant who babysat for a colleague of a former admissions director, according to the California State Auditor. In one case, a regent unidentified in the audit sent an "inappropriate letter of support" directly to the UC Berkeley chancellor on behalf of a student with only a 26% chance of winning a spot off the wait list, despite the policy prohibiting efforts by regents to influence admissions decisions by going around the regular process. The applicant was admitted. Auditor's spokeswoman Margarita Fernandez confirmed to The Associated Press that Blum was the regent. Blum told the San Francisco Chronicle on Thursday that he's never been caught doing anything wrong, yet, and that he has used his clout to get friends and family into the elite public system for years. This was the 98th time the Feinstein's have been charged with insider scheming and crony manipulations of public resources.

Mother Jones Magazine has published an article revealing that Bay Area tech insider Jaron Lanier was deeply involved with Jeffrey Epstein's cult. Epstein's sex director: Ghislaine Maxwell, was deeply

involved with Kleiner Perkins top money boys and was photographed at their parties as she arranged sexual deeds. Kleiner Perkins was sued by one of its top staff for sex abuses. Kleiner Perkins has long sat at the head of the table for Bay Area perversion and corruption. Tech insider Elon Musk was also involved with Jeffrey Epstein's cult and also involved with Kleiner Perkins big boys.

Kleiner Perkins was formed in 1972. It has traditionally focused on early-stage investments, but also does later-stage investments. Tom Perkins explained: *"We follow the McDonald's hamburger concept of putting playgrounds in front of burger joints: 'get 'em while they are young and you can control them for life'..."*

The savvy team at Kleiner, aka KPCB, realized that buying politicians was prudent and, in fact, necessary for the kind of financial shell-games they played. Dianne Feinstein had been one of their big bets. Kamala Harris is their "next girl". Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton would be their bigger, and most notorious plays. In a yet to be released recorded interview, Kleiner's Tom Perkin's explains his theory of quid-pro-quo with politicians. His words will make anyone shudder with fear about the fact that these types of Machiavellian billionaires actually exist. In fact, Kleiner Perkins and their festering child: Google, are all comprised of these kinds of warped, power-mad minds.

The firm was named after its four founding partners: Eugene Kleiner, Tom Perkins ("Poor people are Nazi's.."), Frank J. Caufield, and Brook Byers. Other notable members of the firm include partners John Doerr and tax evader Raymond J. Lane, as well as high-profile individuals such as Sun Microsystems co-founder Bill Joy (who joined as partner in January 2005), former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell (who joined in July 2005 in the newly created position of "strategic limited partner"), Vinod Khosla and former U.S. Vice President Al Gore, who joined as partner in November 2007[9] [10] as part of a collaboration between KPCB and Gore's firm Generation Investment Management (GIM) to promote green technology, business and policy solutions. Kleiner Perkins was, and is, the founder of the collusion group known as the Silicon Valley Cartel.

Feinstein backed Italian mobster John Molinari for the next new mayoral position. To hedge her bets, she also kept an inside deal going with candidate Roger Boas, also running for Mayor, and later indicted for racketeering and child prostitution. Molinari lost due to his connections to corruption, abuse of his daughter (Per a San Francisco Police Department report), his tenure of the Golden Gate Bridge district where embezzlement was also charged and his old-school North Beach mob connections. The Weiner-Gate and Epstein Sex Island scandals prove that under-age and twisted sex scandals are part and parcel of this crowd. All three were placed under permanent surveillance by the FBI and multi-agency task force groups.

Feinstein had a number of "bag-men" who delivered cash to her through various outlets. The Coblenz law firm was one such avenue of payola. The most notorious bag-man was James Bronkema, the head of the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce and a co-conspirator of Molinari's on the Golden Gate Bridge District Board. Bronkema received massive funds from David Rockefeller, under various trusts and hotel guises, which Bronkema relayed to Feinstein for real estate favors. Bronkema's mistress, Patricia Novak, the head of the San Francisco Fair, along with her girl friends, recall Bronkema as a tough character who threatened to "turn you into a headless body floating in San Francisco Bay" if you got on his bad side.

A testament to the Bronkema/Rockefeller/Feinstein play are the bridges that run between the

Embarcadero Center buildings, above the roads in San Francisco. Rockefeller wanted those bridges but no other San Francisco developer was allowed to have them. This was per Feinstein's machinations on behalf of her Rockefeller-ian benefactor. "She's a bitch", decried real estate developer Walter Shorenstein, "But she's Rockefeller's bitch". Both the Embarcadero Center and the Golden Gate Bridge's stand as permanent reminders of the beginning of this epoch of corruption.

Feinstein later found a new "Bag-man" named Richard Blum. His billions financed her move to the U.S. Senate with hopes of placing her in the White House. In exchange, she tripled his billions with public policy decisions that almost exclusively benefited Blum's companies.

Feinstein made a deal with Silicon Valley's Elon Musk, facilitated by Kleiner Perkins. She took a plot of land in Fremont, California which her family 1.) ran the real estate company for, 2.) the construction company for, 3.) the lobbying for, 4.) the HR firm for and 5.) other services for. The conflicts-of-interest stagger the imagination. She put Solyndra and Tesla side-by-side on that land and her family grabbed the stock market warrants and lobbying cash for both of the companies. Solyndra failed and got raided by the FBI after \$500+M of taxpayer cash went sideways. Because Barack Obama's campaign was financed by The Silicon Valley Cartel, The White House ordered AG Eric Holder and AG Loretta Lynch to shut down the further investigations of Solyndra, Tesla and the rest of the Cleantech Crash Cartel disasters. The cover-up makes Watergate pale in comparison.

Feinstein helped Cartel member Elon Musk get part of NASA shut down and then get handed the very same NASA contracts that NASA was just curtailed from doing. It was amazing quid-pro-quo. Feinstein would stop at nothing to scrape from the pig trough of state and federal cash.

The media outed Feinstein and she never made it to the White House. The internet has dubbed her: "*The most corrupt living politician in America*". While Feinstein has faded, the Silicon Valley Cartel has tripled in size and power. With payrolls of \$200 million dollars a day, Kleiner, Google and the Kleiner portfolio could order worker bee's to do a lot of damage by trolling blogs and pushing election perception manipulation. They did and they still do!

The Cartel did a study that showed that "edgy candidates like women or blacks could stand out in the media" so they jumped over to use Barack Obama, and then Hillary Clinton, for their government kick-back schemes. The campaign financing deal between the Silicon Valley tech titans goes like this: "*Silicon Valley rigs the internet and media to put you in office and you rig the government to give us insane amounts of cash, stock perks, federal contracts and monopolies*"

Kleiner Perkins created a Russian venture development group and courted the biggest mobsters in Russia. In fact, Silicon Valley's Steven Chu started handing taxpayer cash to the Russian billionaires Ener1, Severstal and other Russian mobster billionaire fronts until even Congress thought it was too overtly corrupt and shut him down. The heads of Russian Cartels were suddenly teaching The Silicon Valley Cartel a thing or two about rigging the system. Kleiner put their insider's Steven Chu, Matt Rogers, Steve Spinner, and Steve Westly in charge of the U.S. Department of Energy pay-to-play gambit with orders to get billions of U.S. taxpayer dollars shipped exclusively back to the Silicon Valley Cartel while sabotaging all of the Cartel's competitors.

For all of it's lovely gardens and tree covered lands, Stanford University is America's corruption training ground. Date rapes thrive in Stanford frat houses. Cover-ups are guaranteed to protect rich

family donors. A huge number of horrific executive sex scandals have shamed the campus over and over. China and the Middle East have poured billions of dollars of bribes into the place. The CIA runs the “*Stanford Research Institute*” program on campus. Hot young female interns that go “up-the-hill” to Sandhill Road can count on getting sexually extorted by the venture capital guys they try to work for. The majority of the “*business leaders*” from Stanford have ended up getting investigated for SEC, FCC, DOJ and FTC violations. Stanford University is where the worst-of-the-worst douche bags are formed!

The Silicon Valley Cartel gets most of their payola from skims off-the-top in investment bank scams and from stock market pump-and-dumps created by exploiting the free government money that they use to artificially hype the stock market valuations while Goldman Sachs and The Silicon Valley Cartel skim the momentary high-points on the Wall Street stock exchange.

These days, in San Francisco proper, almost every third City Hall official is under investigation for corruption. The current Mayor of San Francisco even had sex with one of the arrested goons. The FBI has been asked to pay “special attention” to the crony crime circuit of City Hall. Previous corrupt Mayor Ed Lee had a convenient heart attack at the grocery store.

Kleiner Perkins has always loved to steal federal funds under the guise of “It will help the nation”.

The green-washing “Cleantech” database deals didn’t work out so well so they moved their pitch to “Let’s stop terrorists” with Plaintiff databases. Kleiner had funded many database companies so Silicon Valley pitched Washington that all of their database companies could spy on every American and “see the future” like Tom Cruise did in the movie **Minority Report** and catch bad guys before they become bad”.

This was just a scam to try to make their wasted database internet toys stay relevant. That scam has now failed too. Silicon Valley’s “Big Data” has not only missed every single terrorist activity but it has steered law enforcement down wild goose chases and cost the consumer electronics industry a hundred billion dollars in losses because people hate being spied on. Big Data trying to accurately figure out what organic things will do is like trying to get the Amish to build nuclear reactors. The CIA has found out that you can generate lots of pretty bar graphs and flowcharts with Silicon Valley’s tools but the outcome will be nonsense that has no prudent application in real life.

The newest Silicon Valley “Please-Buy-Plaintiffs-Databases” scam is “Driverless” cars. They need databases to track and spy on all of the drivers.

NO MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC wants driverless cars but The Silicon Valley Cartel gets Obama and Hillary to give them both DOT and DOE taxpayer cash for the facade driverless car projects while they sell their lithium ion batteries, from the Afghanistan lithium fields, that they have monopolized. Great! Apple, exposed in the media in this scheme, was recently forced to cancel it’s car project which was also diving for federal handout dollars.

With modern AI-based forensics, any investigator can now see how these Silicon Valley Cartel dirty payola deals work, who did them, how the money is hidden and who the beneficiary trails lead to, in a series of articles.

Everyone in the world is now aware of the fact that John Doerr, Dianne Feinstein, Elon Musk, Larry Page and Eric Schmidt rig elections, White House decisions and the direction of the use of U.S. Treasury funds. The emails and FBI documents prove it. How long can Americans tolerate the use of 40% of their paychecks to pay for John Doerr's private jets? That remains to be seen.

The Golden Gate Bridge 50th Anniversary Bash was an extravagant party created to skim funds for the political campaigns of Roger Boas, John Molinari, Dianne Feinstein and their friends. The political crooks on the corrupt Golden Gate Bridge Board, hounded by Gene Pratt of Marin, tried to push a twenty two million dollar party that should have only cost \$200,000.00. The majority of the money was originally planned to be skimmed, payola-ed, and back-door conduit-ed, as Dark Money, to these politicians.

Roger Boas was indicted for embezzling city funds from Moscone Center and running an underage whore-house (with an SFPD official) for City Hall officials.

The Golden Gate Bridge Board was publicly shamed into canceling the scam and down-sizing to a slightly less crony operation.

John Molinari was placed under FBI watch, was charged with abuse of his daughter, who was removed from his home by the Police, and forever monitored for corruption. His offices and rentals at Van Ness and Golden Gate Avenue, in San Francisco, were bugged.

Bridge Director, James Bronkema (David Rockefeller's "bag man" on the West Coast) tried to make his mistress: Patricia Novick, the Producer of the party but that plan got outed. Bronkema and the Coblenz law firm were placed under watch for Dark Money political shenanigans.

Dick Blum was suggested as the provocateur who got Dan White to kill Harvey Milk and Mayor George Moscone in order to get Dianne Feinstein her position in government. San Francisco private investigator Paul Kangas has some theories about the whole Moscone and Feinstein mess. San Francisco lawyer Harmeet Dhillon has other theories.

The Golden Gate Bridge scandal was typical of every major project in the Bay Area.

During this period, the San Francisco oligarchs, elitists and gatekeepers who control crony capitalism in San Francisco included: Janet Reilly and Clint Reilly (who the lead characters in the House Of Cards TV series were based on); Ed Lee; John Molinari; Roger Boas; Dick Blum; Vinod Khosla; Anybody named Haas or Getty; Charlotte Maillard; Ed Shultz; Henry Kissinger; Will Hearst; Nancy Pelosi; Dianne Feinstein; Kathryn Feinstein; Scott Weiner; Darcy Brown; Stewart Brand; Joseph Costello; Carl Livingston; Henry Adams; Wally McCormick; Bob McKeen; Jean Bricker; Richard Thieriot; Wilkes Bashford; James Bronkema; William Ball; Gordon Bellis; Frances Bowers; Donna Casey; Gretchen Cebrian; Tina Cella; Lawrence Chickering; Sheldon Cooper; Charles Crocker; Edwin Cutler; Myron Du Bain; Coburn Everdell; Donna Ewald; John Gamble; William Gaylord; Richard Graff; Reid Hoffman; Ann Getty; Anthony Hale; Matilda Kunin; Wendy Linka; Mary Moulton; William Newsom; John Owsley; Bokkara Patterson; Juan Reynal; Steven Swig; Anyone named Thieriot; Wilfred Von Bulow; Michael Whitman; Brayton Wilbur; Rita Barela; John Brunelle; John Calori; William Coblenz; Joseph V. Costello; John Diefenbach; Myron Dubain; Frank Woods; Mort Feld; T. Jack Foster Jr; Gordon P Getty; James Gilleran; John Goy; Evie Haas; Bryan Hemming; John

Jacobs; Fritz Jewett; Ray Jones; George Keller; Art Kern; Bob Lansdon; Arthur Latno; Robert Leefeldt; Bob Lurie; Malcom MacDonald; Dan McCall; Wallace McCormack; Rich Miller; Elizabeth Pfau; Forette Pomeroy; David Ringle; Hadley Roff; Norman Rosenblatt; Albert Schlesinger; Steven L. Swig and a whole pack of related insiders.

Now, as they die off, the whole story can be revealed. Part of that story is based on interviews and meetings with some of them. People like Tom Perkins, James Bronkema, Roger Boas, Melvin Belli and others, ultimately regretted their crimes, or corruptions, and went on-the-record, near the end of their days.

This project's "*insurance policy*" (now posted globally in encrypted torrent files) is based, in part, on their recordings...

Why Silicon Valley CEOs are such raging psychopaths

By [Eric Spitznagel](#)



Silicon Valley has a psychopath problem -- exemplified by the bad behavior of notorious tech CEOs such as Mark Zuckerberg, Elon Musk and Elizabeth Holmes. NY Post photo composite/Mike Guillen

[Sex, drugs & start-ups: Inside Silicon Valley's doomed creative culture](https://nypost.com/2020/08/29/sex-drugs-start-ups-inside-silicon-valleys-doomed-creative-culture/) (

<https://nypost.com/2020/08/29/sex-drugs-start-ups-inside-silicon-valleys-doomed-creative-culture/>)

[Tech CEO enrolls in anti-racism school after tirade](https://nypost.com/2020/07/12/tech-ceo-enrolls-in-anti-racism-school-after-tirade/) (<https://nypost.com/2020/07/12/tech-ceo-enrolls-in-anti-racism-school-after-restaurant-tirade/>)

[Waitress speaks out on tech CEO's racist rant on Asian family](https://nypost.com/2020/07/09/ca-waitress-tells-why-she-canceled-tech-ceos-racist-rant-on-asian-family/) (<https://nypost.com/2020/07/09/ca-waitress-tells-why-she-canceled-tech-ceos-racist-rant-on-asian-family/>)

Maëlle Gavet, a 15-year veteran of the tech industry, recalls an unsettling conversation she had at a Silicon Valley cocktail party in 2017.

Gavet was chatting with an early investor at Uber and mentioned some of the disturbing news surrounding the company's co-founder and CEO, Travis Kalanick. There were revelations about spying on passengers, sexual harassment, a toxic macho work culture, and according to Kalanick's own friends, his "aspirational baller syndrome."

The investor, Gavet told The Post, just laughed and said, "Oh, no, he's so much worse than anybody knows." Gavet was nonplussed, asking the investor why he chose to do business with somebody so unrepentantly awful.

"He may be an asshole," the investor told her. "But he's my asshole."

This was just one of the many interactions that inspired Gavet to write her new book, "[Trampled by Unicorns: Big Tech's Empathy Problem and How to Fix It](https://www.amazon.com/Trampled-Unicorns-Techs-Empathy-Problem/dp/1119730643?tag=nypost-20)" (<https://www.amazon.com/Trampled-Unicorns-Techs-Empathy-Problem/dp/1119730643?tag=nypost-20>) (Wiley), out Tuesday. Though Kalanick was ousted as Uber's CEO in 2017 and stepped down from the company's board of directors earlier this year, his psychopathic behavior is all too common among Big Tech execs, Gavet writes.

Enlarge ImageUber's ex-CEO Travis Kalanick has been accused of spying on passengers and building a toxic macho work culture.NY Post composite/Mike Guillen

According to the Hare Psychopathy Checklist — the universally accepted diagnostic tool used to assess this disorder — a psychopathic personality includes traits such as a grandiose sense of self-worth, a lack of remorse or guilt, poor behavioral controls, pathological lying and a lack of empathy.

These attributes aren't just present "but celebrated in Silicon Valley," says Gavet, who once held the position of executive vice-president of global operations for Priceline Group, among other roles.

News of bad behavior by Silicon Valley CEOs — from Elon Musk's tweeting out misinformation about the pandemic to WeWork co-founder Adam Neumann now being probed by the New York state attorney general over allegations of self-dealing — has recently become so frequent, it's considered normal.

Take Theranos CEO Elizabeth Holmes, known for her eerie lack of blinking and an allegedly faked baritone voice. Once a Silicon Valley darling, she became a self-made billionaire by promising her blood-testing company would revolutionize health care with innovative finger-prick tests that delivered quick, painless, cheap results. But her claims were a lie. She now stands accused of fraud and is reportedly planning to make an insanity plea when she goes to trial this March.

Through the power of her psychopathy, Holmes convinced many — including veteran investors and politicians — “of her ‘messianic vision’ to defy reality with her ‘miracle’ blood-testing kit,” Gavet writes.

Research by the FBI found that companies managed by psychopaths tend to have decreased productivity and low employee morale. In fact, Silicon Valley’s psychopathic traits “trickle down through entire organizations,” says Gavet. “In effect creating psychopathic companies.”

Enlarge ImageWeWork co-founder Adam Neumann is being probed by the New York state attorney general over allegations of self-dealing. NY Post composite/Mike Guillen

This is enabled by an “infantilized culture” at many start-up companies, where employees become accustomed to working in “hyper-privileged bubbles where their every whim is catered to and every need anticipated,” she writes.

At Google, for instance, employees are treated to nap pods, free massages and a luxury hotel-style concierge service to run errands. The biotech firm Genentech reportedly offers perks like on-site car washes, haircuts, spa treatments and even a dentist.

“By sheltering these guys in this little cocoon or womb, it kind of emphasizes that young male problem, where Mom takes care of everything,” says Richard Walker, professor emeritus of geography at the University of California, Berkeley, and a veteran Valley-watcher. “It’s kind of magical, where food just appears, and ‘If my treat isn’t there it’s because Mom forgot to provide it!’ ”

And it’s resulted in a serious lack of empathy, writes Gavet.

In February 2018, a 61-year-old livery driver shot himself in front of City Hall in lower Manhattan, claiming he’d lost his livelihood because of competition from Uber cars. “I will forever remember the reaction of two of my friends working at Uber at the time,” says Gavet.

“During a dinner party, I asked how they felt about the suicide, and they were both like, ‘It’s sad, but it’s the cost of disruption.’ ”

It’s an excuse she’s heard repeatedly. “I can’t tell you the number of times I’ve heard people in Silicon Valley dismiss something horrible they may have caused with, ‘That’s the cost of disruption,’ ” she says. “They’re like, ‘Yeah, it’s awful, but we’re trying to make the world a better place, so it’s OK.’ ”

His legacy has cultivated an indelible association between being a jerk and a genius.

- Maëlle Gavet on Steve Jobs

While that behavior can be found in any industry, from Wall Street to mass media, Gavet says it's particularly embedded and hard to fix in tech, "because it tends to take root at the early stages of a start-up."

"The types of things I witnessed over the years include the work hard/play hard attitude, epitomized by a culture of booze-fueled partying; recklessness; the prioritizing of hyper-growth over sustainable profits; and demeaning comments about women and minorities," she writes.

The examples of it are abundant, from Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg's non-apology after the Federal Trade Commission fined his company \$5 billion for allowing Cambridge Analytica to mine user data for political purposes, to Jeff Bezos complaining during an engineer's presentation, "Why are you wasting my life?"

But some of the more glaring examples happen behind the scenes. Gavet spoke with a content moderator for Facebook, who worked for the company between 2017-2018 and looked for hate speech and graphic violence on the platform. He recalled flagging an image posted of a massacre in Southeast Asia.

Enlarge Image Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos once said to an engineer during a presentation, "Why are you wasting my life?" NY Post composite/Mike Guillen

"There was an image of a baby with somebody's foot on its chest," he said. "I had decided that was a dead baby because it wasn't fighting back." But his auditor felt otherwise, insisting there was no proof that the baby was dead, and the photo remained.

Content moderators get a quality score and every image they mistakenly flag is a ding against their score. The result can be dehumanizing, according to Gavet.

"Imagine arguing about whether a baby is dead because you don't want to get your quality score down," she says. "All you care about is getting the point back, not whether the baby is dead."

The moderator who spoke to Gavet was later diagnosed with PTSD and is now suing Facebook.

The patron saint of Big Tech douches, the one who inspired an entire generation of start-up entrepreneurs to put their worst face forward, was late Apple co-founder and CEO Steve Jobs. He disliked wearing shoes (or showering), preferred parking in handicapped parking spots and once motivated employees by calling them "f--king d--kless assholes."

"His legacy has cultivated an indelible association between being a jerk and a genius," writes Gavet. "Which has ballooned to the point where many people believe that a founder-CEO, in particular, actually has to be a jerk to be a genius."

She calls it the Steve Jobs Syndrome, and she's witnessed both powerful and up-and-coming tech exes believing in the myth like it's doctrine. Theranos CEO Holmes ruthlessly copied Jobs — not just by wearing black turtlenecks — but also by following his example of persuading people "to believe he was a prophet even when he was wrong," Gavet writes.

Enlarge Image
Late Apple CEO Steve Jobs preferred parking in handicapped parking spots and once motivated employees by calling them “f–king d–kless assholes.” NY Post composite/Mike Guillen

Gavet recalls working with a high-profile tech founder — she was overseeing the company’s acquisitions — and “every time I called him out on his lack of empathy and humility, which clearly led to many disastrous decisions, he would say to me, ‘Steve Jobs didn’t build Apple by being humble and caring about people.’”

These myths wouldn’t survive if the CEOs alone believed them. Former WeWork CEO Neumann was celebrated in the media for his audacious leadership style — from barefoot strolls through Manhattan to offering his employees tequila shots and Run DMC concerts in the office.

But Neumann’s success was a mirage. “He made millions leasing buildings he partly owned back to WeWork,” Gavet writes. He also bought the trademark to the word “we” and then sold the trademark use to WeWork, his own company, for \$5.9 million.

After initially being valued at \$47 billion in January 2019, WeWork’s worth reportedly dropped to \$10 billion in September that same year. But when Neumann stepped down as CEO, he was paid \$185 million as a “consulting fee.”

Neumann isn’t the only CEO who’s been rewarded for actively making things worse for investors. In early May, Tesla CEO Musk tweeted, “Tesla stock price is too high, IMO.” Within an hour of his tweet, the Tesla share price plummeted 10 percent, wiping \$14 billion off the company’s stock market value. One investor tweeted back at Musk, “Dude ... I just lost \$10k because of this tweet. Wtf is wrong with U?”

Not only is Musk still Tesla’s CEO, but his net worth also jumped this summer to \$103 billion, up from \$22.4 billion last year, making him the third-richest person in the world.

Enlarge Image

For anything to change, Gavet argues that companies need to take a more empathetic approach.

“They need to hire differently, promote differently, reward differently,” she says. “I’m an optimist, but I’m also a capitalist. I believe there are ways to make a company more empathetic, more reasonable, a force of good in the world. And I believe in the long run, that would actually be beneficial for the businesses.”

She sees evidence of it happening already. Tim Bray, a celebrated engineer at Amazon and their onetime vice president of Web Services, quit his job in May because of the “toxicity running through the company culture,” as he wrote in a blog post.

“I choose neither to serve nor drink that poison,” he wrote.

Bray isn’t alone in recognizing the toxic culture, but many are unsure how to take a stand.

“Some of the CEOs I’m close to — and I still think they are, to a large extent, psychopaths — they’re struggling,” says Gavet. “They tell me, ‘It feels like I’m damned if I do, damned if I don’t.’ They get

criticized for being too aggressive, but when they try to be empathetic, they're criticized for being too soft."

The trend of psychopathy at the top of Big Tech won't be "disrupted," Gavet says, until we stop expecting the next Steve Jobs to be as abrasive and psychotic as, well ... Steve Jobs.

[Joel B. Pollak notes](#) that former Vice President Joe Biden promised earlier this month that his climate change policies will bring new jobs — "good, paying union jobs." He has made — and broken such promises before.

In 2009, Biden [promised](#) (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5g_6TYULxMg) that \$529 million in new Department of Energy loan guarantees to Fisker Automotive to produce electric cars in Delaware would provide "billions of dollars in good, new jobs." Four years later, Fisker filed for bankruptcy — without producing a single car in the U.S.

As Breitbart News [reported](#) (<https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2013/11/23/obama-admin-picks-green-energy-loser/>) at the time, Fisker was granted the loan guarantees to produce a hybrid sports car called the "Karma" for the luxury auto market, with a price of \$103,000. High-profile political figures lobbied for the deal. Fisker filed for bankruptcy failed in 2013 and taxpayers lost \$139 million on the venture. Republicans noted: "The jobs that were promised never materialized and once again tax payers are on the hook for the administration's reckless gamble."

Along with failed solar panel manufacturer [Solyndra](#) (<https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2011/09/19/solyndra-scandal-hits-obama-white-house/>), Fisker was one of the highest-profile failures of the stimulus, which Biden [oversaw](#) (<https://www.npr.org/2020/04/06/828303824/a-look-back-at-how-joe-biden-managed-the-2009-stimulus-package>), and which he has touted on the campaign trail as proof of his ability to handle America's economic recovery.

Moreover, Vice President Biden admitted pushing for Fisker to build its new "Karma" plant in his home state of Delaware.

As the *Wall Street Journal* [reported](#) (<https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB126074549073889853>): "A spokeswoman for Mr. Biden said that he had made no direct appeals to DOE [Department of Energy] on Fisker's behalf before the loan was approved, though he did talk to the company several times afterward to put in a plug for his home state."

The Delaware site, an old GM plant, was located across the continent from Fisker's corporate headquarters in Southern California.

The *Washington Post* [noted](#) (https://www.washingtonpost.com/cars/fisker-an-influential-disaster/2013/04/05/a7438a0a-9e21-11e2-9219-51eb8387e8f1_story.html) :

Even current Vice President Joe Biden was drawn into the Fisker debacle. To build its planned Project Nina vehicle—to be dubbed the Atlantic—Fisker maneuvered itself into a

purchase of a former GM plant in Wilmington, Del., that had once built the smart Pontiac Solstice and Saturn Sky roadsters. The plant was one of many properties split off during GM's 2009 bankruptcy filing, and was to be sold as a part of the "old GM." While the plant had some physical advantages of being near a port, it had several big disadvantages—namely, it was a world away from Fisker's U.S. headquarters in California, needed expensive retooling, was far too large for the task at hand, and was ostensibly more expensive to retrofit than some other "old GM" properties, such as Doraville, the suburban Atlanta plant that once built GM minivans.

The Wilmington plant did have the huge advantage of lying in Vice President Biden's backyard. Lobbying by all local politicians is said to have won the day for the Wilmington plant, but like much of Fisker's financial history, the details are blocked from view. [Vice President Biden would not respond directly to questions about Fisker posed by ABC News](http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/fisker-build-electric-cars-us/story?id=16458585#.UAY9T7TY8rV), (<http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/fisker-build-electric-cars-us/story?id=16458585#.UAY9T7TY8rV>) his office insisting only that he supported the ATVM [Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing] program—but failing to address how a site from his hometown was given a Federally-backed reprieve.

As the left-wing *Nation* later [noted](https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/biden-delaware-way-graft/) (<https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/biden-delaware-way-graft/>), the new Fisker facility was less than five miles from Joe Biden's Delaware home.

Biden proudly [announced](https://www.energy.gov/articles/vice-president-biden-announces-reopening-former-gm-boxwood-plant) (<https://www.energy.gov/articles/vice-president-biden-announces-reopening-former-gm-boxwood-plant>) the deal in 2009: "We knew that we needed to do something different – in Delaware and all across the nation." He [declared](https://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/car-company-us-loan-builds-cars-finland/story?id=14770875) (<https://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/car-company-us-loan-builds-cars-finland/story?id=14770875>): "We're making a bet on the future, we're making a bet on the American people, we're making a bet on the market, we're making a bet on innovation." When Fisker won the loan, Biden [celebrated](https://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/car-company-us-loan-builds-cars-finland/story?id=14770875) (<https://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/car-company-us-loan-builds-cars-finland/story?id=14770875>): "The story of Fisker is a story of ingenuity of an American company, a commitment to innovation by the U.S. government and the perseverance of the American auto industry." He [proclaimed](https://investigativeresearchcenter.org/hunter-biden-listed-as-fisker-creditor-raising-questions-about-green-energy-boondoggle/) (<https://investigativeresearchcenter.org/hunter-biden-listed-as-fisker-creditor-raising-questions-about-green-energy-boondoggle/>): "This is seed money that will return back to the American consumer in billions and billions and billions of dollars in good, new jobs."

It was a pledge that would be [described](https://www.canadianbusiness.com/companies-and-industries/the-ode-fisker-automotive-2007-2013/) (<https://www.canadianbusiness.com/companies-and-industries/the-ode-fisker-automotive-2007-2013/>), in retrospect, as "delusional."

Fisker produced exactly [zero](https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=KAyc-8qGpv0) (https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=KAyc-8qGpv0) cars in the U.S. Instead, it [produced](https://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/car-company-us-loan-builds-cars-finland/story?id=14770875) (<https://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/car-company-us-loan-builds-cars-finland/story?id=14770875>) its first cars in Finland. In addition to the losses for the federal taxpayer, Delaware had [committed](https://why.org/articles/delawares-hope-for-fisker-rests-with-chinese-billionaire/) (<https://why.org/articles/delawares-hope-for-fisker-rests-with-chinese-billionaire/>) over \$20 million to the deal by the time the company filed for bankruptcy in 2013.

Biden learned nothing from the Fisker fiasco. In his climate speech, he promised once again to promote electric vehicles, saying he would [deliver](https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/joe-biden-climate-change-speech-transcript-september-14) (<https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/joe-biden-climate-change-speech-transcript-september-14>) “more than a million new jobs in the American auto industry.”

We have heard such promises before... The politicians turned out to have lied in order to profit on insider trading.

(See more in next revision...)

Running The Scams

The public must continue to terminate these felony organized crimes by major public officials and Silicon Valley oligarch tech mobsters! (<https://www.breitbart.com/tech/2020/08/31/deleted-big-techs-battle-erase-trump-movement-steal-election/>)

Taxpayers must use the internet to publicly shame them! The public must boycott their companies and crash their stock! Voters must demand their arrests and indictments. Citizens must join together in one voice to make it illegal for politicians to own stock because that is how bribes are now paid! (<https://www.yahoo.com/lifestyle/insider-trading-rife-no-regulators-090007170.html>)

State and federal officials defrauded citizens out of millions of dollars of their life-savings and then attacked those taxpayers for reporting the crimes! those officials then put the profits and stock market funds from those crimes in their own, and their families, corrupt monopoly pockets! (<https://www.msn.com/en-us/money/markets/monopoly-power-lies-behind-worst-trends-in-us-fed-study-says/ar-BB186Jq0?ocid=uxbndlbing>)

Their attacks against individuals were their downfall. FBI-class forensic evidence has shown that there were only a few people who could have operated, financed and run command-and-control of the attacks. The money, the bribes, the beneficiary profit tracings, the instructions, their covert communications, the stock market owner-ships, etc.; all trace back to the same handful of people who are all business and political manipulation partners. Their attacks boomeranged back to point straight at the attackers! The evidence is clear!

It seems like the stonewalling never ends. Famous California and Washington DC politicians ran these crimes along with big tech oligarchs!

Huge cover-ups (<https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6827837-States-Newsroom-1023-Application-Materials.html>) are underway but they will never be allowed to get away with it! they are being exposed by these crowd-sourced investigations that use 100% legal law enforcement and intelligence technologies !

U.S. Government Proves That Rogue CIA And FBI Agents Exist And Use Government Agencies For Revenge Hit Jobs; Just As Plaintiff Asserted When Plaintiff Proved SSA, DOJ, DOE Agencies Found To Run Vendettas On Citizens Who Spoke Up About Corruption - Durham Case! (<https://townhall.com/tipsheet/katiepavlich/2020/08/14/breaking-the-first-durham-indictment-is-here-n2574370>)

Jeffrey Epstein is dead, *Raj gupta* has been jailed, *Steve Rattner* was indicted, *James Bronkema* is dead, *Roger Boas* is dead....but those were just the *tip of the ice-berg*. *Eric Schmidt*, *Larry Page*, *Elon Musk* and their crooked senators are still running around doing the same old crimes and corruption via their network of dirty tricks operatives.

In one of the whistle-blower complaints about State and Federal officials conduct in stimulus programs, Plaintiff made repeated attempts to inform executive leadership and legal advisers about questionable activities of those officials. Plaintiff has all of the needed additional evidence to back up their allegations against these officials.

Concerned parties have been blocked from reporting the activity to Offices of Legal Affairs, in violation of the law. In retribution, A number of parties had tax-payer financed revenge programs launched against them using State and Federal resources. Plaintiff directly witnessed much of the behavior and reported it, personally, to the FBI at their offices. Plaintiff has made top law enforcement and intelligence officials aware of these concerns on repeated occasions. To Plaintiff knowledge, none of the agencies ever took action to resolve the issues, and several of them specifically directed subordinate staff to continue facilitating questionable activities after the concerns were raised. Plaintiff witnessed the concerning activities in Washington, D.C., New York, California and in activities with overseas parties.

White House Staff including Rahm Emanuel, Bill Daley, Jay Carney, Robert Gibbs, Steve Rattner, David Axelrod, John Podesta, et al; and The Secretary of Energy Steven Chu and the Chief Counsel for the United States Department of Energy Daniel Cohen and Bill Cooper were, (from 2007 forward), either financed by, friends, with, sleeping with, dating the staff of, holding stock market assets in, promised a revolving door job or government service contracts from, partying with, personal friends with, photographed at private events with, exchanging emails with, business associates of or directed by; Plaintiff business adversaries, or the Senators and Department of Energy politicians that those business adversaries pay campaign finances to, or supply political digital search manipulation services to. Criminal U.S. Senators coordinated and profited in these schemes. Their own family members have now supplied evidence against them. Nobody is allowed to "win" government funds ***unless*** they are friends and stock market partners with certain U.S. Senators. Even if your application metrics beat every single other competing Applicant, you will get lied to and defrauded by Department of Energy and White House officials. You will be told that you have a "*fair chance*", **but** all of the money is secretly hard-wired to a business partner of a Pelosi or Feinstein and you will just waste your time, staff resources and payroll waiting for years on promised funds that will never come.

From 2007 forward, The White House and The Department Of Energy were controlled by the Silicon Valley tech oligarchs for monopolistic profiteering! (ie: You could not swing a cat in the Obama White House without hitting a Google executive or an ex-lover of Eric Schmidt) That is a violation of the law, the Constitution and the American Way.

SEE THIS REPORT TO CONGRESS:

[How Google Controls Government Policy And Process In America FREE.pdf](http://american-corruption.com/How%20Google%20Controls%20Government%20Policy%20And%20Process%20In%20America%20FREE.pdf)

(<http://american-corruption.com/How%20Google%20Controls%20Government%20Policy%20And%20Process%20In%20America%20FREE.pdf>)

GOGGLE HAS BRIBED EVERY POLITICIAN; HOW DO THEY GET AWAY WITH SUCH CORRUPTION?..." (<https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/the-conservative-inc-to-big-tech-pipeline/>)

The Silicon Valley High-Tech Black-Listing Antitrust Litigation And Big Tech's Attacks On Democracy

*"...Who are the criminal mobsters of Silicon Valley's democracy manipulation millionaires and billionaires known as "The Commission" (Also known as "The Paypal Mafia", The "Deep State", "The Silicon Valley Cartel")? Who are the elitist tax evader, sex freak, money-laundering, **black-list** (<https://www.mediaite.com/news/ex-google-engineer-says-glitch-blocking-websites-including-drudge-breitbart-could-have-revealed-a-mysterious-list/>)operating, Senator bribing, off-shore cash hiding, election rigging insiders who manipulate the system for their own insider trading schemes: Reid Hoffman, Larry Page, Sergy Brin, Elon Musk, Dustin Moskovitz, Mark Zuckerberg, Eric Schmidt, Laurene Powell Jobs, Steve Spinner, Steve Westly, Vinod Khosla, Andy Bechtolsheim, Brian Goncher, Cheryl Sandberg, David Drummond, Andy Rubin, David Plouffe, Tim Draper, Jeffrey Epstein, Gilman Louie, Ira Ehrenpreis, Tim Cook, McKinsey Consulting, Deloitte, Goldman Sachs, Jerry Brown, Richard Blum, James Breyer, John Podesta, Joe Lonsdale, John Doerr, Keith Rabois, Marc Andreessen, George Soros, Mario Rosatti, Martin LaGod, Michael Moritz, Viktor Vekselberg, Larry Summers, Pierre Omidyar, Tom Steyer, Steve Jurvetson, Steve Rattner and their CARTEL including their crooked lawyers and lobbyist mobs! They have "command and control and exclusive-beneficiary positions in ongoing, coordinated, criminal and anti-trust activities involving government and stock market funds...". Their crimes financially benefited Dianne Feinstein, Nancy Pelosi, Jerry Brown, Kamala Harris and Barack Obama and their stock market holdings, while harming their competitors on purpose. The securities and stock market records prove that it was crony corruption and payola. The sex crime victims of Cartel member [Jeffrey Epstein](https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-8639501/Bill-Clinton-smiles-receiving-neck-massage-Jeffrey-Epstein-victim.html) (<https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-8639501/Bill-Clinton-smiles-receiving-neck-massage-Jeffrey-Epstein-victim.html>) reported him to the DOJ a decade ago, yet nothing was done. Plaintiff reported this Cartel in 2008, STILL, nothing has been done! These people have run a stock market and government funding State and Federal PONZI SCHEME in every "stimulus" from 2008 forward! They use free government money, stock valuation pump-and-dump and black-lists to make certain that no competitor can ever operate against them in any market. The more that the California Senators get to control Congress, the more they get to push laws that benefit companies owned by their spouses! By filling California up with illegal immigrants, enticed by the offer of "free stuff", Dianne and Nancy get to control federal policy by manipulating the census numbers. By controlling government decisions, Nancy and Dianne get to give taxpayer money to their friends (Elon Musk, Eric Schmidt, Mark Zuckerberg, etc, who they own stock with) and deny that money to their competitors. They have a covert news and media network (<https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2020/05/dark-money-networks-fake-news-sites/>) that hides all news*

coverage about the crimes. Illegal immigrants equal control of the stock market profits for Nancy's, Kamala's and Dianne's investment banker husbands. It is as simple as that!..."

HOW THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND CALIFORNIA SENATORS CREATED THE LARGEST INSIDER TRADING SCHEME IN HISTORY

Companies in PR-hype industries sometimes have a history of [reinventing themselves](https://www.ft.com/content/8c46ff08-5522-469e-bc6c-4be08cdf9828) (<https://www.ft.com/content/8c46ff08-5522-469e-bc6c-4be08cdf9828>). For Tesla Motors and Solyndra the potential transition from start-up to future energy monopoly was being facilitated by the government. Now Kodak has copied this corruption scam. The **U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE)** [signed a letter of interest](https://www.dfc.gov/media/press-releases/dfc-sign-letter-interest-investment-kodaks-expansion-pharmaceuticals) (<https://www.dfc.gov/media/press-releases/dfc-sign-letter-interest-investment-kodaks-expansion-pharmaceuticals>) to provide hundreds of millions in favored-nation 'loans' to them to support the company's plans to produce green energy things for the U.S. domestic market. Thereafter, a series of ensuing events raised concerns about potentially illegal insider trading, and of an uneven level playing field for investors in U.S. stock markets. The immediate response by U.S. Congress was to investigate. The new KODAK Covid loan is the same kind of crime, which insiders learned they could get away with in the Obama **U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY**.

Whether the suspicious trading activity is a case of illegal insider trading activity is difficult to judge without further scrutiny by prosecutors. However, these new types of substantial loans from the government to private companies give rise to a new type of private information. While traditional corporate events, such as earnings announcements or corporate takeovers, are subject to strict rules about the disclosure of information and reporting requirements, it appears that the disbursement of government subsidies and grants falls into a grey area not effectively covered by existing rules. Thus, it is necessary to consider more transparent and consistent protocols on information disclosure to avoid providing unfair advantages to a select group of company insiders including California Senators and Energy Department staff.

Just one day before the official announcement of the loan, on July 27, Kodak's stock price jumped by about 25 percent on a trading volume of 1,645,719 shares, over five times the average daily trading volume in prior months. These unusual trading activities were likely [attributable to the premature release of the news by several media outlets](https://www.wsj.com/articles/tweets-and-articles-sent-kodak-shares-surg-ing-before-official-announcement-11596056729). (<https://www.wsj.com/articles/tweets-and-articles-sent-kodak-shares-surg-ing-before-official-announcement-11596056729>)

Unusual trading activity also occurred in Kodak's stock options, even prior to the news leakage. The trading volume was especially strong in out-of-the-money (OTM) call options, which are set to profit especially from a positive jump in stock prices, with daily trading volumes of all OTM call options on July 17, 20 and 27 that was more than ten times larger than average volumes since the beginning of 2020.

Kodak's executives and board members are also linked to controversial transactions. About one month before the announcement, on June 23, the company's executive chair and a director [purchased over 50,000 shares](https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?) (<https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?>

action=getcompany&CIK=0000031235&type=4) of the company's stock a day during the time when the company was negotiating loans with the government. In addition, four executives were [granted stock options right on July 27](#), (<https://www.wsj.com/articles/kodaks-stock-surge-turned-insiders-options-into-potential-windfall-11596220862>) just one day before the stock price skyrocketed. Prior to another major stock price drop, due to a freezing of the Kodak loan associated with the congressional investigation, a board [member donated \\$116 million](#) (<https://www.ft.com/content/6e7494c4-56cd-4121-8027-ecfc9586958c>) in company shares, entitling the donors to a substantial tax deduction.

These events have alerted legislators and raised concerns that trades of investors may explain the suspicious activity with access to material non-public information. On August 3, Sen. [Elizabeth Warren](#) (D-Mass.) formally [requested the Securities and Exchange Commission \(SEC - <https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2020.08.03%20Letter%20to%20SEC%20re%20Kodak%20stock%20trades.pdf>\)](#) to [investigate](#) the possibility of insider trading and violation of regulatory compliance rules. Two House committee chairs also launched their own inquiries, [requesting detailed records](#) from the loan provider, DFC. (https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/2020.08.04_h_cmtes_ltr_to_dfc.pdf)

Besides these valid outcries due to concerns about the potential for illegal insider trading, this turn of events raises a question of broad public interest. Why was the usual protocol for the enforcement of news disclosure and insider trading regulations around corporate events not followed in this case? The announcement of the government-sponsored Kodak loan is no different from traditional corporate events, such as earnings disclosures, announcements of mergers and acquisitions, spinoffs, or new product announcements. It also involves secret negotiations in executive offices that give rise to the potential for trading on privileged information.

In the Kodak case, the private information was indeed material. The \$765 million government loan it received amounts to 54 percent of the company's total assets, 78 percent of its annual revenue, and is 64 times larger than its annual operating cash flows, according to its [most recent 10-K filing](#). (https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/31235/000156459020011408/kodk-10k_20191231.htm) It is not surprising that such news boosted the stock price from about \$2 to \$60 in a matter of days. Another related issue is that the DFC and Kodak did not release the news at the same time. This lack of consistency in information disclosure makes it difficult to pinpoint when the information was publicly available.

The Kodak experience was not unique. The [massive monetary and fiscal interventions](#) (<https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19>) that have been announced in the U.S., Europe and elsewhere are likely to lead to similar types of sensitive news releases. The difference with respect to more traditional corporate announcements is that the government has a seat at the table. U.S. officials and their counterparts elsewhere are picking winners and losers in the disbursement of grants, loans and contracts. Thus, a new source of privileged information has emerged that raises the possibility that insiders may well profit from possession of such information before it is released to the market.

In the Department of Energy Cleantech Crash political payola quid pro quo, government money was used by Goldman Sachs and their clients for the following scams, EVERY SINGLE ONE OF WHICH was used in the Dept of Energy ATVM AND LGP funds manipulations.

The Bribes Using The Stock Market:

Every One of these [financial scam tricks](#) (https://www.sec.gov/files/Algo_Trading_Report_2020.pdf) is used **daily** by the suspects in this case:

**** The Silicon Valley Stock Scam Called: "Pools"**

Agreements, often written, among a group of traders to delegate authority to a single manager to trade in a specific stock for a specific period of time and then to share in the resulting profits or losses." [5] In Australia section 1041B prohibits pooling. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Market_manipulation#cite_note-5)

**** The Silicon Valley Stock Scam Called: "Churning"**

When a trader places both buy and sell orders at about the same price. The increase in activity is intended to attract additional investors, and increase the price.

**** The Silicon Valley Stock Scam Called: "Stock bashing"**

This scheme is usually orchestrated by savvy online message board posters (a.k.a. "Bashers") who make up false and/or misleading information about the target company in an attempt to get shares for a cheaper price. This activity, in most cases, is conducted by posting libelous posts on multiple public forums. The perpetrators sometimes work directly for unscrupulous Investor Relations firms who have convertible notes that convert for more shares the lower the bid or ask price is; thus the lower these Bashers can drive a stock price down by trying to convince shareholders they have bought a worthless security, the more shares the Investor Relations firm receives as compensation. Immediately after the stock conversion is complete and shares are issued to the Investor Relations firm, consultant, attorney or similar party, the basher/s then become friends of the company and move quickly to ensure they profit on a classic Pump & Dump scheme to liquidate their ill-gotten shares. (see P&D)

**** The Silicon Valley Stock Scam Called: "Pump and dump"**

A [pump and dump](#) scheme is generally part of a more complex grand plan of market manipulation on the targeted security. The Perpetrators (Usually stock promoters) convince company affiliates and large position non-affiliates to release shares into a free trading status as "Payment" for services for promoting the security. Instead of putting out legitimate information about a company the promoter sends out bogus e-mails (the "Pump") to millions of unsophisticated investors (Sometimes called "Retail Investors") in an attempt to drive the price of the stock and volume to higher points. After they

accomplish both, the promoter sells their shares (the "Dump") and the stock price falls, taking all the duped investors' money with it.

**** The Silicon Valley Stock Scam Called: "Runs"**

When a group of traders create activity or rumours in order to drive the price of a security up. An example is the [Guinness share-trading fraud](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guinness_share-trading_fraud) of the 1980s. In the US, this activity is usually referred to as *painting the tape*.^[6] Runs may also occur when trader(s) are attempting to drive the price of a certain share down, although this is rare. (see Stock Bashing) (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guinness_share-trading_fraud)

**** The Silicon Valley Stock Scam Called: "Ramping (the market)"**

Actions designed to artificially raise the market price of listed securities and give the impression of voluminous trading in order to make a quick profit.^[7] (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Market_manipulation#cite_note-7)

**** The Silicon Valley Stock Scam Called: "Wash trade"**

In a [wash trade](#) the manipulator sells and repurchases the same or substantially the same security for the purpose of generating activity and increasing the price.

**** The Silicon Valley Stock Scam Called: "Bear raid"**

In a [bear raid](#) there is an attempt to push the price of a stock down by heavy selling or [short selling](#).^[8] (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Market_manipulation#cite_note-8)

**** The Silicon Valley Stock Scam Called: "Lure and Squeeze"**

This works with a company that is very [distressed on paper](#), with impossibly high debt, consistently high annual losses but very few assets, making it look as if bankruptcy must be imminent. The stock price gradually falls as people new to the stock short it on the basis of the poor outlook for the company, until the number of shorted shares greatly exceeds the total number of shares that are not held by those aware of the lure and squeeze scheme (call them "people in the know"). In the meantime, people in the know increasingly purchase the stock as it drops to lower and lower prices. When the short interest has reached a maximum, the company announces it has made a deal with its creditors to settle its loans in exchange for shares of stock (or some similar kind of arrangement that leverages the stock price to benefit the company), knowing that those who have short positions will be squeezed as the price of the stock sky-rockets. Near its peak price, people in the know start to sell, and the price gradually falls back down again for the cycle to repeat.

**** The Silicon Valley Stock Scam Called: "Quote stuffing"**

[Quote stuffing](#) is made possible by high-frequency trading programs that can execute market actions with incredible speed. However, high-frequency trading in and of itself is not illegal. The tactic

involves using specialized, high-bandwidth hardware to quickly enter and withdraw large quantities of orders in an attempt to flood the market, thereby gaining an advantage over slower market participants. [9] (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Market_manipulation#cite_note-9)

**** The Silicon Valley Stock Scam Called: "Cross-Product Manipulation"**

A type of manipulation possible when financial instruments are settled based on [benchmarks](#) set by the trading of physical commodities, for example in United States Natural Gas Markets. The manipulator takes a large [long \(short\) financial position](#) that will benefit from the benchmark settling at a higher (lower) price, then trades in the physical commodity markets at such a large volume as to influence the benchmark price in the direction that will benefit their financial position.

**** The Silicon Valley Stock Scam Called: "Spoofing (finance)"**

[Spoofing](#) is a disruptive algorithmic trading entity employed by traders to outpace other market participants and to manipulate commodity markets. Spoofers feign interest in trading futures, stocks and other products in financial markets creating an illusion of exchange pessimism in the futures market when many offers are being cancelled or withdrawn, or false optimism or demand when many offers are being placed in bad faith. Spoofers bid or offer with intent to cancel before the orders are filled. The flurry of activity around the buy or sell orders is intended to attract other [high-frequency traders](#) (HFT) to induce a particular market reaction such as manipulating the market price of a security. Spoofing can be a factor in the rise and fall of the price of shares and can be very profitable to the spoofer who can time buying and selling based on this manipulation.

**** The Silicon Valley Stock Scam Called: "Price-Fixing"**

A very simple type of fraud where the principles who publish a price or indicator conspire to set it falsely and benefit their own interests. [The Libor scandal](#) for example, involved bankers setting the [Libor](#) rate to benefit their trader's portfolios or to make certain entities appear more creditworthy than they were.

**** The Silicon Valley Stock Scam Called: "High Closing (finance)"**

High closing is an attempt to manipulate the price of a security at the end of trading day to ensure that it closes higher than it should. This is usually achieved by putting in manipulative trades close to closing.

**** The Silicon Valley Stock Scam Called: "Cornering the market"**

In [cornering the market](#) the manipulators buy sufficiently large amount of a commodity so they can control the price creating in effect a [monopoly](#). For example, the brothers [Nelson Bunker Hunt](#) and [William Herbert Hunt](#) attempted to corner the world [silver](#) markets in the late 1970s and early 1980s, at one stage holding the rights to more than half of the world's deliverable silver.[10] (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Market_manipulation#cite_note-TEXAS-10) During the Hunts' accumulation of the precious metal, silver prices rose from \$11 an ounce in September 1979 to nearly

\$50 an ounce in January 1980.[11] (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Market_manipulation#cite_note-NYT-11) Silver prices ultimately collapsed to below \$11 an ounce two months later,[11] much of the fall occurring on a single day now known as [Silver Thursday](#), due to changes made to exchange rules regarding the purchase of commodities on margin.[12] (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Market_manipulation#cite_note-TimeBubble-12)

**** The Silicon Valley Stock Scam Called: "*The Conduit Double Blind*"**

In this scam, government money is given to a Tesla, Solyndra, etc. who then money launder the cash through executive-held 501 c3 and c4 charities; and company assets and then provide **DARK MONEY** cash and services to political campaigns like Obama and Clinton election funds. In the case of Tesla, Google (an investor and boyfriend of Musk) supplied billions of dollars of web search rigging. Stock ownership in the companies and deals is traded for campaign funds. David Brock is a master of this kind of Dark Money money-laundering for political campaigns using PACS and pass-through spoofing.

Tesla and Solyndra investors have used ALL of the above tactics and more. Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan have thousands of staff who PROVIDE these stock market manipulation tricks to people like Elon Musk, Larry Page, Eric Schmidt, et al. These kinds of financial crimes and corruption account for the manipulation of over **ONE TRILLION DOLLARS** of ill-gotten profits annually!

Given the massive stimulus packages that are in force today and expected to be implemented going forward, regulators need to set clear guidelines for how and when such privileged information can be disclosed, and impose rigorous trading restrictions for investors with access to private information. Failure to do so always gives unfair advantage to some and damages the level playing field in financial markets.

To avoid providing such unfair advantage to selected executives, the SEC and the Department of Justice need to develop new procedures to incorporate potential illegal transactions derived from information about government intervention through diverse channels. Plaintiff advocate for a more transparent and consistent protocol on information disclosure regarding government's loan programs to prevent similar events from recurring. For example, the government could channel the release of news about COVID-19-related stimulus interventions through a common platform to prevent leakage from diverse sources and reduce information asymmetry among investors.

The DFC loan to Kodak is the first of its kind under the Defense Production Act but not the first ever because DOE already created the pump-and-dump scheme for tech oligarchs. Nobody should be surprised by Kodak trying a proven corruption scam. Since we are in unprecedented times, government agencies and regulators need to make changes to adapt to the current situation and fulfill their mission to ensure a level playing field for investors even during this difficult period. Regulation never happens in these scams because most California Senators and their families profit from these crimes and corruption.

These parties, above, are the crooks under deep surveillance by the public and targeted for 100% legal termination and exposure. Federal agencies and citizen sleuths are asked to fully prosecute them! San Francisco and Silicon Valley can't go bankrupt fast enough to make everyone happy about the downfall of these corrupt empires! these people are the dark core of the entity known as "*The Deep State*", aka, "*The Commission*", aka, "*The Silicon Valley Mafia*", aka "*The Paypal Mafia*", et al.

Most of the people listed above paid and/or took bribes!

There are over 320 million people in America and the handful of people listed above ruined Democracy for every one of them by manipulating the government for their personal profits at the expense of every taxpayer!

Victim: " *...Without breaking a single law, we are hunting down and destroying every single one of the scumbags who attacked us and destroyed Democracy for their own power mongering, sex cult-driven, sick profiteering schemes...These crooks need to know, with certainty: if the FBI doesn't get you - we and the crowd-sourced public forensics groups will!...*"

Join the "FOLLOW-THE-MONEY" Team and learn 100% legal CIA and FBI-class tactics and technologies which are being used to track why these people are all connected by covert financial and asset tracks. Extensive case files and dossiers on each party, below, are available in torrents globally. These people knowingly engaged in these crimes, attacks and illicit activities! ** = The worst ones. They share a cadre of dirty CPA, legal and lobbyist firms that assist them with their dirty work and run the interface between Fusion GPS, Black Cube, Media Matters, Gizmodo and other hit-job services.

Follow-the-money, the surveillance data, the stock market accounts, the sex workers and the emails! These people don't do "good deeds" or help their nation. They do dirty schemes to help themselves make money off of citizens and destroy their competitors because they would rather cheat than compete!

This is who financed and operated the attacks. They operate illicit manipulations and anti-trust violations. Free-roaming automatic AI bots are out working around-the-clock scanning every database to connect their bribes, payola, stealth funds, tax evasions, money-laundering, sex trafficking and other illicit deeds. These are the ones that everyone is working on exposing, indicting and TAKING DOWN!

Court Statement By One Of Many Victims:

"... Plaintiff were attacked with a \$30 million dollar+ retribution/political-reprisal/revenge hatchet-job program contracted by White House and Department of Energy political operatives, their appointees and staffing. Plaintiff has sourced the payment records evidence to prove it. Those public officials illegally used taxpayer-financed government funds and they were also business competitors of my peers and I. They are mad because they got caught doing crimes with taxpayer funds...There is, now, no legal or historical-fact question about the veracity of the proof that public officials put

"hit-jobs" on reporters, whistle-blowers or competitors using government resources to do so. In fact, today, the U.S. Congress is spending nearly a third of it's time on the question of agencies being used as reprisal operations....famous senators, their Silicon Valley oligarch financiers and their associates run a felony-class organized crime insider-trading scam that abuses taxpayers and sabotages competing businesses at the expense of the public treasuries...IMAGINE LIVING IN A WORLD WHERE ALMOST EVERY ONE OF THE PUBLIC OFFICIALS THAT WERE SUPPOSED TO HELP YOU TURNED OUT TO BE YOUR BUSINESS COMPETITORS. IMAGINE HAVING THEM USE GOVERNMENT RESOURCES TO PROFIT AT YOUR EXPENSE, BLOCKADE YOU AND TREAT DEMOCRACY LIKE A GARAGE SALE!

This is about a group of U.S. Senators, Silicon Valley Oligarchs, Detroit Oligarchs, Crooked Law Firms and Lobbyists who commit crimes in order to manipulate over a trillion tax dollars into their, and their friends pockets. They use media monopoly tricks to try to shut out any other viewpoints. They push manufactured "emotional trigger" issues that they believe will get more tax money allocated to "issue solutions" that they, and their friends, happen to already own the monopolies for. They are felons yet they control some of the offices of the agencies who are supposed to arrest them. Silicon Valley bought K Street lobby firms and U.S. Senators, gave them more 'Dark Money' than history has ever seen and then had giant tech-law firms bribe, hit-job and blockade any attempts to arrest them...The U.S. Government hired us, paid us part of Plaintiff money, then asked us to spend Plaintiff life savings and years of Plaintiff time on THEIR federal project based on their lies and false-promises. Then they took the assets we were asked to invest, plus the money they owed us, and gave it to their friends. When we complained to the FBI, Congress and the SEC, they hired Fusion GPS-like companies to run "hit-jobs" on us and threaten Plaintiff lives.

WE WERE LIED TO AND DEFRAUDED BY GOVERNMENT AGENCIES. THEY TOOK Plaintiff MONEY AND USED US, AND Plaintiff PEERS, AS A SMOKE-SCREEN TO HIDE THEIR CRONY PAYOLA CRIME THAT PUT TAXPAYER CASH IN THEIR FRIEND'S POCKETS...Plaintiff has received ZERO justice and ZERO compensation for Plaintiff damages, Plaintiff time, Plaintiff witness testimony and Plaintiff help provided to the authorities! Plaintiff demand Plaintiff compensation from the State And Federal authorities! Neither I, Plaintiff peers or the voters will ever let this go until we receive justice!..."

Key points of note in this RICO racketeering case:

- These [Jeffrey Epstein-LIKE](https://www.netflix.com/title/80224905) (<https://www.netflix.com/title/80224905>) crooks include senators, technology ceo's and famous sand hill road venture capitalists. those suspects have engaged in the largest sets of bribes in u.s. history! don't let these silicon valley sex-trafficking, bribing, racist, misogynist, tax-evading, money-laundering, black-listing, felony criminals get away with it!

- The [Flynn Case](https://www.trunews.com/article/former-intel-chiefs-flynn-destroyed-by-cia-nsa-hit-job) (<https://www.trunews.com/article/former-intel-chiefs-flynn-destroyed-by-cia-nsa-hit-job>), The [Strzok Case](https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/peter-strzoks-wife-discovered-lisa-page-affair-on-his-phone-doj-reveals) (<https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/peter-strzoks-wife-discovered-lisa-page-affair-on-his-phone-doj-reveals>), The [Solyndra Case](https://www.judicialwatch.org/corruption-chronicles/fed-audit-confirms-govt-corruption-in-solyndra-deal/) (<https://www.judicialwatch.org/corruption-chronicles/fed-audit-confirms-govt-corruption-in-solyndra-deal/>), The [GOOGLE Corruption Cases](https://www.wsj.com/articles/justice-department-state-attorneys-general-likely-to-bring-antitrust-lawsuits-against-google-11589573622), (<https://www.wsj.com/articles/justice-department-state-attorneys-general-likely-to-bring-antitrust-lawsuits-against-google-11589573622>) The 200+ [Silicon Valley Cases](https://www.technewsworld.com/story/85141.html) (<https://www.technewsworld.com/story/85141.html>) and [MORE](https://www.allsides.com/news/2020-05-14-0636/obamagate-isn-t-conspiracy-theory-it-s-biggest-political-scandal-Plaintiffs-time-and), prove that [White House](https://www.allsides.com/news/2020-05-14-0636/obamagate-isn-t-conspiracy-theory-it-s-biggest-political-scandal-Plaintiffs-time-and) (<https://www.allsides.com/news/2020-05-14-0636/obamagate-isn-t-conspiracy-theory-it-s-biggest-political-scandal-Plaintiffs-time-and>) officials weaponized federal intelligence and services staff and used federal agencies to put hit-jobs on citizens, as anti-trust violating reprisal/revenge vendettas, on orders from their [Silicon Valley](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/High-Tech_Employee_Antitrust_Litigation) (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/High-Tech_Employee_Antitrust_Litigation) campaign financiers. Billionaires and their companies like Tesla, Google, Facebook, Solyndra, Netflix, etc., got kick-backs, government contracts, monopolies and tax evasion perks for their quid-pro-quo! In the current and previous "emergency stimulus bills", under the guise of "it's an emergency, give us all the money", Congressional leaders took taxpayer funds and put the money and stock market perks in their family bank accounts, while sabotaging their business competitors. The Congressional hearings have proven it!

- "Plaintiffwitnessed a series of [felony corruption crimes](http://american-corruption.com/AAFINAL-DOE-Loan-Guarantees-Report%20-%20THE%20CLEANTECH%20CRASH%20ENERGY%20DEPT%20SLUSH%20FUND.pdf) (<http://american-corruption.com/AAFINAL-DOE-Loan-Guarantees-Report%20-%20THE%20CLEANTECH%20CRASH%20ENERGY%20DEPT%20SLUSH%20FUND.pdf>), mind numbing cronyism, and [political payola using insider trading](http://american-corruption.com/GOOGLE_FEDERAL_COMPLAINT_NOTES_2020.html) (http://american-corruption.com/GOOGLE_FEDERAL_COMPLAINT_NOTES_2020.html) and we reported those crimes. In exchange we got [hit-jobs](https://gawker-media-attacks.weebly.com/) (<https://gawker-media-attacks.weebly.com/>), cover-ups, de-funding, rights-blockades, harassment and ZERO JUSTICE from public officials!"

- [News reports](https://thenationalpulse.com/politics/biden-black-lives-matter-defund-the-police/) (<https://thenationalpulse.com/politics/biden-black-lives-matter-defund-the-police/>) have now [revealed](https://theconservativetreehouse.com/2020/06/11/exploited-again-financial-contributions-to-black-lives-matter-are-being-funneled-to-biden-campaign/?utm_source=whatfinger) (https://theconservativetreehouse.com/2020/06/11/exploited-again-financial-contributions-to-black-lives-matter-are-being-funneled-to-biden-campaign/?utm_source=whatfinger) that the Silicon Valley oligarchs are [funding and creating](https://www.investmentwatchblog.com/here-is-the-employee-chart-for-actblue-charities-the-company-that-receives-every-dollar-raised-via-the-black-lives-matter-website/?utm_source=whatfinger) (https://www.investmentwatchblog.com/here-is-the-employee-chart-for-actblue-charities-the-company-that-receives-every-dollar-raised-via-the-black-lives-matter-website/?utm_source=whatfinger) the BLM riots and street ruckus in order to get even more political donations for election manipulations. These are the same Stanford elitists that ran the Cleantech Crash scam. They don't care about the environment, racism or anything but their stock market accounts. They only care about killing off their competitors and they use "green-washing" to cover their crimes. You can find a list of their names at the bottom of this document. They have thousands of operatives like Steve Spinner, David Plouffe, Sid Blumenthal, Nick Denton, etc. that launder hundreds of millions of dollars through a vast number of PAC's and fake 'charities'. This mob had the idea to: "*control all information and manipulate politics for the benefit of their bank accounts*"

- Public forensic investigations are [bringing hell](http://american-corruption.com/HOW%20TO%20DESTROY%20ANY%20CORRUPT%20COMPANY%20OR%20PERSON%20ON%20EARTH) (<http://american-corruption.com/HOW%20TO%20DESTROY%20ANY%20CORRUPT%20COMPANY%20OR%20PERSON%20ON%20EARTH>)

%20WITH%20TOTALLY%20LEGAL%20TACTICS.pdf) to every big tech crook involved in this scheme, for the rest of their lives, until they are brought to justice. These crooks are now under surveillance (http://american-corruption.com/EXPOSING_CORRUPT_OLIGARCHS.html) and investigation (<https://www.centreforpublicimpact.org/case-study/fbi-virtual-case-file-system/>) by the public, and they are being exposed, doxed, reported and FBI-charged. Disclosure dossiers (<https://legalbeagle.com/8546756-write-official-case-file.html>) have been produced on every single one of the top 200 culprits! (http://american-corruption.com/EXPOSE_THE_MOBSTERS.html) Global citizen social media and news out-reach programs (http://american-corruption.com/ANTI_CORRUPTION_BATTLE_ON_BEHALF_OF_AMERICAN_CITIZENS.html) contact hundreds of thousands of voters per day. By the time the next elections get here, EVERYBODY (http://american-corruption.com/EXPOSING_CORRUPT_OLIGARCHS.html) will know about this corruption and EACH (http://american-corruption.com/EXPOSING_CORRUPT_OLIGARCHS.html) of the perpetrators by name! If you have a computer YOU have the tools to investigate them just like the FBI does.

- Plaintiff saw criminal actions including bribes, insider trading, etc., that Plaintiff politicians engaged in, and got no help, no responses and no provision of Plaintiff Constitutional rights so we are forced to rely on citizen crowd-sourcing of investigations and mass social media out-reach for justice! (<https://finance.townhall.com/columnists/maritanoon/2012/11/25/exclusive-doe-corruptionappointed-and-elected-officials-should-face-prison-time-n851724>)

- The 2008 Department of Energy Cleantech Crash proves that a federal agency was used as just one big slush-fund to pay-off political campaign financiers, operate insider-trading stocks and sabotage those financiers competitors using taxpayer-financed resources! Plaintiff has used private investigator, FBI resources and deep AI research to reveal that all government staff working on Plaintiff application were getting quid-pro-quo...they were on the take. (Can anyone point out to us EVEN ONE person who was in the DOE/White House loop who was not working for, invested in, getting a future job from or other wise conflicted?) What do you do when The U.S. Government convinces you to invest millions of dollars, and your life, into one of their projects. Then their project turns out to be a scam where they had covertly hard-wired the upside to a couple of Senator's and their campaign financier friends. The fix was in and the game was rigged to use a government program as a slush-fund for friends-with-benefits. Plaintiff s, and the public, got defrauded. Now the damages must be paid for, one way, or another. Every one of the insiders who did get government funding got it in the exact same size and order as their covert political campaign funding and stock market bribes to the deciders. Chamath Palihapitiya and other Silicon Valley insiders have now exposed the fact that Greylock, Kleiner, etc. are just a VC Ponzi Scheme! in this whole mess.

(<https://www.cbsnews.com/news/cleantech-crash-60-minutes/>)

(http://american-corruption.com/EXPOSE_THE_MOBSTERS.html)

(<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NVVsdIHslfI>)

- Elon Musk got government money by bribing public officials and stacking hundreds of his friends and shareholders, ie: Steven Chu, Matt Rogers, Steve Westly, Steve Spinner's 'special friend', investor Google's employees, etc. on the staff of the Department of Energy and in the White House. In other words, hundreds of Elon Musk's friends and financiers from Silicon Valley (Mostly from his investor: Google) were placed in the very offices that decided if he got the government funds. Plaintiff has FBI-class records, financial tracking, emails, stock market relay records and other forensic data that proves it. Plaintiff can swear, warrant, certify and prove these assertions in front of Congress in a live Congressional hearing or Civil Jury trial, given non-compromised legal backing. Musk bribed Senators, bought a President and had his buddies take over most of the Department of Energy. [Lithium metals](https://lithium-ion.weebly.com/), (<https://lithium-ion.weebly.com/>) and other rare earth mining materials, are monopolized by Elon Musk and his Silicon Valley Cartel, in rare-earth corrupt mining scams. Lithium's widespread [use in cars is hindered](https://www.hackernoon.com/dangers-li-ion-batteries-might-aware-4960f2f75ae7) (<https://www.hackernoon.com/dangers-li-ion-batteries-might-aware-4960f2f75ae7>) by a challenging obstacle: upon multiple charge-discharge cycles, [fractal filaments called dendrites](https://www.pressconnects.com/story/news/2020/01/21/lithium-batteries-everywhere-dangerous-what-know-rochester-binghamton/4480496002/) (<https://www.pressconnects.com/story/news/2020/01/21/lithium-batteries-everywhere-dangerous-what-know-rochester-binghamton/4480496002/>) always grow through the electrolyte from the negative to the positive electrode and [short-circuit the battery](https://batteryuniversity.com/learn/article/safety_concerns_with_li_ion) (https://batteryuniversity.com/learn/article/safety_concerns_with_li_ion) from the inside, thus guaranteeing that [Tesla Cars](https://www.livescience.com/62179-tesla-fire-cleanup-danger.html) (<https://www.livescience.com/62179-tesla-fire-cleanup-danger.html>) will [eventually all explode](https://www.wired.com/2017/03/dont-blame-batteries-every-lithium-ion-explosion/) (<https://www.wired.com/2017/03/dont-blame-batteries-every-lithium-ion-explosion/>) . [Musk and Panasonic have known](https://www.wired.com/2017/03/dont-blame-batteries-every-lithium-ion-explosion/) this since 2007 (They are "dumping" the batteries via Tesla) and have paid U.S. Senators, who own stock in Tesla, [to cover it up. The lithium fires and toxic vapors are a major safety concern because they have killed, poisoned and injured too many citizens.](https://www.wired.com/2017/03/dont-blame-batteries-every-lithium-ion-explosion/) Musk gets away with his scams because he pays U.S. Senators bribes with stocks in his corporations and has a thousand crooked Goldman Sachs investment bankers selling his hair-brained schemes to your parents pension funds. Musk's partners created the government policy to sell pretend air, known as carbon credits. He makes \$200M per year selling this pretend air. It is like you getting paid to sell your farts based on the hope that you might eat some beans some day. Musk's big bucks don't come from selling cars but from government mooch schemes.

(<https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/battery-behind-dangerous-deadly-e-cigarette-explosions-n1032901>)

(<https://eandt.theiet.org/content/articles/2016/10/lithium-ion-batteries-found-to-produce-toxic-gases/>)

(<https://www.visiontimes.com/2019/02/15/dangers-of-lithium-ion-batteries.html>)

- Plaintiff has formally asked the FBI and DOJ to investigate, engage in surveillance upon and interview attackers: Nicholas Guido Denton, John Hermann, Ian Fette, Adrian Covert, Patrick George, John Cook, Larry Page, Eric Schmidt, David Drummond, David Axelrod, David Plouffe, Lachlan Seward, Jay Carney, Robert Gibbs and their associates and determine how they were compensated for the attacks, who had command and control of their actions and who acted as a conduit for the funds. These people bribed government officials, sold Plaintiff government and Democratic process like they were running a garage sale and used taxpayer-funded resources to attack anyone who reported the

crimes involving their Tech Cartel! Their emails, text messages, stock market accounts, bank accounts, paypal accounts and social accounts prove what they were up to!

A Previous Sent Letter To William Barr, Attorney General For The United States Of America Via Certified Mail And Email:

“...Plaintiff filed a federal Tort Claim ‘Form 95’ for damages and were informed by federal insiders that the claim was being stone-walled. Plaintiff need to take deeper legal action against the government entities that caused the damages. Those damages are metricized in the seven to nine figures and proven by forensic data.

Plaintiffs, and Plaintiff peers, have filed claims and reports with every law enforcement and regulatory entity we know of and testified for a number of them. My co-investors filed lawsuits and won in federal court on the proof that a government entity engaged in favoritism and quid-pro-quo but I have yet to receive any damages cash as I was an interested party in those other cases. My lawyer now works for you so he is conflicted out from helping us on this case any further.

After completing a federal contract, to perfection, to build America's next generation energy and transportation technologies, Plaintiff team were promised a factory contract, and funding, to deliver these low-cost, hyper-efficient, job-building, clean solutions to every American.

It turns out, we were lied to and defrauded. My associates found out that crooked politicians had secretly arranged to give Plaintiff money and contracts to their best friends. That is a felony crime that abuses quite a few State and federal RICO, Anti-Trust laws, Quid-Pro-Quo laws, the public and the roots of Democracy..

Plaintiff found out, thanks to FBI, OSC, GAO, OMB and private investigators, that the jurisdictional Senators and related politicians were engaged in corruption in partnership with a specific group of Silicon Valley tech oligarchs, now under investigation by various agencies of the U.S. Government.

Investigators have not found a single political entity in this case who was not either: financed by, friends with, sleeping with, dating the staff of, holding stock market assets in, promised a revolving door job or government service contracts from, partying with, personal friends with, photographed at private events with, making profits by consulting for, exchanging emails with, business associates of or directed by; one of those business adversaries, or the Senators and politicians that those business adversaries pay campaign finances to, or supply political search engine manipulation services to.

In other words, the FBI found that the politicians that were supposed to represent and protect us were the owners, financiers and beneficiaries of Plaintiff local and national competitors. Plaintiff would be

delighted to sit down with you at Plaintiff regional FBI office to go over the connections and crimes with you and the senior FBI staff again.

Plaintiff were lied to by government representatives who said we could make "hundreds of millions of dollars in sales profits and carbon credits sales" if we invested millions of dollars of Plaintiff resources and years of Plaintiff lives in America. Plaintiff were induced to invest. Plaintiff invested, but those representatives secretly knew they had already hard-wired the funds to Plaintiff competitors. Plaintiff competitors made hundreds of millions of dollars at Plaintiff expense!

Those "representatives" were Senators and government agency bosses who were financed by, friends with, sleeping with, dating the staff of, holding stock market assets in, promised a revolving door job or government service contracts from, partying with, personal friends with, photographed at private events with, making profits by consulting for, exchanging emails with, business associates of or directed by; one of those business adversaries, or the Senators and politicians that those business adversaries pay campaign finances to, or supply political search engine manipulation services to.

Plaintiff product and services metrics beat those of every other competitor. Plaintiff won on every comparison item except we refused to pay the bribes and cooperate with the illegal quid-pro-quo demands.

Plaintiff found that mega-insider law firms operate a cartel of political appointee placements via quid-pro-quo deals, black-lists and manipulation of public policy and policy decisions via covert perks and payola schemes.

Plaintiff found out how insider stock trading between politicians and tech companies is the largest form of corruption in America.

Plaintiff found out who the top 200 dirty politicians, corrupt investment bankers and tech oligarchs were that operated the scheme. Plaintiff found out thanks to some FBI, GAO, Congressional and Media investigators. The evidence and financial tracking software proves it. The quid-pro-quo tracks back to each and every one of their stock market, i-bank and estate accounts.

Plaintiff issues are headline news every day. Nobody can doubt the veracity of Plaintiff claims since they read about the exact same things in the news every morning.

How might you help me, personally, recover my monies for the damages from fraud, interference and other losses?..."

Plaintiff has asked the FBI, OSC, SEC and FTC to investigate the fact that the executives and investors of Google, YouTube, Facebook, Tesla, Netflix, LinkedIn, and their owned politicians, run an organized criminal stock market and public policy manipulation racketeering cartel.

These tech oligarchs have been documented meeting and conspiring to harm others, that they compete with, using mobster-type tactics and methods. That is a FELONY violation of federal RICO laws.

Plaintiff elected officials owned portions of these companies, were financed by these companies, allowed these companies to write laws they presented to Congress, slept with the staff of these companies, exchanged staff with these companies, had media manipulated on their behalf by these companies and engaged in other illicit deeds with these companies

Per The United States Congress, The FBI and the FTC: The Previous High-Tech Antitrust Black-Listing Litigation is a [United States Department of Justice](#) (DOJ) [antitrust](#) action and a civil [class action](#) against several [Silicon Valley](#) companies for secret collusion agreements which targeted high-tech employees. This case was one of the most famous federal lawsuits in Silicon Valley. [Scam fronts for Silicon Valley oligarchs are being exposed daily.](#)

(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Department_of_Justice)

(<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antitrust>)

(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Class_action)

(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Silicon_Valley)

(<https://www.politico.com/news/2020/05/05/americans-progressive-action-super-pac-fake-234316>)

The [tech Cartel is evil](#) because:

they steal any technology they desire;

(<https://thebaffler.com/latest/mouthbreathing-machiavellis>)

they run a [prostitution ring](#) and [sexually extort young women and interns](#) in Silicon Valley;

(<https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2018/01/brotopia-silicon-valley-secretive-orgiastic-inner-sanctum>)

(<https://www.mercurynews.com/2017/07/09/silicon-valley-reeling-wake-sexual-harassment-storm/>)

they are 'rape culture' [take-what-they-want misogynists](#);

(<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/03/technology/silicon-valley-sexual-harassment.html>)

ageists and [racists](#) as their history of abuses has proven;

(<https://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/google-gender-and-ethnic-demographics-statistics/>)

their Palo Alto Cartel operates AngelGate-type collusion and stock market insider trading schemes that harm independent business and the public;

(<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Angelgate>)

(http://american-corruption.com/Pelosi_Clan_Owned_By_China.html)

their Cartel ran the "no poaching" CEO ring which was class-action sued by DOJ and tech workers; 90% of their divorce court files reveal horrific abuses and sex trafficking;

(<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/aug/12/gurbaksh-chahal-silicon-valley-domestic-assault-sentence>)

(<https://www.news.com.au/finance/tech-titan-michael-goguen-of-sequioa-capital-kept-amber-baptiste-as-a-sex-slave-for-13-years/news-story/91012180fc3b23d50c1e6be8105c92e7>)

They have an army of lobbyists that pay cash, stock market and revolving door bribes to U.S. Senators;

(<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/sep/03/silicon-valley-politics-lobbying-washington>)

(<https://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2014/10/28/corruption-and-the-revolving-door-recent-discussions-and-further-reflections/>)

They can even evade FBI & SEC investigations; They hire women to act as 'trophy wives' and 'beards';

(https://www.forbes.com/2008/07/11/billionaire-wives-club-biz-billies-cx_cv_0711billiewives_slide.html)

(<https://www.axios.com/silicon-valley-sex-party-was-at-steve-jurvetsons-home-1515699374-132b7731-3e58-4727-bc6a-48e5c234a3e5.html>)

they have lobbyists rig the U.S. Patent Office in order to block inventor patent rights because they are using stolen technologies;

(<https://www.usinventor.org/>)

they have been caught on video and recordings beating, kicking and harming women hundreds of times;

(<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/aug/12/gurbaksh-chahal-silicon-valley-domestic-assault-sentence>)

They have bought up all of the Tier-One tech law firms and order them to **black-list**, and never help, those who seek equal tech rights;

(<https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/free-books/employee-rights-book/chapter10-9.html>)

they collude to abuse your privacy and make databases on the public for political control; they have to cheat to compete because they are only good with spread sheets instead of innovation; They run black-lists, character assassination attacks, collusion and other anti-trust violating acts in violation of RICO laws.

Silicon Valley has become the largest assemblage of douche-bags and yuppie frat boy **criminals** in human history.

(<https://www.jobsforfelonshub.com/locations/jobs-for-felons-in-palo-alto-california/>)

Theranos is not the exception, it is the standard. **Tesla**, Google, Theranos, Plaintiff swork, Facebook are lies backed by famous political insiders to protect **their insider trading** and covered-up by fake news operators. They are also fronts to fund political campaigns via the ill-gotten profits from their endeavors.

(http://american-corruption.com/departement_of_energy_financing.html)

(<https://senatestockwatcher.com/>)

When the bad guys, and their lap-dog politicians, attack you because your products are better than theirs they are proving that they are **frat boy scumbags**, from Stanford and Yale, that operate in a little pack, like dogs! Their Sandhill Road operation should be raided by the FBI! The best thing that could come from the COVID pandemic is that they all are forced into bankruptcy!

(<https://www.nationalreview.com/2016/06/stanford-rape-case-hook-culture-root-campus-sexual-assault-problem/>)

When your **Senator holds stock market shares** in companies that exist to **profit on the backs of consumers**, via corruption, then it is impossible for that Senator to ever do anything but be corrupt!

(<https://www.cbsnews.com/news/congress-trading-stock-on-inside-information/>)

(<https://www.tampabay.com/florida-politics/buzz/2020/04/22/donna-shalala-lone-democrat-overseeing-500b-virus-fund-failed-to-disclose-2019-stock-sales/>)

Plaintiff has reported this in writing to winklerm@sec.gov, sanfrancisco@sec.gov and 30+ other federal officers but have yet to see Plaintiff whistle-blower rewards...or any action! Do you wonder how big politician insider stock trading is? Take a look at how many TRILLIONS of dollars pass through the stock markets annually and then look at the reported, AND

UNREPORTED, securities holdings of famous U.S. Senators and government agency staff. That is what Seth Rich and the people in the "In Memory Of" section, below, were disclosing. [These are massive crimes!](#)

([http://american-corruption.com/ANTI CORRUPTION BATTLE ON BEHALF OF AMERICAN CITIZENS.html](http://american-corruption.com/ANTI_CORRUPTION_BATTLE_ON_BEHALF_OF_AMERICAN_CITIZENS.html))

The crooks at Google, Facebook, Tesla, Linkedin, Netflix, etc., broke felony laws and the [basic principles of Democracy.](#)

(<https://www.cbsnews.com/news/congress-trading-stock-on-inside-information/>)

[GOOGLE, Especially, must be exterminated and every executive and investor exposed and prosecuted because of these crimes:](#)

(<https://www.cbsnews.com/news/congress-trading-stock-on-inside-information/>)

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[Google faces \\$5 billion lawsuit in U.S. for tracking 'private' internet use. Google WILL pay for their crimes and must be extinguished as a business because of their corruption!](#)

(<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-alphabet-google-privacy-lawsuit/google-faces-5-billion-lawsuit-in-u-s-for-tracking-private-internet-use-idUSKBN23933H>)

They bribed your Senators, White House Staff, insider agency staff and operated a Silicon Valley Oligarch sociopath political Cartel.

What kinds of people were some of these high tech oligarchs? Read their divorce Court Records about their Jeffrey **Epstein**, [NXIVM](#) sex trafficking; Andy Rubin and Goguen [sex slaves](#); tax evasions; money laundering; intern abuses; misogyny; racism; political insider-trading stock market bribes to U.S. Senators; a '[Silicon Valley Tech Mafia](#)' and other horrors.

(<https://www.thecut.com/2019/05/the-most-disturbing-details-from-the-nxivm-sex-cult-case.html>)

([http://american-corruption.com/department of energy financing.html](http://american-corruption.com/department_of_energy_financing.html))

What would you do if you found out that Eric Schmidt, Larry Page, Elon Musk, Sergy Brin, John Doerr and other dynastic elitist insider Stanford frat boys were running a mob-like Cartel? Over 60,000 engineers in Silicon Valley took the problem to Federal Court!

The defendants, in the first case, included [Adobe](#), [Apple Inc.](#), [Google](#), [Intel](#), [Intuit](#), [Pixar](#), [Lucasfilm](#) and [eBay](#), all high-technology companies with a principal place of business in the San Francisco–

Silicon Valley area of California where they collude together to harm competitors. It is a well documented fact that Facebook, Google, Netflix, LinkedIn, etc. use sophisticated psychological testing on each applicant in order to filter out all but the most radical devotees of the founders ideologies. These companies then maintain an echo-chamber resonance, throughout the company, to reinforce their ideological message, much like Scientology does. In these companies one must praise Elon Musk and Mark Zuckerberg and hate those who the founders target. The founders target their competitors, in violation of anti-trust laws.

The first civil class action was filed by five Plaintiff s, *one of whom has died* in a curious incident; it accused the tech companies of collusion between 2005 and 2009. In [Abolish Silicon Valley: How to liberate technology from capitalism](#) we see another of thousands of insiders expose the fact that Silicon Valley is a pile of filth.

(<https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/622177/abolish-silicon-valley-by-wendy-liu/>)

Additional cases are planned for filing. Formal complaints have been filed with The SEC, The DOJ, The GAO, The FBI, The FTC and The U.S. Congress. Active investigations into '[Angelgate](#)' and related [collusion and anti-trust matters](#) are known to be under-way by federal, news outlet and private investigators as of 2020.

(<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Angelgate>)

U.S. Senators, and other politicians, who covertly own stock in these Silicon Valley companies, have been delaying enforcement against these corrupt companies. Consumer rights groups have pledged to take down each and every politician who owns these corrupt stocks and protects these corrupt companies!

Plaintiffalliance of the public, journalists, investigators and agency staff have FBI-level investigated: Steven Chu, Larry Page, David Dummond, Lachlan Seward, Andy Rubin, Jeffrey Epstein, Elon Musk, Nicholas Guido Denton, Harvey Weinstein, Eric Schmidt and the rest of the RICO-violating "Club" and had them fired or removed from their positions. They will remain under public surveillance for the rest of their lives and their case files will be added to monthly via submissions to federal agencies and news entities.

What would an insane tech oligarch (Like Schmidt, Musk, Reid, Brin, Westly, Page, Khosla, etc.) do for trillions of dollars of criminal gain and control of politics and ideology?

When you run the following query on the stock market volume for a single day, ie: "Select sum(Close*volume*0.001), count(*) from myTable where date = '9/27/2017'.."you get the following

result: 7300 stocks were traded, Total Money flow: \$271,072,334,824. This is how much was traded on that day.

The total world derivatives market has been estimated at about \$791 trillion face or nominal value, 11 times the size of the entire world economy.

The World Bank publishes global data on stocks traded by \$ value [here](#). ie:

- 2016 - \$77.5 trillion for the year.
- (<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.TRAD.CD?end=2016&start=1975&view=chart>)

Most exchanges publish this stat. [Here](#) is the data for NASDAQ

- Feb 6, 2018 - \$192 billion for the day.
- (<http://www.nasdaqtrader.com/Trader.aspx?id=DailyMarketSummary>)

And the Indian stock market volume data (in Indian Rupees) is [here](#).

- BSE + NSE cash market, Feb 2018 - About Rs 40,000 crore daily. That's about \$6 billion per day.
- (<http://www.moneycontrol.com/stocks/marketstats/turnover/>)

Average estimates put daily stock movement between 5 to ten trillion dollars per day. You can buy lot's of Weinstein/Epstein-like private islands, private jets, sex parties, U.S. Senators and crony government contracts with that kind of money. Once an oligarch starts buying sex with underage girls, they don't stop. [In fact, there is nothing that a corrupt tech oligarch and their owned Senator won't do to keep their little pig trough filled up.](#)

(http://american-corruption.com/EXPOSE_THE_MOBSTERS.html)

The average murder/robbery in the United States is undertaken for an average amount under \$100.00

Thus, an Eric Schmidt, Elon Musk, Steve Westly, David Drummond, Vinod Khosla, Reid Hoffman, Steve Jurvetson, Andy Rubin, Larry Page or similar oligarch, who is sociologically addicted to money and power, is [most certainly capable of ordering and operating election manipulations](#), Presidential bribes, murders and engaging in other crimes to protect those greed-based assets. They have the full resources to do so, have federal records proving that they hire lobbyists and operatives who do these things for them and have a documented history of engaging in extremist actions.

(http://american-corruption.com/How_Google_And_Facebook_Put_Obama_In_The_White_House.html)

The Silicon Valley Cartel Hires Gawker, Gizmodo, Jalopnik, Black Cube, Fusion GPS, etc. to run "hit-jobs" on those who report their crimes!

The Hit Job

How much do you have to pay Google, Alphabet, YouTube and Black Cube to dedicate a portion of their servers to push a character assassination set of links, against a competitor, to all five billion people on Earth with internet access? How much did Obama, Clinton, Bloomberg spend using those exact same systems to attack their political enemies? How much does it cost to order a citizen's social security benefits blockaded, have their phones and computers hacked and run a global character assassination media campaign to defame and black-list them? Every one of the attack technologies and resources were previously deployed against Presidential candidates in past elections. The providers, operators and compensation conduits of the attack services are known to law enforcement. The payment records have been uncovered, revealing that over \$30M of billings were incurred. By way of contrast: \$30M is the typical WEEKLY expenditure for opposition character assassination programs in a U.S. Presidential election using Gawker, Gizmodo, Facebook, Google and Fusion GPS media attack services. ([See the detailed investigation report on the specific attacks](http://www.majestic111.com/)) (<http://www.majestic111.com/>)

Plaintiffknow. Plaintiff has their financial records, invoices and receipts and so does the FBI and the NSA.

How much do you have to pay to get them to lock those attack links on one of the first 4 lines of EVERY search result, in the same position in the search results, for over a decade (which proves that their search results are not "organic", they are manually manipulated by Google and YouTube)? How much did Obama, Clinton, Bloomberg spend using those exact same systems to attack their political enemies?

Plaintiffknow. Plaintiff has their financial records, invoices and receipts and so does the FBI and the NSA.

How much does it cost to make a Disney-like animated movie about a whistle-blower? How much does the production and software and person-hour billings cost? How much does it cost to distribute that movie world-wide and lock it in the top line of all search results?

Plaintiffknow. Plaintiff has their financial records, invoices and receipts and so does the FBI and the NSA.

How much does it cost to hire a warehouse full of Russian, Nigerian and Chinese click-farm operators who use Palantir and Google software to instantly be alerted of any mention of a person's name on the internet and to then go slam that person in the comment sections with endless troll remarks? Elon Musk uses these same people to hype his narcissistic need for attention. Obama, Clinton, Bloomberg and

other politicians hire these same people to attack their political adversaries. How much does it cost to have anonymous trolls in foreign countries kill a person's brand globally?

Plaintiff know. Plaintiff has their financial records, invoices and receipts and a huge number of lawsuits, court records, federal investigation and investigative journalism reports have exposed those records and details. The FBI, NSA, SEC, FTC and Congressional investigators can also confirm these numbers!

So it turns out that it costs: **\$35,422,152.00 to have a person and their business killed!**

That is how much they spent on their attack on the Plaintiff s! The people at the top of the heap who organized the attacks were David Plouffe, Jay Carney, David Axelrod, Denis McDonough, Steve Rattner, Robert Gibbs, Rahm Emanuel and their associates and they did it from **The West Wing and The Oval Office in The White House.**

Many of the political attacks were edited by [Nick Denton](#) and his seedy tabloid empire Gawker/Gizmodo.

(https://www.takimag.com/article/gawker_media_hypocrites_vs_douchecanoes/)

Media Matters for America founder David Brock is a hired media assassin who reaped illegal profits through the transfer of millions from a nonprofit he founded to a for-profit entity under his control, according to an IRS complaint filed by a watchdog group. The [complaint](#) details how Brock's nonprofit group American Bridge Foundation (AB Foundation) transferred \$2.7 million in tax-exempt assets to True Blue Media, a for-profit company owned by Brock that is the parent company of ShareBlue, a for-profit media company now known as [The American Independent](#).

(<https://cdn01.dailycaller.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/AB-Foundation-Complaint.pdf>)

(<https://americanindependent.com/>)

The transfers violated IRS rules that prohibit nonprofit organizations from using their tax-exempt resources to pay personal or private expenses of any key figures connected to the nonprofit, the complaint stated. AB Foundation's transfers to True Blue Media were disclosed in the nonprofit's Form 990s filed to the IRS in [2017](#) and [2018](#). *"Brock is a well-known hit man who took money to target Plaintiff group in reprisal for whistle-blowing...."* Said Team 7 staff.

The money was conduited and assisted for pass-through by political financiers Eric Schmidt, Larry Page, Sergey Brin, Elon Musk, John Doerr, Vinod Khosla, Steve Westly, Steve Spinner and their [Silicon Valley oligarch Cartel](#) black-listing operation.

(http://american-corruption.com/department_of_energy_financing.html)

It was a felony. It violated RICO, Anti-Trust and Constitutional laws.

So they spent over thirty five million dollars attacking the Plaintiff and shutting down a competitor that was targeted to make over six billion dollars in profits. The attackers then made the six billion dollars in profits for themselves, at the expense of the Plaintiff s.

So how much do you think they owe the Plaintiff per previous court awards for such crimes against a member of the public?

[Silicon Valley's No-poaching Case: The Growing Debate over ...](#)

<https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/silicon-valleys-poaching-case-growing-debate-employee-mobility/>

"**Silicon Valley's No-poaching** Case: The Growing Debate over Employee Mobility." Knowledge@Wharton. The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 30 April, 2014.

[Steve Jobs was 'central figure' in Silicon Valley's 'no ...](#)

<https://money.cnn.com/2014/08/11/technology/silicon-valley-poaching-case/index.html>

Aug 11, 2014A **lawsuit** by **Silicon Valley** workers claims Steve Jobs was a ringleader in a conspiracy not to poach employees. If **Silicon Valley's** biggest companies want an embarrassing employee **lawsuit** to go ...

The Political Corruption Crimes Plaintiff Experienced In California And Washington DC

The government is responsible to Plaintiff for the damages to Plaintiff s.

As natural born citizens, they suffered injuries caused by the crimes of government staff during, and after, Plaintiff work for the government.

The NY Times reported: "[Ms. Feinstein and her husband sold \\$1.5 million to \\$6 million worth of stock in Allogene Therapeutics, a California-based biotech company, in transactions that took place on Jan. 31 and Feb. 18.](#)" S

(<https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/19/us/politics/richard-burr-stocks-sold-coronavirus.html>)

he, as usual, claimed that she has "no involvement in her husband's financial decisions" to avoid criticism. Do you really think that she has no idea about multi-million dollar deals that her husband is involved in? Dianne Feinstein, and her family owned the HR services, the construction company, the leasing services and the stock market accounts in Tesla and Solyndra and got the owners of those companies their government hand-outs. White House Staff and Department of Energy staff were fully aware of this and covered up these conflicts to protect their own stock holdings and revolving door jobs. She, and other Senators, ordered hit-jobs on the competitors to those companies, who were their constituents, in order to protect their stock holding profiteering efforts.

Public integrity at The Department of Energy and The U.S. Congress is in shambles because of this audacious corruption.

The Crimes And Corruption That Plaintiff Experienced

These are just a few of the corrupt financial conflicts of interest we experienced while engaging in a federally contracted program:

- Plaintiff saw Congress not only fail to eliminate both the appearance and the potential for financial conflicts of interest; we saw Senators, White House staff and Department of Energy executives optimize the support structure to engage in such criminality. Americans must be confident that actions taken by public officials are intended to serve the public, and not those officials. The actions taken by Obama Administration staff and Department of Energy officials in illicit coordination with U.S. Senators were criminal acts in violation of RICO and other laws.
- Plaintiff saw illicit individual stock ownership by Members of Congress, Cabinet Secretaries, senior congressional staff, federal judges, White House staff and other senior agency officials while in office. Those government officials acquired, held, 'pump-and-dumped' and traded stock where its value was influenced by their agency, department, or actions in efforts that harmed us.
- Plaintiff saw government officials, including Plaintiff U.S. Senators, engage in organized crime via insider trading, revolving door job payola, sex-for-perks trades, stock valuation fluffs, and more illicit actions.
- Plaintiff saw conflict of interest laws and ethics violated by the President and Vice President in violation of Conflicts of Interest standards in which the President and the Vice President did not place conflicted assets, including businesses, into a blind trust to be sold off and hid conflicts of interest.
- Plaintiff [saw senior Department of Energy government officials](http://american-corruption.com/department_of_energy_financing.html), employees, contractors and White House staff invest in privately-owned assets that did present conflicts and harmed us, including large companies like Tesla, Google, Facebook, Sony, Netflix, etc., and commercial real estate. (http://american-corruption.com/department_of_energy_financing.html)
- Plaintiff saw an organized crime scheme to not respond to filings by citizens or reporters. Former White House and Energy Department staff use 'stone-walling' to intentionally delay responses for a decade, or more, and that tactic continues to this day.
- Plaintiff saw ethics rules violations by government employees, including unpaid White House staff and advisers.
- Plaintiff saw executive branch employees fail to recuse from all issues that might financially benefit themselves or a previous employer or client from the preceding 4 years in the "Cleantech" programs.

- Plaintiff saw a 'Revolving Door' between Silicon Valley industry and government and we saw tech companies buying influence in the government or profiting off of the public service of these officials.
- Plaintiff saw lobbying by the President, Vice Presidents Members of Congress, federal judges, and Cabinet Secretaries; and, we saw other federal employees lobbying their former office, department, House of Congress, or agency.
- Plaintiff saw Plaintiff competitors immediately hiring or paying these senior government officials from agencies, departments, and/or Congressional offices recently lobbied by those companies and staff from Plaintiff Senator's office go freely back-and-forth at jobs at the companies and the offices of the Senators.
- Plaintiff saw the world's largest companies, banks, and monopolies, especially Goldman Sachs, (measured by annual revenue or market capitalization) hiring or paying former senior government officials mentioned herein. Plaintiff saw the massive, and unfair, ability of companies to buy influence through current government employees
- Plaintiff saw current lobbyists taking government jobs after lobbying.
- Plaintiff saw over 82 of Plaintiff friends and peers suddenly die under strange circumstances. Some of them appear to have been murdered to shut them up.
- Plaintiff saw corporate outlaws like Google, Tesla, Facebook, LinkedIn, Netflix, Sony, etc., working in government via top corporate leaders whose companies were caught breaking federal law.
- Plaintiff saw contractor corruption where federal contractors and licensee employees worked at the agency awarding the contracts.
- Plaintiff saw "Golden Parachutes" that provide corporate bonuses to executives for federal service as bribes.
- Plaintiff saw massive influence-peddling in Washington DC.
- Plaintiff saw the manipulation of the federal definition of a "lobbyist" to exclude most individuals paid to influence government.
- Plaintiff saw individuals paid to influence government on behalf of for-profit entities and their front-groups who were facades for Silicon Valley oligarchs.
- Plaintiff saw the obfuscation of the disclosure of lobbyist activities and influence campaigns where

Plaintiff competitor's lobbyists did not disclose specific bills, policies, and government actions they attempted to influence; nor many meetings with public officials; and many documents they provided to those officials

- Plaintiff saw massive influence-peddling by Foreign Actors such as that which occurred in the ENER1, Severstal, Solyndra and related scandals. Plaintiff saw substantial foreign influence in Washington by foreign lobbying.

- Plaintiff saw American lobbyists accepting money from foreign governments, foreign individuals, and foreign companies to influence United States public policy at the Department of Energy and other agencies.

- Plaintiff saw Plaintiff competitors current lobbyists taking government jobs after lobbying and using those positions against us where they exploited 'Legalized Lobbyist Bribery' and traded money for government favors for Plaintiff competitors.

- Plaintiff saw political donations from lobbyists to candidates or Members of Congress in exchange for helping Plaintiff competitors that the lobbyists worked for and that the Members of Congress owned stock in. Plaintiff saw those lobbyists operate contingency fees that allowed those lobbyists to be paid for a guaranteed public policy outcome.

- Plaintiff saw Plaintiff competitor's lobbyist gifts to the executive and legislative branch officials they lobby.

- Plaintiff saw Plaintiff Congressional representatives use Plaintiff competitor's lobbyists for "expertise" and information in Plaintiff industry.

- Plaintiff saw those in Plaintiff congressional service get paid non competitive salaries that do not track with other federal employees.

- Plaintiff saw the removal of the nonpartisan Congressional Office of Technology Assessment to avoid providing open-source critical scientific and technological support to Members of Congress in order to tunnel-vision info about Plaintiff competitors.

- Plaintiff saw a non-level playing field between Plaintiff competitor's corporate lobbyists and government via excessive lobbying over \$500,000 in annual lobbying expenditures by Plaintiff competitors in a huge number of anti-trust violations.

- Plaintiff saw a COMPLETE failure of individuals and corporations to disclose funding or editorial conflicts of interest in research submitted to agencies that is not publicly available in peer-reviewed publications.

- Plaintiff saw McKinsey sham research which undermines the public interest by not requiring that such studies, that present conflicts of interest, undergo independent peer review to be considered in the Congressional rule-making process.
- Plaintiff saw agencies refuse to justify withdrawn public interest rules via public, written explanations.
- Plaintiff saw loopholes exploited by powerful corporations like Google, Facebook, Tesla, Netflix, Sony, etc., to block public interest actions.
- Plaintiff saw loopholes that allow corporations, like Tesla and Google, to tilt the rules in their favor and against the public interest.
- Plaintiff saw Silicon Valley oligarchs and their agency shills delay or dominate the rule-making process by the practice of inviting Google, Tesla or Facebook to negotiate rules they have to follow.
- Plaintiff saw inter-agency review manipulation as a tool for corporate abuse used for the banning of informal review and closed-door industry lobbying at the White House's Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
- Plaintiff saw abusive injunctions from rogue judges, like Jackson, et al, where individual District Court judges, can temporarily block agencies from implementing final rules.
- Plaintiff saw hostile agencies use sham delays of implementation and enforcement by using the presence of litigation to postpone the implementation of final rules.
- Plaintiff saw obfuscation by agency public advocates to prevent public engagement.
- Plaintiff saw the blockading of private lawsuits by members of the public to hold agencies accountable for failing to complete rules or enforce the law, and to hold corporations accountable for breaking the rules.
- Plaintiff saw a failure to inoculate government agencies against corporate capture such as Google undertook against the White House.
- Plaintiff saw Plaintiff complaints and whistle-blowing buried in an avalanche of lobbyist activity.
- Plaintiff saw Plaintiff competitor corporations game the courts by requiring courts to presumptively defer to agency interpretations of laws and prohibiting courts from considering sham McKinsey studies and research excluded by agencies from the rule-making process
- Plaintiff saw blocking of the Congressional Review Act provision banning related rules that prevent

agencies from implementing the will of Congress based on Congress' prior disapproval of a different, narrow rule on a similar topic.

- Plaintiff saw a failure in the integrity of the judicial branch by reducing rules that prevent conflicts of interest.

- Plaintiff saw individual stock ownership by federal judges in Plaintiff competitors.

- Plaintiff saw judges accepting gifts or payments to attend private seminars from private individuals and corporations that were Plaintiff competitors.

- Plaintiff saw non-ethical behavior by the Supreme Court in which the Court did not follow the Code of Conduct that binds all other federal judges

- Plaintiff saw a lack of public insight into the judicial process by the hiding of information about the process and an increase in the barriers to accessing information.

- Plaintiff saw reduced disclosure of non-judicial activity by federal judges and the hiding of judges' financial reports, recusal decisions, and speeches.

- Plaintiff saw a blockade of public access to court activity by refusing to live-stream, on the web, audio of their proceedings, making case information easily-accessible to the public free of charge, and by federal courts not sharing case assignment data in bulk.

- Plaintiff saw Plaintiff rights restricted and Plaintiff access to justice blocked to all but the wealthiest individuals and companies.

- Plaintiff saw barriers that prevented us as individuals from having Plaintiff case heard in court via harsh pleading standards that make it too hard for individuals and businesses that have been harmed to make their case before a judge.

- Plaintiff saw no independent agency dedicated to enforcing federal ethics and anti-corruption laws.

- Plaintiff saw no support for stronger ethics and public integrity laws via stronger enforcement.

- Plaintiff saw no federal ethics enforcement with effective investigative and disciplinary powers that would help individuals.

- Plaintiff saw minimal enforcement of ethics laws via corrective action, levying civil and administrative penalties, and referring egregious violations to the Justice Department for criminal arrest and enforcement.

- Plaintiff saw no IG anti-corruption and public integrity oversight over federal officials, including oversight of agency Inspectors General, or ethics matters for White House staff and agency heads, or waivers and recusals by senior government officials.
- Plaintiff saw no investigation independent and protected from partisan politics through a single Director operating under strict selection, appointment, and removal criteria.
- Plaintiff saw Deutsche Bank pay Jeffrey Epstein' Russian hookers and manipulate finances for Elon Musk to cook the books.
- Plaintiff saw no easy online access to key government ethics and transparency documents, including financial disclosures; lobbyist registrations; lobbyist disclosures of meetings and materials; and all ethics records, recusals, and waivers.
- Plaintiff saw no independent and empowered ethics office insulated from congressional politics.
- Plaintiff saw few criminal and civil violations in Plaintiff case referred to the Justice Department, the Office of Public Integrity, or other relevant state or federal law enforcement.
- Plaintiff saw broken Federal Open Records laws, public official and candidate tax disclosures.
- Plaintiff saw Silicon Valley Oligarch special interests using secret donations from corporations and their Cartel of billionaires to influence public policy without disclosure
- Plaintiff saw Google and Facebook provide over a billion dollars of political campaign financing with NO action by the FEC.
- Plaintiff saw fake tech company 'nonprofit organizations' refuse to list donors who bankrolled the production of any specific rule-making comment, congressional testimony, or lobbying material, and refuse to reveal whether the donors reviewed or edited the document at the Silicon Valley insider companies.
- Plaintiff saw the hiding of individuals and corporations disclosures of funding, or editorial conflicts of interest, in research submitted to agencies that is not publicly available in peer-reviewed publications.
- Plaintiff saw McKinsey sham "Cleantech" and "battery research" reports undermineg the public interest by using studies that present conflicts of interest to independent peer review to be considered in the rule-making process.
- Plaintiff saw loopholes in Plaintiff open records laws that allow federal officials to hide tech industry and Silicon Valley oligarch industry influence.

- Plaintiff saw a failure of the presumption of disclosure and a failure to affirmatively disclose records of public interest, including meeting agendas; government contracts; salaries; staff diversity; and reports to Congress.
- Plaintiff saw Tesla Motors get in-person, hand-walked, through the DOE government cash give-away while all of Tesla's competitors were ignored, black-listed, never communicated with and blockaded.
- Plaintiff saw no use of a central FOIA website that is searchable and has downloadable open records databases with all open FOIA requests and all records disclosed through FOIA.
- Plaintiff saw limited FOIA enforcement by not limiting FOIA exemptions and loopholes, and by not giving the National Archives the authority to overrule agency FOIA decisions and to compel disclosure.
- Plaintiff saw Congress become less transparent by not ending the corporate lobbyists leg up in the legislative process. The public deserves to know what Congress is up to and how Silicon Valley lobbyists influence legislation.
- Plaintiff saw a failure to require all congressional committees to immediately post online more information, including hearings and markup schedules, bill or amendments text, testimonies, documents entered into the hearing record, hearing transcripts, written witness answers, and hearing audio and video recordings.
- Plaintiff saw a refusal of Members of Congress to post a link to their searchable voting record on their official websites
- Plaintiff saw a hiding, by Silicon Valley lobbyists of when they lobby a specific congressional office; specific topics of visit; the official action being requested; and all documents provided to the office during the visit.
- Plaintiff saw much, much more...

Any politician who allows these crimes and corruptions to continue to exist is part of those crimes and corruptions. never believe any candidate who does not swear to end each of the above listed payola and corruption processes!

IF AMERICA WAS SERIOUS ABOUT ENDING CORRUPTION, IT WOULD MAKE THE ABOVE ILLICIT DEEDS A FELONY, BUT THE CALIFORNIA POLITICIANS WILL DO ANYTHING TO KEEP THEIR PIG TROUGH GOING!

THE ONGOING ATTACKS ON THE MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC WHO REPORTED THESE CRIMES

The victim's cases have never been fairly reviewed by non-biased, non-conflicted officials. The victim's FBI-class investigators and peers have not found a single entity in the government's case reviews, or determinations, who was not either: financed by, friends with, sleeping with, dating the staff of, holding stock market assets in, promised a revolving door job or government service contracts from, partying with, personal friends with, photographed at private events with, making profits by consulting for, exchanging emails with, business associates of or directed by; one of those business adversaries, or the Senators and politicians that those business adversaries pay campaign finances to, or supply political search engine manipulation services to. FBI and CIA-class Forensic data proves it.

The victims have demanded, in writing to SSA, DOJ, OSC, SEC, FBI, that an unbiased lawyer and CPA be provided by The State for the case but none has been provided. As they are now low-income, senior, disabled, felony crime victims, the federal government's LSC Corporation and public-interest law groups have stated that it is their right to receive such case assistance from The State. The victims have contacted NOSSCR, LSC, Legal Aid, NADR, and all known local resources on the list provided by the feds but none of those taxpayer funded entities have been responsive because they are helping the cover-ups.

The assertions provided by a Task Force team of 3 letter agency folks, Congressional staff, investigative reporters and crowd-sourced voters supporting the case investigations are beyond reproach, and true, unless someone refuses to hear the truth due to a personal political agenda.

The victim's government-promised benefits have STILL yet to be provided to them and many of the actions by politically conflicted federal officials, so far, have succeeded in harming the victims further. The peers of the victims have received millions and millions of dollars for their Department of Energy, and other agency, whistle-blowing but the other victims have been blocked from getting legal support.

These abuses and benefits blockades are a violation of the victim's human rights, U.S. Constitution and State Constitutional rights. (Yes, each State has constitutional rights you get, too)

The victims put their lives on the line for their country. They have worked 60 hours, or more, per week, since the 70's. They more than earned their full benefits plus damages, interest and back-fees equal to precedents set in the referenced whistle-blower court cases, below.

The victims are fully qualified for, and have the right to receive, a State supplied law firm to represent them but they have been blockaded from their rights because corrupt political figures are embarrassed about their crimes being exposed.

Elected officials and agency staff have one job, that job it is to work for THESE VICTIMS the citizens. Those politicians, though, have been shown to have millions of dollars in their stock market accounts from competing with these victims via their ownership in competing companies that they are supposed to be regulating.

At least one of the California Senators has over \$100 million dollars in their accounts, (a fact the FBI can confirm), from stock market manipulations like this. Politically driven, and greed motivated, agency staff are constantly looking for any little opportunity or reason to use agency resources to harm any whistle-blower in reprisal for the success of the anti-corruption task forces they have assisted.

Federal officials stealth-hired Google, Gawker, Gizmodo, YouTube, In-Q-Tel, Fusion GPS and Black Cube to produce tens of millions of dollars of political reprisal media attacks and coordinate toxic exposures against the victims. The attacks have been proven by federal and private investigators to have happened, The source of the attacks, the financiers of the attacks, the beneficiaries of the attacks and the operators of the attacks are the same handful of government people.

The victims are seeking an analytical, objective, reasonable, non-political review of their case. Unlike Julian Assange, Edward Snowden and other whistle-blowers, not only did they do nothing illegal but they are law enforcement and intelligence service consultant who HELP the nation! They are Smedley Butler-like and not Edward Snowden-like!

It is foolish for any party to ignore the capacity for crime that the Jeffrey Epstein, Harvey Weinstein (ie: his threat to have Jennifer Aniston killed for reporting his sex crimes) and Larry Page oligarchs get involved in, along with the Senators they own and control.

The nature of the core crime case is profound in that it was driven by White House staff and United States Senators, who ordered attacks on the victims in reprisal. These famous political figures use the trillions of dollars in government treasuries and massive stock market scams for illicit profiteering by rigging the system exclusively for themselves and their crony insiders.

They attacked the victims using government taxpayer funded media (Fusion GPS, Black Cube, Google/YouTube/Alphabet, Pysops, Gizmodo Media, Media Matters, Blumenthal, etc.) and spy agency tools because the victims competed with their businesses and reported their crimes. This month the news headlines reveal that San Francisco Bay Area government has as many corrupt politicians as Chicago and relies on the same RICO-violating insider corruption network to operate; as proven by deep AI searches of their financial records. Arrests of those officials are now underway.

Silicon Valley law enforcement records prove that the tech oligarchs that finance these political figures, engage in an organized, racketeering-based, massive sex trafficking, tax evasion, anti-trust violating, spousal abuse, money laundering, black-listing, racist, ageist, political bribery, crony racketeering crime Cartel. The Famous U.S. Senators, Governors and their staff knowingly engage in, finance, operate and benefit from these crimes in exchange for search engine manipulation and stock market insider trading.

The Google, Facebook and Twitter components of this Cartel censor and cover-up news coverage of these crimes, and attacked the victims, because they have a financial connection to the perpetrators.

All of the crooks have had their files hacked. The evidence is out there at the NSA, FBI, etc. Even hackers from Russia and China have copies of the incriminating data. The bad guys will eventually lose!

It is unlikely that any whistle-blowers have as productive a domestic resume, as many letters of reference from famous third-parties and as much proof-of-work as these victims have proven in their evidence sets. The victims have been friends with, and shared homes with, multiple White House and Senate staff and family members and some them have even vouched for the victims. These whistle-blowers know the 'inside scoop'.

The victims are bi-partisan and not affiliated with any political party but they hate political corruption and have the connections to fight it when it affects them and America. Pictures and videos of famous political figures hugging them and meeting with them abound.

In a positive turn of events Whistle-blower Walter Tamosaitis” (easily found on web searches) who was also a Department of Energy Whistle-blower, got a rare victory. Walter got \$4.1 MILLION DOLLARS for his whistle-blower work about the Department of Energy malfeasance.

The rest of the victims have gotten nothing but punishing benefits blockades and benefit reductions that guaranteed they would never be able to afford rent, going to a show or a restaurant, legal services or anything else in their lives! One of the people they helped get arrested sits around and drinks and collects over \$150,000.00 per year in government benefits...and they are an arrested crook. The victims are having a hard time seeing how they have been treated fairly in light of their deeply documented public service!

SSA, and other agencies, were weaponized as political reprisal tools against the victims. James Brown, Jr, the HHS California head of Obamacare was arrested by the FBI for political corruption and racketeering during this. In Marin county HHS investigators were also arrested for sex crime. These tiny victories do not pay the rent for the victims, though.

Some of the victims were awarded a Congressional commendation award in the Iraq War Bill under the United States Congress. They, and their team were to build America's alternative energy back-up plan for the nation under the Department of Energy. They fully executed their federal agreement and did not go bankrupt, embezzle funds, bribe California politicians or get FBI- raided like their competitor: Solyndra!

U.S. Senators, Agency Heads And Congress-People Were bribed With These Payments:

Billions of dollars of Google, Twitter, Facebook, Tesla, Netflix and Sony Pictures stock and stock warrants which is never reported to the FEC; Billions of dollars of Google, Twitter, Facebook, Tesla, Netflix and Sony Pictures search engine rigging and shadow-banning which is never reported to the FEC; Free rent; Male and female prostitutes; Cars; Dinners; Party Financing; Sports Event Tickets; Political campaign printing and mailing services "Donations"; Secret PAC Financing; Jobs in Corporations in Silicon Valley For The Family Members of Those Who Take Bribes And Those Who

Take Bribes; "Consulting" contracts from McKinsey as fronted pay-off gigs; Overpriced "Speaking Engagements" which are really just pay-offs conduited for donors; Private jet rides and use of Government fuel depots (ie: Google handed out NASA jet fuel to staff); Real Estate; Fake mortgages; The use of Cayman, Boca Des Tores, Swiss and related money-laundering accounts; Bribes to Stanford officials to admit their kids to college; The use of HSBC, Wells Fargo, Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank money laundering accounts and covert stock accounts; Free spam and bulk mailing services owned by Silicon Valley corporations; Use of high tech law firms such as Perkins Coie, Wilson Sonsini, MoFo, Covington & Burling, etc. to conduit bribes to officials; and other means now documented by us, The FBI, the FTC, The SEC, The FEC and journalists.

Part of this matter was featured on CBS News 60 Minutes investigative news segments. (ie: the segments: "THE CLEANTECH CRASH", "CONGRESS TRADING ON INSIDER INFORMATION", "THE LOBBYISTS PLAYBOOK" and investigations into hundreds of billions of dollars of stock market payola illicitly routed through Silicon Valley tech companies). *If the White House, at that time, had been charged for these stock market campaign payola crimes, The President would have been forced out of office. Instead, the AG, Eric Holder, was impeached/Held-In-Contempt-Of Congress and he had to leave office.*

This is why the attacks on the victims have been so spy agency-oriented and sophisticated: To punish them for helping law enforcement and because the victims accidentally competed with Senator's stock market schemes by making their products obsolete via BETTER products.

There are now thousands of news and Congressional reports; from "Spygate", to The IRS Lois Lerner case to the FBI McCabe case and a vast number of SSA IG reports, particularly SSA about government agencies being weaponized against citizens for political reprisals. Compromised staff used SSA resources to harm the whistle-blowers and block their benefits because they helped halt one of the largest corruption schemes in modern American history.

This case is still an active case via many federal law enforcement and regulatory agencies. Some of the victims were cellular-level blood poisoned by exposure to toxic chemicals, compounds, powders and radioactive materials in their work environments for the Department of Energy projects. It is unclear if this poisoning was intentional "Alexander Valterovich Litvinenko-like" reprisal poisoning or accidental. The minimal Obamacare medical coverage that some of the victims have does not fund the testing and treatment of Cesium, Thorium overdose, micro-particulant toxins, radical solvents, high energy EMF and the kinds of exotic materials that Department of Energy weapons and energy labs, that victims worked with, use in their locations.

While the victims benefits application was underway in one part of the federal building, on the upper floors of the same building, victims were assisting a federal crime investigation against powerful local and Washington DC politicians and their oligarch financiers, on other floors of that federal building, corrupt political officials were figuring out how to harm the victims and engage in reprisals.

From FBI-class federal investigators and private investigators, records prove that well known California Senate officials and well known White House officials ordered government benefits to be

blocked, delayed, obfuscated, denied and otherwise harmed as political reprisal and retribution for the assistance the victims supplied to law enforcement.

Criminal forensic data has proven that digital manipulation of some of victims records and files did occur and that SSA computers are regularly hacked by many parties including the China 'Cloud Hopper' APT 10 group, currently under federal indictment, and hundreds of domestic attack groups, some of whom are hired by U.S. Senators. A number of California and Washington DC Senators and agency heads have already been arrested, indicted and/or removed from office in these matters.

Over 40 of the victims peers in this matter (Rajeev Motwani, Gary D. Conley, Seth Rich, Dr. Epstein's wife, etc.) are now dead from mysterious circumstances. Victims have received numerous death threats and have been personally attacked on multiple occasions including getting their cars rammed and drive-by death threats.

Some of those victims may have been murdered for whistle-blowing. Multiple senior government officials and Senators have been exposed hiring Google, YouTube, Fusion GPS, In-Q-Tel, PsyOps, Cambridge Analytica, ShareBlue, Media Matters, Black Cube, Gizmodo and other "kill services" to attack citizens in political reprisals.

[*Pelosi, Feinstein & Congress Cash in on Insider Trading | RepresentUs*](#)

<https://represent.us/action/insider-trading/>

In 2011, a CBS investigation blew the lid off of one of Washington's most poorly-kept secrets: members of **Congress** were routinely exploiting legal loopholes to engage in **insider trading** and line their own pockets — a criminal offense for regular citizens. In the ensuing public outrage, **Congress** passed a law called the STOCK Act, and took a [...]

[*Congress: California Senators Trading stock on inside information? - CBS News*](#)

<https://www.cbsnews.com/news/congress-trading-stock-on-inside-information/>

Congress: Trading stock on inside information? ... But, congressional lawmakers have no corporate responsibilities and have long been considered exempt from **insider trading** laws, even though they ...

[*Congress Tells Court That Congress Can't Be Investigated ...*](#)

<https://theintercept.com/2015/05/07/congress-argues-cant-investigated-insider-trading/>

But as the Securities and Exchange Commission made news with the first major investigation of political **insider trading**, **Congress** moved to block the inquiry.

[*Reckless stock trading leaves Congress rife with corruption ... - POLITICO*](#)

<https://www.politico.com/story/2017/05/14/congress-stock-trading-conflict-of-interest-rules-238033>

POLITICO Investigation. Reckless stock **trading** leaves **Congress** rife with conflicts . After the furor over Tom Price's investments, four more members quietly bought shares in the same firm.

[Nancy Pelosi Built Wealth on 'Insider Trading', that's where her covert \\$120M came from...](#)

<https://thepoliticalinsider.com/nancy-pelosi-insider-trading/>

"Nancy Pelosi has engaged in **insider trading**," Hill said, "because she's been the beneficiary of information that other people wouldn't have, so Paul Pelosi is able to make active trades on her **insider** knowledge." Listen below:

[Apple Google Silicon Valley No Cold Calling Anti-Poaching](#)

<https://www.lieffcabraser.com/antitrust/high-tech-employees/>

Silicon Valley firms and other **high-tech** companies owe their tremendous successes to the sacrifices and hard work of their employees, and must take responsibility for their misconduct. One of the principal means by which **high-tech** companies recruit employees is to solicit them directly from other companies in a process referred to as "cold ...

[Engineers Allege Hiring Collusion in Silicon Valley - The ...](#)

<https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/01/technology/engineers-allege-hiring-collusion-in-silicon-valley.html>

Mar 1, 2014 Alan Hyde, a Rutgers professor who wrote "Working in **Silicon Valley**: Economic and Legal Analysis of a **High-Velocity** Labor Market," said the **no-poaching** accusations go contrary to what has made ...

[Apple, Google and others to pay \\$415m to settle Silicon ...](#)

<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/11843237/Apple-Google-and-others-to-pay-415m-to-settle-Silicon-Valley-no-poaching-lawsuit.html>

Apple, Google and others to pay \$415m to settle **Silicon Valley 'no poaching' lawsuit** US judge agrees settlement that will see thousands of technology workers receive thousands of dollars

[Dirty Secrets of Silicon Valley Poaching | Paysa](#)

<https://www.paysa.com/blog/dirty-secrets-of-silicon-valley-poaching/>

Silicon Valley is a talent magnet. With prestigious **high-tech** corporations such as Google, Apple, Facebook, Netflix, and Tesla Motors among the Fortune 1000 companies and thousands of startups finding their home in the world-renowned technology hub, this comes as **no** surprise.

[Silicon Valley no-poaching deal appears headed for approval](#)

<https://phys.org/news/2015-03-silicon-valley-no-poaching.html>

Silicon Valley no-poaching deal appears headed for approval. by Howard Mintz, San Jose Mercury News

[Silicon Valley's \\$415 million poaching settlement finalized](#)

<https://www.mercurynews.com/2015/09/03/silicon-valleys-415-million-poaching-settlement-finalized/>

Sep 3, 2015 **Silicon Valley's \$415 million poaching settlement finalized ... valley-tech-giants-learn-from-no-poaching-antitrust-case/ 'When Rules Don't Apply': Did Silicon Valley tech giants learn from no ...**

[Justice Department Requires Six High Tech Companies to ...](#)

<https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-requires-six-high-tech-companies-stop-entering-anticompetitive-employee>

One of the complaints arose out of a larger investigation by the Antitrust Division into employment practices by **high tech** firms. The division continues to investigate other similar **no** solicitation agreements. Adobe Systems Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in San Jose, Calif., and 2009 revenues of nearly \$3 billion.

Cold calling is one of the main methods used by companies in the high-technology sector to recruit employees with advanced and specialised skills, such as software and hardware engineers, programmers, animators, digital artists, Web developers and other technical professionals.^[1] Cold calling involves communicating directly in any manner with another firm's employee who has not otherwise applied for a job opening. Cold calling may be done in person, by phone, letter, or email.^[2] According to the legal brief filed by a Plaintiff in one of the class-action cases, cold calling is an effective method of recruiting for the high-technology sector because "employees of other [high-technology] companies are often unresponsive to other recruiting strategies... [and] current satisfied employees tend to be more qualified, harder working, and more stable than those who are actively looking for employment."^[3]

Amy Lambert, Google's associate general counsel, noted in a blog post shortly after the DOJ's actions, that Google's definition of cold calling does not necessarily eliminate recruiting by letter or email, but only the process of calling on the telephone. By implication, recruiting through LinkedIn incurs recruiting by "InMail" - LinkedIn's own mail contact system: "In order to maintain a good working relationship with these companies, in 2005 we decided not to "cold call" employees at a few of Plaintiff partner companies. Plaintiff policy only impacted cold calling, and we continued to recruit from these companies through LinkedIn, job fairs, employee referrals, or when candidates approached Google directly. In fact, we hired hundreds of employees from the companies involved during this time period."

The challenged "no cold call" agreements are alleged bilateral agreements between high technology companies not to cold call each other's employees. The DOJ alleges that senior executives at each company negotiated to have their employees added to 'no call' lists maintained by human resources personnel or in company hiring manuals. The alleged agreements were not limited by geography, job function, product group, or time period. The alleged bilateral agreements were between: (1) Apple and

Google, (2) Apple and Adobe, (3) Apple and Pixar, (4) Google and Intel, (5) Google and Intuit,[4] and (6) Lucasfilm and Pixar.[5]

The civil class action further alleges that agreements also existed to (1) "provide notification when making an offer to another [company]'s employee (without the knowledge or consent of the employee)" and (2) "agreements that, when offering a position to another company's employee, neither company would counteroffer above the initial offer." [3]

Department of Justice antitrust action

The [United States Department of Justice Antitrust Division](#) filed a complaint in the [US District Court for the District of Columbia](#) alleging violations of Section 1 of the [Sherman Act](#). In *US v. Adobe Systems Inc., et al.*, the Department of Justice alleged that Adobe, Apple, Google, Intel, Intuit, and Pixar had violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act by entering into a series of bilateral "No Cold Call" Agreements to prevent the recruitment of their employees (a similar but separate suit was filed against Lucasfilm on December 21, 2010[6]).

(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/High-Tech_Employee_Antitrust_Litigation#cite_note-6)

The DOJ alleged in their Complaint that the companies had reached "facially anticompetitive" agreements that "eliminated a significant form of competition...to the detriment of the affected employees who were likely deprived of competitively important information and access to better job opportunities." The DOJ also alleged that the agreements "were not ancillary to any legitimate collaboration," "were much broader than reasonably necessary for the formation or implementation of any collaborative effort," and "disrupted the normal price-setting mechanisms that apply in the labor setting." [4] The same day it filed the suit, the DOJ and the defendants proposed a settlement. [7]

(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/High-Tech_Employee_Antitrust_Litigation#cite_note-doj_case_proposed_settlement-7)

A final judgment enforcing the settlement was entered by the court on March 17, 2011. [8]

(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/High-Tech_Employee_Antitrust_Litigation#cite_note-doj_adobe_final_judgement-8)

Although the DOJ Complaint only challenged the alleged "no cold call" agreements, in the settlement, the companies agreed to a more broad prohibition against "attempting to enter into, entering into, maintaining or enforcing any agreement with any other person to in any way refrain from, requesting that any person in any way refrain from, or pressuring any person in any way to refrain from soliciting, cold calling, recruiting, or otherwise competing for employees of the other person", for a period of five years; the court can grant an extension. [8]

(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/High-Tech_Employee_Antitrust_Litigation#cite_note-doj_adobe_final_judgement-8)

The settlement agreement does not provide any compensation for company employees affected by the alleged agreements. [9]

(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/High-Tech_Employee_Antitrust_Litigation#cite_note-judge oks-9)

Lucasfilm entered into a similar settlement agreement in December 2010.[5]

(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/High-Tech_Employee_Antitrust_Litigation#cite_note-Richey-5)

Civil class action

In re: High-Tech Employee Antitrust Litigation ([U.S. District Court, Northern District of California](#) 11-cv-2509 [10]) is a [class-action](#) lawsuit on behalf of over 64,000 employees of [Adobe](#), [Apple Inc.](#), [Google](#), [Intel](#), [Intuit](#), [Pixar](#) and [Lucasfilm](#) (the last two are subsidiaries of [Disney](#)) against their employer alleging that their wages were repressed due to alleged agreements between their employers not to hire employees from their competitors.[11][12] The case was filed on May 4, 2011 by a former software engineer at Lucasfilm and alleges violations of California's antitrust statute, Business and Professions Code sections 16720 et seq. (the "Cartwright Act"); Business and Professions Code section 16600; and California's unfair competition law, Business and Professions Code sections 17200, et seq. Focusing on the network of connections around former Apple CEO [Steve Jobs](#), the Complaint alleges "an interconnected web of express agreements, each with the active involvement and participation of a company under the control of Steve Jobs...and/or a company that shared at least one member of [Apple's board of directors](#)." The alleged intent of this conspiracy was "to reduce employee compensation and mobility through eliminating competition for skilled labor." [13]

On October 24, 2013 the [United States District Court for the Northern District of California](#) granted class certification for all employees of Defendant companies from January 1, 2005 through January 1, 2010.[9]

As of October 31, 2013, Intuit, Pixar and Lucasfilm have reached a tentative settlement agreement. Pixar and Lucasfilm agreed to pay \$9 million in damages, and Intuit agreed to pay \$11 million in damages.[9] In May 2014, Judge [Lucy Koh](#) approved the \$20 million settlement between Lucasfilm, Pixar, and Intuit and their employees. Class members in this settlement, which involved fewer than 8% of the 65,000 employees affected, will receive around \$3,840 each.[14]

The trial of the class action for the remaining Defendant companies was scheduled to begin on May 27, 2014. The Plaintiff intended to ask the jury for \$3 billion in compensation, a number which could in turn have tripled to \$9 billion under antitrust law.[15] However, in late April 2014, the four remaining defendants, [Apple Inc](#), [Google](#), [Intel](#) and [Adobe Systems](#), agreed to settle out of court. Any settlement must be approved by Judge [Lucy Koh](#). [16][17]

On May 23, 2014, Apple, Google, Intel, Adobe agreed to settle for \$324.5 million. Lawyers sought 25% in attorneys' fees, plus expenses of as much as \$1.2 million, according to the filing. Additional award payments of \$80,000 would be sought for each named Plaintiff who served as a class representative.[18] Payouts will average a few thousand dollars based on the salary of the employee at the time of the complaint.

In June 2014, Judge Lucy Koh expressed concern that the settlement may not be a good one for the Plaintiff s. Michael Devine, one of the Plaintiff s, said the settlement is unjust. In a letter he wrote to

the judge he said the settlement represents only one-tenth of the \$3 billion in compensation the 64,000 workers could have made if the defendants had not colluded.[\[19\]](#)

On August 8, 2014, Judge Koh rejected the settlement as insufficient on the basis of the evidence and exposure. Rejecting a settlement is unusual in such cases. This left the defendants with a choice between raising their settlement offer or facing a trial.[\[20\]](#)

On September 8, 2014, Judge Koh set April 9, 2015 as the actual trial date for the remaining defendants, with a pre-trial conference scheduled for December 19, 2014. Also, as of early September 2014, the defendants had re-entered mediation to determine whether a new settlement could be reached.[\[21\]](#)

A final approval hearing was held on July 9, 2015.[\[22\]](#) On Wednesday September 2, 2015, Judge Lucy H. Koh signed an order granting Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement. The settlement website stated that Adobe, Apple, Google, and Intel has reached a settlement of \$415 million and other companies settled for \$20 million.

According to the settlement website, Gilardi & Co., LLC distributed the settlement to class members the week of December 21, 2015.

See also

- [Corrupt Eric Schmidt And His Role In The Illegal Collusion](#)
- [Antipoaching](#)

The Tectopus: How Silicon Valley's most celebrated CEOs conspired to drive down 100,000 tech engineers' wages

[By Mark Ames](#)

In early 2005, as demand for Silicon Valley engineers began [booming](#), Apple's Steve Jobs sealed a secret and illegal pact with Google's Eric Schmidt to artificially push their workers wages lower by agreeing not to recruit each other's employees, sharing wage scale information, and punishing violators. On February 27, 2005, Bill Campbell, a member of Apple's board of directors and [senior advisor](#) to Google, emailed Jobs to confirm that Eric Schmidt "got directly involved and firmly stopped all efforts to recruit anyone from Apple."

Later that year, Schmidt instructed his Sr VP for Business Operation Shona Brown to keep the pact a secret and only share information "verbally, since I don't want to create a paper trail over which we can be sued later?"

These secret conversations and agreements between some of the biggest names in Silicon Valley were first exposed in a Department of Justice antitrust [investigation](#) launched by the Obama Administration

in 2010. That DOJ suit became the basis of a [class action lawsuit](#) filed on behalf of over 100,000 tech employees whose wages were artificially lowered — an [estimated \\$9 billion](#) effectively stolen by the high-flying companies from their workers to pad company earnings — in the second half of the 2000s. Last week, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals denied attempts by Apple, Google, Intel, and Adobe to have the lawsuit tossed, and gave final approval for the class action suit to go forward. A jury trial date has been set for May 27 in San Jose, before US District Court judge Lucy Koh, who presided over the Samsung-Apple patent suit.

In a related but separate investigation and ongoing suit, eBay and its former CEO Meg Whitman, now CEO of HP, are being sued by both the [federal government](#) and the [state of California](#) for arranging a similar, secret wage-theft agreement with Intuit (and possibly Google as well) during the same period.

The secret wage-theft agreements between Apple, Google, Intel, Adobe, Intuit, and Pixar (now owned by Disney) are described in court papers obtained by PandoDaily as "an overarching conspiracy" in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Clayton Antitrust Act, and at times it reads like something lifted straight out of the robber baron era that produced those laws. Today's inequality crisis is America's [worst on record](#) since statistics were first recorded a hundred years ago — the only comparison would be to the era of the railroad tycoons in the late 19th century.

Shortly after sealing the pact with Google, Jobs strong-armed Adobe into joining after he complained to CEO Bruce Chizen that Adobe was recruiting Apple's employees. Chizen sheepishly responded that he thought only a small class of employees were off-limits:

I thought we agreed not to recruit any senior level employees.... I would propose we keep it that way. Open to discuss. It would be good to agree.

Jobs responded by threatening war:

OK, I'll tell Plaintiff recruiters they are free to approach any Adobe employee who is not a Sr. Director or VP. Am I understanding your position correctly?

Adobe's Chizen immediately backed down:

I'd rather agree NOT to actively solicit any employee from either company....If you are in agreement, I will let my folks know.

The next day, Chizen let his folks — Adobe's VP of Human Resources — know that "we are not to solicit ANY Apple employees, and visa versa." Chizen was worried that if he didn't agree, Jobs would make Adobe pay:

if I tell Steve [Jobs] it's open season (other than senior managers), he will deliberately poach Adobe just to prove a point. Knowing Steve, he will go after some of Plaintiff top Mac talent...and he will do it in a way in which they will be enticed to come (extraordinary packages and Steve wooing).

Indeed Jobs even threatened war against Google early 2005 before their "gentlemen's agreement," telling Sergey Brin to back off recruiting Apple's Safari team:

if you [Brin] hire a single one of these people that means war.

Brin immediately advised Google's Executive Management Team to halt all recruiting of Apple employees until an agreement was discussed.

In the geopolitics of [Silicon Valley tech power](#), Adobe was no match for a corporate superpower like Apple. Inequality of the sort we're experiencing today affects everyone in ways we haven't even thought of — whether it's Jobs bullying slightly lesser executives into joining an illegal wage-theft pact, or the tens of thousands of workers whose wages were artificially lowered, transferred into higher corporate earnings, and [higher compensations](#) for those already richest and most powerful to begin with.

Over the next two years, as the tech industry entered another frothing bubble, the secret wage-theft pact which began with Apple, Google and Pixar expanded to include Intuit and Intel. The secret agreements were based on relationships, and those relationships were forged in Silicon Valley's [incestuous boards of directors](#), which in the past has been recognized mostly as a problem for shareholders and corporate governance advocates, rather than for the tens of thousands of employees whose wages and lives are viscerally affected by their clubby backroom deals. Intel CEO Paul Otellini [joined](#) Google's board of directors in 2004, a part-time gig that netted Otellini [\\$23 million in 2007](#), with tens of millions more in Google stock options still in his name — which worked out to \$464,000 per Google board event if you only counted the stock options Otellini cashed out — dwarfing what Otellini made off his Intel stock options, despite spending most of his career with the company.

Meanwhile, Eric Schmidt served on Apple's board of directors until 2009, when a [DoJ antitrust investigation](#) pushed him to resign. Intuit's chairman at the time, Bill Campbell, also served on Apple's board of directors, and as official advisor — ["consigliere"](#) — to Google chief Eric Schmidt, until he [resigned](#) from Google in 2010. Campbell, a celebrated figure ("a quasi-religious force for good in Silicon Valley") played a key behind-the-scenes role connecting the various CEOs into the wage-theft pact. Steve Jobs, who took regular Sunday walks with Campbell near their Palo Alto homes, valued Campbell for his ability "to get A and B work out of people," gushing that the conduit at the center of the \$9 billion wage theft suit, ["loves people, and he loves growing people."](#)

Indeed. Eric Schmidt has been, if anything, even more profuse in his praise of Campbell. Schmidt credits Campbell for structuring Google when Schmidt was brought on board in 2001:

His contribution to Google — it is literally not possible to overstate. He essentially architected the organizational structure.

Court documents show it was Campbell who first brought together Jobs and Schmidt to form the core of the Silicon Valley wage-theft pact. And Campbell's name appears as the early conduit bringing Intel into the pact with Google:

Bill Campbell (Chairman of Intuit Board of Directors, Co-Lead Director of Apple, and advisor to Google) was also involved in the Google-Intel agreement, as reflected in an email exchange from 2006 in which Bill Campbell agreed with Jonathan Rosenberg (Google Advisor to the Office of CEO and

former Senior Vice President of Product Management) that Google should call [Intel CEO] Paul Otellini before making an offer to an Intel employee, regardless of whether the Intel employee first approached Google.

Getting Google on board with the wage-theft pact was the key for Apple from the start — [articles](#) in the tech press in 2005 pointed at Google's recruitment drive and incentives were the key reason why tech wages soared that year, at the highest rate in well over a decade.

Campbell helped bring in Google, Intel, and, in 2006, Campbell saw to it that Intuit — the company he [chaired](#) — also joined the pact.

From the peaks of Silicon Valley, Campbell's interpersonal skills were [magical](#) and awe-inspiring, a crucial factor in creating so much unimaginable wealth for their companies and themselves. Jobs [said](#) of Campbell:

There is something deeply human about him.

And Schmidt [swooned](#):

He is my closest confidant...because he is the definition of trust.

Things — and people — look very different when you're down in the Valley. In the nearly 100-page court opinion issued last October by Judge Koh granting class status to the lawsuit, Campbell comes off as anything but mystical and "deeply human." He comes off as a scheming consigliere carrying out some of the drearier tasks that the oligarchs he served were constitutionally not so capable of arranging without him.

But the realities of inequality and capitalism invariably lead to mysticism of this sort, a natural human response to the dreary realities of concentrating so much wealth and power in the hands of a dozen interlocking board members at the expense of 100,000 employees, and so many other negative knock-off effects on the politics and culture of the world they dominate.

One of the more telling elements to this lawsuit is the role played by "Star Wars" creator George Lucas, who emerges as the Obi-Wan Kenobi of the wage-theft scheme. It's almost too perfectly symbolic that Lucas — the symbiosis of Baby Boomer New Age mysticism, Left Coast power, political infantilism, and dreary 19th century labor exploitation — should be responsible for dreaming up the wage theft scheme back in the mid-1980s, when Lucas sold the computer animation division of Lucasfilm, Pixar, to Steve Jobs.

As Pixar went independent in 1986, Lucas explained his philosophy about how competition for computer engineers violated his sense of normalcy — and profit margins. According to court documents:

George Lucas believed that companies should not compete against each other for employees, because '[i]t's not normal industrial competitive situation.' As George Lucas explained, 'I always — the rule we had, or the rule that I put down for everybody,' was that 'we cannot get into a bidding war with other companies because we don't have the margins for that sort of thing.'

Translated, Lucas' wage-reduction agreement meant that Lucasfilm and Pixar agreed to a) never cold call each other's employees; b) notify each other if making an offer to an employee of the other company, even if that employee applied for the job on his or her own without being recruited; c) any offer made would be "final" so as to avoid a costly bidding war that would drive up not just the employee's salary, but also drive up the pay scale of every other employee in the firm.

Jobs held to this agreement, and used it as the basis two decades later to suppress employee costs just as fierce competition was driving up tech engineers' wages.

The companies argued that the non-recruitment agreements had nothing to do with driving down wages. But the court ruled that there was "extensive documentary evidence" that the pacts were designed specifically to push down wages, and that they succeeded in doing so. The evidence includes software tools used by the companies to keep tabs on pay scales to ensure that within job "families" or titles, pay remained equitable within a margin of variation, and that as competition and recruitment boiled over in 2005, emails between executives and human resources departments complained about the pressure on wages caused by recruiters cold calling their employees, and bidding wars for key engineers.

Google, like the others, used a "salary algorithm" to ensure salaries remained within a tight band across like jobs. Although tech companies like to claim that talent and hard work are rewarded, in private, Google's "People Ops" department kept overall compensation essentially equitable by making sure that lower-paid employees who performed well got higher salary increases than higher-paid employees who also performed well.

As Intel's director of Compensation and Benefits bluntly summed up the Silicon Valley culture's official cant versus its actual practices,

While we pay lip service to meritocracy, we really believe more in treating everyone the same within broad bands.

The companies in the pact shared their salary data with each other in order to coordinate and keep down wages — something unimaginable had the firms not agreed to not compete for each other's employees. And they fired their own recruiters on just a phone call from a pact member CEO.

In 2007, when Jobs learned that Google tried recruiting one of Apple's employees, he forwarded the message to Eric Schmidt with a personal comment attached: "I would be very pleased if your recruiting department would stop doing this."

Within an hour, Google made a "public example" by "terminating" the recruiter in such a manner as to "(hopefully) prevent future occurrences."

Likewise, when Intel CEO Paul Otellini heard that Google was recruiting their tech staff, he sent a message to Eric Schmidt: "Eric, can you pls help here???"

The next day, Schmidt wrote back to Otellini: "If we find that a recruiter called into Intel, we will terminate the recruiter."

One of the reasons why non-recruitment works so well in artificially lowering workers' wages is that it deprives employees of information about the job market, particularly one as competitive and overheating as Silicon Valley's in the mid-2000s. As the companies' own internal documents and statements showed, they generally considered cold-calling recruitment of "passive" talent — workers not necessarily looking for a job until enticed by a recruiter — to be the most important means of hiring the best employees.

Just before joining the wage-theft pact with Apple, Google's human resources executives are quoted sounding the alarm that they needed to "dramatically increase the engineering hiring rate" and that would require "drain[ing] competitors to accomplish this rate of hiring." One CEO who noticed Google's hiring spree was eBay CEO Meg Whitman, who in early 2005 called Eric Schmidt to complain, "Google is the talk of the Valley because [you] are driving up salaries across the board." Around this time, eBay entered an illegal wage-theft non-solicitation scheme of its own with Bill Campbell's Intuit, which is still being tried in ongoing federal and California state suits.

Google placed the highest premium on "passive" talent that they cold-called because "passively sourced candidates offer[ed] the highest yield," according to court documents. The reason is like the old Groucho Marx joke about not wanting to belong to a club that would let you join it — workers actively seeking a new employer were assumed to have something wrong with them; workers who weren't looking were assumed to be the kind of good happy talented workers that company poachers would want on their team.

For all of the high-minded talk of post-industrial technotopia and Silicon Valley as worker's paradise, what we see here in stark ugly detail is how the same old world scams and rules are still operative.

Follow all of the Techtopus coverage [here](#).

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External links

- [Docket for US v. Adobe Systems Inc., et al.](https://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/adobe.htm) (<https://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/adobe.htm>)

- [Docket for US v. Lucasfilm Ltd.](https://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/lucasfilm.html) (<https://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/lucasfilm.html>)
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- [Docket for In re: High-Tech Employee Antitrust Litigation](http://dockets.justia.com/docket/california/candce/5:2011cv02509/243796/) (<http://dockets.justia.com/docket/california/candce/5:2011cv02509/243796/>)
- [Order Granting Plaintiff s' Supplemental Motion for Class Certification, In re High-Tech Employee Antitrust Litigation, no 11-CV-02509 \(N.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2013\)](https://www.scribd.com/doc/201651711/October-24-2013-Class-Cert-Order) (<https://www.scribd.com/doc/201651711/October-24-2013-Class-Cert-Order>)
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THE LIES, CORRUPTION AND ANTI-TRUST VIOLATING INSIDER TRADING SCAMS AT THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Any voyage onto the path of funding from the Department of Energy will be a road to hell.

While frozen-smile aides will shake your hand and tell you how "*excited they are to welcome your application*", behind your back they are sharpening their knives.

Over 100 past Applicants were lied to, defrauded, stone-walled, bottom-drawer'd, sabotaged, and generally screwed with by **The Department of Energy** in order to: 1.) protect campaign financiers who were their competitors and 2.) stone-wall those Applicant's for being competitive against the Elon Musk and Solyndra chosen insiders.

Almost EVERY competing Applicant was faster, cheaper, had better MPG, was easier to manufacture, had lower cost to the main-stream market, had a better set of financials, had a better debt ratio, was safer, etc. but they missed one key factor: **THEY DID NOT OFFER BRIBES AS LARGE AS ELON MUSK DID!**

Even in 2020 you would have to be a sucker to apply for DOE funds. There are people inside DOE who are dedicated to making sure you never get that money. You can get a faster loan from a commercial bank without thousands of hidden "gotchas" and insider trading schemes to trip you up. These tricks, built into the Department of Energy process, are created to ensure that DOE insiders have thousands of excuses to never let you get the money unless you agree to finance the correct political candidates.

Political insiders will always, though, find a way to disqualify any applicant who competes with campaign financier favorites. Hundreds of highly qualified applicants were denied because Elon Musk knew they could put Tesla out of business without DOE's exclusive support of his monopoly. Tesla's own senior staff have written widely about the 'gate-keeper' insider trading scam at DOE. DOE is an anti-trust operator who is a gatekeeper of industry winners and losers based on who donated the most to certain PACs.

The Secretary of Energy and the Chief Counsel for the United States Department of Energy have been challenged, in writing, to provide the names of **ANY** Loan Programs Office (LPO) or Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing (ATVM) Program official, reviewer, advisor or staffer who was not, from 2007 forward, either financed by, friends, with, sleeping with, dating the staff of, holding stock market assets in, promised a revolving door job or government service contracts from, partying with, personal friends with, photographed at private events with, exchanging emails with, business associates of or directed by; one of those business adversaries, or the Senators and Department of Energy politicians that those business adversaries pay campaign finances to, or supply political digital services to. From 2008 forward, The White House and The Department Of Energy were controlled by the Silicon Valley tech oligarchs! That is a violation of the law, the Constitution and the American Way.

Department of Energy PR officials blindly push their revisionist history propaganda party-line hype that the DOE has been "*fair and successful*". There has never been a bigger lie on Earth since the first frat boy told the first sorority girl "*don't worry, I won't get it in your mouth..*"

One group used CIA and FBI style investigation tools to hunt down every reviewer, contractor and insider involved in the Loan Programs Office (LPO) or Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing (ATVM) Program since 2007. A forensic chart was produced showing the insider trading, revolving door and social engagements of each. In almost 97% of the cases, every person was found to have glaringly unethical, often criminal, conflicts of interest between beneficiary lines of connection.

In fact, multiple groups have insisted that the FBI, the NSA, The CIA and 60 Minutes conduct their own independent studies, on a name, by name basis of the DOE staff involved and publish the results of that study to Congress and the public.

The U.S. Department of Energy has supplied no apologies, no compensation for damages to the victims and no halt in the slush-fund payola schemes!

Do you doubt the veracity of these claims? Show this letter to Bill Cooper, the head lawyer for DOE. Ask him to provide forensic data proving any of these assertions are not true! He can't do it!

Plaintiff can provide thousands of FBI agents, investigative journalists and Congressional staff to prove these assertions are true.

Dept. of Energy staff claim that they got rid of all of the bad people at DOE and that the evil ones don't work there any more but OPM confirms that to be a lie. The stock market holdings, revolving door deals, voter records and social media postings of the current Dept of Energy staff prove that the corrupt ones never left. Tell DOE to take a look at their moral construct if they contact you!

See <http://www.majestic111.com> for more on this.

Jay Carney was Obama's "Hit Man" in the Oval Office at The White House during the Cleantech Crash. It was Carney who helped order character assassinations and hit jobs on members of the public who spoke out about the crimes. Carney was recently caught, again, ordering hit jobs at Amazon, as well. In a famous magazine interview, his home was revealed to be covered in communist propaganda posters.

Leaked notes from an internal meeting of Amazon leadership obtained by VICE News reveal company executives discussed a plan to smear fired warehouse employee Christian Smalls, calling him “not smart or articulate” as part of a PR strategy to make him “the face of the entire union/organizing movement.”

“He’s not smart, or articulate, and to the extent the press wants to focus on us versus him, we will be in a much stronger PR position than simply explaining for the umpteenth time how we’re trying to protect workers,” wrote Amazon General Counsel David Zapolsky in notes from the meeting forwarded widely in the company.

The discussion took place at a daily meeting, which included CEO Jeff Bezos, to update each other on the coronavirus situation. Amazon SVP of Global Corporate Affairs Jay Carney [described the purpose to CNN on Sunday](#): “We go over the update on what's happening around the world with Plaintiff employees and with Plaintiff customers and Plaintiff businesses. We also spend a significant amount of time just brainstorming about what else we can do” about COVID-19.

(<https://www.cnn.com/videos/business/2020/03/29/is-amazon-doing-enough-to-protect-workers-and-customers.cnn>)

Amazon [fired the warehouse worker Smalls](#), after he led a walkout of a number of employees at a Staten Island distribution warehouse. Amazon says he was fired for violating a company-imposed 14-day quarantine after he came into contact with an employee who tested positive for the coronavirus.

(https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/5dmea3/amazon-fired-the-warehouse-worker-who-organized-a-walkout-over-coronavirus)

Zapolsky’s notes from the meeting detail Amazon’s plan to deal with a wave of bad press and calls for investigations from elected officials following the firing of Smalls. They also show top Amazon brass wanted to make Smalls the focus of its narrative when questioned about worker safety.

“We should spend the first part of Plaintiff response strongly laying out the case for why the organizer’s conduct was immoral, unacceptable, and arguably illegal, in detail, and only then follow with Plaintiff usual talking points about worker safety,” Zapolsky wrote. “Make him the most interesting part of the story, and if possible make him the face of the entire union/organizing movement.”

They discussed encouraging Amazon executives to use Smalls to discredit the wider labor movement at Amazon. Employees at the warehouse, known as JFK8, [launched an effort to unionize in 2018](#).

(<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-12/employees-at-amazon-s-new-nyc-warehouse-launch-unionization-push>)

In his notes, Zapolsky wrote that there was “general agreement” on this point among the other attendees of the meeting. (Zapolsky’s notes also mention SVP of worldwide operations and customer service Dave Clark and SVP of human resources Beth Galetti.) This is the typical culture of the Obama crowd of insider executives who will destroy any citizen who gets in their way. Jay Carney runs a ***Massive covert organized corruption team at Amazon in order to manipulate Democracy.***

Examples of these groups include Pacronym and American Bridge who are part of Arabella Advisors, a consulting firm that is not required to identify its donors.

Pacronym’s affiliated groups create a large network of fake local news outlets that are designed to promote progressive viewpoints inside battleground states in order to rig insider trading for their top bosses.

They are all part of a wealthy dark money network that manipulates public policy for personal profiteering.

American Bridge 21st Century and Pacronym are cutting ads thrashing outsiders as super PACs who go after people they don't like, The Washington Post [reported](#). Both groups also have ties to two fake false-front large nonprofit groups — New Venture Fund and Sixteen Thirty Fund — connected to a massive extreme-leaning consulting group.

(https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/democratic-groups-to-spend-millions-hitting-trump-over-coronavirus-response/2020/03/17/5f9fadba-686c-11ea-9923-57073adce27c_story.html)

NVF gave one of Pacronym’s nonprofits — ACRONYM — \$250,000 while providing American Bridge \$40,000 in 2018, [according to](#) NVF’s 2018 IRS documents. IRS [records](#) also indicated American Bridge pulled in \$200,000 in 2018 from nonprofit Sixteen Thirty Fund, which reportedly spent \$141 million on various extreme-leaning causes during the midterm election year.

(https://apps.irs.gov/pub/epostcard/cor/205806345_201812_990_2020013117095977.pdf)

(<https://static.politico.com/4b/32/19c3670b41dfa1f8c1b3e0972138/2018-1630-form990.pdf>)

Sixteen Thirty Fund and nonprofit NVF are tied into the same sprawling network, according to an analysis by investigators. Arabella Advisors, a philanthropic consulting company based in Washington, D.C., manages four nonprofits, including the [NVF](#), Sixteen Thirty Fund, Hopewell Fund and the Windward Fund.

(<https://www.influencewatch.org/non-profit/new-venture-fund/>)

Sixteen Thirty Fund has not responded to requests for comment, while NVF acknowledged making a grant to ACRONYM in 2018 but noted that it “has nothing to do with the activities at PACRONYM or American Bridge.”

Arabella representative Steve Sampson called NVF merely a “client of ours,” even though the consulting group shares a Washington, D.C., office with all four groups, according to NVF and Sixteen Thirty Fund’s 2018 IRS records. American Bridge has not responded to requests for comment.

Other groups have raised alarms about the network as well.

“Arabella Network is the umbrella, and they have these two funds that flow toward both of these groups. A clearly full-blown extremist arm that is casting itself as a nonprofit is politicizing this event,” former Nevada Attorney General Adam Laxalt told the press.

Laxalt is the Outside Counsel to Americans for Public Trust, a group dedicated to uncovering unethical behavior. Americans for Public Trust has [covered](#) the network in the past. **(RELATED: Billionaire Allegedly Behind A False Flag Operation In Alabama Helped Finance The Group Behind Iowa Caucus Chaos)**

(<https://dailycaller.com/2020/02/18/acronym-iowa-caucus-barack-obama/>)

“American lives are more important than scoring cheap political points,” he added after suggesting that the group is striking while the iron is hot and making certain they capitalize on a crisis that has so far killed thousands of people.

Laxalt is referring to Pacronym’s [announcement](#) on March 17 to plow \$5 million into a digital advertising campaign railing against those they hate. The ads are published through Four is Enough, a Pacronym project.

(https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/democratic-groups-to-spend-millions-hitting-trump-over-coronavirus-response/2020/03/17/5f9fadba-686c-11ea-9923-57073adce27c_story.html)

ACRONYM’s founder said the campaign makes sense from a public health and national security perspective.

Democratic operative David Plouffe another Jay Carney-type "hit-man", who managed former President Barack Obama’s 2008 White House bid, sits alongside McGowan on ACRONYM’s board.

ACRONYM has not responded to the DCNF’s repeated requests for comment. **(RELATED: Tech Firm Behind Iowa Caucus Disaster Also Played Role In Creating A Covert Democratic Propaganda Media Outfit)**

(<https://dailycaller.com/2020/02/04/iowa-caucus-shadow-buttigieg/>)

Some academics argued that orchestrating such a campaign skirts ethical rules. Running advertisements thrashing the president during a health crisis looks bad, according to Daniel Kreiss, a professor of political communication at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

“It’s a very fine line between ensuring that the president has the legitimacy to speak authoritatively on what Americans must do in order to be safe, and the very real and legitimate questions to raise regarding how the president has handled this crisis given that he’s on the ballot in November,” Kreiss [told](#) WaPo in a March 17 report addressing the ad campaign push.

(https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/democratic-groups-to-spend-millions-hitting-trump-over-coronavirus-response/2020/03/17/5f9fadba-686c-11ea-9923-57073adce27c_story.html)

Laxalt, Nevada's former attorney general, expressed a similar position.

"The timing of attacking the president in battleground states is appalling. If they are going to do it, then you name the place. I think that doing it right this second is outrageous," he told the DCNF.

Meanwhile, ACRONYM's McGowan is also creating a constellation of local news websites that act as progressive arms targeting the president and his policies.

McGowan, a digital [producer](#) for Obama for America in 2011 and the [proprietor](#) behind ACRONYM, raised at least \$25 million from wealthy liberals to create a media company called [Courier Newsroom](#) that is designed to deliver information favorable to Democrats. Courier is rolling out newspapers in swing states to counter what its founder believes is right-wing spin on Facebook and across the digital domain.

(<https://www.linkedin.com/in/taramcgowan/>)

(<https://dailycaller.com/2019/11/05/obama-trump-elections-ads-digital/>)

(<https://couriernewsroom.com/>)

Along with the Courier Newsroom, McGowan is reportedly creating Virginia Dogwood and Arizona's Copper Courier, among others that are expected to roll out in Michigan, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Virginia and Wisconsin, all battleground states.

Mind the Gap at Stanford University is an even sneakier covert group from this crowd. Their efforts haven't previously been reported. They recently petitioned some donors for at least \$100,000 to support its efforts. Backers include people like [Facebook co-founder Dustin Moskovitz](#), former Google CEO Eric Schmidt, San Francisco power broker Ron Conway, and a coterie of major Democratic donors from across Silicon Valley, including fundraiser Amy Rao. What is also unusual is that Mind the Gap is led not by highly experienced political hands, but by academics with no professional backgrounds as fundraisers. The group's leaders are a pair of Stanford law professors: [Barbara Fried](#), who has no apparent campaign experience, and [Paul Brest](#), the former president of the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation. [Graham Gottlieb](#), a Stanford fellow who served in junior roles for former President Barack Obama's 2012 reelection campaign and in his White House, is its executive director.

(<https://www.cnn.com/2016/09/09/politics/facebook-cofounder-gift-democrats/index.html>)

(<https://law.stanford.edu/directory/barbara-fried/>)

(<https://law.stanford.edu/directory/paul-brest/>)

(<https://casbs.stanford.edu/people/graham-gottlieb>)

While dressed in khaki's and acting like they are "saving the trees", the people behind these groups are cold-blooded mercenaries drunk on power, hookers, private jets and a sense of being above-the-law.

A Corrupt Politician They Didn't ...

<https://newswithviews.com/democrats-havent-seen-a-corrupt-politician-they-didnt-like/>

Overcoming the specter of a roiling federal **corruption** probe that threatened to draw the curtain on his 16-year career on Capitol Hill, ... Secretary of Energy **Steven Chu**, and UN Ambassador Susan Rice were all among the top ten most corrupt politicians in Washington for 2012, ...

OBAMA SCAM: Who are the main VIP cartel members targeted ...

<http://themillenniumreport.com/2018/02/obama-scam-who-are-the-main-vip-cartel-members-targeted-for-takedown/>

OBAMA SCAM: Who are the main VIP cartel members targeted for takedown? The Crooks

Is Elon Musk A Fraud?

https://xyzcase.weebly.com/uploads/1/4/4/1/14419908/is_elon_musk_a_fraud_.pdf

"Elon Musk is a criminal and a racketeer" Op-Ed- By Lee Van Steiner If you hear that phrase and you suddenly turn your brain off and think to yourself: "I don't want to hear that because, either; A.)

Ripoff Report > Washington, District of Columbia

<https://www.ripoffreport.com/reports/united-states-department-of-energy/washington-district-of-columbia-20585/united-states-department-of-energy-steven-chu-kathy-zoi-lachlan-seward-matt-rogers-st-1412021>

United States Department of Energy **Steven Chu**, Kathy Zoi, Lachlan Seward, Matt Rogers, Steve Spinner, They defrauded over 100 companies and individuals in a crony payola

Steven Chu Should Lose His Job Over The Solyndra Scandal ...

<https://www.investors.com/politics/editorials/steven-chu-should-step-down-after-solyndra-scandal/>

In testimony Thursday before the House Energy and Commerce Committee, **Steven Chu**, caught in a tangled web of administration deceit regarding a \$535 million guaranteed loan to Solyndra, tried but ...

THE BASICS

CAPSULE OVERVIEW:

A crime involving stock market securities insider-trading, contracts, bribes and famous politicians occurred. Plaintiff saw it, were invited in to it, and reported it and now a cover-up is being operated.

EXPANDED CAPSULE OVERVIEW:

Department of Energy Staff (ie: Chu, Zoi, Seward, Cohen, etc.), White House Staff (ie: Emanuel, Axelrod, Carney, Plouffe, Gibbs, etc.), CIA staff (ie: Panetta, Woolsey) owned the rare earth (ie: lithium, indium, cobalt) mining scam stock (ie: Goldman Sachs & JP Morgan transfers) market securities from foreign countries (ie: Afghanistan, Congo, etc.) which only benefited themselves, Elon Musk and his Silicon Valley Cartel (ie: Page, Cohen, Schmidt, Westly, Khosla, Spinner, Hoffman, etc.). They ran hit-jobs and anti-trust schemes against competitors and whistle-blowers using a racketeering operation structure. They run corporate escort rings, lobbyist bribe PACs, money laundering and tax evasion joint operations and character assassination media cartels.

MORE DETAILED OVERVIEW:

- Famous political figures use the **trillions** of dollars in government treasuries and the stock market for illicit profiteering by rigging the system exclusively for themselves and their crony insiders.
- They attacked us using government taxpayer funded media (***Fusion GPS, Black Cube, Google, Pysops, Gizmodo, Media Matters, Blumenthal, etc.***) and spy agency tools because we competed with their businesses and reported their crimes.
- San Francisco Bay Area government has as many corrupt politicians as Chicago and relies on the same RICO-violating insider corruption network to operate; as proven by deep AI searches of their financial records. Arrests of those officials is now underway.
- Silicon Valley law enforcement records prove that these tech oligarchs engage in an organized, racketeering-based, massive sex trafficking, tax evasion, anti-trust violating, spousal abuse, money laundering, black-listing, racist, ageist, political bribery, crony racketeering crime Cartel.
- Famous U.S. Senators, Governors and their staff knowingly engage in, finance, operate and benefit from these crimes in exchange for search engine manipulation and stock market assets.
- Silicon Valley and Hollywood media companies censor and cover-up news coverage of these crimes because they have a financial connection to the perpetrators.
- [Most of the government officials working on Plaintiff case were hand-picked by Plaintiff business adversaries.](#)

([http://american-corruption.com/EXPOSE THE MOBSTERS.html](http://american-corruption.com/EXPOSE_THE_MOBSTERS.html))

Plaintiffcase has never been fairly reviewed by non-biased, non-conflicted officials. Plaintiff FBI-class associates have not found a single entity in Plaintiff case reviews, or determinations, who was not

either: financed by, friends, with, sleeping with, dating the staff of, holding stock market assets in, promised a revolving door job or government service contracts from, partying with, personal friends with, photographed at private events with, exchanging emails with, business associates of or directed by; one of those business adversaries, or the Senators and politicians that those business adversaries pay campaign finances to, or supply political digital services to.

Who are the criminal mobsters of Silicon Valley's democracy manipulation millionaires and billionaires? Who are the elitist tax evader, sex freak, money-laundering, Senator bribing, off-shore cash hiding, election rigging insiders who try to rig the system for their own insider trading schemes: They hire these dirty law firms, investment bankers, lobbyists, fake charity fronts and character assassination services to do their dirty work. Their contractors and employees pay the bribes, relay the orders, buy the 'reporters', implement their black-lists, source the hookers and do the day-to-day illicit deeds.

These are the people funding and promoting riots across the US and Europe.

[LinkedIn Co-Founder Reid Hoffman](#), who [notoriously backed](#) a group that “spread disinformation during the 2017 Alabama special election for U.S. Senate,” is now being joined by other Big Tech billionaires in a plot to boost presumptive Democratic nominee for president Joe Biden in 2020.

(<https://www.forbes.com/profile/reid-hoffman/#3e47244a1849>)

(<https://www.newsbusters.org/blogs/techwatch/corinne-weaver/2019/04/23/lefty-billionaires-election-plot-bought-56x-more-ads>)

Democrats are “scrambling to patch [Biden’s] digital deficits,” according to [Vox Recode](#). “[B]ehind the scenes, Silicon Valley’s billionaire Democrats **are spending tens of millions of dollars on their own sweeping plans** to catch up to President Donald Trump’s lead on digital campaigning.” [Emphasis added.] Recode said these “sweeping plans” are “poised to make [these billionaires] some of the country’s most influential people when it comes to shaping the November results.”

These billionaires in particular are funding everything from “nerdy political science experiments to divisive partisan news sites to rivalrous attempts to overhaul the party’s beleaguered data file.”

As Recode tells it, “Joe Biden has a problem. Silicon Valley billionaires think they have a solution.”

Recode identified four major players from Big Tech that have the “most ambitious plans”: Reid Hoffman, Facebook co-founder [Dustin Moskovitz](#), philanthropist [Laurene Powell Jobs](#), and former Google CEO [Eric Schmidt](#).

(<https://www.forbes.com/profile/dustin-moskovitz/#7ca9684d1dd3>)

(<https://www.forbes.com/profile/laurene-powell-jobs/#436a3ff5704f>)

(<https://www.forbes.com/profile/eric-schmidt/#569af27c138e>)

Hoffman, in particular, stands out from the rest. [OpenSecrets](#) revealed that “political operations are pouring millions of ‘dark money’ dollars into ads and digital content masquerading as news coverage to influence the 2020 election.”

(<https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2020/05/dark-money-networks-fake-news-sites/>)

One of those progressive [operations](#) is dubbed Courier Newsroom, which “has faced scrutiny for exploiting the collapse of local journalism to spread ‘[hyperlocal partisan propaganda](#).’” Courier Newsroom is owned by the leftist nonprofit ACRONYM.

(<https://www.newsbusters.org/blogs/business/joseph-vazquez/2020/05/26/lefty-dark-money-group-acronym-behind-liberal-fake-news>)

(<https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/02/06/is-it-local-journalism-or-just-local-propaganda/>)

OpenSecrets reported that ACRONYM had “received [financial backing](#) from [Investing in US](#), an investment vehicle funded by Silicon Valley donor and billionaire LinkedIn founder Reid Hoffman.” Recode said that Hoffman’s “aides have indicated that setting up partisan news sites that masquerade as journalism is one of the priorities of its group of allied donors.” According to Recode, Hoffman has put around \$10 million into ACRONYM.

(<https://www.politico.com/news/2020/02/05/angry-democrats-unload-operative-over-iowa-caucus-results-110807>)

(<https://mronline.org/2020/02/07/acronym-group-that-sabotaged-iowa-caucus-birthed-by-billionaire-who-funded-alabama-disinformation-campaign/>)

But that isn’t all Hoffman has been up to. Recode reported that Hoffman invested “\$18 million, his single-biggest bet this cycle,” in a political startup called Alloy.

Recode reported that “[t]he startup is attempting to build a warehouse to store the data that various progressive groups collect on voters and use it to try to get them to the polls.” Recode continued: “As part of its data acquisition, Alloy has bought some lists of voters’ cellphone numbers, a data source that people say Hoffman’s team, like other donors, sees as key this year due to the new need for digital campaigning.”

The former [Google CEO Eric Schmidt](#) is also getting heavily involved this cycle. Recode said Schmidt “has sunk money into the Democratic Data Exchange, a modest, competing effort by the Democratic National Committee to encourage data sharing by state parties to improve the party’s beleaguered digital backbone.” Recode interestingly assessed that Schmidt “may be working more closely with the party than Hoffman.”

(<https://ericsschmidt.com/bio/>)

Schmidt also had [reportedly](#) given a \$4.7 million gift to the taxpayer-funded liberal outlet National Public Radio with his wife Wendy.

(<https://www.newsbusters.org/blogs/business/joseph-vazquez/2020/05/20/npr-editor-lauds-npr-landing-47m-contribution-dem-donor>)

“This focus on ‘information distribution’ has also led many Silicon Valley donors, directly or indirectly, to fund projects like [Pulso](#) and [PushBlack](#), which are quasi-journalistic plays focused on the Hispanic and African American communities, respectively,” Recode said. “Two things both Pulso and PushBlack also do? Register voters who are likely to be Democrats.”

(<https://projectpulso.org/>)

(<https://pushblack.org/>)

Tech billionaires, “particularly Moskovitz and Powell Jobs,” are unleashing “millions into some of the country’s most ambitious voter-registration programs — **almost all of it behind the scenes** — hoping to emulate what worked for Democrats in 2018,” according to Recode. [Emphasis added.]

About a dozen voter-registration groups, which included failed Democratic Georgia gubernatorial candidate Stacey Abrams’s leftist group [Fair Fight](#), gathered at Powell Jobs’s “Emerson Collective headquarters in mid-March to raise money for their 2020 plans, sources told Recode.”

(<https://fairfight.com/about-fair-fight/>)

For Moskovitz, his “North Star is a desire to nail the lowest ‘cost-per-net-Democratic-vote.’” Recode said “[t]hat’s largely led his team toward the funding of mail and voter-registration work.”

As [Big Tech platform Twitter](#) dips into editorializing Trump’s tweets, it appears that other billionaire liberals from Silicon Valley are not going to be sitting idly by for a repeat of the 2016 election outcome.

(<https://www.newsbusters.org/blogs/techwatch/alexander-hall/2020/05/27/liberal-media-back-twitter-fact-checking-trump-voter-fraud>)

These people operate like a private Mafia that use Plaintiff government as their plaything!

Recap:

The Silicon Valley tech Cartel (AKA: "Paypal Mafia", "Deep State") is evil because these racist, ageist, sex-trafficking, money-laundering, elitist, politician bribing, tax evaders: steal any technology they desire; They manufactured the CLEANTECH CRASH as shown in the 60 MINUTES episode of the same name; they run a prostitution ring and sexually extort young women and interns in Silicon Valley; they are 'rape culture' take-what-they-want misogynists, ageists and racists as their history of abuses has proven; their Palo Alto Cartel operates AngelGate-type collusion and stock market insider trading schemes that harm independent business and the public; their Cartel ran the "no poaching" CEO ring which was class-action sued by DOJ and tech workers; 90% of their divorce court files reveal horrific abuses and sex trafficking; They have an army of lobbyists that pay cash, stock market and revolving door bribes to U.S. Senators; They can even evade FBI & SEC investigations; They hire women to act as 'trophy wives' and 'beards'; they have lobbyists rig the U.S. Patent Office in order to block inventor patent rights because they are using stolen technologies; they have been caught on video and

recordings beating, kicking and harming women hundreds of times; They have bought up all of the Tier-One tech law firms and order them to black-list, and never help, those who seek equal tech rights; they collude to abuse your privacy and make databases on the public for political control; they have to cheat to compete because they are only good with spread sheets instead of innovation; They run black-lists, character assassination attacks, collusion and other anti-trust violating acts in violation of RICO laws. Silicon Valley has become the largest assemblage of douche-bags and yuppie frat boy criminals in human history. Theranos is not the exception, it is the standard. Tesla, Google, Theranos, Wework, Facebook are lies backed by famous political insiders to protect their insider trading and covered-up by fake news operators. They are also fronts to fund political campaigns via the ill-gotten profits from their endeavors. When the bad guys, and their lap-dog politicians, attack you because your products are better than theirs they are proving that they are frat boy scumbags, from Stanford and Yale, that operate in a little pack, like dogs! Their Sandhill Road operation should be raided by the FBI! The best thing that could come from the COVID pandemic is that they all are forced into bankruptcy! When your Senator holds stock market shares in companies that exist to profit on the backs of consumers, via corruption, then it is impossible for that Senator to ever do anything but be corrupt! We have reported this in writing to winklerm@sec.gov, sanfrancisco@sec.gov and 30+ other federal officers but have yet to see Plaintiff whistle-blower rewards...or any action! Do you wonder how big politician insider stock trading is? Take a look at how many TRILLIONS of dollars pass through the stock markets annually and then look at the reported, AND UNREPORTED, securities holdings of famous U.S. Senators and government agency staff. That is what Seth Rich and the people in the "In Memory Of" section, below, were disclosing. These are massive crimes! The perpetrators operate a massive and abusive national sex cult. The perverts in the SandHill Road Venture Capital offices, located between Highway 280 down to Santa Cruz Avenue on Sand Hill Road in Menlo Park, California, are the main perpetrators of this global cartel. Their executives at Google, Facebook, Netflix, LinkedIn, Twitter, and their related holdings, comprise the rest. The Harvey Weinstein and Ed Buck sex scandals are well known. These men's sex cult actions have been widely covered in the news individually in the Joe Lonsdale rape case, The Kleiner Perkins Ellen Pao sex abuse lawsuit, The Eric Schmidt sex penthouse stories, The Jeffrey Epstein case, The Google Forrest Hayes hooker murder case, The Andy Rubin sex slave case, The Sergy Brin 3-way sex romp scandal, The British Hydrant investigation, The Elon Musk Steve Jurvetson billionaire sex parties scandals, The NXIVM sexual slave cases, The Michael Goguen anal sex slave trial, The Tom Perkins Hooker Parties and thousands of other cases and federal divorce court filings. This group of people have proven themselves, over and over, to be sociopath control freaks not fit for participation in public commerce, public policy or media control. The Four Seasons Hotel and Rosewood Hotels in Silicon Valley are estimated to engage in over \$30,000.00 of high-end escort sex trafficking per day, a portion of it managed by Eastern Bloc Mafia operators. The Elon Musk sex perversions are the tip of the iceberg. At least 10 Ukrainian escorts fly in and out of SFO and SJO airports every week for these Cartel members. Google boss David Drummond engaged in horrible philandering sexual violations of his wife yet Google covers up every story about it on the web. Google's Eric Schmidt is under massive investigation. You hear about the female victims of this sex cult but you rarely hear about the young male victims. One of their vast numbers of prostitutes is quoted as saying that the girls and boys are paid "not just for sex but for the oligarch's endless need to feel that they can control anyone for any reason...". Multiple attorney general's controlled by their cartel, ie: Eric Schneiderman and Eliot Spitzer, are involved in these sex rings. These are the main influencers of a national political party and they are all involved in horrific sex perversions and abuses! All Silicon Valley tech cartel media companies work together to censor all news and information in order to hide coverage of their dirty deeds and to only put politicians in office that will give the Cartel political payola, kick-backs and insider stock pumps. The Smedley Butler "Business Plot" from the past

is not unlike the coup that Google and clan tried. See details in Emily Chang's book: BROTOPIA; Roan Farrow's book: CATCH & KILL; Edward Snowden's Book: PERMANENT RECORD; Peter Schwetzer's book: THROW THEM ALL OUT; Dave Eggers book: THE CIRCLE; Franklin Foer's book: WORLD WITHOUT MIND; Corey Pein's book: JOURNEY INTO THE SAVAGE HEART OF SILICON VALLEY; Dan Lyon's book: DISRUPTED; Antonio Martinez book: CHAOS MONKEYS. The Angelgate, Epstein, No-Poaching DOJ Class Action, and hundreds of other cases, prove that they meet, conspire, collude and blacklist in felony violation of anti-trust and RICO Racketeering laws. - 90% of these guys came from 100% of the fraternity houses involved in the recent college rape cases.

The Quid Pro Quo

How California Politicians And Silicon Valley Tech Company Quid-Pro-Quo Works To Hide The Criminality of Corruption

Christine Lakatos massive investigations of Jerry Brown, Dianne Feinstein, Nancy Pelosi, Kamala Harris and other famous California politicians owning parts of Tesla Motors, Facebook, Google, Netflix and Cleantech is jaw dropping. All of those politicians competing constituents have suffered for it, or been put out of business by exclusive deals that only Tesla Motors, Facebook, Google, Netflix and YouTube got. That is a crime!

A large volume of forensic research proves that Silicon Valley Cartel tech firms receive benefits from politicians and politicians, at the same time, benefit from these firms.

This evidence on the exchange of benefits between politicians and firms implies some sort of agreement between these two parties. This agreement, however, cannot be in the form of a written contract as writing direct fee-for-service contracts between a politician and a firm is considered bribery (Krozner and Stratmann 1998; 2000). In addition, either party to this agreement might renege on its promise and the other party cannot resort to the courts.

Procon.org, for example, reports: “Less than two months after ascending to the United States Senate, Barack Obama bought more than \$50,000 worth of stock in two speculative companies whose major investors included some of his biggest political donors. One of the companies was a biotech concern that was starting to develop a drug to treat avian flu. In March 2005, two weeks after buying about \$5,000 of its shares, Mr. Obama took the lead in a legislative push for more federal spending to battle the disease. The most recent financial disclosure form for Mr. Obama . . . shows that he bought more than \$50,000 in stock in a satellite communications business whose principal backers . . . had raised more than \$150,000 for his political committees.” (<http://insidertrading.procon.org/viewresource.asp?resourceID=1580#obamaa>. See more examples from the Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (CREW) report (2009).)

The literature and Plaintiff eye-witness experience proves that politically-connected Silicon Valley tech firms monthly obtain economic favors, such as securing favorable legislation, special tax exemptions, having preferential access to finance, receiving government contracts, or help in dealing with regulatory agencies. The evidence proves that Google's support, for example, can help in winning elections. For example, firms can vary the number of people they employ, coordinate the opening and closing of plants, and increase their lending activity in election years in order to help incumbent politicians get re-elected. (See Roberts 1990; Snyder 1990; Langbein and Lotwis 1990; Durden, Shorgen, and Silberman 1991; Stratmann 1991, 1995, and 1998; Fisman 2001; Johnson and Mitton 2003; Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Ueda 2004; Sapienza 2004, Dinç 2005; Khwaja and Mian 2005; Bertrand, Kramarz, Schoar, and Thesmar 2006; Faccio 2006; Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell 2006;

Jayachandran 2006; Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee 2006; Claessens, Feijen, Laeven 2008; Desai and Olofsgard 2008; Ramanna 2008; Goldman, Rocholl, and So 2008, 2009; Cole 2009; Cooper, Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov 2009; Correia 2009; Ramanna and Roychowdhury 2010; Benmelech and Moskowitz 2010.)

The share ownership of politicians serves as a mechanism to quid-pro-quo their relationships with big tech firms, is as follows: The ownership of politicians plays multiple distinct (but not necessarily independent) roles; one that relies upon the amount of ownership and one that does not. First, as investors in firms, politicians tie their own interests to those of the firm. Thus, harming (benefiting) the firm means harming (benefiting) the politician and vice versa. By owning a firm's stock, politicians commit their personal wealth to the firm and reduce a firm's uncertainty with regard to their actions toward the firm. This will, in turn, enhance the firm's incentive to support the politician-owner during both current and future elections in order to prolong the incumbency period for as long as possible. Firms have their lobbyists push to be able to know the amount of ownership likely to be material to politicians. This knowledge, in turn, enables them to judge whether the politician's interest is aligned with the firm's interest and optimize quid-pro-quo.

The Political Action Committee (PAC) contribution of firms (which is a direct measure of benefits flowing from firms to politicians) is a significant determinant of ownership allocations by members of Congress. The ownership of Congress members in firms that contribute to their election campaigns is roughly 32.8% higher than their ownership in noncontributing firms even after accounting for factors that are associated with both ownership and contribution (such as familiarity, proximity and investor recognition). Democratic members invest more (less) in firms that favor, i.e., contribute more to, the Democratic Party. Politicians are partisan investors.

The committee assignments of politicians is a proxy for whether their relations with firms are enforced (Kroznor and Stratmann 1998). Silicon Valley tech firms like Facebook, Tesla and Google obtain private benefits out of their mutual relations with politicians. When the strength of the association between ownership and contributions at the firm level increases, the provision of government contracts to those firms increases.

Members of Congress, candidates for federal office, senior congressional staff, nominees for executive branch positions, Cabinet members, the President and Vice President, and Supreme Court justices are required by the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 to file annual reports disclosing their income, assets, liabilities, and other relevant details about their personal finances.

Personal financial disclosure forms are filed annually by May 15 and cover the preceding calendar year. The Center for Responsive Politics (CRP) collected the 2004–2007 reports for Congress members from the Senate Office of Public Records and the Office of the Clerk of the House. The Center then scanned the reports as digital images, classified the politicians' investments into categories including stocks, bonds, and mutual funds, and built a database accessible via a web query.

Using CRP's website, you can collect the shares in S&P 500 firms held by members of Congress between 2004 and 2007, for example. You can collect the stock ownership data for every firm that

joined the S&P 500 Index any time between January 2004 and April 2009; regardless of when it joined the index, and you can obtain all the available stock ownership data for that firm between 2004 and 2007. Likewise, if a firm dropped out of the index at any time during 2004–2008, you nevertheless should retain the firm in your sample for the target period. As such, your sample would include stocks in 642 unique firms owned by politicians between 2004 and 2007, for example.

Politicians are required to report only those stocks whose value exceeds \$1,000 at the end of the calendar year or that produce more than \$200 in income. They are CURRENTLY not required to report the exact value of the holding, but instead must simply check a box corresponding to the value range into which the asset falls. The CRP then undertakes additional research to determine the exact values of these stocks. When the Center makes these determinations, it reports them instead of the ranges and I use these values in my study. When only the range is available, you should use its midpoint as the holding's value. You would, thus have data on the stock holdings of over 709 politicians for that time period.

Using the CRP's website, you can search for all Political Action Committees (PACs) associated with tech firms. You then collect data on each contribution these PACs made to candidates (both the winners and losers) running for the Senate and House elections. Tricky corrupt Silicon Valley firms establish several PACs, each in a different location, and each of these PACs can contribute to the same candidate. In such cases, you total for each candidate every contribution he or she received from PACs affiliated with the same firm. To parallel the investment data sample period, for example, you collect every contribution made from the 2003–2004 cycle up to and including the 2007–2008 cycle. Many Silicon Valley tech firms use deeply covert Fusion GPS, Perkins Coie, BlackCube, Psyops-type service to make very hidden additional payola payments to California politicians.

You can collect government contract data from Eagle Eye Publishers, Inc., one of the leading commercial providers of Federal procurement and grant business intelligence and <http://www.usaspending.org>. Eagle Eye collects its contract data from Federal Procurement Data System–Next Generation (FPDS-NG), the contract data collection and dissemination system administered by the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA). FPDS-NG provides data on procurement contracts awarded by the U.S. Government. If these contracts are awarded to company subsidiaries, Eagle Eye searches for the names of their parent companies and assigns each subsidiary to its appropriate parent. You must collect both the number and aggregate value of government contracts that were awarded to my sample firms between 2004 and 2007 in Plaintiff example time-frame..

You will see, for example, that Representative Maxine Waters (D-CA) is a ten-term member of Congress and a senior member of the House Financial Services Committee. She arranged a meeting between the Department of Treasury and OneUnited Bank, a company with close financial ties to Ms. Waters, involving both investments and contributions.

“In September 2008, Rep. Waters asked then-Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson to hold a meeting for minority-owned banks that had suffered from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac losses.

The Treasury Department complied and held a session with approximately a dozen senior banking regulators, representatives from minority-owned banks, and their trade association. Officials of OneUnited Bank, one of the largest black-owned banks in the country that has close ties to Rep. Waters, attended the meeting along with Rep. Waters' chief of staff. Kevin Cohee, chief executive officer of OneUnited, used the meeting as an opportunity to ask for bailout funds.

. . . Former Bush White House officials stated they were surprised when OneUnited Officials asked for bailout funds. . . . In December 2008, Rep. Waters intervened again, asking Treasury to host another meeting to ensure minority-owned banks received part of the \$700 billion allocated under the Troubled Asset Relief Program. . . . Within two weeks, on December 19, 2008, OneUnited secured \$12.1 million in bailout funds. . . . This was not the first time Rep. Waters used her position to advance the interests of the bank. Rep. Waters' spouse, Sidney Williams, became a shareholder in OneUnited in 2001, when it was known as the Boston Bank of Commerce. In 2002, Boston Bank of Commerce tried to purchase Family Savings, a minority-owned bank in Los Angeles. Instead, Family Savings turned to a bank in Illinois. Rep. Waters tried to block the merger by contacting regulators at the FDIC. She publicly stated she did not want a major white bank to acquire a minority-owned bank.

When her efforts with the FDIC proved fruitless, Rep. Waters began a public pressure campaign with other community leaders. Ultimately, when Family Savings changed direction and allowed Boston Bank of Commerce to submit a winning bid, Rep. Waters received credit for the merger. The combined banks were renamed OneUnited. . . . In March 2004, she acquired OneUnited stock worth between \$250,001 and \$500,000, and Mr. Williams purchased two sets of stock, each worth between \$250,001 and \$500,000. In September 2004, Rep. Waters sold her stock in OneUnited and her husband sold a portion of his. That same year, Mr. Williams joined the bank's board. . . . OneUnited Chief Executive Kevin Cohee and President Teri Williams Cohee have donated a total of \$8,000 to Rep. Waters' campaign committee. . . . On October 27, 2009, less than two months before OneUnited received a \$12 million bailout, the bank received a cease-and-desist order from the FDIC and bank regulatory officials in Massachusetts for poor lending practices and excessive executive compensation . . . the bank provided excessive perks to its executives, including paying for Mr. Cohee's use of a \$6.4 million mansion . . ." (Crew report 2009, pp. 123–125)

Thanks to Crony quid-pro-quo, we also have Fisker Automotive, Inc.'s \$529 Million U.S. Taxpayer Loan Approval by the Department of Energy, detailing how startup Fisker Automotive's Chief Operating Officer Bernhard Koehler pleaded with the Department of Energy in a panicked Saturday midnight hour email to receive a \$529 million loan as the company was 2 weeks from Chapter 7 liquidation, that it was laying off most of its employees, that no private sector investors would fund the company without DOE guarantees, and that Fisker was unable to raise any further equity funding from independent private-sector investors given the company's financial condition. These statements were made to a Loan Officer at the DOE . No private sector Loan underwriting (approval) committee would ever grant a low interest loan to a desperate buyer that had just confessed it was in a state of insolvency and was about to layoff most of its staff. Yet within a few weeks the DOE would approve a \$529 Million Credit Facility to Fisker. Despite the DOE Loan Officer official's sworn testimony at April

24th's House Oversight Committee that the DOE used "same private sector underwriting standards when approving Fisker and other approved Taxpayer Funded Loans" - likely perjury based in documents.

In a 'U.S. GOVERNMENT CONFIDENTIAL EMAIL': FISKER AUTOMOTIVE: August 2009: Co-Founder Bernhard Koehler emails U.S. Dept. of Energy Loan Officer in Sat. midnight Panic admitting VC Firms all declined to invest, and company is out of cash. Weeks later the U.S. Department of Energy approves \$529M U.S. Taxpayer Funded Loans to FISKER. NO PRIVATE SECTOR Lender would ever authorize a Loan for even \$5 Million let alone \$529 Million after receiving this email stating private sector investors had examined the company and declined equity investments, that they might loan money as more secure Debt, and the Chief Operating Officer of the company further stating that the borrower is totally insolvent. (Weeks after this email the U.S. Federal Government Dept. of Energy Loan Committee Approves Fisker Automotive as a credit-worthy borrow for \$529 Million in U.S. Taxpayer Funded Loans). Fisker got the cash because President Obama said to "give it to them" in order to please his campaign financiers.

The same thing happened with Tesla Motors. Elon Musk and Tesla Motors were broke when DOE gave them the money.

PrivCo CEO Sam Hamadeh stated in an official statement: "The documents obtained by PrivCo paint a picture of how an insolvent, unproven automaker received \$192 million in taxpayer funding. The Department of Energy made a loan that no rational lender would have made. This loan was the equivalent of staying execution on a company that was terminally ill to begin with." Tesla and Fisker could not have been taxpayer funded unless bribes and criminal quid-pro-quo was underway by President Obama and the U.S. Senator insider traders.

XP Vehicle's had been the first to initiate negotiations to retask the NUMMI plant in Fremont, California after Elon Musk went on the record saying the NUMMI Plant was worthless to Tesla. Dianne Feinstein's chief of staff then threatened XP Vehicles and warned them to cease action on NUMMI. Shortly thereafter, Tesla announced they had acquired the NUMMI plant which Dianne Feinstein's family owned a business interest and she had arranged for Tesla to get funding and presided at the Tesla re-opening of the NUMMI plant.

Per [Christine Lakatos](#) 2014 began with a bang: "[Obama's Second Term Is All About Climate Change.](#)" *New York Magazine*, in their reporting, claimed that the evidence of this has to do with President Obama's appointment of John Kerry ("longtime climate obsessive") as Secretary of State, as well as other key green appointees.

(<https://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2014/01/obamas-second-term-is-all-about-climate-change.html>)

Kerry, by the way, while recently in Indonesia, blasted climate change deniers, warning, "Climate change may be the world's 'most fearsome' weapon of mass destruction and urgent action is needed to combat it," [wrote](#) CBC News Canada.

(<https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/john-kerry-blasts-climate-change-deniers-shoddy-scientists-1.2539163>)

This scare tactic — now adding to the long list of liberal crap, which includes ludicrous allegations that climate change [will lead to](#) “an orgy of killing, looting, rape and burglary” (just ask James Delingpole) — surfaced just weeks after President Obama’s State of the Union address (January 28, 2014) where he emphatically [declared](#) that the climate change debate is over.

(<https://www.breitbart.com/Breitbart-London/2014/02/28/Rape-Muder-Chocolate-Shortages-Is-There-Anything-Climate-Change-Doesn-t-Cause>)

(<https://www.politico.com/blogs/politico-live/2014/01/obama-climate-change-is-a-fact-182145.html>)

But the debate is settled. Climate change is a fact. And when Plaintiff children’s children look us in the eye and ask if we did all we could to leave them a safer, more stable world, with new sources of energy, I want us to be able to say yes, we did.

A claim that many Americans, including *Washington Post* columnist Charles Krauthammer, find “[absurd](#)” — with [even](#) co-founder of Greenpeace Patrick Moore, last month, [stating](#) to members of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee that there is no scientific proof of man-made climate change.

(<https://dailycaller.com/2014/02/17/krauthammer-the-president-pretends-that-this-is-all-settled-science/>)

(<https://www.thenewamerican.com/tech/environment/item/17736-no-proof-of-man-made-climate-change-says-greenpeace-co-founder>)

(https://www.epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=415b9cde-e664-4628-8fb5-ae3951197d03)

The president, during his speech, which was a “[call to action](#)” with or without Congress, also [pumped up](#) his “all the above” energy strategy, asserting that it was working: “America is closer to energy independence.” Later, Mr. Obama claimed that his energy policy “was creating jobs and leading to a cleaner, safer planet.”

(<https://www.cnn.com/2014/01/28/politics/2014-state-of-the-union/index.html>)

(https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/full-text-of-obamas-2014-state-of-the-union-address/2014/01/28/e0c93358-887f-11e3-a5bd-844629433ba3_story.html)

While Marita Noon (energy expert and Towhall.com [columnist](#)) has continually tackled the president’s so-called “energy independence” assertion, together we have debunked the green jobs hype and deception many times, including in my recent study on the [Obama-backed green energy failures](#).

(<https://greencorruption.blogspot.com/2014/01/cleantech-crash-cbs-lesley-stahl.html>)

Moreover, a year ago, we blew the lid off of [Climate Hawk Kerry](#) and his part in green corruption. What's most disingenuous is that while Kerry preaches "global warming doom and gloom," his "government carbon footprint" is [enormous](#) — with no end in sight. (And who's tracking his personal carbon footprint?)

(https://greencorruption.blogspot.com/2013/01/climate-hawk-senator-john-kerry-and-his.html#.Uuu0Tyhc_zJ)

(<https://freebeacon.com/politics/analysis-john-kerrys-carbon-footprint-is-enormous/>)

Worse, Kerry played a part in crafting President Obama's 2009 stimulus bill, which was a piece of legislation that allowed him to create a *financial footprint* inside this scandal as well. This includes *timely* green energy investments with the Big VC firm Kleiner Perkins (where "climate billionaires" John Doerr and Al Gore are partners) that will be mentioned many times in this post, including the fact that this firm was a huge winner from the Green Bank of Obama.

The massive spending bill, commonly known as the economic stimulus package, which was [signed into law](#) five years ago, was marketed as a means to save Plaintiff economy from the brink of disaster and create American jobs.

(<https://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/economy/198547-white-house-touts-stimulus-on-fifth-anniversary>)

If you caught Michelle Malkin's [tribute](#) to the so-called (failed) Recovery Act, you'll discover, "The actual cost of the \$800 billion pork-laden stimulus has ballooned to nearly [\\$2 trillion](#)."

(<https://michellemalkin.com/2014/02/14/5-years-later-hows-that-wreckovery-working-out-for-ya/>)

(https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/post/the-real-price-tag-for-stimulus-between-1-trillion-and-17-trillion/2011/08/25/gIQA2Cc41Q_blog.html)

Even Speaker of the House John Boehner [weighed in](#), "The 'stimulus' has turned out to be a classic case of big promises and big spending with little results ..."

(<https://dailycaller.com/2014/02/17/obama-quiet-as-gop-taunts-him-for-failed-stimulus-plan/>)

Tucked inside was approximately \$100 billion earmarked for renewable energy, which [became](#) "a special-interest feeding frenzy."

(<https://washingtonexaminer.com/obamas-stimulus-became-a-special-interest-feeding-frenzy/article/2544230>)

Obama's Second Term Agenda: Climate change by executive fiat & billions more of taxpayer cash

Obama has [continually pledged](#) during his second term, that he will be “governing unilaterally, by executive order and by regulatory mandate,” [warned](#) a *Washington Times* reporter — thus his [weapons of warfare](#) are his “pen and phone.” Forget about the Constitution and its check and balances.

Even as those on the Right are up in arms over in the president’s [excessive use](#) (and abuse) of executive power, leading Democrats are [applauding this move](#) and pushing for more. Yet if we go back in time to 2008, we find that then-candidate Obama played a different tune, [slamming](#) President Bush’s use of executive action.

The author of the *New York Magazine* [piece](#) also noted that other than Secretary of State John Kerry, several Obama second-term moves signal the high priority he assigns the issue of climate change: “This is true not only of the figures Obama has appointed to posts that inherently concern climate change, like his [green appointees](#) to run the Environmental Protection Agency [EPA] and the Department of Energy [DOE], but also to general political advisors, like Denis McDonough and John Podesta, both committed environmentalists who will drive Obama’s climate focus” — both McDonough and Podesta from the left-wing think tank, Center for American Progress (CAP), and the focus of this Green Corruption File.

Podesta, who in November 2013, [was spotted](#) at a fundraising event for Hillary Clinton, [according to](#) the *Washington Post*, “Is expected to stay with the Obama administration for a just a year, freeing him to join the campaign of Mrs. Clinton if she runs for president in 2016.” It turns out that McDonough was the one that brokered his “executive power gig,” of which “Podesta’s portfolio would be broad and would include climate-change issues and executive actions, as well as the troubled health-care law,” [reported](#) the *Washington Post*.

As Kerry and Obama continue their campaign of “climate disaster on the horizon,” the strategic [move](#) in adding Podesta as White House counselor had already signaled an aggressive approach to their radical, expensive and deceptive green energy agenda. In fact, Podesta began his role inside the Obama White House by stirring up the liberal base, when in a [profile published](#) on December 17, 2013 by POLITICO, “Podesta is quoted comparing Republicans to the infamous cult led by Jim Jones, who was responsible for the 1978 cyanide poisoning of more than 900 of his followers in Guyana...” — only to later [apologize](#) via twitter of all places.

Now [labeled](#) “climate change and energy transformation agenda,” Obama and his minions have been, and continue to push through their radical views with [mandates](#), [regulations](#) and legislation, which benefits special interest groups and the Obama administration’s green cronies, while adversely affecting American families. Even the non-partisan organization Reason.com, too, sees the [dire reality](#) here: “Obama’s [Climate Five-Year] plan ambitiously seeks to control nearly every aspect of how Americans produce and consume energy.” One of those is directing the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) “to work expeditiously to complete carbon pollution standards for both new and existing power plants.”

Using the iron fist of the EPA — a key department in Obama’s “war on energy” known for its [abuse of power](#) — the president also tried to force refiners to produce cellulosic biofuels. However, [as noted by](#) Political Outcast, “The standards set were completely unrealistic and unattainable.” On the horizon are

new [green rules](#) for trucks, buses and other heavy-duty vehicles, as well as whatever *maneuvers* the White House deems suited for their “[green energy revolution](#).”

Additionally, whether we like it or not, this clean-energy mission is funded by taxpayers — President Obama’s “save the planet slush fund.” A March 2012 [report](#) by the Brookings Institute places the Obama administrations’ “total government spending (both stimulus and non-stimulus) on green initiatives at [\\$150 billion through 2014](#). But that’s not enough to save the planet. Last month, the president [began pushing](#) for a \$1 billion taxpayer-funded program “to help communities across the country prepare for the effects of climate change” — AKA the climate resilience fund. This program is separate from the “[Climate Action Plan](#)” that the president introduced in June 2013, which also calls for releasing [more taxpayer money](#) (\$8 billion [from](#) the DOE Loan Guarantee Program).

Furthermore, Obama’s DOE is [attempting to establish](#) a new renewable energy section (under the DOE Loan Guarantee Program), for grid-integrated green power projects — with the plan of spending anywhere from \$1.5 billion to as much as \$4 billion of taxpayer money. The Obama administration is also [restarting](#) the DOE’s Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing ([ATVM](#)), which is also part of the DOE Loan Guarantee Program — with more than \$15 billion in remaining authority.

This is the same Energy Department program which the Green Corruption Files has exposed many times how, in the process of doling out \$34 billion of taxpayer money, at least 90 percent of the recipients have *meaningful* politically connections (bundlers, top donors, fundraisers, etc) to the president and other high-ranking Democrats — in many cases, to both. While the DOE will have you believe that these loans were based on “merit,” the kicker is that in March 2012, the House Oversight and Government Reform committee [unleashed a damaging report](#) revealing that the stimulus-created 1705 section of the DOE’s Loan Program had doled out in excess of \$16 billion to 26 projects, of which 22 of the loans were rated “Junk” grade due to their poor credit quality. “The remaining ended up on lowest end of the investment grade of categories, giving the DOE’s 1705 loan portfolio an overall average of BB-.”

So, it’s no wonder that this loan program fostered big [alternative energy losers](#) such as Solyndra, Beacon Power, Abound Solar, Vehicle Production Group, and Fisker Automotive, flushing billions of tax dollars down the toilet — with billions more still at risk. Yet, the loan program is not the only one place you’ll find the president’s “cleantech” losers. In January, I released my new study, [documenting](#) 32 Obama-backed green energy failures, while tracking the financially troubled, and even those, ironically, having environmental issues as well — over 30 and counting.

Besides the fact that the Energy Department [continues to subsidize](#) green energy, there are also many stimulus-created programs that have been extended and are still dishing out “the green.”

(<https://www.hydrogenfuelnews.com/doe-offers-funding-geothermal-energy-research/8516476/>)

One of the largest is the [1603 Grant Program](#), which to date has awarded over \$20 billion of tax-free cash. The Advanced Energy Manufacturing Tax Credit program ([48C Program](#)), which was funded by \$2.3 billion, just unleashed Phase II.

(<https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/recovery/Pages/1603.aspx>)

(<https://energy.gov/downloads/48c-phase-ii-advanced-energy-manufacturing-tax-credit-program-selections>)

The currently passed 1,000-page [trillion-dollar farm bill](#) will continue to fund renewable energy programs such as the Biorefinery Assistance Program, administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA). The USDA, with \$1.02 billion in loan power, along with \$600 million stimulus funds from the Energy Department and a \$132 million DOE stimulus loan, used taxpayer money to fund 31 “not so shovel-ready” risky projects (also politically connected) — of which last time I checked (August 2013), about a third were having issues.

(<https://www.omaha.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20140129/NEWS/140128521/1689>)

Podesta Power

Over the course of unleashing this scandal, I've hinted that CAP is a dark, driving force behind President Obama's massive green energy scheme — roles that range from legitimate to shady lobbying practices, to the fact that numerous CAP “fellows” were at the helm of the green energy deal making, holding key positions inside the Obama White House, his Green Team, and his Energy Department.

Today's Green Corruption File will connect the dots as to Center for American Progress' part in this scam, while shedding light on old and new data. As I *progress*, I'll expose its alternative energy advocacy as well as its funders — corporate donors that were kept secret until their release in late 2013 — **with those in the renewable energy business (at least 17) cashing in at the Green Bank of Obama.**

Let's go back in time when Podesta — former chief of staff to President Bill Clinton — was *infamous* for what is dubbed “[Project Podesta](#)“: “This was a system that enabled the Clintons to push through unpopular policies that neither Congress nor the American people wanted. Its implementation marked a dramatic tilt in the balance of power, giving the executive branch an unprecedented ability to force its will on the legislative branch,” documented [DiscoverTheNetworks.com](#).

Most know that in 2003, Podesta founded CAP, which as mentioned, is organization funded by billionaire George Soros, who has a [massive footprint](#) inside this green corruption scandal. He then served as the organization's president and CEO, of which it was [reported](#), “Podesta was hand-picked for the job by CAP co-founders Soros and Morton H. Halperin.”

In 2008 and early 2009, Podesta, an Obama bundler, while still at CAP, [ran](#) Obama's transition team as the co-chair [along side](#) Valerie Jarrett and [Peter Rouse](#). Meanwhile by 2011, Podesta stepped down from his CEO role and [became the](#) Chair of CAP and the CAP Action Fund — only to leave CAP and join the White House at the end of 2013 in his new role as Obama's “[executive power czar](#).”

But if you go back to right after the Republican 2010-midterm victory, Podesta already had a plan: “The president should bypass Congress and wield the executive powers of his office,” [reported](#) Bloomberg last December. In fact, “Podesta had compiled 47 pages of proposals for unilateral action on issues from immigration to solar energy.” Podesta even [wrote the foreword](#) for that [CAP report](#) “on how the president could use his executive authority to advance a progressive agenda, including actions to unilaterally force the U.S. economy to become greener.”

Furthermore, Podesta has served as an Independent Advisory Council [member](#) of the notoriously corrupt community organization [ACORN](#). Podesta was also on the board of the Apollo Alliance as late as 2011. While I’ve unleashed the Apollo Alliance (now BlueGreen Alliance) and [their](#) part inside this massive clean-energy scam, I’ll briefly touch upon them again today. But what’s key here is that Apollo is [another](#) Soros-funded left-wing organization, who along with its “[green jobs radical network](#),” exerts powerful influence on the views and policies of the Obama administration — and they too were involved in drafting the 2009-Recovery Act.

CAP’s Left-wing Billionaire George Soros: Obama’s “agent of green”

Meanwhile, [Soros](#) is one of the 2009 stimulus authors that [I had covered](#) in October 2013: Those individuals and groups that were involved in crafting the clean-energy sector of the [2009 Recovery Act](#), and who ultimately financially benefited directly (and/or their invested firms, family or friends) from the \$100 billion that [was earmarked](#) for renewable energy.

According to Peter Schweizer’s blockbuster 2011 bestseller [Throw Them All Out](#):

Billionaire George Soros gave advice and direction on how President Obama should allocate so-called “stimulus” money in a series of regular private meetings and consultations with White House senior advisers even as Soros was making investments in areas affected by the stimulus program.

While we know that early on, [Soros had visited the White House](#) on at least five occasions since Barack Obama became president, possibly more, Schweizer gives specifics, “Mr. Soros [met with](#) Mr. Obama’s top economist, [Larry Summers — also a CAP fellow] on February 25, 2009 and twice more with senior officials in the Old Executive Office Building on March 24th and 25th as the stimulus plan was being crafted. Later, Mr. Soros also participated in discussions on financial reform.”

As documented by Schweizer, “In the first quarter of 2009, [Mr. Soros went](#) on a stock-buying spree in companies that ultimately benefited from the federal stimulus,” including twelve alternative energy and utility companies. Moreover, if we add in other Soros green energy investments that bagged “green” funds, we can confirm that this Soros is connected to at least \$11 billion from the Green Bank of Obama, the majority from the 2009-Recovery Act.

Due to the fact that Soros is a well-known donor to CAP, here’s a sneak peek of what I personally tracked in my [March 2013 Green Corruption File](#), exposing how this left-wing billionaire not only bankrolled Obama’s 2008 and 2012 campaigns, but cashed in on the stimulus bill that he helped craft. Interestingly, four of these companies are also CAP corporate donors (marked with an asterisks), which will be detailed later.

- **Brookfield Asset Management (BAM):** As documented in the March 20, 2012 House Oversight [report](#) on the DOE’s disastrous loan program, “George Soros and Martin J. Whitman, both prominent Democratic donors, are both heavily invested in Brookfield.” In September 2011, The Granite Reliable wind project [was awarded](#) \$168.9 stimulus loan, which is owned BAM. Then on May 23, 2012, they also snagged a \$56 million [1603 stimulus grant](#) for “wind in New Hampshire.” While there are [additional ties](#) to this wind deal that I’ll highlight later when I get to Heather Podesta (super lobbyists sister-in-law of John Podesta), whose firm [Heather Podesta & Partners](#), from 2009 until 2012, served as [lobbyists](#) for BAM.
- **First Solar*:** Through various fund, and as early as 2007, Soros invested in First Solar — the big solar company that is tied to \$3 billion of the 1703 DOE stimulus loans, including one project that was sold to NRG Energy — another Soros timely investment.
- **SolarCity:** In February 2012, the Private equity firm Silver Lake Kraftwerk [invested in SolarCity](#) — whereas in early 2011, Silver Lake [had launched](#) a clean energy fund in collaboration with billionaire Soros and Cathy Zoi (former DOE Insider). SolarCity, which will be detailed later, so far (and since 2009) has been subsidized with “green” through various stimulus funds, grants and federal tax breaks at the tune of \$514 million.

Soros’ Twelve “Stimulus” Green Energy Stock-Buying Spree:

1. **NRG Energy and its subsidiaries:** Initially won \$5.2 billion in 1705 stimulus loans for four projects and at least 65 grants that total over \$363 million of taxpayer money with 37 unaccounted for. Plus much more green energy funds through various alliances.
2. **American Electric Power (AEP)*:** at least four stimulus grants totaling \$740 million. Plus, more detailed later.
3. **Ameren:** five stimulus grants totaling about \$672.5 million
4. **FirstEnergy Solutions:** at least two stimulus grants totaling just over \$71 million. No cash that I could find for BioFuel Energy benefited when the EPA announced a regulation on ethanol.
5. **Constellation***, an Exelon Company: at least one grant worth \$200 million stimulus grants and Constellation is one of the most prolific providers of green energy to federally owned facilities.
6. **Covanta Energy*:** unclear as to how many green government subsidies or the exact dollar amount, but obviously Covanta stands to benefit from the NAT GAS Act if it comes to light again. And what about those [Congressional earmarks](#) Schweizer found?
7. **Edison International:** at least two stimulus grants worth \$64.6 million, and I’m sure there are more...
8. **Entergy:** I’ve only tracked two small stimulus grants, which add up to close to \$10 million
9. **PPL Corporation:** I found one stimulus grant at \$19 million
10. **PSEG:** one stimulus grant for \$76 million.

11. **Powerspan Clean Energy Technology**: one large stimulus grant worth \$100 million

Mr. & Mrs. Podesta the Super Lobbyists: Strike “green” gold

In my [June 2013](#) Green Corruption File, I briefly addressed John Podesta, but more so profiled his brother, Tony Podesta — dubbed “The Lobbyist” by *Newsweek*, and the founder and Chairman at the Podesta Group, which he [started](#) with his brother John in 1987.

Even though [news hit](#) in early 2013, that Heather and Tony Podesta, the married super lobbyists separated, they are both (via different firms) tied to numerous Obama-backed clean-energy deals.

As [documented by](#) the Center for Responsive Politics, you’ll find that the [Podesta Group](#)’s lobbying income went from \$16,070,000 in 2008 to \$25,780,000 in 2009, and has since significantly increased. Their client lists (past and present) includes large corporations such as Bank of America, BP America, and General Electric (GE aviation), General Motors, and Google (Computers/Internet) — all in the green energy business, with BofA, GE and Google also CAP donors that won green energy funds from the Obama administration.

CH2M Hill

Nevertheless, there are quite a few others, of which [in 2009](#), the Podesta Group took on as clients that stand out — those that ultimately won a significant amount of stimulus funds, starting with CH2M Hill that [received](#) \$1.3 billion for the clean up at the Hanford Nuclear Reservation. The details on this special stimulus earmark can be found in my June 2013 “[Nuclear Crimes and Misdemeanors](#)” story, which highlights not only the cronyism and corruption, but the fact that in June 2013, CBS News [reported](#) that this costly project has been plagued with problems, “delays and billions over budget.”

SolarReserve

SolarReserve got special treatment from the Department of Interior (DOI) for their [Crescent Dunes Solar Energy Project](#) located in Tonopah, Nevada, which received a [\\$737 million](#) DOE stimulus loan.

(<https://www.solarreserve.com/en/newsroom/photos/crescent-dunes-solar-energy-plant>)

(<https://lpo.energy.gov/projects/solarreserve-llc-crescent-dunes/>)

SolarReserve also snagged stimulus grants, yet the amount is unknown. This large DOE deal (another non-grade investment) was announced on [May 19, 2011](#), and despite those inside the Energy Department that wanted to “kill the transaction,” it was [finalized](#) on September 28, 2011.

(https://www.solarreserve.com/en/newsroom/press-releases/us-department-of-energy-offers-a-conditional-commitment-for-737-million-loan-guarantee-to-solarreserve-for-nevada-solar-project/@@download/file/SolarReserveLGPConditionalCommitmentAnnoucement_Macquarie051911.pdf)

(<https://energy.gov/articles/energy-department-finalizes-737-million-loan-guarantee-tonopah-solar-energy-nevada-project>)

Along the way, it included “relentless assistance” by the Majority Leader Harry Reid as well as some drama. Not to mention, SolarReserve, a [predominately](#) Democrat donor, [executives](#) had given to Reid’s campaign since 2008.

(<https://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/summary.php?id=D000056865&cycle=A>)

(<https://freebeacon.com/issues/solar-shenanigans/>)

Needless to say, there are more SolarReserve investors in the mix that can be found in my [November 2013 Green Corruption File](#): “Underneath Senator Harry Reid’s Clean-Energy Dirt: Career politician directly linked to over \$3 billion in green energy stimulus loans.”

(<https://greencorruption.blogspot.com/2013/11/underneath-senator-harry-reids-clean.html#.UweEbCiRnzI>)

One of the key connections to this deal is Citigroup, who has been a major investor in Solar Reserve since 2008, which is chronicled in my February 2013 post, “[Citigroup’s Massive ‘Green’ Money Machine](#).” Still, since Citigroup is also a CAP corporate donor, we’ll dig deeper later.

(https://greencorruption.blogspot.com/2013/02/citigroups-massive-green-money-machine.html#.UlhdqOBc_zJ)

General Motors & the Chevy Volt

General Motors (GM) — the failed Big Auto company that was [bailed out](#) by taxpayers in 2009 — was a client of the Podesta Group [from 2010](#) until 2012. GM was also a [CAP donor](#) in 2011, and a big recipient of stimulus money. Starting in 2009 until recently, they have bagged hundreds of millions of stimulus dollars (I tracked \$471.6 million so far) to support the Chevy Volt as well as green car components, of which I’ll get more specific when I dissect CAP’s corporate donors.

Duke Energy

Duke Energy, the nation’s largest electric power company, is another CAP corporate donor, which has been a client of the Podesta Group since 2009. What’s interesting here is that Jim Rogers, the chairman of Duke Energy is another Obama donor, and was a [major player](#) at the 2012 Democratic convention, as a contributor, creditor, host, and a speaker. Duke Energy won hundreds of millions of green energy money for various projects, which will be detailed later.

Progress Energy

From 2011 to 2012, the Podesta Group added Progress Energy, which in 2009, [won](#) a \$200 million smart-grid stimulus grant. Progress Energy is a [customer](#) of Silver Spring Networks that is a [Foundation Capital](#), Kleiner Perkins, and Google [investment](#) — all with friends and ties to the Obama White House that will be documented a few times in the post.

SolarCity & SunEdison

Additionally, in 2012, the Podesta Group added SolarCity and SunEdison to its list of clients — both members of ACORE, the renewable energy [lobby powerhouse](#) that helped “design the Department of Energy grant programs that partly offset the loss of tax equity financing arrangements.” This is part of the green corruption story that I chronicled in my post, “[The RAT in the Recovery and the Gang of Ten.](#)”

Founded in 2006, [SolarCity](#) has a string of connections to the Obama White House that I’ve been tracking and reporting on for some time, including billionaire players that received taxpayer money for other green energy deals, such as Elon Musk, [Nicholas J. Pritzker](#), and George Soros. Throw in other stimulus winners like Al Gore’s firm Generation Investment Management ([early investor](#) and [major stockholder](#)) as well as Obama’s Wall Street buddies: Goldman Sachs, [Bank of America](#), and [Citigroup](#). In between, SolarCity has developed partnerships with [PG&E](#), and [Google](#). But before Podesta came along in 2012, SolarCity had been an energy client of top D.C. lobbyist McBee Strategic Consulting, since 2009 — another [major green corruption villain](#) that I tackled in September 2013.

Nevertheless, Fox News [reported](#) in December 2012, when SolarCity was under a federal probe that they had applied for \$341 million in grants. However, I found 33 federal stimulus grants [from the 1603 Program](#) that were awarded to SolarCity and [USB SolarCity Master Tenant](#) in 2011 and 2012, ranging across 15 states, totaling over \$92 million.

MARCH 9, 2013 SolarCity UPDATE: Right after this publishing this post, it was brought to my attention that SolarCity, whose success is dependent on government handouts, has received additional green energy subsidies, which places their total at \$514 million.

According to [California Watchdog.org](#)...

(<https://watchdog.org/130098/solarcity-horror-stories/>)

SolarCity has accepted more than [\\$11 million in federal stimulus funds](#) [from September 2009 to March 2010] to make its business run. But the real public support appears elsewhere. Because SolarCity technically owns the energy systems it installs, SolarCity — not the homeowner — earns the federal tax break intended as an incentive to go solar. So far the company has earned [\\$411 million in such tax breaks](#). The company also may earn additional income on state subsidies.

(<https://www.recovery.gov/arra/Transparency/RecoveryData/Pages/Recipient.aspx?duns=785156410>)

(<https://quote.morningstar.com/stock-filing/Quarterly-Report/2013/9/30/t.aspx?t=XNAS:SCTY&ft=10-Q&d=91ea1bcddf31efc04556da7970ad5084>)

Meanwhile, SunEdison, a global provider of solar-energy services, was an early [Goldman Sachs](#) clean-energy investment — Goldman, another CAP donor, and huge winner from the Green Bank of Obama that I’ll get to much later. But we can confirm that SunEdison, in 2013, won 5 federal stimulus grants [from the 1603 Program](#) for “solar electricity” that ranges across 5 states, totaling over \$1.8 million tax dollars.

(<https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20060615005527/en/SunEdison-Announces-Capital-Raise-Goldman-Sachs-Lead>)

(https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/recovery/Pages/1603.aspx?utm_medium=email&utm_source=et&utm_content=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.treasury.gov%2Finitiatives%2Frecovery%2FPages%2F1603.aspx&utm_campaign=1475793_209355_RNC%20Research)

Granite Reliable / Brookfield Renewable Power

On the other side, there is Granite Reliable that [received](#) a \$168.9 million stimulus loan in September 2011 for a wind project in Coos County, New Hampshire. Then on May 23, 2012, they also snagged a \$56 million [1603 grant](#) for wind in New Hampshire, which I am assuming is the for the same project. Work on Granite Reliable’s wind farm created 198 construction jobs and six permanent jobs.

Nancy Ann DeParle, President Obama’s former Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy in the White House, had a [financial stake](#) in the success of Granite Reliable, due to the fact that she and sat on the Board of Directors for Noble Environmental Power, LLC, which owned Granite Reliable.

Obviously, this is a conflict of interest, but there are [additional ties](#) to this wind deal. Noble sold Granite Reliable in December 2010 to [Brookfield Asset Management](#) (BAM), just 6 months prior to the conditional approval (June 2011) of the DOE loan guarantee and deep into the application process. Despite the [speculative credit rating](#), this loan was finalized in September 2011.

Not only was Brookfield Renewable Power ([a subsidiary of BAM](#)) represented by Citigroup as [lead advisor](#) during the loan review process, BAM has additional Democrat ties such as Diana Taylor, former New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s long-time girlfriend. As mentioned earlier, George Soros and Martin J. Whitman, which are both prominent Democratic donors, are both heavily invested in Brookfield.

But this case [directly hits](#) the Podesta family, because from 2009 until 2012, Heather Podesta, sister-in-law of John Podesta, via [Heather Podesta & Partners](#) served as [lobbyists](#) for BAM — and they’ve been lobbying on behalf of [Brookfield Power](#) (electric utilities), since 2011, raking in over \$1.3 million from the two connected groups.

Southern Company

Mrs. Podesta’s firm also represented [Southern Co.](#) from 2008 until 2010, raking in over \$300,000. This energy giant is part the [Vogtle Project](#), which in February 2010, won a massive [DOE loan](#): “a conditional commitment for \$8.33 billion to support the construction of the nation’s next generation of advanced nuclear reactors.” Despite the project’s [troubles](#) coupled with harsh [criticism](#), the Obama administration [just finalized](#) this DOE deal.

Southern Company — a heavy hitter lobbyist and big donor to both political parties — [bankrolled](#) President Obama’s 2013 Inauguration. And due to the fact that this was another DOE loan approval that was *pressured* by the White House (this one in December 2009), further Intel is found in my [July 2013](#)

[Green Corruption File](#), “Nuclear Disaster: \$10.33 billion in energy loans pressured by the White House and POTUS approved, now at risk.”

Center for American Progress: The “green” pusher

While CAP [characterizes](#) itself as “an independent nonpartisan educational institute dedicated to improving the lives of Americans through progressive ideas and action,” [according to](#) left-leaning Huffington Post, they’ve “been a vocal voice for this president’s policies in the media and on the Hill. But their area of highest visibility is advocacy for a clean-energy economy where John Podesta has personally led the effort.”

Of course, as a strong proponent of alternative energy, CAP has also been a big backer of the Energy Department’s huge multi-billion-loan guarantee program for renewable energy projects — a government program, of which the [stimulus law](#) added \$16 billion in lending power (the DOE’s “junk bond” and cronyism [portfolio](#)), where we find that many of CAP’s corporate donors have cashed in big time.

We also know that [according to](#) the Washington Free Beacon, in September 2008, CAP “authored a [report](#) titled “Green Recovery: A Program to Create Good Jobs and Start Building a Low-Carbon Economy” that included many recommendations ultimately incorporated into President Obama’s controversial \$800 billion stimulus package.” But CAP is not done: since the president released his [Climate Action Plan](#) in June 2013, CAP continues to [pressure](#) for additional *action*, including, but not limited to, rejecting the Keystone XL pipeline and a call to dole out [billions more](#) in renewable energy funds.

[CAP](#), the progressive think tank with [deep rooted ties](#) to the Clintons, has been on my radar since 2010, and periodically mentioned throughout my work. As noted already, they are [closely aligned](#) with, and have a major foothold [inside](#) the Obama White House. This is not limited to the new CAP additions: [Denis McDonough](#), White House Chief of Staff and Obama’s new advisor, John Podesta.

What’s been forgotten is that a squadron of CAP experts worked with President Obama’s transition team, and they have been “reportedly [highly influential](#) in helping to craft White House Policy.” In 2008, [Edwin Chen](#) of Bloomberg, in his article, “Soros-Funded Democratic Idea Factory Becomes Obama Policy Font,” noted “CAP, which has 180 staffers and a \$27 million budget, devotes as much as half of its resources to promoting its ideas through blogs [ThinkProgress and the Wonk Room], events, publications and media outreach.”

In fact [CAP boasts](#) of John Podesta’s part: “Podesta served as co-chair of President Barack Obama’s transition, where he coordinated the priorities of the incoming administration’s agenda, oversaw the development of its policies, and spearheaded its appointments of major cabinet secretaries and political appointees.”

In addition to Podesta as the co-chair, “at least 10 other CAP experts” were advising the incoming administration, “including Melody Barnes (Obama bundler), the center’s executive vice president for

policy who co-chairs the agency-review working group and Cassandra Butts, the senior vice president for domestic policy, who is now a senior transition staffer,” reported Bloomberg.

What has not been widely disclosed is CAP’s *dark* participation, other than their “recommendations,” inside the stimulus package, whereas as noted, \$100 billion was earmarked for renewable energy. Hidden deep inside the 1,073-page stimulus bill, which was [drafted by](#) the Obama transition team and congressional aides, was a RAT: an attempt to suppress potential investigations, and only a few news outlets caught it in February of 2009: the [Washington Post](#) and the [Washington Examiner](#), and completely exposed in my Green Corruption File entitled, “[The RAT in the Recovery and the Gang of Ten](#).”

Entitled the [Obama-Biden Transition Project](#), it employed approximately 400 people and it was comprised of Obama bundlers and campaign contributors as well as lobbyist and those that operate inside Washington’s egregious revolving door. What’s more fascinating to point out is that [according to](#) the Center for Responsive Politics, “Members of Barack Obama’s presidential transition team weren’t necessarily selected solely on their resumes and expertise — some may have scored positions over similarly qualified individuals because they supported the president-elect by bundling money for his presidential campaign or opening their own wallets to him.”

Five CAP Fellows at the Center of “the green”

More relevant to green corruption is that this lengthy list provides us with some familiar members operating inside this clean-energy scam, which of course, were also bundlers for Obama’s [2008](#) campaign — [even bundling again](#) in 2012. Even though, in October 2013, I gave insight into the Obama-Biden Transition Team and the numerous green energy players, here’s an overview with the CAP fellows marked with asterisks:

1. Valerie B. Jarrett (Obama bundler): Obama-Biden Transition Project Co-Chair
2. *John Podesta (Obama bundler): Obama-Biden Transition Project Co-Chair /Now “Executive Power Czar”
3. *Carol M. Browner (Obama bundler): Advisory Board Member and Energy Policy Working Groups / Was promoted to Climate Czar, from January 2009 until February 2011
4. Michael Froman (Obama bundler): Advisory Board Member
5. TJ Glauthier (Obama bundler): Executive Office of the President
6. Lisa Jackson (Obama bundler): Energy and Natural Resources Team Leads
7. David Sandalow (Obama bundler): Energy Policy Working Groups
8. *Steve Spinner (Two-time Obama bundler): Technology, Innovation & Government Reform Policy Working Groups / Was promoted to DOE Advisor in April 2009 until September 2011
9. Tom Wheeler (Two-time Obama bundler): Working Group Members; Science, Tech, Space and Arts Team Leader

10. Heather Zichal (Obama bundler): Energy Policy Working Groups

Add to this list two more CAP fellows: Lawrence Summers, who, in late 2008 (until 2011), [became](#) President-elect Obama's Director of the National Economic Council and Van Jones, who in March 2009, [was appointed](#) as a special adviser for green jobs for the Obama White House, until he resigned in September 2009. This means that we have five CAP fellows that I'll profile below.

Obviously, operatives from this team were rewarded with positions inside the Obama White House, while others in 2009, snagged other key green energy roles. My focus has been on the "DOE Insiders" — those from Obama's "[Green Team](#)" and his Energy Department [officials](#) and advisors, which included its fair share of Al Gore disciples and well-connected [Venture Capitalists](#). There has been a dozen on my radar that are either directly connected to tens of billions of green-government subsidies (loans, grants and special tax breaks), or helped their friends secure the funds.

Ironically, [many have fled](#) since their 2009 appointments, but it's worth noting that the "DOE Dirty Dozen," under Energy Secretary Stephen Chu, includes Carol Browner (1), Lisa Jackson, Van Jones (2), Steve Isakowitz, Steve Spinner (3), Matt Rogers, Jonathon Silver (4), Cathy Zoi (5), Kristina Johnson (6) and others like James Markowsky (7), Steven Westly (8), Sanjay Wagle (9), David Danielson (10), David Sandalow (11), David Prend (12) — another piece of this scandal currently in the works.

What's telling is that these DOE Insiders were part of the decision making process, even as the rest had access influence in one way or another. They were in charge of picking winners and losers, especially in regards to the Energy Department's multi-billion Loan Guarantee Program, mentioned many times in this post, whereas I have personally been tracking since 2010.

What we find is that many of those operating inside the Energy Department had more sinister roles and were using tactics such as lobbying, pressure, collusion, and coercion. The evidence of this started circulating in 2011, when the Solyndra Saga broke, but worse, was confirmed in many of the DOE email exchanges released to the public since that time, which includes the massive "2012 Internal DOE Email Dump" that was unleashed in late October of that year.

These correspondences [basically prove](#) that the president, the White House, Secretary Chu, and certain DOE officials lied about how they handled the green energy loans on various fronts — which was followed by secrecy, cover-ups and even perjury.

In November 2012, Marita Noon and I [began unleashing](#) the content of these email interactions, of which we found plenty of references to the president, POTUS, the White House, the "7th floor," and "the Hill." More disturbing is that contrary to House Oversight testimonies by DOE officials, those inside the DOE were rushing the approval of the DOE loans — a fast track process imposed at the POTUS level, yet they were met with resistance by the Treasury as well as the Office of Management and Budget ([OMB](#)), amongst others involved in the deal making process.

As it turns out, these emails reveal that many of the DOE loans were rushed and approved for political reasons — visits, speeches, announcements, photo ops, and talking points for the president as well as

for the purpose of helping those connected to the companies seeking the loans — CEO’s, investors, and Democrat politicians, which goes beyond [subsidizing Nevada companies](#) in order to help Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid win his 2010 reelection campaign.

These bombshell emails also expose the cozy relationships DOE officials and advisors had during the loan review process with loan applicants and their CEO’s, lobbyists, and investors, etc. It’s no surprise that they had meetings and calls with DOE officials and Energy Secretary Chu, but there are documented meetings and calls with the president, VP, and WH as well as plenty of “green fraternizing” going on — bike riding, coffee meetings, sleepovers, “beer summits,” Al Gore parties, dinners, Democrat fundraisers, and so on.

NOTE: “2012 Internal DOE Email Dump” is in reference to the House Oversight huge document dump that was [unleashed](#) in October 2012 (see [Memorandum, Appendix I](#) and the [350+ page Appendix II](#)), and due to its value, will be sourced many times in this report.

Today we’ll stay focused on Center for American Progress, starting with the fact that other than John Podesta, we have Valerie B. Jarrett: President’s Obama’s longest serving advisor and confidante, of which some refer to her as the “[shadow chief of staff](#).”

While Podesta is directly tied to CAP, Ms. Jarrett has an indirect connection: Prior to joining the Obama administration as [Senior Advisor](#) and assistant to the president, she [served as](#) Vice Chairman of The [Joyce Foundation](#) (Obama sat on the board 1994 to 2002), the Chicago-based organization, who is a major donor to radical environmentalist and conservation groups [as well as](#) progressive movements like CAP.

This was part of the climate scam that not involves many green corruption suspects, but leads to [cap-and-trade](#), of which I began to [unravel](#) in 2010, and [what I refer to](#) as the “pot of gold at the end of the climate rainbow” — warning that with so much at stake, even if the planet blows up, they will get their cap-and-trade, or a version of it.

Jarrett, also in September 2009, hosted a “[Clean-Energy Summit](#)” where an array of attendees just so happened to “collectively strike gold” with over \$5.3 billion in taxpayer funds from the Green Bank of Obama. We also know that internal emails showed (released in 2011) that [deliberations on Solyndra](#) — the first DOE loan to go bad and scream corruption — “reached into Obama’s inner circle, including senior adviser Valerie Jarrett and former chief of staff Rahm Emanuel.”

Additionally, we can confirm via the “2012 Internal DOE Email Dump” that Ms. Jarrett had a December 7, 2010, meeting with “the CEO’s of NRG and Reliant.” NRG Energy (a Fortune 500 and S&P 500 Index company) and its subsidiaries (Reliant is one) [was the recipient](#) of most of junk-rated stimulus loans, which includes NRG Solar for the Agua Caliente project (\$967 million); NRG Solar for the California Valley Solar Ranch (\$1.2 billion); BrightSource Energy Ivanpah project (\$1.6 billion); and Prologis for Project Amp (\$1.4 billion).

NRG Energy is one of those twelve timely Soros investments that I alluded to earlier (along with additional Obama administration connections) that snagged \$5.2 billion in loans and a truck load of

grants as well as other cleantech funds from the Green Bank of Obama. But it is the highly paid [president and CEO](#) (since 2003) David Crane ([stock owner](#) and an [aggressive pusher](#) of clean energy) who appeared to have significant influence. [During the course](#) of the June 2012, House Oversight hearing, Crane admitted that between the Bush administration and the Obama administration, he had visited the White House “14 to 15 times,” of which 6 to 7 of his visits were with the Obama White House.

Lawrence Summers: *Currently listed as a Distinguished Senior Fellow at Center for American Progress and mentor to Facebook boss Sandberg*

- Former Director of President Obama’s National Economic Council ([designated](#) on November 24, 2008 to 2011)
- Former Secretary of Treasury under President Bill Clinton (from [1999 to 2001](#))

It’s worth noting that back in the day (November 2008), President-elect Barack Obama rolled out his National Economic Council (NEC), and installed “economic czar” [Larry Summers](#) (not subject to pesky confirmation hearings), who had served as Robert Rubin’s [protégé](#) at Treasury. Rubin, on the other hand, who had spent 25 years at Goldman Sachs before serving as Secretary of Treasury under the Clinton administration ([1995-1999](#)), after his government stint went to Citigroup as a [Senior Counselor](#), only to retire in January 2009. However, what’s not widely known is that behind the scenes [during Timothy Geithner’s time at Treasury], “Rubin was still wielding enormous influence in Barack Obama’s Washington,” [documented](#) POLITICO.

What’s worth pointing out again is that Summers’ private memos to Obama, which were released by [The New Yorker](#) in early 2012, revealed the real intent behind the economic stimulus bill. American Enterprise Institute [reported](#), “A key source for writer Ryan Lizza is a [57-page, “Sensitive & Confidential” memo](#) written by economist Summers to Obama in December 2008,” which exposed “11 stunning revelations from Larry Summers’ secret economics memo to Barack Obama.” One in particular was that the stimulus was about implementing the Obama agenda and rewarding his green cronies.

The short-run economic imperative was to identify as many campaign promises or high priority items that would spend out quickly and be inherently temporary. ... The stimulus package is a key tool for advancing clean energy goals and fulfilling a number of campaign commitments.

Summers, a [Distinguished Senior Fellow](#) at CAP, has significant ties to Wall Street, which if you’ve been paying attention, they ensured an Obama victory in 2008. [Prior](#) to Summers heading to the Obama White House as top economic advisor, he had an [elaborate gig](#) where he worked just one day a week while making \$5.2 million in two years at D.E. Shaw — a New York-based [\\$39 Billion Hedge Fund Giant](#). [According to](#) the *Wall Street Journal*, Summers “received hundreds of thousands of dollars in speaking fees from major financial institutions,” which included “frequent appearances before Wall Street firms including J.P. Morgan, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs and Lehman Brothers.”

What's significant is that both Goldman Sachs and Citigroup (profiled later) are corporate CAP donors that either won billions in green energy funds, or made money off of the deals that occurred. And, the majority of the deal making came from the now \$32 billion Energy Department [Loan Guarantee Program](#), with the majority of the loans awarded and finalized between 2009 and September 2011. This is the same program that, as mentioned earlier, has been pushed and promoted by Center for American Progress for some time.

During Summer's time inside the Obama White House, it's unclear how involved Summers was in the loan program decision making process, but we can confirm via the "2012 Internal DOE Email Dump" that he was part of a scheduled January 2010 meeting with Jonathan Silver (head of the Loan Program at the time), a few DOE officials, and Carol Browner — the latter another CAP fellow that will be profiled next.

"Nearly a year before [Solyndra](#) went bankrupt and engulfed the White House in scandal, President Obama's top economic advisors [Summers and Timothy Geithner] warned him about the risks of the clean-energy loan program that granted the solar company more than a half-billion dollars" — [as reported](#) by the Business Insider in September 2011.

Needless to say, Solyndra was only one of the [22 "junk" loans](#) awarded by the Energy Department's \$16 billion stimulus program — a program where we find that Summers is directly tied to one of those DOE deals, while his buddy David Shaw, a two-time Obama bundler, had an invested interest in more.

Mr. Shaw is the founder of D.E. Shaw, where Summer's worked before joining the Obama White House, and a firm that is connected to at least two renewable energy companies that snagged billions in DOE stimulus loans: First Wind and First Solar that are also CAP corporate donors, which will be expanded upon later. First Wind was the winner of a \$117 million DOE stimulus loan, plus hundreds of millions in stimulus grants, of which, [according](#) to Peter Schweizer, "Larry Summers was part owner of First Wind." Meanwhile, First Solar won three large stimulus loans, totaling over \$3 billion of taxpayer money — not to mention additional green energy funds.

Carol M. Browner: *Founding member of Center for American Progress and currently a Senior Fellow*

- Currently on the Advisory Committee of the Export-Import Bank of the United States
- Headed the Office of Energy and Climate Change Policy (AKA Climate Czar), from January 2009 until February 2011
- Obama-Biden 2008-Transition Team role: Advisory Board Member and Energy Policy Working Groups
- 2008 Obama Bundler

[Browner](#), a career Washington insider, who directed the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) during the Clinton administration, is an Al Gore acolyte, and an [environmental extremist](#) with a few left-wing radical ties on her secret resume. While Browner worked for Gore as far back as 1988, at some point (between 2007 and 2009), [she served](#) as a board member of the Gore's Alliance for Climate

Protection — which, in July 2011, was morphed into “[The Climate Reality Project](#).” From what I gather, this was the result of merging two environmental groups: The Alliance for Climate Protection and The Climate Project, which were both founded in 2006 by Al Gore.

Browner was also a 2008 Obama bundler and part of the Obama-Biden Transition Team, who was later appointed to the president’s 2009 [Green Team](#) as the “climate czar,” only to [abruptly resign](#) in early 2011.

Prior to her tenure at the Obama White House, Browner was a founding board member (from 2003-2008) for CAP, and she is currently listed as a [Senior Fellow](#). Browner, [not only](#) “pushed for billions of dollars for renewable energy in the economic stimulus bill,” she was part of the decision-making process inside the Energy Department’s [Loan Guarantee Program](#), which at the time of her departure had doled out \$34.7 billion of taxpayer money. Browner [is implicated](#) in an array of issues surrounding these loans, as reflected in many of the DOE email exchanges released to the public since 2011, as well as the “2012 Internal DOE Email Dump.”

With such deep connections to the former-Vice President Al Gore, and his climate mission, one wonders why Gore and his investment firms — Kleiner Perkins and Generation Investment Management — raked in so much of the DOE money under her watch. As of January 2013, I tracked that these two firms combined are tied to at least \$10 billion (more if you add in Silver Spring Networks and the fact that their “customers” raked in \$1.3 billion in smart-grid stimulus grants), from the taxpayer-funded Green Bank of Obama, the majority coming from the 2009-Recovery Act — the stimulus bill (renewable energy part) that Doerr helped author, while Browner pushed to include taxpayer money.

Browner may have left her “climate” post, but she currently sits (and has for a while) on the Advisory Committee of the Export-Import Bank of the United States (Ex-Im), another means where Plaintiff government dishes out billions of American taxpayer dollars in support of clean energy.

“The Ex-Im Bank uses [taxpayer money](#) to backstop politically favored projects, which “just greases the wheels of the powerful and often corrupt big Washington Establishment,” [wrote](#) Heritage Action. This is another “green bank” that not only supports [other Nations](#), but where you’ll find corporate welfare and crony capitalism run amok, which includes quite a number of the president’s favored firms: Abengoa, First Solar (Exelon Corp.) and SolarWorld, to name a few.

As [recently as](#) October 2013, at a [Washington, D.C. CAP event](#) (10th anniversary policy conference), Browner had this to say about the Keystone Pipeline: “There will be some twists and turns” in the political debate over the pipeline, but “at the end of the day [Obama] is going to say no,” [reported](#) the Huffington Post.

(https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2013/10/25/carol-browner-keystone-obama_n_4164156.html?just_reloaded=1)

(<https://www.americanprogress.org/events/2013/10/23/77992/caps-10th-anniversary-policy-conference/>)

(https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2013/10/25/carol-browner-keystone-obama_n_4164156.html?just_reloaded=1)

This was an event that besides Browner, featured other Big Green personalities such as Van Jones, Tom Steyer, John Podesta, Treasury Secretary Jack Lew, Secretary of State John Kerry, California Governor Jerry Brown, Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel, and of course, Al Gore.

Tom Steyer, CAP Board Member and Donor, Climate Change Radical, Big Oil Investor, Obama Bundler, Margie Sullivan's partner and Billionaire Buddy of all the Tech Oligarchs

At that event, Browner was [joined on a panel](#) with Van Jones, the former “green jobs czar” — also a CAP fellow (profiled next) — along with environmental advocate Tom Steyer, who has been on an [anti-Keystone XL crusade](#) for some time.

(https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2013/10/25/carol-browner-keystone-obama_n_4164156.html?just_reloaded=1)

(https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2013/10/04/tom-steyer-keystone-harper_n_4044667.html)

In fact, Jones has been on the record [slamming](#) the president's delay on denying the pipeline.

(<https://www.cnn.com/2013/05/30/opinion/jones-obama-keystone-pipeline/index.html>)

Meanwhile, Steyer is the same hedge-fund billionaire and megabucks Obama bundler and Democrat donor that was also a Big Oil Investor through his former firm Farallon Capital Management that has an [invested interest](#) in the rejection of the pipeline.

(<https://www.humanevents.com/2013/06/27/green-is-the-color-of-corruption/>)

Like most prominent Obama fundraisers, Steyer has enjoyed relatively easy access to the White House, and as of the summer of 2012, it was reported that he had met with senior White House officials in the West Wing on at least four occasions. Steyer was even handpicked to make a [cameo appearance](#) at the [2012](#) Democratic National Convention.

(<https://greencorruption.blogspot.com/2012/09/obamas-green-cronies-made-dnc-cameo.html#.UwvejCiRnzI>)

Additionally, Steyer, “plans to spend as much as \$100 million during the 2014 election, seeking to pressure federal and state officials to enact climate change measures through a hard-edge campaign of attack ads against governors and lawmakers,” [reported](#) the *New York Times* last month.

(https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/18/us/politics/financier-plans-big-ad-campaign-on-environment.html?_r=1)

In September 2012, the *Washington Free Beacon* [documented](#) that Steyer “is [reportedly](#) one of the backers of [Greener Capital](#), which invests in alternative fuel companies that benefit from the anti-oil policies of the Obama administration.

(<https://freebeacon.com/the-one-percent-gets-its-turn/>)

(<https://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/15/a-foil-for-the-koch-brothers/>)

(<https://www.greenercap.com/index.php>)

” What’s key to this Green Corruption file is that “Steyer has donated at least \$1.4 million to the Center for American Progress (CAP) since 2009 through his TomKat Charitable Trust. As of 2010, he was listed as a director of the left-wing think tank.”

In December 2013, The Beacon, in their piece “[Keystone to the Kingdom](#),” we find a stunning look at the relationship between Mr. Steyer and John Podesta:

(<https://freebeacon.com/keystone-to-the-kingdom/>)

“[Steyer](#) is on the board of the Center for American Progress, and in the early months of 2012 he and Podesta cosigned a *Wall Street Journal* op-ed, “[We Don’t Need More Foreign Oil and Gas](#),”

(<https://climatesolutions.org/donate/climate-solutions-5th-annual-breakfast/tom-steyer>)

(<https://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970203718504577178872638705902>)

arguing against Keystone and for tax loopholes such as the Production Tax Credit, increasing the value of the green energy companies in which Steyer invested and on whose boards Podesta sat.”

Moreover, while a slew of Democrats who oppose the Keystone XL pipeline, [stand to benefit](#) from its rejection, Farallon Capital Management “has extensive holdings in fossil fuel companies

(<https://washingtonexaminer.com/who-gets-rich-off-of-blocking-the-keystone-xl-pipeline/article/2543928>)

— including investments that could benefit from the blocking of the Keystone pipeline,” [reported](#) *The Daily Caller* in May 2013.

(<https://dailycaller.com/2013/06/20/top-anti-keystone-activist-could-benefit-from-blocking-pipeline/>)

One in particular stands out: “Farallon also still holds stock in BP” — the oil giant that [according to POLITICO](#) in 2010, Obama was the biggest recipient of BP donations over the past twenty years.”

(<https://www.politico.com/news/stories/0510/36783.html>)

In case you didn’t know, British Petroleum, the oil and gas giant that in 2001, began re branding to Beyond Petroleum (BP), was heavily in the “green” business via [BP Alternative Energy](#) (biofuels, wind and solar). However, in the spring of 2013, BP switched gears and started [abandoning](#) renewable energy.

(<https://finance.townhall.com/columnists/maritanoon/2013/04/07/smart-money-abandoning-renewable-energy-n1560319/page/full>)

Still, that was after BP had snagged millions in “green” funds from the Obama administration, of which I [began to unravel](#) in April 2013 due the fact that BP is in cahoots with Sempra Energy, the winner of a \$337 million DOE stimulus loan for the Mesquite Solar Project in Arizona.

(<https://greencorruption.blogspot.com/2013/04/newly-bankrupt-chinese-solar-producer.html#.UvZU3yiRnzL>)

Also, BP, at that time, was part of [all five](#) of Sempra's wind projects.

(<https://www.semprausgp.com/energy-solutions/wind-projects.html>)

BP Alternative Energy is also an [investor](#) in BrightSource Energy — the winner of a [\\$1.6 billion DOE stimulus loan](#) that involves more CAP corporate donors and a slew of additional Obama cronies that I'll get to much later.

(<https://www.brightsourceenergy.com/investors#.UvZVNCiRnzI>)

(<https://lpo.energy.gov/projects/brightsource-energy-inc/>)

Van Jones: Senior Fellow at Center for American Progress (it is unknown when Van first joined CAP, but we do know that he [rejoined](#) in February 2010)

- Green Jobs Czar, from March 2009 to September 2009
- 2008 to 2009 Crafter of the Recovery Act: both personally and via the Apollo Alliance, as part or their National Steering Committee, where Van Jones was a board member from 2006 to either 2008 or 2009

As the story goes, Van Jones — [left-wing radical](#), turned CNN contributor — was handpicked to become Obama's "green jobs czar" in 2009:

(<https://www.wnd.com/2009/08/106653/>)

"We were so delighted to be able to recruit him into the White House," Senior Advisor Valerie Jarrett, stated on August 12, 2009. Mr. Jones' advisory post at the White House was short lived due to his radical past and behavior, and in September 2009 he resigned, [blaming](#) it on a "smear campaign of lies and distortions to distract and divide."

(<https://thinkprogress.org/politics/2009/09/06/59506/van-jones-resigns/>)

Nevertheless, Van is another very active CAP member where his focus remains on "green-collar jobs." He's still a strong force in the midst of the climate change debate, pushing green jobs, as well as his [extreme](#) environmental ideology.

(<https://www.rebuildthedream.com/>)

Since 2010, Jones has been a [Senior Fellow at CAP](#), whereas his bio states, "he is a co-founder of three successful nonprofit organizations: the Ella Baker Center for Human Rights, Color of Change, and Green For All" — of which both George Soros and Al Gore (both huge winners of green energy monies) have been know to [fund](#) Van's causes as far back as the 90's, including Green for All.

(<https://www.americanprogress.org/about/staff/jones-van/bio/>)

(<https://epaabuse.com/537/watermelon-patch/van-jones-is-the-ultimate-watermelon-green-outside-red-inside/>)

Mr. Jones has been featured in a few of my posts, but most recently when I exposed the various green parties involved in crafting the energy sector of the 2009-Recovery Act — and how they and their friends raked in tens of billions from the Green Bank of Obama. Certainly, Van’s White House post, which comprised of overseeing billions in “green” stimulus funds, and the subsequent controversy surrounding his eco-radical mission (good and bad press) helped catapult Jones into fame and possibly some fortune. In my opinion, this would include the success of his green jobs book, [numerous](#) green honors, and his CNN gig — success that he may not have seen otherwise.

(<https://www.vanjones.net/about>)

We’ve tracked Jones’ connections to CH2M HILL (also a client of the Podesta Group), the winner of \$1.3 billion in stimulus funds as well as Solar Mosaic, where Jones was an advisor, who ultimately, in June 2012, was [awarded](#) a \$2 million grant from the Energy Department’s [SunShot Initiative](#). Solar Mosaic had also [employed](#) Rebuild the Dream to do its public relations work, [documented](#) the *Daily Caller* in 2012. Also, in 2012 and 2013, Solar Mosaic snagged two small 1603 federal stimulus grants: one in Arizona for \$13,123 and in California for \$185,700.

What about Mr. Jones’ *solicitation* business? Prior to Van’s resignation, in August 2009, his Green for All [launched](#) a program called [Capital Access Program](#) (CAP) to help green businesses secure stimulus funds — monies that he was overseeing at that time, of which [his bio](#) confirms. In fact, during the 2012 presidential election (as a [CNN contributor](#)), Jones bragged about his part in the implementation of the clean-energy stimulus funds: he helped “run the inter-agency process that oversaw \$80 billion [some [reports](#) go as high as \$100 billion] in green energy recovery spending.”

What’s also relevant is that not only did Jones personally participate in the formation of 2009-Recovery Act, he was with the Apollo Alliance as part of their National Steering Committee and Board member (from 2006 to either 2008 or 2009) — when the Apollo Alliance successfully got many of their policy ideas packaged into the stimulus bill, including, but not limited to, its expensive and unsuccessful “green jobs” program.

Both Senator Harry Reid and Mr. Jones have bragged about the Apollo’s participation. Adding to the mix is that the Apollo Alliance is a project of the Tides Center. And, the Tides Center/ Tides Foundation is another Soros funded left-wing organization that was also funded by the [Joyce Foundation](#), mentioned earlier under Valerie Jarrett.

(<https://www.discoverthenetworks.org/funderprofile.asp?fndid=5310&category=79>)

What you should know about the Tides Center can be found at [Watchdog.org](#), who in 2013, labeled their programs as “a checklist of liberalism’s most ambitious agenda.” Moreover, it’s become a meeting place of two potentially warring factions of the Left — labor and environmentalists,” charged [Tori Richards](#) early last year.

(<https://watchdog.org/>)

(<https://watchdog.org/72855/tides-uses-tax-dollars-to-turn-america-to-the-left/>)

Richards [continues](#)....

(<https://watchdog.org/72855/tides-uses-tax-dollars-to-turn-america-to-the-left/>)

Perhaps Tides' biggest coup was using its Apollo Alliance Project to help draft Obama's massive stimulus bill. The final stimulus bill doled out billions of dollars to further the Left's green-energy agenda and social justice constituency while preserving labor's role in centralized economic planning.

Apollo Alliance, now labeled as the [BlueGreen Alliance](#), not only enjoys political clout, but they also have significant and highly influential [green allies and donors](#), which at one point included John Podesta as an Apollo board member — adding another layer to CAP's power behind this massive green energy scheme.

(<https://www.bluegreenalliance.org/apollo>)

([https://keywiki.org/index.php/Apollo Alliance#cite_note-6](https://keywiki.org/index.php/Apollo_Alliance#cite_note-6))

Steve Spinner: Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress from September 2010 to October 2011, where he publicly advocated for energy policies that support clean, renewable energy

- Two-time Obama Bundler
- DOE Loan Programs Advisor, from April 2009 to September 2010
- 2008 Obama-Biden Transition Team role: Technology, Innovation & Government Reform Policy Working Groups

Steve Spinner, a two-time Obama bundler, not only worked for Obama's 2008 transition team, he also was part the president's 2012 reelection campaign, serving as a California finance chair and founded "Technology for Obama (T4O)." His wife was Solyndra's lawyer.

In April 2009, [Spinner](#) was appointed as the DOE Loan Programs Advisor to then-Energy Secretary Steven Chu, yet by September 2010, he left the DOE and about that same time joined CAP as a Senior Fellow [until October 2011](#).

(<https://energy.gov/articles/fact-check-steve-spinner>)

(<https://www.politico.com/news/stories/1011/66287.html>)

During the course of [Spinner's](#) DOE gig, he acted as a liaison between the Recovery Act Office and the Loan Programs Office, of which he was responsible for monitoring the loan program. According to the DOE, "In that capacity, [Spinner] played no role in the decision-making on or evaluation of individual loan applications or the awarding of any grants."

(<https://energy.gov/articles/fact-check-steve-spinner>)

Spinner was also handpicked to make a [cameo appearance](#) at the [2012](#) Democratic National Convention, along with other wealthy Obama green cronies: Steve Westly, Tom Steyer (profiled earlier) and Jim Rogers, who will be profiled later.

(<https://greencorruption.blogspot.com/2012/09/obamas-green-cronies-made-dnc-cameo.html#.UwvejCiRnzI>)

(<https://www.demconvention.com/>)

Spinner & Solyndra

Spinner is well known for his [involvement](#) and influence (investigations [and](#) internal emails prove) to the ill-fated, politically connected Solyndra, which was once the [poster child](#) for the president's clean-energy initiative.

(<https://www.politico.com/news/stories/1011/65448.html>)

(<https://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/obama-fundraiser-pushed-solyndra-deal-inside/story?id=14691618#.UFZk7BjdtJM>)

(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0J6h1PcVQp8&feature=player_embedded)

The Solyndra Saga — FBI raid and all — in 2011, morphed into the template for Obama's green corruption scandal: political payback, costing taxpayers at least \$570.4 million. Yet, most concluded a long time ago that Solyndra was only the tip of the iceberg.

Nevertheless, Spinner's participation, despite the DOE's denial, has been proven many times over, including in October 2011, when [POLITICO](#) and others seized on his role inside this scandal, stating, "[Spinner] played an active part in Solyndra's \$535 million loan guarantee [[approved](#) in September 2009] despite conflict of interest concerns over his wife's work at a law firm that also represented the California solar company."

(<https://www.politico.com/news/stories/1011/65448.html>)

(<https://lpo.energy.gov/Plaintiffs-projects/discontinued-projects/>)

Solyndra also [snagged](#) a \$25.1 million in California tax credit, and at some point before 2011, Solyndra indirectly bagged another loan from the Export-Import Bank, which was obtained by a third-party company to the tune of \$10.3 million.

(<https://greencorruption.blogspot.com/2014/01/cleantech-crash-cbs-lesley-stahl.html#.UwkCwCiRnzI>)

It should be emphasized that back in 2009, Fitch had rated the Solyndra DOE loan "non-investment grade," [as revealed](#) by the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform in March 2012 — a report that implicates Spinner even more so.

(<https://oversight.house.gov/report/the-department-of-energys-disastrous-management-of-loan-guarantee-programs/>)

White House e-mails released late last year [2011] indicate that Spinner was influential in securing the \$528 million loan to now-bankrupt Solyndra. Many of those EMAILS were written just days after he signed an ethics agreement pledging that he would “not participate in any discussion regarding any application involving” his wife’s law firm.

In one message to a DOE official on August 28, 2009, Spinner wrote, “**How hard is this? What is he waiting for? . . . I have OVP and WH breathing down my neck on this.**” The e-mail went on to demand that the DOE official “**walk over there and force [the official working on the Solyndra evaluation] to give [him] an answer.**” After just being contacted by Solyndra, Spinner inquires in another e-mail, “**Any word on OMB? Solyndra’s getting nervous.**” The e-mail correspondence occurring in the final days before the Solyndra loan closed in September 2009 centers heavily on Spinner’s efforts to coordinate plans for either the President or Vice President to announce the first loan approval at a scheduled visit to Solyndra.

Spinner & Tesla Motors

Additionally, we know that prior to joining the DOE, Spinner was an energy-focused venture capitalist and high-tech consultant. At some point, Spinner was a “consultant” to Tesla Motors, the “billionaire’s electric car company,” with an array of Obama pals in the mix (Elon Musk , [Steve Westly](#), Nicholas Pritzker, Google executives, Vantage Point Capital Partners and Goldman Sachs), of which in January 2010, was subsidized with \$465 million of taxpayer money from the DOE’s ATVM program.

Spinner & First Solar

Needless to say, according to *The Nation*’s May 2013 piece entitled “[The Secret Donors Behind the Center for American Progress and Other Think Tanks](#),” is where we first discover that First Solar was a huge favorite of CAP. [First Solar](#) is the solar firm, which is connected to a slew of Obama cronies, that is also a confirmed 2012 CAP corporate donor — possibly as early as 2011.

While we chronicled “[The First Solar Swindle](#)” in the summer of 2012, let me reiterate — although in more detail later — that they were awarded over \$3 billion in stimulus loans, as well as additional taxpayer money. One key tidbit of Intel from *The Nation* is where we learn of Spinner’s participation in the First Solar DOE deal making....

Last year [2012], when First Solar was taking a beating from congressional Republicans and in the press over job layoffs and alleged political cronyism, CAP’s Richard Caperton praised Antelope Valley in his testimony to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, saying it headed up his list of “innovative projects” receiving loan guarantees. Earlier, Caperton and Steve Spinner — a top Obama fundraiser who left his job at the Energy Department monitoring the issuance of loan guarantees and became a CAP senior fellow — had written an article cross-posted on CAP’s website and its Think Progress blog, stating that Antelope Valley represented “the cutting edge of the clean energy economy.”

The CAP article referenced above by Caperton and Spinner (“[Don’t Let Clean Energy Funding Die on the Vine](#),”) was published on July 13, 2011, and where we find that CAP demanded that more taxpayer

money be used to fund the DOE's loan program — even calling for a green bank “as a permanent financing tool for clean energy projects.”

Spinner & Silver's Collusion

The CAP piece referenced above also opened up another can of worms. Jonathon Silver, at that time an Obama administration official at the Energy Department “actively collaborated with CAP in 2011 to advance the president's green energy agenda, in possible violation of federal law,” [documented](#) the Washington Free Beacon on September 14, 2012.

This is where internal emails surfaced showing that over several days via Spinner and Silver's [personal email accounts](#) (correspondences that also imply the two were in touch multiple times over the phone), the two colluded: “In July 2011, Steve Spinner, then a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress (CAP), sought and received guidance from Jonathan Silver, executive director of the Department of Energy's (DOE) loans program, regarding a CAP [editorial](#) urging Congress to expand funding for the program and permanently establish a Clean Energy Deployment Administration (CEDA), or ‘green bank,’ to further fund clean energy projects.”

Spinner & BrightSource Energy

Inside the “2012 Internal DOE Email Dump,” we also discover that as early as September 2009, there was “strong push” by Silver, Spinner, and Matt Rogers (Senior Advisor to Energy Secretary Steven Chu from January 2009 until September 2010) to push through the \$1.6 billion BrightSource Energy deal.

NOTE: Jonathan Silver, reported to be an Obama bundler, has quite the impressive background.

As noted by [Barron's Magazine](#) (in 2010), Silver had been a managing partner at Core Capital Partners [and co-founder] in Washington. “Coincidentally, one of his colleagues there was Tom Wheeler, a 2008 Obama bundler” — mentioned under the Obama-Biden Transition Team.

(<https://online.barrons.com/article/SB50001424052970203296004575352982133405348.html>)

We also know that [Silver's wife](#) has served as financial director of the Democratic Leadership Council, and that the couple hosted a party to promote Al Gore's environmental advocacy group, the Alliance for Climate Protection. This party (fundraiser) surrounded [Silver's vetting process](#) (September 2009), in which he invited two key DOE officials.

(<https://mag.newsweek.com/2011/11/13/how-obama-s-alternative-energy-programs-became-green-graft.html>)

(<https://freebeacon.com/den-of-cronies/>)

Silver was appointed as the Executive Director of the Loan Programs Office in November 2009, and [resigned](#) in early October 2011, amidst the “Solyndra \$535 Million Saga”

(<https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/07/us/politics/jonathan-silver-quits-energy-dept-loan-guarantee-office.html>)

— even [testifying](#) in September 2011. Considering that there is much to be said about Silver’s just shy of a two-year stint at the DOE, we do know that it included helping Secretary Chu accelerate the loan review process.

(https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2011/09/14/dept_of_energy_no_reason_to_believe_we_were_misled_by_solyndra.html)

In reading hundreds of pages from the “2012 Internal DOE Email Dump,” it’s evident that Silver aggressively pushed the loans through (fast tracked) as directed, influenced, and pressured by the POTUS, Vice President Joe Biden, the White House, the 7th Floor, and the Hill — and did so with arrogance, even as he was fraternizing with those seeking the DOE loans.

Despite his resignation, Silver has appeared before the House Oversight Committee twice (July 2012 and September 2013), of which at that time there was a slew of emails proving cronyism and corruption that Silver had to answer to. This is where some of the most bombshell details emerged, starting with the fact that in the course of Silver’s testimony during the [July 18th Oversight hearing](#), it was revealed that he and other DOE officials and advisors were using their personal email accounts to conduct Energy Department business.

(<https://oversight.house.gov/hearing/the-administrations-bet-on-abound-solar-assessing-the-costs-to-the-american-taxpayers/>)

Silver also made this [denial](#): “...as I say, almost nobody that I am aware of in the Loan Program even knew who the individuals were who had invested, either directly or indirectly into these companies.” Yet, we know this is a lie.

(<https://greencorruption.blogspot.com/2012/07/recent-oversight-hearing-reveals-shady.html#.UvfOEyiRnzI>)

In fact, we exposed this many times in the course of unleashing the “2012 Internal DOE Email Dump,” which [began](#) shortly after their release — even discovering more clean-energy dirt along the way. We can confirm that Silver knew **exactly** who the investors were in the projects seeking Energy Department loans in **at least four** of the deals that were approved: BrightSource, Shepherds Flat, and Kahuka Wind, and Fisker Automotive for starters — all with deep ties to the Obama White House. We also know that Silver expedited some of these loans for presidential photo ops, as well as helping Senator Harry Reid’s 2010 midterm election.

(https://finance.townhall.com/columnists/maritanoon/2012/11/04/busting_open_energys_den_of_deception/page/full)

During the September 10, 2013 House Oversight hearing on “[Preventing Violations of Federal Transparency Laws](#),” members questioned two of the most egregious offenders: Mr. Silver and Lisa Jackson the former head of the EPA mentioned early on as part of the Obama-Biden Transition Team.

(<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eshWKRPU38&feature=em-uploademail>)

Sadly, this hearing didn't get much coverage except for [Paul Chesser](#) at the National Legal and Policy Center, noting that this event "didn't last long enough to get very deep." However, what caught my attention was when Committee Republican Jim Jordan of Ohio grilled Mr. Silver "about his directives to keep messaging out of the public eye" as well as reading particular email exchanges that implicated Silver helping his buddies get DOE loans. Also at issue were the loan program failures.

(<https://nlpc.org/stories/2013/09/16/house-committee-grills-doe-loan-program-director-over-secret-emails>)

However, the most unbelievable attempt to conceal the truth came out at that time: The congressman then showed an email that was sent to the committee staff a couple of days prior to the hearing from Silver's lobbyist (lawyer, it's unclear) demanding, "Don't direct any questions to Mr. Silver." Silver denied knowing anything about THE request, but we never got to the bottom of it because the Ranking Member, Congressman Elijah Cummings stopped Jordan from going down that path due to confusion over attorney/client privilege, and that he and Committee Chairman Darrell Issa would be looking into that issue..." off the record.

Center for American Progress Finally Reveals its Corporate Donors: At least 17 raking in tens of billions of tax dollars from the Green Bank of Obama

While the left-wing think tank is a well-known favorite of billionaire George Soros, as well as other left-leaning ultra-rich donors, "the center does not disclose who finances its activities, a policy it is declining to change even as Mr. Podesta prepares to wield influence over the shape of the Obama administration," [wrote](#) the *New York Times* in 2008.

(https://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/07/us/politics/07podesta.html?_r=4&ref=politics&)

However, "after heavy pressure arising from CAP's quasi-lobbying history. That scrutiny ratcheted up following the announcement that CAP founder John Podesta would be formally joining the Obama administration. Both Politico and the *New York Times* called for the donor list to meet the public eye," [reported](#) *Breitbart News*.

(<https://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2013/12/13/Center-American-Progress-corporations>)

So, on December 13, 2013, CAP "revealed that it's funded by some of the country's largest and most powerful corporations, trade associations and lobbying firms," [announced](#) *POLITICO*.

(<https://www.politico.com/story/2013/12/center-for-american-progress-donor-list-101140.html>)

The donor disclosure [excluded](#) individuals and foundations, only giving insight into their corporate influence, leaving more darkness in its wake.

(<https://freebeacon.com/donor-disclosure-by-center-for-american-progress-leaves-much-in-the-dark/>)

Moreover, it was reported that each of those listed ([58 donors](#)) has given the group more than \$10,000 in 2013, yet the exact amount was not disclosed.

(<https://www.americanprogress.org/about/Plaintiffs-supporters/>)

CAP's 2013 donor list "[contains](#) a myriad of massive corporations, including Apple Inc., AT&T, Bank of America, BMW of North America, Citigroup, Coca-Cola, Discovery, GE, Facebook, Google, Goldman Sachs, PepsiCo, PG&E, the Motion Picture Association of America, Samsung, Time Warner Inc., T-Mobile, Toyota, Visa, Walmart and Wells Fargo" — many of which are part of this massive green energy scheme.

(<https://www.americanprogress.org/about/Plaintiffs-supporters/>)

Still, *The Nation*, in their May 2013 piece "[The Secret Donors Behind the Center for American Progress and Other Think Tanks](#), released a [list](#) of CAP's 2012 corporate donors — labeled "[American Progress Business Alliance Members](#)," which are charged fees:

(<https://www.thenation.com/article/174437/secret-donors-behind-center-american-progress-and-other-think-tanks-updated-524>)

(https://thenation.s3.amazonaws.com/pdf/CAP_alliance_members_2012_2.pdf)

(https://thenation.s3.amazonaws.com/pdf/CAP_alliance_members_2012_2.pdf)

A confidential CAP donor pitch I obtained describes the Business Alliance as "a channel for engagement with the corporate community" that provides "the opportunity to...collaborate on common interests." It offers three membership levels, with the perks to top donors (\$100,000 and up) including private meetings with CAP experts and executives, round-table discussions with "Hill and national leaders," and briefings on CAP reports "relevant to your unique interests."

The Nation also divulged that CAP doesn't publicly disclose the members of its Business Alliance, but they "obtained multiple internal lists from 2011 showing that dozens of major corporations had joined." What's relevant here is that in 2011 the lists compiled by The Nation of "CAP's donors included Comcast, Walmart, General Motors, Pacific Gas and Electric, General Electric, Boeing and Lockheed" — with three confirmed winners of green energy funds.

So basically the donor list and the membership list are one in the same. And, what's even more interesting is how The Nations chronicles CAP's assets:

"After growing rapidly in its first few years, tax records show, CAP's total assets fell in 2006 for the first time, from \$23.6 million to \$20.4 million. Assets started growing again in 2007 when CAP founded the Business Alliance, a membership rewards program for corporate contributors, and then exploded when Obama was elected in 2008."

We know that CAP founded its Business Alliance (corporate donors) in 2007, but since we only have a hint of 2011, combined with lists for 2012 and 2013, the mystery remains. Missing are the corporate donors CAP enlisted from 2007 until 2011. When did these now public donors join CAP, and what was dollar amount of money that was given?

While I am about to dissect the corporations from these lists (2011 to 2013) that received green energy taxpayer money (loans, grants and special tax breaks), in full disclosure, the majority of the stimulus and non-stimulus clean-energy funds (\$150 billion through 2014) were doled out between 2009 and 2011. However, as I reported in the beginning of this post, “green” funds continue to flow, and the Obama administration wants billions more of taxpayer money to save the planet.

I hate to be redundant, but as you’ll see, CAP’s corporate donors are connected to many of the same projects and firms that we have documented in previous Green Corruption Files. This is due to the fact that meaningful political ties — Obama’s bundlers (both in 2008 and in 2012), top donors, financiers, and green cronies — have surrounded the green energy money from the onset. However, considering that CAP players operated inside the Obama White House as well as the Energy Department — prior, during and after the money was doled out — this adds another layer of corruption behind the green energy deals.

At any rate, several of these corporations include Big Banks (even the “too-big-to fail”) that have benefited immensely from President Obama’s cleantech push. Even though many on Wall Street stood by the president in 2012, the majority sided with Mitt Romney. But that was after Obama enjoyed his fare share of Wall Street buddies who helped ensure his victory in 2008, poring millions of dollars into his campaign coffers, making their mark as TOP campaign donors (PAC) — with even Wall Street executives bundling huge sums of money for then-candidate Obama. Additionally, “the big bundlers had broad access to the White House for meetings with top administration officials and glitzy social events.”

Inside these CAP corporate donor lists we find a few TARP recipients such as Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, Bank of America, and Merrill Lynch. What’s more telling is the infiltration of so many Citigroup and Goldman Sachs executives operating (past and present) inside the Obama administration, even shaping his economic policy.

CAP’S 2013 DONORS: Green energy money winners

#1) Bank of America (now Bank of America Merrill Lynch — confirmed donor since 2012):

Both Bank of America and Merrill Lynch (Campaign Committee’s), from 2003 to 2008, supported Senator Obama. Meanwhile, Bank of America, a heavy hitter donor with major lobbying pull, plays both sides of the isle. But in 2008, this Big Bank put their money (PAC and individuals) on blue, including donating to candidate Obama.

In the final days of the DOE loan program (September 2011), the DOE awarded a partial guarantee of \$1.4 billion loan — another shady stimulus deal (“non-investment grade”) that was “personally championed” by then-Energy Secretary Steven Chu — for a project called Project Amp. Prior to the finalization of this DOE transaction, in June 2011, Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Prologis and NRG Energy joined forces on Project Amp, which was “a four-year, \$2.6 billion project to place solar panels on rooftops in 28 states, one of the most ambitious clean-energy projects in recent years,” reported the Wall Street Journal.

The Journal goes on, “Bank of America Merrill Lynch unit will provide \$1.4 billion in loans for the project,” of which “the financing is part of Bank of America’s plan to put \$20 billion of capital to work in renewable energy, conservation and other clean technologies that address climate change.”

However, by October 2013, the Energy Department pulled the plug on Project Amp, and according to POLITICO, Prologis never tapped into the \$1.4 billion. Still, along the way, Prologis did secure “a grant for \$68,000 for the purpose of “rent for warehouse space” under the Recovery Act.

While I have yet to do a complete analysis on Bank of America/Merrill Lynch and their renewable energy portfolio, there are additional firms or projects that this bank has backed that also received “green” taxpayer funds from the Obama administration.

NextEra Energy Wind Energy Assets

First is NextEra, whose CEO Lewis “Lew” Hay, III was member of President Obama’s Jobs Council (from 2011 until 2013), that was awarded two large DOE stimulus loans, as well as a slew of other green energy stimulus funds. This is part of the scheme that we’ve been documenting since the summer of 2012 (“Third Largest Recipient of DOE Risky Loans”), and later in my January 2013 Big Wind Story.

But since Bank of America has invested in the wind side, what’s key here is this: NextEra was the biggest user of the wind energy production tax credit. In an analysis by John Fund of the National Review Online, he states...

Begun 20 years ago to spur the construction of wind-energy facilities that could compete with conventional fossil-fuel power plants, the tax credit [PTC] gives wind an advantage over all other energy producers. But it has mostly benefited conventional nuclear and fossil-fuel-fired electricity producers. The biggest user of the tax credit is Florida-based NextEra Energy, the nation’s eighth-largest power producer. Through skillful manipulation of the credits, NextEra from 2005 to 2009 ‘paid just \$88 million in taxes on earnings of nearly \$7 billion,’ Businessweek reports. That’s a tax rate of just 1.25 percent over that period, when the statutory rate is 35 percent.

SolarCity

Considering that the Podesta Group added SolarCity as a client in 2012, I highlighted the various political connections to this solar firm earlier, including billionaire players that received taxpayer money for other green energy deals, such as Elon Musk, Nicholas J. Pritzker, and George Soros.

But what most don’t know is that SolarCity was in line to get a stimulus loan from the DOE for \$275 million. However, that deal — dubbed SolarStrong — fell apart due to the Solyndra “red flags” just prior to the loan program’s deadline in September 2011. A month later, SolarCity found a willing partner in Bank of America, which was followed by this official announcement: “SolarCity and Bank of America Merrill Lynch today announced that they have agreed to terms on financing for SolarStrong, SolarCity’s ambitious five-year plan to build more than \$1 billion in solar power projects for privatized U.S. military housing communities across the country.”

It should be noted that without government subsidies, SolarCity wouldn't be the success it is today: "SolarCity currently benefits from tax credits totaling as much as 30 percent of the cost of these systems," noted Bloomberg. And, as I documented earlier, SolarCity, so far (and since 2009) has been subsidized with "green" through various stimulus funds, grants and federal tax breaks at the tune of \$514 million.

SunPower

Bank of America Merrill Lynch and SunPower have worked together since 2009. And this year they announced a \$220 million financing program for residential solar lease projects. In January 2010, SunPower Corp, the San Jose, Calif.-based designer and manufacturer of solar panels and systems, received four of the stimulus-enacted Section 48C Tax Credits totaling \$10.8 million. Then, despite SunPower's well-known financial issues and the fact that it was under a shareholder suit alleging securities fraud and misrepresentations, just days (September 2011) before the 1705 Loan Guarantee Program's deadline (along with four other solar companies), this "non-investment" grade \$1.2 billion stimulus loan was approved — to support the construction of the California Valley Solar Ranch (CVSR) in San Luis Obispo County.

The conditional loan to SunPower was announced on April 12, 2011, and shortly thereafter (April 30, 2011), the French oil conglomerate Total committed to buying a \$1.37 billion controlling stake (60%) in SunPower Corp — a bailout that was confirmed in June 2011. Now, SunPower never directly got the cash, because on the final closing of the DOE loan guarantee, they sold the California Valley Solar Ranch to NRG Energy. However, SunPower continued on as the developer and Bechtel as the primary contractor building the project.

Also, to date, SunPower Residential, in 2013 and 2014, snagged 34 federal stimulus grants from the 1603 Program for "solar electricity" that ranges across 12 states, totaling over \$86 million tax dollars.

Other than Bank of America, both SunPower and NRG Energy have additional meaningful political connections to President Obama and other high-ranking Democrats, of which we've documented a few times: First in my October 2012 report (troubled green energy projects) and then in my February 2013 analysis on Citigroup, another CAP donor that is up next, which is a huge player inside this "climate" scam. Lastly, due to the fact that NRG Energy, a Fortune 500 and S&P 500 Index company, of which they and their subsidiaries, initially, were the recipient of most of 1705 stimulus loans: at least \$5.2 billion of taxpayer money (now minus the \$1.4 billion for Project Amp). NRG Energy was one of George Soros' timely investments that I mentioned at the beginning of this post, yet more Intel can be found in my March 2013 Green Corruption File.

#2) Citigroup (confirmed donor since 2012):

Since 2007, Citigroup has been heavily involved in "climate change activities." We also can confirm that this "too-big-to-fail" bank has made a massive footprint inside President's Obama's clean-energy dirt — the candidate that Citigroup helped get elected in 2008 as the number seven top donor (PAC) with many executives and friends of Obama bundling for both his campaigns. Meanwhile, in 2012, Citi contributed to both President Obama and Mitt Romney.

By 2011 — prior to the presidential reelection — through their “50 Billion Climate Change Investment Initiative,” Citigroup had “directed \$36.35 billion into such initiatives so far...” — of which they brag: “In the U.S., Citi has the largest market share (28 percent) of U.S. Department of energy section 1703/1705 Loan Guarantee program financings for alternative energy, and we are the leader in such bond transactions.”

Considering that in February 2013, I dedicated an entire post to Cit and their Massive ‘Green’ Money Machine,” which included a careful analysis of their “2012 alternative energy portfolio” that lists about 37 transactions (plus SolarReserve) — both foreign and here in the United States, here I’ll just give some highlights.

What I found is that 58 percent (22) of Citi’s clients had received government subsidies, totaling approximately \$16 billion from the taxpayer-funded Green Bank of Obama, the majority from stimulus package. Furthermore, my research not only “followed the green money,” but profiled the Citi executives that operate (d) inside the White House, some with key positions, which included President Obama’s 2013 choice to replace Timothy Geithner for Treasury Secretary with Jack Lew (former Chief of Staff), Michael Froman, Richard Parsons, Louis Susman, and Michael Eckhart — to name a few.

Many of the alternative energy projects that Citi was involved are mentioned in today’s study, starting with the Energy Department’s junk bond portfolio, which were doled out between 2009 and 2011:

- BrightSource Energy was awarded \$1.6 billion DOE loan for the Ivanpah solar facility in California
- Brookfield Renewable Power, whereas Granite Reliable received a \$168.9 million loan for a wind project in New Hampshire.
- Caithness/General Electric received a \$1.3 billion DOE loan for the Shepherds Flat wind project in Oregon
- NextEra Energy /First Solar got a \$1.46 billion loan for the Desert Sunlight project in California;
- SolarReserve was awarded \$737 million DOE stimulus loan for the Crescent Dunes project in Nevada.

According to their renewable energy portfolio, Citi, in February 2011, became a major investor in SolarCity. And, as I documented earlier, SolarCity, so far (and since 2009) has been subsidized with “green” through various stimulus funds, grants and federal tax breaks at the tune of \$514 million.

Citigroup, as of 2010 was listed as SunPower’s bookrunner. Then in August 2011 SunPower and Citi set up a \$105 million fund for residential solar leasing projects, which states, “SunPower will use the fund to extend its SunPower Lease programme to customers in 8 US states, expanding the financing options available to homeowners interested in SunPower solar energy systems. The SunPower Lease is now available in Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York and

Pennsylvania. Citi is contributing \$80m to the fund.” Again, I covered SunPower under Bank of America, showing that this solar firm was given plenty of green government subsidies:

In January 2010, SunPower Corp received four of the stimulus-enacted Section 48C Tax Credits totaling \$10.8 million.

In September 2011, SunPower is part of the \$1.2 billion stimulus loan to support the construction of the California Valley Solar Ranch (CVSR) in San Luis Obispo County.

SunPower Residential, in 2013 and 2014, snagged 34 federal stimulus grants from the 1603 Program for “solar electricity” that ranges across 12 states, totaling over \$86 million tax dollars.

#3) Goldman Sachs (possibly a donor since 2012):

Goldman Sachs was a top Obama donor in 2008, but we also know that two Goldman executives sat on Obama’s 2008 Finance Committee and a slew of partners, executives and board members bundled for, and donated to Obama’s 2008 campaign. Meanwhile, his administration has been infested with Goldmanites — even as early as 2008 when a Goldman board member, James A. Johnson (also an Obama bundler that I profiled many times due to his former firm Perseus), was chosen as head of Barack Obama’s vice presidential search team. Known as Jim Johnson and “a fixture of establishment Washington, with ties to Wall Street and “a major presence in Democratic politics for more than two decades,” Mr. Johnson resigned his VP vetting role amidst criticism over his part in the Countrywide Financial scandal as well as controversy surrounding his role as Fannie Mae’s chief executive from 1991 to 1999.

Even though in 2012, Goldman Sachs turned their back on Mr. Obama in 2012, there were many executives and board members that helped him get reelected.

Like Bank of America, I haven’t had the opportunity to examine Goldman Sachs’ Alternative Energy Group and its Environmental Markets financing and advisory; however, we do know that Goldman has been investing in renewable energy since at least 2005.

By 2014, Goldman Sachs “declared that the renewable sector is one of the most compelling” — even as they backed “green” in 2012, having committed \$40 billion to renewable energy (made and planned investments). According to Renew Economy, “Stuart Bernstein, who heads the bank’s clean-technology and renewables investment banking group, told Recharge in a recent interview in a story titled Goldman goes Green, “It is at a transformational moment in time.”

As Goldman promotes President Obama’s Climate Action Plan along with other winners of clean-energy funds, they also brag about their climate change roles: “In 2012, we financed nearly \$2 billion and co-invested more than \$430 million in the sector. We also served as financial advisor on clean-energy transactions valued at more than \$1.1 billion.”

Needless to say, since 2010, I’ve been following Goldman and tracking how this Big Bank has been cashing in on the stimulus funds. As my research developed, I found their DNA all over this green energy scheme, of which to date we can confirm that Goldman Sachs has an invested interest — via various roles, and having entered the scene at different junctures (before, during and after taxpayer

subsidies were awarded), in many projects and firms that received loans, grants and special tax breaks. So far I've tracked at least 14 firms connecting Goldman to over \$8.5 billion from the Green Bank of Obama, the majority from the 2009-Recovery Act.

Keep in mind too, that Goldman is associated (former executives and investments) with the Big VC firm Kleiner Perkins as well as Generation Investment Management (GIM) — mentioned a few times already. As a reminder, Kleiner Perkins is where we find the “climate duo,” whose combined carbon footprint is larger than my entire city: Billionaires John Doerr and Al Gore (partners at the firm), where Doerr, “a very big-ticket Obama donor,” in January 2009, persuasions were reflected in the 2009-Recovery Act via his “meetings with Obama’s transition team and leaders in Congress” as well as the fact that he made “five recommendations to Congress and President-elect Barack Obama to jumpstart a green-tech revolution and fight global warming.”

Shortly thereafter (around February 6, 2009) and just days prior to signing the stimulus bill (February 18, 2009), Obama appointed Doerr as a member of his Economic Recovery Advisory Board (PERAB), which later morphed into the president’s jobs council — only to close down in February 2013.

Meanwhile, back in 2004 Gore started GIM with former CEO of Goldman Sachs Asset Management David Blood, who is another Obama bundler. Apparently, Blood is the “wizard behind” GIM, and behind this “sustainable firm” are several former Goldman executives and partners — even as Doerr, in 2007, joined the GIM advisory board.

This and more insight were profiled in my January 8, 2013 file on Doerr and Gore, whose “Greentech Portfolio” (at least 50%) and GIM’s “Sustainable Investing” secured billions in loans, grants and special tax breaks — the two firms combined are tied to at least \$10 billion from the taxpayer-funded Green Bank of Obama, the majority coming from the 2009-Recovery Act, of which Doerr had helped author.

As far as Goldman: first off they made big money from the sale of Horizon Wind Energy to Portugal’s EDP for \$2.5 billion in 2007, of which ironically, starting in 2009 until the end of 2012, EDP Renewables North America LLC (formerly Horizon Wind Energy LLC), received over \$700 million of free taxpayer money from the Obama stimulus bill (\$722,468,855 in Section 1603 Grants) for eleven wind projects, placing them at the number two spot of foreign firms that were winners of US grants. This was a shocking report released in early 2013 by the Energy and Commerce Committee, exposing the extent to which foreign corporations are benefiting from green energy stimulus funding.

Goldman’s Green Losers, Winners, Biofuels, & Smart Grids

Nevertheless, Goldman is credited as the “exclusive financial adviser” for the now bankrupt Solyndra (\$570.4 million loss), and in 2010, handled the IPO of what most deem a government winner, Tesla Motors that was awarded \$465 million from the DOE ATVM program. Also, according to Goldman, “In May 2013, [they] helped raise over \$1 billion in new financing for Tesla Motors.”

There are more bankrupt ones as well: SpectraWatt (\$20.5 million), Nordic WindPower (\$8.6 million), and Suntech Power Holdings Co. (\$2.1 million) — all taking millions of taxpayer money down with them, while Goldman remains unscathed.

Goldman is also active in advanced biofuels and feedstock companies, handling the IPOs of biofuel companies, of which at least two won money and contracts from the Obama administration: Amyris (\$25 million stimulus grant), Kior (seeking \$1 billion DOE loan) and Solazyme (\$21.7 million DOE stimulus grant; plus part of the \$12 million biofuel contract with the U.S. Navy) — the latter company has its very own direct connection to CAP: Jonathan Wolfson, Solazyme co-founder and Chief Executive Officer, “is an active participant in many advisory groups, including sitting on the board of the Center for American Progress (CAP) Clean Tech Council.

Meanwhile, Goldman hooked up with another huge winner of stimulus funds: “In March 2013, [they] served as lead-left bookrunner on the \$93 million initial public offering for Silver Spring Networks” — a Foundation Capital, Kleiner Perkins, and Google (all with friends in the White House) green investment, which in 2009, cashed in big time when the DOE starting handing the smart-grid grants as part of the 2009-Recovery Act. During the course of my January 2013 analysis on Silver Spring, I found that 30 percent of the \$4.5 billion stimulus smart-grid grants went to their “customers” — that’s over \$1.3 billion. Then in my May 2013 report, “Smart Grid, Dirty Devices”, I documented additional ties and an interesting analysis of its IPO: “Silver Spring IPO has more red flags than a Communist Party military parade,” PrivCo CEO Sam Hamadeh.

Goldman’s Green DOE Stimulus Loans

Considering that First Solar is also a CAP Business Alliance Member (donor), we’ll expand on that solar firm later, but what is key here is that Goldman was an early investor in First Solar that snagged three large DOE stimulus loans (over \$3 billion) — a story we’ve featured many times, starting with “The First Solar Three Billion Dollar Swindle.”

Still, Goldman was (is) also an investor in U.S. Geothermal that in February 2011, landed a \$97 million DOE stimulus loan slated to build a 22-megawatt power plant in the eastern Oregon desert. This was — one of the first geothermal projects funded by the DOE, despite the fact that in December 2010, S&P had rated this loan as non-investment grade. Yet, the “2012 Internal DOE Email Dump” prove that this deal was rushed and approved in time for a POTUS photo op. Moreover, U.S. Geothermal had other projects that snagged millions in green energy subsidies.

Then in September 2011, Cogentrix of Alamosa, LLC (Cogentrix Energy a subsidiary of Goldman Sachs), was awarded a \$90.6 million DOE stimulus loan for the Alamosa Solar Generating Project in Colorado. Cogentrix, on July 16, 2012 bagged a \$34.6 million stimulus grant (free taxpayer money) from the 1603 Grant Program — I’m assuming this is for the same project.

But that’s not all....

BrightSource Energy Just Got Darker

According to Renew Economy (January 2014), “[Goldman] has also a substantial investment in BrightSource Energy,” which actually brought its Ivanpah solar power facility into full production last month — and if not for a federal loan guarantee, the \$2.2-billion project would have never seen the light of day. Now this massive solar power plant (struggling to produce power) has become the “\$2.2 Billion Bird-Scorching Solar Project” — with even the left-leaning Los Angeles Times, chronicling their grand opening like this:

After nearly four years of construction that killed desert tortoises, burned the feathers off passing birds and mowed down thousands of acres of native flora, Ivanpah officially opened last month with a gala that included a rock band and a horde of dignitaries — Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz among them.

We’ve been uncovering BrightSource Energy’s \$1.6 billion shady DOE deal since July 6, 2012, and as new information became available we’ve revisited this huge solar transaction several times. In short, the Ivanpah Solar Electric Generating System (SEGS) in California was subsidized with a \$1.6 billion DOE stimulus loan, which was announced on February 22, 2010 and finalized April 11, 2011 — a project that also received special treatment by the Department of Interior, which was documented in Plaintiff “2012 Special Seven Series.”

Still, BrightSource investors not only include Goldman Sachs, but additional 2008 Obama donors such as Google, Morgan Stanley, and BP Alternative Energy. Meanwhile the Ivanpah project incorporates a slew of ties to President Obama as well as Vice President Joe Biden and Senator Harry Reid. This story comprises of big donors, political cronies and connections such as BrightSource, VantagePoint, Google, NRG Energy, PG&E, Goldman Sachs, Citigroup, George Soros, the former Commerce Secretary John Bryson, McBee Strategic Consulting, lobbyists Bernie Toon, and others — with DOE officials, Obama’s Green Team, and several in Congress from the Democrat side involved.

While I briefly addressed Citigroup’s part in this billion-dollar deal in February 23, 2013 (Ongoing — \$250mm IPO / Joint Bookrunner), it should be noted that just days after the finalization of the \$1.6 billion government loan, BrightSource had filed for an IPO, of which Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Citigroup Inc. and Deutsche Bank AG were leading the proposed offering. However, a year later, they canceled their IPO, and BrightSource CEO John Woolard (now former) told Gigaom.com that it was “because of the weak public markets, particularly for solar and greentech companies...” — of which, to date the IPO is still pending. Yet, we do know that Goldman has made equity investments in the solar developer BrightSource.

We also can confirm that additional political heavyweights have been hovering over this deal, starting with Bechtel (another big corporation with their hand in the stimulus) that constructed BrightSource’s Ivanpah project as well as the fact that sometime in October 2010, during the time of their DOE loan review process, “NRG became the lead investor (\$300m) in Ivanpah solar project. In fact, as mentioned, this was one of the four (now three) large taxpayer-funded stimulus projects that NRG Energy is part of.

Side Note: My March 22, 2013 file covers The Soros connection, its CEO David Crane, and more. My September 2013 post on BrightSource’s Top DC lobbyist (since 2009) gives more insight into other

players inside this \$1.6 billion DOE deal, such as VantagePoint, Google Inc, and PG&E, which included ongoing interaction and pressure from the heavyweight K Street firm McBee Strategic Consulting — another huge player inside this green energy scam. What’s key is that Steve McBee “reportedly wrote key provisions in the stimulus bill to open the spigot of green corporate welfare” — thus over 60 percent of his energy client list cashed in under the Obama administration.

Lastly, in November 2013, we unleashed BrightSource’s connection to Senator Harry Reid as well as the incriminating “2012 Internal DOE Email Dump” relevant to this particular DOE transaction.

What’s key here is that BrightSource Energy has never been solid. In fact, the “Oakland-based BrightSource Energy Inc. had emerged from the bankruptcy of its parent company.” Now I’m assuming this was out of the ashes of BrightSource Industries (Israel) Ltd. that was formerly known as LUZ II Ltd., and changed its name in December 2008.

Nevertheless, according to Schweizer in Throw Them All Out, as he described the financial issues they were having, “BrightSource badly needed this infusion of taxpayer cash.” So in essence this \$1.6 billion stimulus DOE deal was a bailout, which is a clear violation of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 — a fact that we elaborated on many times.

Goldman: SolarCity, SunEdison & SunRun

According to Renew Economy (January 2014), “Goldman Sachs also provided \$500 million of finance to SolarCity, to allow the biggest solar installer in the US to expand its solar leasing business. Goldman is one of a number of banks to do that — the latest was Bank of America/Merrill Lynch.”

Goldman, in 2012, also handled the IPO for SolarCity — the solar firm I first highlighted under the Podesta Group (became a 2012 client) and expanded upon under Bank of America, noting that SolarCity was not only in line to receive a loan from the Energy Department, but as documented earlier, SolarCity, so far (and since 2009) has been subsidized with “green” through various stimulus funds, grants and federal tax breaks at the tune of \$514 million. We’ll keep watching...

There is also SunEdison LLC — a global provider of solar-energy services — which was also an early Goldman Sachs investment. Due to the fact that this solar firm also became a client the Podesta Group in 2012, I covered the fact that in 2013, SunEdison won 5 federal stimulus grants from the 1603 Program for “solar electricity” that ranges across 5 states, totaling over \$1.8 million tax dollars.

Furthermore, SunEdison is in cahoots with JPMorgan, GE Capital as well as Southern Company and a few other familiar green energy players and CAP donors such as Bank of America, Duke Energy, and First Solar.

Just last month, the Wall Street Journal reported, “Sunrun Inc., a company that finances and installs home solar projects, has retained Goldman Sachs to raise a growth equity round of more than \$100 million, according to a person familiar with the situation.”

SunRun can be found in my May 2012 research on Foundation Capital — another friend of the Obama White House and big VC winner of taxpayer money from the Green Bank of Obama, adding to my

long list of Big VC's that have had made out like bandits. As of October 2013 , I found that SunRun, between 2011 and 2013, snagged 23 federal stimulus grants from the 1603 Program for “solar electricity” that ranges across 10 states, totaling over \$141 million tax dollars, thus far.

Plus in 2010, SunRun announced a \$100 million joint program with major utility Pacific Gas & Electric, which according to Venture Beat, “PG&E will be funding the rooftop systems in question via its subsidiary, Pacific Energy Capital II, a tax equity fund,” of which “In lieu of traditional returns, the investor — PG&E in this case — gets tax benefits in addition to some cash returns.”

#4) Covanta Energy (confirmed donor since 2012):

This was one of those Soros timely investments (twelve alternative energy and utility companies) that I had alluded to in the beginning of this post and exposed in my March 2013 Green Corruption File. I found that Covanta, a clean-energy company and the recipient of federal stimulus grants, also received millions in 2010 through Congressional earmarks, yet it is unclear as to how many green government subsidies or the exact stimulus dollar amount that Covanta Energy snagged. Also, Covanta Energy stands to benefit from the NAT GAS Act if it comes to light again.

#5) General Electric (confirmed donor since 2011):

General Electric (GE) is a heavy donor to both Republicans and Democrats, and its CEO Jeffrey Immelt “plays the role of typical corporate donor who hedges his bets on both sides of the fence.” However in 2008, GE gave the Obama campaign \$529,855, marking them as a top Obama donor.

Meanwhile, in early 2009, Immelt was first appointed as a member of Obama’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board (PERAB), which later morphed into the president’s jobs council, where Immelt served as the Jobs Czar, until it closed down in February 2013.

Nevertheless, GE is a major player on the clean-energy scene as well as in this green energy scheme, starting with the fact that they were also part of the DOE’s Electricity Advisory Committee that had influence into the 2009-Recovery Act. In 2009, the New York Times recognized GE’s green power, noting, “GE lobbied Congress to help expand the clean-energy subsidy programs, and it now profits from every aspect of the boom in renewable-power plant construction, including hundreds of millions in contracts to sell its turbines to wind plants built with public subsidies.”

I’ve been keeping track of GE’s “green tab” since 2012, which at that time exceeded \$3 billion in direct (some indirect) taxpayer cash. This tally includes three large stimulus loans from Energy Department’s junk bond portfolio that were doled out between late 2010 until September 2011.

Considering the treasure trove of Intel found in the “2012 Internal DOE Email Dump,” I revisited GE in my December 2012 post. Long story short, in October 2010, the Caithness Shepherds Flat wind project located in eastern Oregon was awarded a \$1.3 billion DOE stimulus loan — a \$2 billion project sponsored by GE, who also supplied the project with 338 wind-turbines. These internal emails show that this transaction was approved with White House pressure. For example:

September 9, 2010 EMAIL: James McCrea (subject line: Shepherds Flat — Draft Responses to OMB Questions), “As you all know, the pressure to make decisions on this transaction are high so speed of the essence.” Then later that day, McCrea writes (Email #4 from Appendix I) he says, “Pressure is on real heavy on SF [Shepherds Flat] due to interest from VP.”

Shepherds Flat’s developers also received “a \$500 million federal grant, state tax credits totaling \$18 million, accelerated depreciation on federal and state taxes worth \$200 million, and a premium for its power from the state worth \$220 million.” At some point, the Shepherds Flat wind farm received three separate tax credits totaling \$30 million from the state of Oregon.

But there’s more...

In September 2011, the poorly rated 1366 Technologies, sponsored in part by GE, received a direct \$150 million stimulus loan from the DOE for its solar manufacturing plant.

GE is also part of the \$1.2 billion DOE stimulus loan for the Desert Sunlight project, which was finalized in September 2011. This is part of the First Solar Swindle that has been mentioned a few times in this post, and will be detailed later.

Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) loaned \$54.6 million to Kansas City Southern Railway Company (KCSR) “to purchase thirty new General Electric ES44AC diesel-electric locomotives” — a loan that raised red flags in the March 2012 House Oversight investigation.

Also, you’ll be “blown away” by the billions of “wind energy grants” that flew out of the stimulus package back in February 2010, of which at that time, GE was contracted to at least 26% of them as the “Turbine Manufacturer.”

In late 2009, it was reported by Gigaom, “GE is one of the newer smart meter players, but the conglomerate has been working with utility Oklahoma Gas & Electric on a 6,600 smart meter trial, and has a contract with PHI, which received \$104.80 million for a smart meter deployment in Washington, DC. GE also has a big contract with Florida Power and Light” that also the recipient of a \$200 million stimulus grant.

Other than bagging direct green energy stimulus money, GE has also joined forces with others that have benefited from Obama’s alternative-energy taxpayer funds. Two in particular — the Advanced Metering Partners, another John Doerr “venture” via Silver Spring Networks, as well as Energy Technology Ventures formed in 2011 with NRG Energy and ConocoPhillips. And, I’m sure if were to visit GE again, we’d find much more than \$3 billion in green energy funds.

#6) Google (confirmed donor since 2012):

Google, like Wall Street and Big Energy, plays the political game well: it’s all about access and influence, starting with campaign contributions. Google’s \$814,540 contribution to then-Senator Obama’s campaign made it the fifth largest donor in 2008, and in 2012 moved up to the number three spot with a whopping \$805,119. Furthermore, Google’s CEO at the time, Eric Schmidt, served as an informal advisor to President Obama. Schmidt, Google Executive Chairman, was also an Obama donor

in 2008, and since April 2009, is (was) a member of the president's Science and Technology Advisory Council (PCAST).

Another Google political connection is Dan Reicher, director of climate and energy initiatives at Google, who was one of the founders of Cleantech and Green Business Leaders for Obama. There are other interesting folks behind the Google scenes such as John Doerr and Al Gore — the dynamic climate duo mentioned periodically in this post — who has served as a member of Google's board of directors since May 1999, with Gore as a (past) senior advisor.

And according to Michelle Malkin, "Google cofounder Sergey Brin, Chief Legal Officer and Senior Vice President David Drummond, and Google Vice President and Chief Internet Evangelist Vint Cerf are all vocal Obama supporters and top donors." Meanwhile, Google co-founders Sergey Brin & Larry Page, invested in Tesla Motors, while Google, in 2011, partnered with SolarCity (mentioned a few times now) to create a \$280 million fund for residential solar projects — both BIG winners of "green" taxpayer money.

Like many of these Big VC's that won a significant amount of green money from the Obama administration — Kleiner Perkins, Khosla Ventures, The Westly Group, VantagePoint Capital Partners, Google Ventures, Foundation Capital, and others — their "cleantech investments" overlap, and I briefly touched on Google in my January 2012 post about Doerr and Gore.

Later, I documented Google as energy client of McBee Strategic Consulting (in my September 2013 Green Corruption File), discovering and exposing the fact that Google Ventures — via their "Energy Investments" and other "green deals" that I tracked down at that time — has ten verified stimulus and other green energy money winners, which places their investment score at close to \$5 billion of taxpayer cash, which includes three DOE loans: BrightSource Energy (\$1.6 billion); GE's Caithness Shepherds Flat wind project (presented under GE for \$1.3 billion); and Tesla Motors that won \$465 million ATVM loan. If you add in Silver Spring Networks' customers that won \$1.3 billion in smart-grid stimulus grants, which I divulged here a few times, that figure rises to \$6.3 billion and counting.

#7. PG&E (confirmed donor since 2011):

This utility giant is a strong Obama and Democrat donor that happens to be all over this "green" scam. Not only did they have direct influence over the DOE loans, they are jam-packed with Washington "green cronies," including Cathy Zoi, who is the "most controversial former PG&E employee to hold an influential government." Zoi, an Al Gore acolyte was a DOE Insider from 2009 until 2011, and she is not only tied to PG&E but other stimulus winners.

Still, PG&E was another client of the top DC lobbyist, McBee Strategic Consulting, of which I divulged in my September 2013 Green Corruption File. As reported by the Washington Free Beacon in 2012, "PG&E has become an aggressive buyer of power supplied by solar, wind, and other renewable sources, in large part due to statutory requirements under California's Renewable Portfolio Standard, which mandated that 20 percent of the utility's electricity come from renewable sources by 2010 — and 33 percent by 2020."

The big win for this huge energy corporation is that they have an invested interest in seven Energy Department stimulus loans worth \$7.6 billion. Moreover, with the exception of BrightSource Energy's \$1.6 billion project, of which we now know from an email Dated January 4, 2010, that Peter Darbee, then CEO of PG&E, had himself spoken to President Obama about this deal, the rest of the loans were finalized between June and September 2011. While the details into these taxpayer-funded projects can be found in my April 2013 post, here's an overview.

Agua Caliente Solar Power Project located in Yuma, Arizona, of which "PG&E will purchase the project's power and deliver it to customers in California." Project by NRG Solar: \$967 million loan guarantee

BrightSource Energy development located in Baker, CA, of which "electricity from the project will be sold under long-term power purchase agreements with Pacific Gas & Electric and Southern California Edison Company (SCE)." Project by NRG Energy, Inc. (BrightSource): \$1.6 billion loan guarantee

California Valley Solar Ranch of which the 250-megawatt is under construction in eastern San Luis Obispo County, and "is generating clean, reliable solar power for transmission over PG&E's utility grid." Project by NRG Solar and SunPower is still involved: \$1.237 billion loan guarantee

Desert Sunlight Project located in Riverside, CA, with the PPA (purchase power agreement) listed as Southern California Edison and PG&E. This is a First Solar Project that is co-owned by NextEra Energy Resources, GE Energy Financial Services, and Sumitomo Corporation of America: partial guarantee of \$1.46 billion

Genesis Solar Energy Project located in Riverside County, CA of which "power from the project will be sold to Pacific Gas and Electric Company." Project by NextEra Energy Resources, LLC: partial guarantee of \$852 million loan

Mesquite Solar 1, LLC located in Maricopa County, AZ, of which Bloomberg News had reported at the time the DOE loan was approved, "Sempra will sell electricity from the Mesquite Solar 1 plant to California's largest utility, PG&E Corp., under a 20-year contract." Project by Sempra Mesquite: \$337 million loan guarantee

Mojave Solar located in San Bernardino County, CA, of which at the time of the DOE loan approval (September 2011), "Abengoa signed a power-purchase agreement with PG&E to buy the energy produced by the project for a period of 25 years." Project by the Spanish firm Abengoa Solar, Inc.: \$1.2 billion loan guarantee

Meanwhile, my May 2013 "Smart Grid, Dirty Devices" divulges PG&E's partnership with Silver Spring Networks on many fronts (PG&E is their top customer). Silver Springs is the the lucky smart-grid technology company that I mentioned earlier, who has an array of White House connections — Foundation Capital, Kleiner Perkins and Google — and as of January 2013 is linked to at least \$1.3 billion in smart-grid stimulus grants.

But there's more...

PG&E won a significant amount of stimulus money for various projects, of which last year I found at least seventeen that added up to over \$55 million of tax dollars.

PG&E also bagged at least four stimulus 1603 grants in 2012 and 2013 (for fuel cell, hydropower and solar) totaling \$127.2 million.

SolarCity and SunRun, who both won large sums of stimulus money (duly noted in this post), are in cahoots with P.G.&E. Corporation, the California utility holding company's tax-equity fund to finance residential solar installations.

CAP'S 2011 & 2012 DONORS: Clean-Energy Money Winners (referred to as "American Progress Business Alliance Members")

Energy/Utilities

#8) American Electric Power (AEP):

While I found that AEP (between 2009 and 2010) was awarded at least four stimulus grants totaling \$740 million, which was detailed in my March 2013 Green Corruption File, there is more to share. According to Schweizer's bombshell book, "in the first quarter of 2009, Soros made an initial purchase of more than 1.5 million shares in American Electric Power (AEP), a utility company that invested heavily in an energy project called FutureGen."

This was a project that had been abandoned by the Bush administration; however, on June 12, 2009, the Obama administration revived FutureGen: "a federal-industry partnership that would build an advanced coal-burning power plant in Illinois to trap and store carbon dioxide emissions." After Obama took office, he not only restarted FutureGen with \$1 billion from the stimulus package, but he moved the project to Meredosia.

The FutureGen Industrial Alliance "was formed to partner with the U.S. Department of Energy on the FutureGen project." At that time it was a consortium of major coal and utility companies such as American Electric Power Co. Inc. and Peabody Energy Corp. Just thirteen days later, both AEP and Southern Co withdrew from the U.S.-government backed FutureGen project.

Despite ongoing drama, cost overruns and delays, as well as potential air pollution and other matters; back in February 2013, the FutureGen project was moving forward. While AEP was gone, we did find Ameren Corp (another Soros timely investment) along the way. Currently the FutureGen Industrial Alliance includes Alpha Natural Resources, Joy Global Inc, Peabody Energy, Xstrata Coal Pty Limited, and another CAP corporate donor, Anglo American (up next).

#9) Anglo American (confirmed donor since 2012, listed under energy/utility):

As detailed above, Anglo American, "one of the world's largest mining companies, is headquartered in the UK and listed on the London and Johannesburg stock exchanges," is now part of the FutureGen project funded with green energy funds. This past January, the Energy Department "gave the long-planned FutureGen clean-coal project one of the final OKs [and \$1 billion] it needs to start building," announced the Daily Journal.

According to most reports, “If all goes according to plan, the FutureGen project should be fully operational by 2017 and continue commercial operations for at least 20 years.”

#10) Constellation Energy:

Again, this is one of those twelve alternative energy and utility companies that another Soros had invested in shortly having helped craft the 2009 stimulus package that I had alluded to in the beginning of this post (exposed in my March 2013 Green Corruption File). I found that Constellation, an Exelon Company, which is labeled as “the president’s utility,” was another top 2008 Obama donor and big winner of “green” funds. Constellation received a \$200 million stimulus grant, of which since they are (were) the parent of Baltimore Gas and Electric Co, I’m assuming the \$200 million smart-grid grant (awarded in October 2009) that went to BGE is the one Schweizer had mentioned in his book (unless they got another \$200 million for something else).

Moreover, according to the Washington Free Beacon, “Constellation is one of the most prolific providers of green energy to federally owned facilities, sporting contracts with the General Services Administration (GSA) for the U.S. Capitol building, the Federal Reserve, the Smithsonian Institution, the United Nations building in New York, and a host of federal buildings in several states.”

#11) Dow Corning (Silicone Manufacturing/Solar):

In January 2010, two manufacturing tax credits were awarded from the 48C stimulus-created program for solar projects in Michigan. The tax credits included “\$141.9 million for Hemlock Semiconductor’s (a joint venture of Dow Corning Corporation and others) expansion of its Michigan polycrystalline silicon operations, and \$27.3 million for a monosilane plant Dow Corning is building.”

By 2012, Hemlock Semiconductor announced that they “were postponing three of the four phases of their \$1.2 billion plant in Tennessee,” of which the state of Tennessee had committed \$245 million to Hemlock — some of which was stimulus funds. In 2013, the company began laying off hundreds of workers at their Clarksville plant — even 100 were from their facility in Michigan (March 2013), and 50 more in May 2013. With the future of their plants unknown, “Dow Corning Corp. announced [November 2013] that it is acquiring a bigger stake in Hemlock Semiconductor.” So, here we have two more failing stimulus-funded projects that we need to watch — and a CAP donor ta boot.

#12) Duke Energy:

As duly noted, Duke Energy — the nation’s largest electric power company — has been a client of the Podesta Group since 2009. Jim Rogers, the chairman of Duke Energy, is another Obama donor, who was a major player at the 2012 Democratic convention, as a contributor, creditor, host, and even a speaker.

While Duke Energy is worthy of additional scrutiny, my January 2013, Big Wind Story documented that in 2011, Duke Energy was the recipient of a \$22 million grant from the DOE’s ARPA-E advanced energy research program that was funded by the 2009 stimulus package. This was “to design, build and install large-scale batteries to store wind energy at one of its wind farms in Texas.”

Then in May 2013 (previously dated June 2010), Notrees Windpower — a project of Duke Energy located in Texas — was handed a stimulus grant from the 1603 Program for \$103.6 million. And after a quick glance, I found three 1603 stimulus grants for Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC that were dished out in 2012 and 2013, totaling over \$62 million for “hydropower” and “solar electricity.” Duke Energy was also privy to the “smart” money as well — in 2009, the DOE awarded Duke Energy a \$200 million stimulus smart-grid grant to support projects in the Midwest.

#13) Enel Green Power North America:

In July 2012, Enel Green Power, through its US subsidiary Enel Green Power North America Inc., was awarded a grant for approximately \$99 million from the 2009-Recovery Act 1603 grant program for the construction of the Caney River wind farm in Kansas. The Caney River and the Rocky Ridge wind farm project includes J. P. Morgan as well as Wells Fargo Wind Holdings LLC and Metropolitan Life Insurance Company.

#14) First Solar (Solar Manufacturing and possibly a 2011 donor):

As I’ve alluded to many times in this post and others, First Solar has considerable ties to the Obama administration, starting with the fact that this solar firm was an early investment of Goldman Sachs, the Wall Street giant mentioned above as a CAP corporate donor since 2012 (maybe sooner).

In the mix we find another First Solar investor — Generation Investment Management (GIM), which as you know, is Al Gore’s sustainability firm tied to many green energy deals. Along the way we find a myriad of Obama billionaire cronies (donors and bundlers) that were also investors in First Solar: Ted Turner, Paul Tudor Jones, Whitney Tilson, David Shaw, as well as the fact George Soros bought First Solar stock sometime in late 2007, until about May 2011, as recorded at GuruFocus.com.

Prior to the \$3 billion in DOE stimulus loans, in 2010, First Solar snagged \$16.3 million “to expand its manufacturing facility to produce fully completed thin-film solar modules,” in Ohio, which was part of the 2009-Recovery Act via the DOE / Treasury, Clean Energy Manufacturing Tax Credits (48C). According to reports, “The Ohio Department of Development also lent First Solar \$5 million, and the state’s Air Quality Development Authority gave the company an additional \$10 million loan” — marking First Solar’s Ohio facility as taxpayer-funded with over \$30 million.

But it gets better: First Solar, in 2011, “also scored \$547.7 million in loan guarantees [by the controversial taxpayer funded Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im)] to subsidize the sale of solar panels to solar farms abroad,” as documented by Veronique de Rugy (senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center) in her stunning assessment of DOE’s Loan Program. Ms. de Rugy goes on, “More troubling is the fact that some of the Ex-Im money [\$192.9 million] went to a Canadian company named St. Clair Solar, which is a wholly owned subsidiary of First Solar, meaning that the company received a loan to buy solar panels from itself.”

This Ex-Im transaction even hits closer to CAP, starting with Carol Browner — CAP fellow, former DOE insider, and Al Gore’s pal — who sits on (and has for a while) the Advisory Committee of the Export-Import Bank.

Still, the Daily Caller last month, unearthed another alarming connection: “[First Solar] is not only listed as a CAP donor, but has also been listed as a client of the Albright Stonebridge Group (ASG) in 2011 — a lobbying firm founded by former Clinton Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. ASG is also listed as a CAP donor.”

And, it gets better, as reported in The DC...

Coincidentally, Export-Import Bank President Fred Hochberg has spoken annually at CAP since 2011 — the same year First Solar got its loan. It is unknown whether the solar company was also a CAP donor at the time.

When Hochberg spoke at the progressive think tank in 2012, he mentioned that Alice Albright was in attendance — Madeleine Albright’s daughter and the Ex-Im’s chief operating officer from 2009 to 2013. Hochberg spoke on June 25 and First Solar was awarded \$57.3 million in financing on July 18. In 2011, Hochberg spoke on June 15 and, just over a week later on June 23, Ex-Im awarded First Solar millions more in financing. That year the taxpayer-backed export bank awarded First Solar nearly \$573 million to make their products more competitive abroad and boost their sales — most of that financing came after Hochberg gave his speech. First Solar Vice President Frank de Rosa was likely bundling donations for Obama’s reelection campaign around this time.

Nevertheless, the big money came from the Energy Department: First Solar, an Arizona-based manufacturer of solar panels, in August and September 2011, won three 1705 DOE “junk rated” stimulus loans totaling over \$3 billion. Marita Noon and I first covered the “First Solar Swindler” in the summer of 2012, which began by documenting how seven solar companies received fast-tracked approval by the Department of the Interior (DOI) to lease federal lands in a no-bid process:

Abengoa Solar, BrightSource Energy, First Solar, Nevada Geothermal Power, NextEra Energy Resources, Ormat Nevada, and SolarReserve.

Since then, we’ve tracked First Solar’s woes, which began since the finalization of these three large DOE loan guarantees — projects, by the way, that were sold to more Obama “energy” cronies just after the taxpayer funds were approved. However, First Solar remained involved in all of them.

The Projects

Exelon (Antelope Valley Solar Ranch): \$646 million stimulus loan

In September 2011, the same day that the Antelope Valley Solar Ranch, located in California, received a DOE loan guarantee for \$646 million, Exelon Corp. purchased it. First Solar, which developed the project, is still actively involved. The AVSR1 project, by the way, is expected to create 350 construction jobs and 20 permanent jobs.

The Chicago-based Exelon Corp, a big Obama donor and labeled as “The President’s Utility,” by itself is a huge piece of the Green Corruption scandal, which I have alluded to in the past and another piece of the scandal in the works.

NextEra Energy Resources, LLC (Desert Sunlight): \$1.46 billion stimulus loan

The California Desert Sunlight, in September 2011 — again the same day that this project received \$1.46 billion offer for a partial loan guarantee from the DOE — was sold to NextEra Energy Resources, LLC, the competitive energy subsidiary of NextEra Energy, Inc. and GE Energy Financial Services. Yet, the September announcement also stated, “First Solar will continue to build and subsequently operate and maintain the project under separate agreements.” Both CEO’s Jeffrey Immelt and Lewis Hay were featured in my “Green Five: Spreading the Wealth to Obama’s Ultra-Rich Jobs Council Members” series.

According to the DOE, Desert Sunlight, which is expected to create 550 construction jobs and 15 permanent jobs for the plant’s operation, “will deploy commercially available First Solar Series 3 modules and is projected to achieve commercial operation by February 28, 2015.”

NRG Solar, LLC (Agua Caliente): \$967 million stimulus loan

In August 2011, as the \$967 million DOE loan guarantee for the Agua Caliente, located in Arizona, was announced, it was purchased from First Solar by NRG Solar, LLC, a subsidiary of NRG Energy. At that time it was noted that the First Solar will be providing the solar panels for this project, and that the plant, when completed, would supply power to PG&E.

According to the DOE, the Agua Caliente project — considered another jobs creator with an expected 400 construction jobs and 10 permanent jobs — “currently generates enough energy to power 49,600 households annually.”

Keep in mind that documented much earlier was Steve Spinner — the two-time Obama bundler DOE advisor (April 2009 to September 2010) turned CAP fellow (September 2010 to October 2011) — and his part in the First Solar deal making, which included advocacy for the at least the Antelope Valley project. Nevertheless, there are additional CAP players here, starting with what The Nation revealed in May 2013:

José Villarreal — a consultant at the power-house law and lobbying firm Akin Gump, who ‘provides strategic counseling on a range of legal and policy issues’ for corporations — was on First Solar’s board until April 2012 while also sitting on the board of CAP, where he remains a member, according to the group’s latest tax filing.

#15) First Wind

In my January 2013 Big Wind Story — also a client of the top DC lobbyists McBee Strategic Consulting — I exposed a “twister of sweetheart deals” found in the Department of Energy’s junk bond portfolio, which included four risky wind projects. One of those was Kahuku Wind Power, LLC, a project of First Wind in Kahuku Oahu, HI, which in July 2010, was granted a \$117 million DOE stimulus loan, estimated to create a whopping 200 jobs. And then on February 3, 2012 this same project received a 1603 grant for over \$35 million [docket #2594 to \$35,148,839].

Sadly, in August 2012 a fire that destroyed First Wind's battery storage facility (built by Xtreme Power) and sent toxic fumes into the air, which left ratepayers in the dark over costs and safety. And, it was reported on January 23, 2014 that "Xtreme Power ran out of cash and filed for bankruptcy," — NOTE: Xtreme Power built the energy storage system for Duke Energy's Notrees wind energy farm in Texas, another winner of stimulus funds, listed above.

The First Wind plan was to secure taxpayer money and then go public. Now they achieved their first objective with the help of U.S. taxpayers, because and as of July 2012, First Wind's projects have also received over \$452 million in grants through the stimulus' 1603 Program.

- First Wind's Stetson Wind Farm in Maine — \$40,441,471
- Cohocton Wind Farm in New York, \$52,352,334
- Dutch Hill Wind Farm In New York, \$22,296,494
- Milford Wind Corridor Phase I In Utah; \$120,147,809
- Milford Wind Corridor Phase II In Utah, \$80,436,803
- Rollins Wind Farm In Maine; \$53,246,347
- Sheffield Wind Farm In Vermont, \$35,914,864
- Kahuku Wind Farm In Hawaii, \$35,148,839
- Steel Winds II Wind Farm In New York, \$12,778,75

However, in November 2010, Bloomberg announced, "First Wind Holdings Inc., the operator of wind-energy projects backed by D.E. Shaw & Co. and Madison Dearborn Partners LLC, said it withdrew its initial public offering because of unfavorable market conditions" that's code for "weak demand."

Speaking of IPO's...

Within the House Oversight leaked emails that were unleashed late October 2012, more specifically the 350+ page Appendix II ("2012 Internal DOE Email Dump"), we find that just months prior to the final approval of the Kahuka loan there was intense interaction within the DOE regarding this transaction...

"Someone is pressing Jonathan [Jonathan Silver is the former Executive Director of the Loan Program Office] who is now pressing hard on the everyone as the sponsor has an IPO in the works."

This and more can be found in my Big Wind Story, including a the fact the first-rate, high-powered political ties to First Wind are vast, starting with D.E. Shaw & Co, a New York-based investment firm that is a backer of First Wind Holdings Inc. (also an investor in First Solar). This was noted when I profiled Larry Summers from CAP — adding that, according to Peter Schweizer, "Larry Summers was part owner of First Wind."

The founder of the hedge fund DE Shaw & Co., David Shaw, is a two-time Obama bundler, who employed Larry Summers before heading to the Obama White House, as the top economic advisor. It turns out that in 2011, according to BusinessInsider.com, Shaw, a computer scientist and computational

biochemist, was “appointed by Obama to serve on the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology.”

As revealed by Peter Schweizer, “another 42 percent of First Wind is owned by Madison Dearborn Partners, an investment firm with close ties [and friend of] to then-White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel. The founder of the firm, David Canning, had been a bundler for George W. Bush. But he switched sides in 2008 and gave heavily to Obama. Madison Dearborn gave more to Emanuel’s congressional campaigns than did any other business.”

While the GOP found that “Julia Bovey, First Wind’s Director of External Affairs, was formerly Director of External Affairs for Obama’s Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (June 2009 to June 2010),” there is much bigger fish here. All government backed green comes with a slew of lobbyists, and First Wind is no different — enter in Larry Rasky’s Lobbying Firm with ties to the top.

Larry Rasky, “a longtime confidant and campaign strategist” of Vice President Joe Biden, was also a 2012 Obama bundler, and since Obama took office, “Rasky has visited the White House at least 21 Times,” half of which were during the course of the DOE loan review process (Data.gov, Accessed 7/18/12). Moreover, we know that in 2009, about the time the 2009-Recovery Act passed, First Wind retained lobbyists Rasky Baerlein Strategic Communications as well as Brownstein, Hyatt et al, who is primarily a Democrat donor, with some Republicans in the mix — and as of 2012, maintains the work of Rasky. .

#16) General Motors (donor in 2011)

As I divulged at the beginning of this post, General Motors (GM) — a CAP donor in 2011 — was a client of the Podesta Group from 2010 until 2012. Even after the taxpayers bailed out General Motors in 2009 (over \$80 billion — \$17.5 billion under Bush and \$63.4 billion from Obama), of which we lost at least \$14 billion, green energy taxpayer money continues to subsidize the failed auto maker. This time, though, was for GM’s hybrid electric vehicle the Chevy Volt — a car that’s not doing very well.

What I’ve tracked so far is that starting in 2009 until recently, GM has bagged hundreds of millions of stimulus dollars (\$471.6 million to be exact) to support the Chevy Volt as well as green car components, of which I’ll share the details when I dissect the CAP corporate donors.

According to the January 25, 2012 House Oversight Report...

The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) appropriated \$2.4 billion for domestic production of batteries and components for electric cars. Of this, \$1.5 billion in grants were directed toward manufacturing the batteries, while the remaining \$900 million went to building new facilities or improving existing facilities to produce electric drive components. This included \$151.4 million to Michigan-based Compact Power, Inc., for production of lithium-ion polymer battery cells for the GM Volt; \$105.9 million directly to GM for production of high-volume battery packs for the Volt; \$105 million to GM to construct facilities for electric drive systems; and \$89.3 million to Delphi Automotive Systems, a former division of GM, to expand manufacturing facilities for electric drive power components.

Also, “buyers of the Volt will receive a federal tax credit of up to \$7,500 of per vehicle” as well as state tax credits.

Then, lo and behold, on December 12, 2013, Think Progress — CAP’s propaganda machine — announced, “Ford Motor Company and General Motors Company will receive a combined \$50 million to support their respective manufacturing facilities that produce electric cars.” This was from the stimulus-created 48C Program, of which GM’s share was \$20 million for “its Detroit-Hamtramck Assembly Plant where the company manufactures Extended Range Electric Vehicles— Chevrolet Volts and the Cadillac ELR electric luxury coupe — along with internal combustion cars.”

#17) Xcel Energy:

What’s interesting is that Xcel Energy was in the loop with Cogentrix Energy, a subsidiary of Goldman Sachs, which in September 2011, snagged a \$90.6 million DOE stimulus loan for the Alamosa Solar Generating Project. Then on July 16, 2012, Cogentrix bagged a \$34.6 million stimulus grant (free taxpayer money) from the 1603 Grant Program — I’m assuming this is for the same project.

What’s interesting (see graph with Goldman Sachs stimulus loans) is that the partners involved in this project included utility Xcel Energy (XEL), which signed a 20-year contract to buy enough CPV power to supply electricity to 6,500 homes; and Amonix, the California-based company that will supply the CPV panels — Amonix (complete with Obama buddies) was subsidized with \$29.6 million of taxpayer money before it went bankrupt in July 18, 2012. What a scam...

Also, according to MinnPost.com, in 2010, Minnesota’s Senator Al Franken visited Mulroy’s Body Shop “to highlight the use of federal stimulus funds in creating jobs and boosting the alternative energy economy.” It turns out that the owner had 174 solar panels installed on the roof of his Nicollet Avenue body shop in South Minneapolis. And that “Minneapolis-based Solarflow Energy installed the system and is leasing the equipment to Mulroy’s under contract with Xcel Energy. The lease agreement also includes installation, maintenance and support. The federal stimulus funds deliver a grant-in-lieu of a 30 percent tax credit on the value of the installation to Solarflow.” Solarflow start-up was partially funded through an Xcel Energy Renewable Development Fund grant of \$1.5 million.

While Xcel was omitted from the \$3.4 billion in stimulus smart-grid grants in 2009, for their highly touted \$100 million “Smart Grid City” project in Boulder, Colorado did snag about \$24.2 million in federal economic stimulus money for “Smart Grid” updates to the state’s power grid and customer meters. Still, Xcel Energy is slapping ratepayers with the bill: “In 2010, Xcel found itself asking Colorado regulators for permission to recoup \$44.5 million in rate increases, but the Colorado Public Utilities Commission only gave it \$27.9 million,” as documented by GreenTechMedia in 2012. And it seems that while they were seeking another \$16.6 million in 2012 for their Smart Grid City mess, “The Colorado Public Utility Commission (recently) denied Xcel’s request to recover a big chunk of that \$45 million,” reported Smart Grid News in August 2013.

In closing...

What's clear is that spending millions to elect the right president, while giving big money to other high-ranking politicians, pays big time. This game is played by also hiring high-powered lobbyists, while employing think tanks and organizations that have significant clout. Sadly, this is how crony capitalism works — more like corporate welfare, because this game is rigged for the ultra rich and huge corporations, screwing the taxpayer all the way to the bank. In the meantime, career politicians continue in power; thus fueling the never-ending corrupt cycle of political payback.

Along the way, what counts is either a position or connection (friends and family) inside the White House or a particular government department. It's all about "access and influence" — thus those that play the game well are guaranteed millions, if not billions, of taxpayer money. It's not for the feeble minded, the regular law-abiding citizen, nor the small business worthy of American taxpayer support.

However, Americans have the power to vote the bums out and make it a FELONY for any politician, or their family members, to own stock market stocks or assets.

In the Bay Area Elite arrogant asshole dynasties send their kids to Stanford University. Stanford puts the kids in asshole frat houses to train them to get away with rape and run monopolies. When they graduate they either go up the hill to Sandhill Road and start a venture capital clone operation or they get their frat friends on Sandhill Road to racketeer-fund their start-up or political campaign using money scammed from your parents pension funds. They only work with their frat buddies and insiders in a tribal 'old boys club' manner. They steal all the technology and markets they want because they control all of the tech lawyers and politicians via bribes and revolving doors. Stanford bosses keep all of this covered-up and covertly fund political campaigns to grease the wheels of political corruption. They then sexually extort some Stanford interns in Rosewood Hotel rooms, get the most 'trophy wife' ones pregnant, and start the cycle all over again. This is how "Silicon Valley" operates.

David Brock Can Kill You, And Destroy Your Democracy, With A Single Facebook Page

- You may not have the right kind of education, technical savvy or psychology PhD to understand how this is possible but you know that Silicon Valley is doing something very, very bad to you..right?

[Michael Wade](#) reveals that the dealings that have been revealed between Cambridge Analytica and Facebook have all the trappings of a Hollywood thriller: a Bond villain-style CEO, a reclusive billionaire, a naive and conflicted whistleblower, a hipster data scientist turned politico, an academic with seemingly questionable ethics, and of course a triumphant president and his influential family. Facebook, Google and Netflix executives and venture capitalists set out to use their data to push their ideology and politics on the world using psychological tricks embedded in their media. You, and Congress, are not smart enough to see how they are doing it. The cow at the meat processing plant is not smart enough to see that, at the end of the week, a metal rod will be shot into his skull and he will be gutted. The public and the cow are both being harvested. One for their privacy, the other for their meat.

The public still buys devices with microphones and cameras on them. The public still uses sites and programs that you have to "log in" to so that you can be data-harvested. Cows can't read newspapers so they can be excused for not knowing that millions of cows before them were chopped up. The news tells the humans that all of the products of Silicon Valley spy on, and abuse them, yet the humans still keep using those products and buying those phones that are just glorified listening devices. One could argue that the humans are dumber than the cows because the humans seem to be incapable of considering the consequences of their digital actions even after being warned.

Much of the discussion has been on how Cambridge Analytica was able to obtain data on more than 50 million Facebook users – and how it allegedly failed to delete this data when told to do so. But there is also the matter of what Cambridge Analytica actually did with the data. In fact the data crunching company's approach represents a step change in how analytics can today be used as a tool to generate insights – and to exert influence. They proved that Facebook has a file on every American.

For example, pollsters have long used segmentation to target particular groups of voters, such as through categorizing audiences by gender, age, income, education and family size. Segments can also be created around political affiliation or purchase preferences. The data analytics machine that presidential candidate Hillary Clinton used in her 2016 campaign – named "Ada" to target groups of eligible voters in the same way that Barack Obama had done 4 years previously. In fact Google and Facebook manipulated culture, the internet and elections and pretty much, **alone**, illicitly put Obama in the White House in exchange for Quid Pro Quo.

Cambridge Analytica was contracted to the Trump campaign and provided an entirely new weapon for the election machine. While it also used demographic segments to identify groups of voters, as Clinton's campaign had, Cambridge Analytica also segmented using [psychographics](#). As definitions of class, education, employment, age and so on, demographics are informational. Psychographics are behavioral – a means to segment by personality.

Huge numbers of kids have committed suicide because of posts on Facebook. This is widely reported. What is not widely reported is that huge numbers of adults have committed suicide because of organized attacks on them operated by Media Matters, Fusion GPS and hundreds of other hired political attack services.

This makes a lot of sense. It's obvious that two people with the same demographic profile (for example, white, middle-aged, employed, married men) can have markedly different personalities and opinions. We also know that adapting a message to a person's personality – whether they are open, introverted, argumentative, and so on – goes a long way to help getting that message across and/or to control the intent of others.

Understanding people better for better election manipulation

Eric Schmidt, David Drummond, Larry Page, Mark Zuckerberg, Kent Walker, and the other Facebook/Google oligarchs, are clinical sociopaths. The feds never arrest them, the fines against them are meaningless, corrupt U. S. Senators protect them, they have Jeffrey Epsteinian hookers-on-

demand...there is no reason for them to end their crimes and every incentive for them to double-down on their machinations. They are above the law!

Traditionally, there have been two routes to ascertaining someone's personality. You can either get to know them really well – usually over an extended time. Or you can get them to take a personality test and ask them to share it with you. Neither of these methods is realistically open to pollsters. Cambridge Analytica found a third way, with the assistance of two University of Cambridge academics.

The first, Aleksandr Kogan, sold them access to 270,000 personality tests completed by Facebook users [through an online app he had created](#) for research purposes. Providing the data to Cambridge Analytica was, it seems, against Facebook's internal code of conduct (except if it pushes ideologies Zuckerberg wants), but only in March 2018 has Kogan been "banned" by Facebook from the platform. In addition, Kogan's data also came with a bonus: he had reportedly collected Facebook data from the test-takers' friends – and, at an average of 200 friends per person, that added up to some 50 million people.

However, these 50 million people had not all taken personality tests. This is where the second Cambridge academic, [Michal Kosinski](#), came in. Kosinski – who is said to believe that micro-targeting based on online data could strengthen democracy – had figured out a way to [reverse engineer a personality profile from Facebook activity](#) such as likes. Whether you choose to like pictures of sunsets, puppies, or people apparently says a lot about your personality. So much, in fact, that on the basis of 300 likes, Kosinski's model is able to predict someone's personality profile [with the same accuracy as a spouse](#).

Kogan developed Kosinski's ideas, improved them, and cut a deal with Cambridge Analytica. Armed with this bounty – and combined with additional data gleaned from elsewhere – Cambridge Analytica built personality profiles for more than 100 million registered US voters. It's claimed the company then used these profiles for targeted advertising.

Imagine for example that you could identify a segment of voters that is high in conscientiousness and neuroticism, and another segment that is high in extroversion but low in openness. Clearly, people in each segment would respond differently to the same political ad. But on Facebook they do not need to see the same ad at all – each will see an individually tailored ad designed to elicit the desired response, whether that is voting for a candidate, not voting for a candidate, or donating funds. Google does this every minute of every day, to influence politics, because they get away with it with ease.

Cambridge Analytica worked hard to develop dozens of ad variations on different political themes such as immigration, the economy, and gun rights, all tailored to trick different personality profiles.

Behavioral analytics and psychographic profiling are here to stay, no matter what becomes of Cambridge Analytica. This digital data rape industrializes what salespeople have always done but in the most sinister and evil way possible, by adjusting their message and delivery to the personality of their customers. This approach to electioneering – and indeed to marketing – will be Cambridge Analytica's ultimate legacy of darkness.

Protect yourself from tech Cartel corruption: Poison your data by always lying in online forms, use fake names and fake email addresses online, NEVER put your real address, city, phone, birth date or ANY other identifiable data online. Deny the Silicon Valley Cartel ANY ability to abuse your data!

Read more: [Cambridge Analytica scandal: legitimate researchers using Facebook data could be collateral damage](http://theconversation.com/cambridge-analytica-scandal-legitimate-researchers-using-facebook-data-could-be-collateral-damage-93600) (<http://theconversation.com/cambridge-analytica-scandal-legitimate-researchers-using-facebook-data-could-be-collateral-damage-93600>)

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Damages Calculation Metrics Based On Court And Case Precedents

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Plaintiff Character Witness Evidence, Credentials And Work History

Plaintiff Law Enforcement, Sting Ops And IC Career Credentials

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Proof-2: A Different Evidence Set Repository (<http://newsplus007.com/>)

Reports: Documents Provided To Law Enforcement And Regulatory Agencies (<http://testimony111.com/>)

Videos: Broadcast News Video Evidence Proving The Assertions (<http://newsplus007.com/VIDEOS/>)

[Photos, Memes And News Clippings About The Incident](http://newsplus007.com/VIDEOS/) (<http://newsplus007.com/VIDEOS/>)

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[More News Videos Proving The Assertions Of Organized Crime And Corruption](http://evidencevideos.com/) (<http://evidencevideos.com/>)

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[How Silicon Valley Rips Off Inventors](https://www.usinventor.org/) (<https://www.usinventor.org/>)

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NSA surveillance archives per each perpetrator mentioned herein

FBI surveillance archives per each perpetrator mentioned herein

FSB surveillance archives per each perpetrator mentioned herein

Acknowledgments

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