

The Felon Lawyers Of Silicon Valley

- A REPORT TO FEDERAL INVESTIGATORS -

Warped sociopath frat lawyers emulate the “*godfather*” films, with impunity and epic deviance, in partnership with Big Tech oligarchs and government officials, who they share illicit stock gains with



This revision is a draft version of the FBI/FTC/FINCEN/FEC document

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The Tech Cartel Mob Lawyers

You have seen the names of Silicon Valley’s Big Tech lawyers in many articles. Today, though, they have gone from ‘*prestigious*’ to ***criminally corrupt***. You can thank the owners of Google, Facebook, Netflix and Facebook for that. Lawyers are supposed to adhere to the law but these lawyers are violating every aspect of the law and justice and should be ARRESTED!

Zuckerberg, Doerr and Schmidt may be the ‘Godfathers’ of the Silicon Valley Mafia but the filthiest, dirtiest, most lethal hit-jobs are designed, operated and implemented by the Tech law firms. They are the soldiers of this Mafia. The FBI should raid their offices if they are sincere about actually ending corruption in America.

One victim of the mercenary bastards known as the ***Palo Alto Legal Mafia*** had the following experience:

He had invented, patent-filed, built, launched as operating companies and deployed the technologies and business models that Facebook, Google, YouTube, Netflix, Tesla, Sony Pictures, et al; operate off of ***over ten years before any of those companies existed***. Facebook, Google, YouTube, Netflix, Tesla, Sony Pictures, et al and their VC’s (venture capital investors) came and looked at the inventions under the guise of “maybe investing”. After spying, copying and stealing this Tech Cartel just went on their way with impunity.

Who says he was first: A.) The United States Patent Office; B.) nearly a thousand signed non-disclosure agreements, C.) emails between all related parts; D.) signed contracts; surveillance and news videos; E.) the entire hacked file servers of Sony Pictures, Google, famous Silicon Valley VC’s; F.) whistle-blower disclosures; G.) document leaks and Edward Snowden, Panama Papers, Swiss Leaks, Julian Assange – type leaks; H.) Federal investigation files...and hundreds of other proofs...

Intellectual property investigators at organizations such <http://www.usinventor.org> and insiders at his patent law firm (Let’s call them ‘***Carrson & Ferston***’) recently revealed that his own patent firm was working against him in order to protect Facebook, Google, YouTube, Netflix, Tesla, Sony Pictures

He spent 40 years of his life creating and building these products, companies and technologies.

His patent firm got him \$27.00 for his 40+ year efforts. His patent firm got Facebook, Google, YouTube, Netflix, Tesla, Sony Pictures over **forty five billion dollars** for their copies of his technologies.

The lawyers at his patent office are the co-owners of Facebook, Google, YouTube, Netflix, Tesla, Sony Pictures, et al; and his key competitors. That's right, the people that were supposed to protect the inventor and help him make money appear to have been sabotaging him and keeping money away from him in order to protect Facebook, Google, YouTube, Netflix, Tesla, Sony Pictures, et al.

The patent development efforts they managed for him had covertly carved out protections for Facebook, Google, YouTube, Netflix, Tesla, Sony Pictures.

It was almost as if Facebook, Google, YouTube, Netflix, Tesla, Sony Pictures, et al; had hired this Silicon Valley patent firm to log-jam, obfuscate, delay, defer and black list this inventor simply because he had beat them at their own game. The inventor's own patent firm discouraged the inventor from suing the thieves in order to protect Facebook, Google, YouTube, Netflix, Tesla, Sony Pictures, et al

Now, the average Joe might wonder if companies really do engage in such shenanigans but a quick search on the PACER.GOV law repository, or a call with the FBI, FINCEN or INTERPOL shows that they do it every day.

These companies have spent billions of dollars bribing Congress and putting their skills INSIDE the U.S. Patent Office to make sure that small inventors NEVER get their money. Facebook, Google, YouTube, Netflix, Tesla, Sony Pictures, et al; liberally steal all of their technologies. Google and Facebook put their own lawyers in charge of The U.S. Patent Office operations in order to keep from having to pay inventors.

These companies have spent billions of dollars on lobbyists and horrific "kill services" like: **Cardinal & Pine**; **Pacronym, Acronym**; **The Americano**; **Investing in US**; **Shadow Inc**; **Courier Newsroom**; **IN-Q-Tel**; **Gawker Media**; **Jalopnik**; **Gizmodo Media**; **K2 Intelligence**; **WikiStrat**; **Podesta Group**; **Fusion GPS**; **Clearview AI Face Tracking, Google**; **YouTube**; **Alphabet**; **Facebook**; **Twitter**; **Think Progress**; **Media Matters**); **Black Cube**; **Correct The Record**; **Orbis Business Intelligence, Undercover Global Ltd**; **Stratfor**; **Jigsaw**; **ShareBlue/Acronym**; **Versa LLC**; **American Ledger**; **Supermajority News**; **New Venture Fund**; **Sixteen Thirty Fund**; **Cambridge Analytica**; **Sid Blumenthal**; **States Newsroom**; **Hopewell Fund**; **Open Society.**; **Palantir, Kroll, David Brock**; **AmpliFire News**; **American Bridge**; **Plouffe Consulting**; **Pantsuit Nation**; **MotiveAI**; **American Bridge 21st Century Foundation**; **Priorities USA**; **PR Firm Sunshine Sachs**; **The American Independent Foundation**; **Covington and Burling**; **Buzzfeed**; **The American Independent**; **Perkins Coie**; **Secondary Infektion**; **Wilson Sonsini** and thousands more are hired to scan EVERY database, every hour to run hit-jobs, character assassinations, dirty tricks and economic reprisal attacks on Plaintiff, and any targets who compete with Facebook, Google, YouTube, Netflix, Tesla, Sony Pictures, et al.

So they guy's own patent lawyers, who work covertly for the Tech Cartel, who the guy got his client's, investors and partners to pay big money to, was fucking him over, covertly, the whole time at the direction of some insane Silicon Valley oligarchs. The people this guy had trusted his life to had screwed him. The people who held the key to the inventor's future and his retirement money jacked him in the ass.

The guys inventions, products and companies were not "kind of" like the products and companies that Facebook, Google, YouTube, Netflix, Tesla, Sony Pictures, et al. rolled out years later: THEY WERE 100% EXACT CLONE COPIES of his companies.

The inventor had hired almost every major, third-party, independent patent valuation firm in the world to write up valuation analyses of his patent value. They did. The valuation estimates, based on legal science and court precedents came out to a starting low number of \$125 Billion and an average high number of \$350 Billion. So starting from 1977 to 2022, the patent lawyers surely could have come up with some effort that at least bought the guy a \$200K house or a nice car....nope... The inventor got absolutely nothing while his prime competitors, who were partners with the lawyers, got over \$200 Billion dollars each, bought a vast number of mansions and private jets and got their food hand-cooked by a private chef every day.

So these big time investigative news reporters (like ICIJ.ORG) , inventor groups like USINVENTOR.COM and a group of forensic investigators go poking around. They come back and tell this inventor/designer and many other inventors that these patent lawyers and the insiders at Facebook, Google, YouTube, Netflix, Tesla, Sony Pictures, et al; turned out to be either financed by, friends, with, sleeping with, dating the staff of, holding stock market assets in, promised a revolving door job or service contracts from, partying with, personal friends with, photographed at private events with, exchanging emails with, business associates of or directed by; our business adversaries, or the Senators, tech executives and politicians that those business adversaries pay campaign finances to, or supply political digital search manipulation services to.

Criminal U.S. Senators and White House staff coordinated and profited in these schemes and exchanged stock perks with the lawyers. For example; One California Senator's family owned and controlled A.) Government trained attack 'spies' formerly with the CIA, NSA, etc., B.) The leasing contracts for Tesla and Solyndra, C.) Their office staff that threatened Plaintiff in writing and in-person to Plaintiff's Washington DC staff, D.) the financing for Tesla and Solyndra, E.) The construction services for Tesla and Solyndra, F.) The staffing company for Tesla and Solyndra, G.) The adjacent railroad services for Tesla and Solyndra, H.) Key suppliers for Tesla and Solyndra, I.) Goldman Sachs cooperative relationships for Tesla and Solyndra, J.) Transitions from their own Senate Office staff to revolving door jobs at Tesla and Solyndra, K.) Government decisions for Tesla and Solyndra, L.) The relationship incentives between Google, Tesla and Solyndra and that Senator's campaign financing to that Senator; and other illicit conflicts of interest. Plaintiff owned the competing electric car company

and technology that would have obsoleted Tesla, Google and Solyndra and was the first to begin negotiations with the factory that Tesla later took over at the insistence of that Senator, even though Elon Musk appears in news reports, previously stating that he saw no use for the building for Tesla.

Silicon Valley has had the largest number of Congressional hearings against it, BUT the least number of regulations imposed on it. Why? You can look no further than the covert ownership of Silicon Valley by elected officials. Our politicians get paid bribes, by Silicon Valley, to keep the political corruption alive and well while they operate, with impunity, as the biggest threats to society ever manifested.

Lawyer connected politicians protect Silicon Valley and allow it to keep producing child suicides, racism, misogyny, child mental health threats, domestic spying, data harvesting, sex trafficking, election manipulation, tax evasion, censorship, ***intellectual property theft***, political bribery and many other crimes! Why? Because crime pays...**for U.S. Government officials!**

Perkins Coie law firm is under federal investigation for manipulating the U.S. Government (ie: The Durham Investigation). Tech law firm Brobeck imploded after the bosses at Brobeck found out the FBI was monitoring them. Tesla's Wilson Sonsini law firm is under investigation for sock market 'issues'. We have hundreds of investigation files on, so called, "Big Tech" law firms.

These lawyers think they are so clever because they are the gears behind Zuckerberg's, Schmidt's, Draper's, Jurvetson's, Page's and others CORRUPTION MACHINES. "*We'll make sure you never get caught..*" they tell their clients "*... we've got the Cayman Island's and Panama shell corps sewn up..*"

They didn't see the fact that China, Iran, Korea, Russia and an army of 14 year old gamers were going to hack every document they ever created since 2001!

For example, one of the Dr. Evil guys in Silicon Valley is a guy named John Doerr. His offices were physically broken into and all of his emails and digital files were hacked. The job was so pro that many think the CIA did it because he was buddying up with a Russian mob guy named Medvedev. Nothing Rich, dynastic elitist families sent their children to Stanford University, Yale and other related social programming institutions. At these schools they were steered into fraternities and sororities that in Silicon Valley has not been deeply hacked, over and over.

But, the investigators found that the leaks were just a bonus. They already had another way to catch these crooked lawyers. The "new way" involves a new kind of software that catches crooked lawyers along with crooked tech execs and crooked politicians.

The Software That Is Killing The Dirty Lawyers

This new open-source, and free, public software let's any citizen get any corrupt layer arrested. Any citizen can use the software from the comfort of their living room. The AI replicates itself (Like A benign digital version of Covid) across the entire web.

You can download a copy of the software or build-your-own version of it from freely available code at Github, CERN and Linux repositories.

*After suffering billions of dollars of losses from lawyers and oligarchs **Insider Trading** schemes, the inventor and his peers decided to do something about that!*

Illegal and corrupt insider trading tends to be something you don't hear about until it's hit the big news networks and newspapers as the SEC goes for the throat of the accused. By then, unfortunately, those committing it have made their gains, usually in the multi-millions of dollars, and the damage has been done to the stock, its company, investors and the American Way. Covert stock market trades are now the #1 form of bribes in California and Washinton, DC.

Quite frankly, the jail time assessed doesn't correct the damage done, and the fines rarely aid the investors, or the voters, in getting their money and their democracy back. Many of those hurt are Average Joe's and Jill's who were just trying to save their retirement nest eggs. Shame is the tool that works best on the corrupt!

These crimes often involve an **investment banker spouse** and a Senator (Harris, Feinstein, Pelosi, etc.) or other top official, using information, which was not available to the public, buying and selling a company's stock in an underhanded manner. They get these tips and operate the insider trading scams via Big Tech corrupt law firms.

In many cases bribes have been paid with Google, Tesla or Facebook stock in a covert manner. It is particularly onerous when a Senators buys Tesla, Google, Facebook or Solyndra stock, and makes laws that only benefits Tesla, Solyndra, etc, while sabotaging their competitor constituents. Because the dealings involved are pretty much done on the sly, it's been difficult, ***until now***, for the governing body of the SEC to prove illegal insider trading, unless one of the cohorts tattles on the others or their actions become glaringly obvious. In some cases, a sharp mind around the action may take notice and become what's called a whistle-blower.

Previously, writes [Andrew Beattie of Investopedia](#): "... *insider trading is often difficult for the SEC to spot. Detecting it involves a lot of conjecture and consideration of probabilities.*" That was the 'old days', though. Today, the new AI software can bust through these scams like a hot knife through butter!

With this new open-source, free, public spy agency-class software, detecting illegal insider trading is actually less complicated than it sounds.

To the eyes of this new super-powerful AI observer server bot and peer-to-peer databases, it is easy work. You, the citizen, just type the politician or agency employee name into a field and hit the "**analyze**" button. A few minutes later you receive a multi-page PDF report similar to an FBI report on the target. You can either research the subject in more detail or send copies of the report to the FBI, GAO, OSC, SEC or other enforcement group.

The software is an automated AI temporal matching system which includes 24/7 analysis of all stock trades involving politicians to its information source, politician finances, communications and policy participators. It uses some of the same software code used by the CERN mega-research center in Switzerland.

The technology Core Evaluation Points:

- Analyst estimates - these come from what an analyst estimates that a company's quarterly or annual earnings will be. They are important because they help approximate the fair value of an entity, which basically establishes its price on the stock exchange.
- Share volume - this reflects the quantity of shares that can be traded over a certain period of time. There are buyers and there are sellers, and the transactions that take place between them contribute to total volume.

One Way The AI Detects Congressional Insider Trades

Metricized signs of illegal insider trading occur when trades occur that break out of the historical pattern of share volume traded compared to beneficiary participation's of those connected to company and political entity. Another clue of the illegal insider trading is when a lot of trading goes on right before earnings announcements. That tends to be a sign that someone already knows what the announcement is going to indicate, and it's an obvious violation. One module of the new software hunts these trends around-the-clock in an unmanned manner like a detective who never needs to sleep.

The software red alerts are issued when trades are linked closer to the actual earnings and politicians bills instead of what the predicted earnings were. In a corruption case, it's clear the trades - especially made by politicians close to the company - stemmed from information that was not readily available to the general public.

In other words, at the time an insider makes a trade, the trade has a stronger relationship to earnings guidance rather than to earnings results achieved.

Part Of The Insider Trading Detection AI Uses 'Dynamic Time Warping (DTW)'

In econometrics, which is a concept frequently used by quantitative analysts to evaluate stock market prices, dynamic time warping (DTW) is an algorithm that can be used for measuring similarity between two data sequences by calculating an optimal match between the two. This sequence "matching" method is often used in time series classification to properly "line things up."

The method, coupled with AI machine learning ensemble methods, can provide a clear path between the trades made by insiders and public data used to make the trades.

This is a product of artificial intelligence that has been expanded by Indexer, Splunk, Palantir and other firms fast becoming experts in products that can be used to advance the art of manipulating political and social trends in business and markets by using social media, financial data and news stories. The new software process has taken that sort of approach to the next level and targeted every member of Congress, their staff, family and friends. The first emphasis is on California and Washington, DC public figures.

In a hypothetical example, a group of executives failed to trade by industry standards by leveraging material non-public information and policy manipulation. Although consensus estimates called for higher commodity prices at the end of 2015, it appears key executives traded for their personal accounts as a result of the forecast provided by a specialist system within the firm that was adept at predicting prices alongside lobbyist manipulations. Flash-boy trading is now dirtier and powered by Google-class server systems.

In the hypothetical scenario the software aggregates executive trades in 2014 and 2015 and finds a strong link between buys and sells of executive stock options, which line up with material non-public estimates of commodity prices that were provided by the specialist system.

For example, in a "Exec Sell and Exec Buys" graph, a green line represents sells, while a black line represents buys. In the corresponding period, one finds a red line represents unrevised prices provided by the specialist system, and green line represents consensus estimates.

During Q1-2014, there was \$28M in purchases of executive stock options, while in Q2-2014, there was \$25M in sales of executive stock options. The specialist system called for Q3-2014 commodity prices to make a precipitous decline going into the end of 2014. Remember, under this scenario, no revisions were made to the specialist systems' price forecast. In this example, executives were afforded a significant advantage using price predictions from the specialist system.

In a final bullet chart, there was a dynamic time warping distance between trades and consensus estimates of 7.23, but this distance is only 2.19 when comparing specialist system estimates and executive trades. Please note, the closer the distance score is to zero, the more similar the trades are to the estimates they are measured against.

We have applied this process to companies well-known for influence buying like, Google, Tesla and Facebook

It's obvious that the tech executives involved did not follow industry standards in their actions and make public the "insider" information they had access to prior to the trades they made. The lobbyists they hired promoted this rigged trend and paid off Senators with perks. These are the kind of violations the SEC and other governing bodies can look to in attempting to protect the trading public and the

integrity of financial marketplaces. Artificial intelligence tools are a major factor in assisting the tracking of insider trading.

"Every facet of our everyday lives has been impacted, infiltrated and greatly influenced by artificial intelligence technologies," says Vernon A. McKinley, a multi-jurisdictional attorney, based in Atlanta. "In fact, the U.S. government and its multiple agencies have developed specialized intelligence units to detect, track, analyze and prosecute those unscrupulous individuals seeking to profit from the use of such tools, specifically in the financial industry, and to protect the integrity and strength of the U.S. economy and its investors." Now these tools are being turned against the corrupt!

The public can now detect trading anomalies in financial situations using this artificial intelligence software on their desktop computers. No public official will ever be able to do these kinds of corruptions, again, without getting caught.

This approach has already had an impact on how political insiders trade on Wall Street and in financial markets around the world.

This technology can end this corruption forever!

A module of the software uses data from The Center for Responsive Politics, ICIJ Panama Leaks records, Swiss Leaks records and FEC files to reveal covert routes. Famous politicians own part of Tesla Motors, Facebook, Google, Netflix, YouTube and other companies they helped get government money for. All of their competing constituents have suffered for it or been put out of business by exclusive deals that only Tesla Motors, Facebook, Google, Netflix and YouTube got. That is a crime and charges have been filed with federal law enforcement.

A large volume of forensic research proves that Silicon Valley Cartel tech firms receive benefits from politicians and politicians, at the same time, benefit from these firms.

This evidence on the exchange of benefits between politicians and firms proves an agreement between the politicians and the companies. This agreement, however, cannot be in the form of a written contract as writing direct fee-for-service contracts between a politician and a firm is considered bribery (Krozner and Stratmann 1998; 2000). In addition, either party to this agreement might renege on its promise and the other party cannot resort to the courts.

Procon.org, for example, reports: "Less than two months after ascending to the United States Senate, and before becoming President, one Senator bought more than \$50,000 worth of stock in two speculative companies whose major investors included some of his biggest political donors. One of the companies was a biotech concern that was starting to develop a drug to treat avian flu. In March 2005, two weeks after buying thousands of dollars of its shares, this Senator took the lead in a legislative push for more federal spending to battle the disease. The most recent financial disclosure form this Senator . . . shows that he bought more than \$50,000 in stock in a satellite communications business whose principal backers . . . had raised more than \$150,000 for his political committees." See

more examples from the Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (CREW) report (2009.)

The literature and eye-witness experience proves that politically-connected Silicon Valley tech firms monthly obtain economic favors, such as securing favorable legislation, special tax exemptions, having preferential access to finance, receiving government contracts, or help in dealing with regulatory agencies. The evidence proves that Google's support, for example, can help in winning elections. For example, firms can vary the number of people they employ, coordinate the opening and closing of plants, and increase their lending activity in election years in order to help incumbent politicians get re-elected. (See Roberts 1990; Snyder 1990; Langbein and Lotwis 1990; Durden, Shorgen, and Silberman 1991; Stratmann 1991, 1995, and 1998; Fisman 2001; Johnson and Mitton 2003; Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Ueda 2004; Sapienza 2004, Dinç 2005; Khwaja and Mian 2005; Bertrand, Kramarz, Schoar, and Thesmar 2006; Faccio 2006; Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell 2006; Jayachandran 2006; Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee 2006; Claessens, Feijen, Laeven 2008; Desai and Olofsgard 2008; Ramanna 2008; Goldman, Rocholl, and So 2008, 2009; Cole 2009; Cooper, Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov 2009; Correia 2009; Ramanna and Roychowdhury 2010; Benmelech and Moskowitz 2010.)

The software can see that the share ownership of politicians serves as a mechanism to quid-pro-quo their relationships with big tech firms, is as follows: The ownership of politicians plays multiple distinct (but not necessarily independent) roles; one that relies upon the amount of ownership and one that does not. First, as investors in firms, politicians tie their own interests to those of the firm. Thus, harming (benefiting) the firm means harming (benefiting) the politician and vice versa. By owning a firm's stock, politicians commit their personal wealth to the firm and reduce a firm's uncertainty with regard to their actions toward the firm. This will, in turn, enhance the firm's incentive to support the politician-owner during both current and future elections in order to prolong the incumbency period for as long as possible. Firms have their lobbyists push to be able to know the amount of ownership likely to be material to politicians. This knowledge, in turn, enables them to judge whether the politician's interest is aligned with the firm's interest and optimize quid-pro-quo.

The Political Action Committee (PAC) contribution of firms (which is a direct measure of benefits flowing from firms to politicians) is a significant determinant of ownership allocations by members of Congress. The ownership of Congress members in firms that contribute to their election campaigns is roughly 32.8% higher than their ownership in noncontributing firms even after accounting for factors that are associated with both ownership and contribution (such as familiarity, proximity and investor recognition).

The committee assignments of politicians is a proxy for whether their relations with firms are enforced (Kroznor and Stratmann 1998). Silicon Valley tech firms like Facebook, Tesla and Google obtain private benefits out of their mutual relations with politicians. When the strength of the association between ownership and contributions at the firm level increases, the provision of government contracts to those firms increases.

Members of Congress, candidates for federal office, senior congressional staff, nominees for executive branch positions, Cabinet members, the President and Vice President, and Supreme Court justices are required by the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 to file annual reports disclosing their income, assets, liabilities, and other relevant details about their personal finances.

Personal financial disclosure forms are filed annually by May 15 and cover the preceding calendar year. The Center for Responsive Politics (CRP) collected the 2004–2007 reports for Congress members from the Senate Office of Public Records and the Office of the Clerk of the House. The Center then scanned the reports as digital images, classified the politicians' investments into categories including stocks, bonds, and mutual funds, and built a database accessible via a web query.

Using CRP's data, you can use the software to collect the shares in S&P 500 firms held by members of Congress between 2004 and 2007, for example. You can collect the stock ownership data for every firm that joined the S&P 500 Index any time between January 2004 and April 2009; regardless of when it joined the index, and the software can obtain all the available stock ownership data for that firm between 2004 and 2007. Likewise, if a firm dropped out of the index at any time during 2004–2008, the software, nevertheless, will retain the firm in a sample for the target period. As such, the sample would include stocks in hundreds of unique firms owned by politicians between 2004 and 2007, for example.

Politicians are required to report only those stocks whose value exceeds \$1,000 at the end of the calendar year or that produce more than \$200 in income. They are CURRENTLY not required to report the exact value of the holding, but instead must simply check a box corresponding to the value range into which the asset falls. The CRP then undertakes additional research to determine the exact values of these stocks. When the Center makes these determinations, it reports them instead of the ranges and I use these values in my study. When only the range is available, you should use its midpoint as the holding's value. You would, thus have data on the stock holdings of hundreds of politicians for that time period.

Using the software, you can search for all Political Action Committees (PACs) associated with tech firms. It then collects data on each contribution these PACs made to candidates (both the winners and losers) running for the Senate and House elections. Tricky corrupt Silicon Valley firms establish several PACs, each in a different location, and each of these PACs can contribute to the same candidate. In such cases, the software would total, for each candidate, every contribution he or she received from PACs affiliated with the same firm. To parallel the investment data sample period, for example, the software collects every contribution made from the 2003–2004 cycle up to and including the 2007–2008 cycle. Many Silicon Valley tech firms use deeply covert Fusion GPS, Perkins Coie, BlackCube, Psyops-type service to make very hidden additional payola payments to California politicians.

For sources, for example, the software collects government contract data from Eagle Eye Publishers, Inc., one of the leading commercial providers of Federal procurement and grant business intelligence and <http://www.usaspending.org>. Eagle Eye collects its contract data from Federal Procurement Data

System–Next Generation (FPDS-NG), the contract data collection and dissemination system administered by the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA). FPDS-NG provides data on procurement contracts awarded by the U.S. Government. When these contracts are awarded to company subsidiaries, Eagle Eye searches for the names of their parent companies and assigns each subsidiary to its appropriate parent. The software collects both the number and aggregate value of government contracts that were awarded to sample firms between 2004 and 2007 in this example time-frame..

The software reveals, for example, that one Representative is a ten-term member of Congress and a senior member of the House Financial Services Committee. They arranged a meeting between the Department of Treasury and One United Bank, a company with close financial ties to themselves, involving both investments and contributions.

“In September 2008, the Representative asked then-Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson to hold a meeting for their friends in banks that had suffered from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac losses.

The Treasury Department complied and held a session with approximately a dozen senior banking regulators, representatives from those banks, and their trade association. Officials of One United Bank have close ties to the Representative and attended the meeting along with the Representative's chief of staff. Kevin Cohee, chief executive officer of One United, used the meeting as an opportunity to ask for bailout funds.

. . . Former White House officials stated they were surprised when One United Officials asked for bailout funds. . . . In December 2008, the Representative intervened again, asking Treasury to host another meeting to ensure their banks received part of the \$700 billion allocated under the Troubled Asset Relief Program. . . . Within two weeks, on December 19, 2008, One United secured \$12.1million in bailout funds. . . . This was not the first time the Representative used their position to advance the interests of the bank. the Representative's spouse became a shareholder in One United in 2001, when it was known as the Boston Bank of Commerce. In 2002, Boston Bank of Commerce tried to purchase Family Savings, a friend of the Representative in Los Angeles. Instead, Family Savings turned to a bank in Illinois. The Representative tried to block the merger by contacting regulators at the FDIC. The Representative publicly stated they did not want a major bank to acquire a bank that the Representative was friends with.

When the Representative's efforts with the FDIC proved fruitless, the Representative began a public pressure campaign with other community leaders. Ultimately,when Family Savings changed direction and allowed Boston Bank of Commerce to submit a winning bid, the Representative received credit for the merger. The combined banks were renamed One United. . . . In March 2004, the Representative acquired One United stock worth between \$250,001 and \$500,000, and the Representative's spouse purchased two sets of stock, each worth between \$250,001 and \$500,000. In September 2004, the Representative sold their stock in One United and their husband sold a portion of his. That same year,

the husband joined the bank's board. . . . One United Chief Executive Kevin Cohee and President Teri Williams Cohee have donated a total of \$8,000 to the Representative's campaign committee. . . . On October 27, 2009, less than two months before One United received a \$12 million bailout, the bank received a cease-and-desist order from the FDIC and bank regulatory officials in Massachusetts for poor lending practices and excessive executive compensation . . . the bank provided excessive perks to its executives, including paying for Mr. Cohee's use of a \$6.4 million mansion . . .” (Ref: CREW report 2009,pp. 123–125)

Thanks to Crony quid-pro-quo revelations by an earlier version of the software, you can also see that Fisker Automotive, Inc.'s \$529 Million U.S. Taxpayer Loan Approval by the Department of Energy was dirty. Fisker Automotive's Chief Operating Officer Bernhard Koehler pleaded with the Department of Energy in a panicked Saturday midnight hour email to receive a \$529 million loan as the company was 2 weeks from Chapter 7 liquidation, that it was laying off most of its employees, that no private sector investors would fund the company without DOE guarantees, and that Fisker was unable to raise any further equity funding from independent private-sector investors given the company's financial condition. These statements were made to a Loan Officer at the DOE . No private sector Loan underwriting (approval) committee would ever grant a low interest loan to a desperate buyer that had just confessed it was in a state of insolvency and was about to layoff most of its staff. Yet within a few weeks the DOE would approve a \$529 Million Credit Facility to Fisker. Despite the DOE Loan Officer official's sworn testimony at April 24th's House Oversight Committee that the DOE used "same private sector underwriting standards when approving Fisker and other approved Taxpayer Funded Loans" - likely perjury based in documents.

In a 'U.S. GOVERNMENT CONFIDENTIAL EMAIL': FISKER AUTOMOTIVE: August 2009: Co-Founder Bernhard Koehler emails U.S. Dept. of Energy Loan Officer in Sat. midnight Panic admitting VC Firms all declined to invest, and company is out of cash. Weeks later the U.S. Department of Energy approves \$529M U.S. Taxpayer Funded Loans to FISKER. NO PRIVATE SECTOR Lender would ever authorize a Loan for even \$5 Million let alone \$529 Million after receiving this email stating private sector investors had examined the company and declined equity investments, that they might loan money as more secure Debt, and the Chief Operating Officer of the company further stating that the borrower is totally insolvent. (Weeks after this email the U.S. Federal Government Dept. of Energy Loan Committee Approves Fisker Automotive as a credit-worthy borrow for \$529 Million in U.S. Taxpayer Funded Loans). Fisker got the cash because President Obama said to "give it to them" in order to please his campaign financiers.

The same thing happened with Tesla Motors. Elon Musk and Tesla Motors were broke when DOE gave them the money.

PrivCo CEO Sam Hamadeh stated in an official statement: *“The documents obtained by PrivCo paint a picture of how an insolvent, unproven automaker received \$192 million in taxpayer funding. The Department of Energy made a loan that no rational lender would have made. This loan was the*

equivalent of staying execution on a company that was terminally ill to begin with." Tesla and Fisker could not have been taxpayer funded unless bribes and criminal quid-pro-quo was underway by President Obama and the U.S. Senator insider traders.

Since its ruling in *Buckley v. Valeo*, the U.S. Supreme Court has expressed concern regarding corruption or the appearance of corruption stemming from political quid pro quo arrangements and the deleterious consequences it may have on citizens' democratic behavior. However, no standard has been set as to what constitutes "the appearance of corruption," as the Court was and continues to be vague in its definition. As a result, campaign finance cases after *Buckley* have relied on public opinion polls as evidence of perceptions of corruption, and these polls indicate that the public generally perceives high levels of corruption in government. The present study investigates the actual impact that perceptions of corruption have on individuals' levels of political participation. Adapting the standard socioeconomic status model developed most fully by Verba and Nie (1972), an extended beta-binomial regression estimated using maximum likelihood is performed, utilizing unique data from the 2009 University of Texas' Money and Politics survey. The results of this study indicate that individuals who perceive higher levels of quid pro quo corruption participate more in politics, on average, than those who perceive lower levels of corruption.

Quid pro quo is not a difficult concept to understand. Too bad the media doesn't endeavor to investigate and explain it. Your politicians don't work for you, they work for their own insider trading stock market holdings for themselves!

The Biggest Scumbag Lawyers

Law firms are – wittingly or unwittingly – providing corrupt individuals with services that enable them to “move, hide and defend their ill-gotten gains with impunity”, Transparency International (TI) has claimed.

The global organisation called for a “fundamental overhaul” of the anti-money laundering (AML) regime, identifying as a major problem regulatory bodies that have a role as AML supervisors that are also connected to their representative bodies.

Its new report, *At Your Service*, seeks to shine a light on the role played by UK services in corruption and shows how, as well as financial institutions and law firms, the likes of schools, universities, architecture and interior design firms, and luxury goods and services businesses also – unwittingly or otherwise – support corrupt individuals.

TI collected and analysed over 400 cases of high-level corruption and associated money laundering over the last 30 years covering 116 countries of origin, and identified 582 firms and individuals offering services in the UK, including 81 law firms.

It took a close look at 293 property transactions, worth more than £4.4bn, involving suspicious wealth relating to politically exposed persons from high-corruption-risk jurisdictions, or those charged with, convicted of or alleged to have committed corruption offences.

“We identified 56 law firms involved in 132 of these transactions, which were worth more than £3.2bn. These firms either offered conveyancing services to the buyer or were responsible for forming and maintaining the entity used to make the purchase.

“They varied in size from major international businesses to those employing fewer than 10 members of staff. It is unclear whether any submitted SARs [suspicious activity reports] in response to the activity they carried out for the buyers.

“Using Land Registry data on property that offshore companies currently own, we found that these 56 law firms have been involved in at least 4,200 further transactions involving secretive corporate vehicles, which are a common feature of high-end money laundering.”

TI suggested that what it saw as a low level of enforcement action taken by the Solicitors Regulation Authority did not “appear proportionate related to the likely levels of non-compliance with the MLRs [Money Laundering Regulations] within these firms given the number of properties we have found bought with suspicious funds”.

Some 32 law firms were also found to be involved in ‘[Laundromats](#)’ – a series of immense corruption schemes uncovered by the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project.

“Many of these are globally renowned firms with offices around the world. These payments came from shell companies with accounts at Baltic banks that have now been closed. These very same mechanisms have been used in the past to launder money,” the report said.

“It is unclear from the transaction data what services these UK firms supplied. Many of the payment references indicate trade misinvoicing, with payment purposes bearing no relation to the services the beneficiary firms normally provide.”

TI said corrupt individuals were able to use law firms’ services “to defend themselves and their commercial interests, and to cleanse their reputations” as well, with the Financial Action Task Force naming litigation as one way in which criminals may seek to abuse the legal system.

“UK courts have ruled sham litigation, involving fabricated disputes to make a transfer of funds appear legitimate, to be a form of money laundering. Lawyers must ensure the case brought to them is genuine and not an attempt to move criminal funds.”

The report also called out a “serious and worrying pattern” of UK law firms issuing ‘cease and desist’ letters to journalists and non-governmental organisations seeking to expose potential corruption, even if the stories or journalists have no presence in the UK.

“Those providing these services will be required to abide by the MLRs, but may not view this type of activity as a high money laundering risk.”

Among TI’s recommendations were that businesses should apply ethical principles to guide their engagement with high-risk customers. “For example, if a law firm wants to take on a client accused of grand corruption on an ‘access to justice’ basis, it could decide only to do so at legal aid rates.”

The report concluded that the businesses and individuals involved lay “across a spectrum of involvement – from the unwitting to the unscrupulous”.

It added: “We also recognise that there that a large proportion of businesses and professionals are extremely dedicated to doing their bit to help tackle corruption abroad and any proceeds of such activity that ends up here in the UK.”

But it argued that the UK’s system for overseeing compliance with AML laws was inadequate, with multiple AML supervisors, some of which act as both regulators and trade bodies for their industry.

“Furthermore, where wrongdoing is found, enforcement through both civil and criminal sanctions is low, leading to a lack of effective deterrent against cavalier AML practice. This then drives low compliance with regulations, which in turn diminishes the number of actionable reports available to the police.

“This system requires a fundamental overhaul if the UK is to stand any chance of ensuring its private sector provide an effective frontline defence against dirty money.”

When lawyers go bad, holy *shit* do they make the most of it:

Lawyer Thomas Lowe Bills Client for All the Sex They Had

It takes a special type of personality to be a divorce lawyer. Day after day, you deal with clients who are vulnerable, emotional wrecks -- acting as an objective steward of the law, gently guiding them through one of the most trying ordeals of their lives. Or, if you're a divorce lawyer like Minnesotan Thomas Lowe, you compliment your client's boobs until she has lots of sex with you ... and *then you bill her for it*.

Long after Lowe began representing a long-term acquaintance in her divorce, he chatted her up on the finer points of her marital sex life, told her how hot she was, and then leaned against his shelf full of impressive-looking law books, nodded suggestively toward his crotch, and said, "Eh?" And that was all it took for his emotionally unstable client to dive right into a torrid, seven-month affair, during which they christened every last piece of furniture in Lowe's office (possibly the entire building). At this point, Lowe -- who, in case we haven't mentioned it, was quite married -- actually tallied up their encounters and [billed her for his time at various intervals](#).

While we would like to report that he itemized their lovemaking ("EROTIC SPANKING, WITH BABY TALK - 15 MIN"), he actually disguised the details with terms like "meetings" or "drafting memos" (we can only hope he actually included the sarcastic quotation marks on his invoices). We're not sure which is more disturbing -- the fact that Lowe was twisted enough to take advantage of a clearly unstable woman both sexually and financially, or the fact that *she kept sleeping with him even after realizing he was billing her*. Maybe she just thought that's what a lawyer does?

So just how did this future Lifetime Original Movie end, you ask? Lowe's wife found out because of course she did, the affair ended, and he withdrew as his mistress' attorney. And when word got out, the Minnesota Supreme Court stepped in and forever forbade this misanthrope from practicing law again -- "forever" in this case meaning "for 15 months," after which Lowe can [apply to be reinstated](#), provided he successfully completes the professional responsibility portion of the bar exam again. Because that worked so well the first time, when he was [placed on probation](#) in 1997 for buying cocaine from a client, which he presumably billed right back to them as "entertainment expenses."

Lawyer Michael Winner Will Do Lawyer Stuff for Peepshows

Being a criminal defense attorney often involves spending a decent amount of time in prisons, seeing as how the people who pay your bills happen to spend most of their free time there. So, what would be the absolute most unethical way to spend those visits?

Well, Georgia attorney Michael Winner figured that he had access to all sorts of things prisoners (particularly the female ones) needed: prescription drugs, cigarettes, and his own mental fountain of legal knowledge. The female inmates, on the other hand, had ready access to what their mamas gave them. And Winner, being the opportunistic type, was quite willing to [supply contraband and free legal](#)

[services while demanding peepshows](#) from the other side of the glass partition in the prison's private attorney/client room.

He later upped the ante to include [whipping out his junk](#) and acquiring sex IOUs to be redeemed when inmates were released (hey, at least he was motivated to do his job). After one of the inmates finally complained about his pro-boner work, Winner was arrested for three counts of "unlawful trading" with inmates (which is, incidentally, the best legal euphemism ever for his shenanigans), and his contact with female inmates was reduced to standing outside the prison exercise yard with a trench coat and a boombox.

And continuing right along with our theme of lawyers taking advantage of those in desperate situations, it can't get much worse than ...

Lawyer Joseph Caramadre Exploits the Terminally Ill for Profit

Rhode Island estate planner Joseph Caramadre, apparently having had an epiphany that mortuary services and churches were hogging up all that sweet, sweet death money, [started advertising](#) in newspapers that he would hand over two grand to any terminally ill individual willing to furnish him with their signature and other pertinent info. Not content to wait for the near-dead to come to him, he also personally solicited the dying, paid visits to AIDS patients, and talked to the friends and families of the nearly deceased -- he got their information, and they got enough money to make all their bucket list dreams come true (assuming their bucket list consisted solely of "have a couple thousand dollars").

To a functioning member of the human race, it almost seems legit: People suffering from some debilitating illness can't exactly go out and work anymore and, hospital and funerary costs being what they are (i.e. absurd), every little bit helps, right? But hey, what did he need those signatures for, anyway?

Well, see, there are investments (such as certain annuities from insurance companies) that pay out death benefits should the holder die at some point. So, using the information he collected from the dying, Caramadre set about purchasing these in huge quantities, funded with investments made by his clients, friends, and family. Whenever the Grim Reaper came along, Caramadre's cadre got a nice payout (that was NOT shared with the family of the deceased, who didn't even know about it), and he was finally able to realize his dream of profiting from sad, lonely, protracted death with the best of 'em ... to the tune of \$46 million over 15 years.

Caramadre got six years in prison for trading mortality funds and, in an effort to demonstrate that not all judges are completely bereft of a sense of irony, he was also sentenced to 3,000 hours of community service [specifically benefiting the elderly and the terminally ill](#). We bet he's totally not using that time to set up some sort of retirement home Hunger Games for the amusement of his investor pals.

Wait, did we say that a lawyer exploiting his clients can't get much worse than this? Well, that must have been before we found out about ...

Lawyer John Milton Merritt Steals Money from Injured Orphans

In 2002, four little girls lost both their parents in a car crash. Attorney John Milton Merritt stepped in and did what any good public servant would do in that situation: He sued the shit out of those responsible for the tragic accident -- namely, a "tire manufacturer" and an "auto maker" -- secured the girls a settlement that would make Charles Dickens proud, and ... then he freaking stole it. Let's say that one more time: He stole a fortune from four little orphan girls.

On three separate occasions, Merritt went to the bank in which the trust fund was deposited, presented a counterfeit court order directing disbursement to him, and walked out carrying large sacks with dollar signs printed on them. Then he promptly spent the blood money on his firm, presumably on avant-garde coffee mugs made out of human skulls. By 2007, two years after his first "withdrawal," the account was empty. Merritt, however, told the orphans and their grandmother that there was still ["several hundred thousand dollars"](#) left before laughing maniacally and making his merry way to his secret volcano lair for a comfortable retirement spent alternately wringing his hands and stroking an unamused lap cat.

Once you descend that far into stereotypical villainy, though, it's really hard to stop, as evidenced by the fact that four years later Merritt [stole \\$130,000](#) from the trust account of another client of his -- a boy injured in an automobile accident -- because apparently caviar tastes sweeter when it's purchased with bills soaked in children's tears. Oh, and in the time between burglarizing the orphaned children and the injured one, he stole an additional \$3 million by fraudulently setting up lines of credit, falsifying income-tax returns, and forging another attorney's name on other settlement checks. All at the [same fucking bank](#). Would a little oversight kill you, Quail Creek Bank?

It's cool, though, because he [said he was totally going to give all the kids' money back](#) -- until the federal investigation into his illicit deeds interrupted his plan. Those bastards!

Lawyer Paul Bergrin Transforms His Law Practice into a Criminal Emporium

The lawyers we've examined so far have exhibited limited repertoires -- they're all one trick ponies, if you will. New Jersey lawyer Paul Bergrin, on the other hand, apparently studied the entire history of shady lawyers and then asked himself, "Why should I settle for just *one* crime when I could commit a veritable Tarantino-load of crime?"

Starting his rise to infamy as a defense lawyer, he quickly built a high-profile clientele that included Queen Latifah, Lil' Kim, and the former Miss New Jersey who was jailed for [writing bad checks](#) (back when writing checks was a thing). By 2007, Bergrin had graduated to the prestigious moniker of pimp,

when, after hiring a drug smuggler and the self-proclaimed "King of all Pimps" as his paralegal, Bergrin decided to make himself the heir to the pimp king's crown. We mean this in the most literal way possible -- he ran a stable of high-end prostitutes on the side. But lest you think poorly of Paul Bergrin, Esquire, we should mention that these weren't your average, everyday streetwalkers -- they charged \$1,000 an hour and had [titanium business cards](#), for crying out loud.

In 2009, Bergrin was caught and pled guilty to the whole lady-of-the-evening thing, but got by with three years of probation and forfeiting some of his strumpet proceeds. That, however, turned out to be just the tip of the iceberg. See, Bergrin had learned a thing or two about the law on the mean legal streets of the Dirty Jerz, and he was fond of summarizing it thusly: "No witness, no case." A statement which, while absolutely true in most cases, becomes less legal tautology and more action-hero one-liner when you actually hire a hitman to eliminate a witness, advise said hitman on how best to accomplish said elimination, and then make said hitman shit his pants by telling him that [you want to participate in the hit](#).

After [noticing a peculiar trend](#) -- namely, witnesses in Bergrin's cases often either altering their stories or just straight-up dying -- authorities finally decided to step in. Bergrin was [convicted on 23 counts](#), ranging from murderous conspiracy and racketeering to drug and prostitution offenses. Finding himself on the other side of the law finally brought down "The Baddest Lawyer in the History of Jersey," and he now spends his time in prison waiting for Hollywood producers to line up outside his cell.

Do you like this list of lawyers and their bad things? Get ready for a list of EVERY LAWYER at Carr & Ferrell, Wilson Sonsini, Mofo, Covington, Latham, Perkins Coie and all of their disgusting little habits, crimes and insider trading...

Lawyers from Stanford University and the dynastic tech families have their education pushing the concepts of [Machiavellianism](#) and [Nietzsche's elitist moral philosophy](#). These philosophies promote the ideas of some people being "supermen" and the rest of the people being tools. (Hitler loved Nietzsche) The Tech Cartel see themselves as the 'Supermen' that are better than others. Stanford kids are programmed to think they are superior because they are richer and they can get away with things because their "superiority" gives them the right to not follow the rules of "normal" society. They were steered to join exclusionary "Key Clubs", "Guardsmen" groups, "Skull and Bones" pledge cults, "The Masons" and other organizations designed to keep business opportunities, politics and sexual activities within their "elite" groups. Stanford regents cover-up their Brock rapes to keep their rich daddy's paying for Rodin statues in the garden.

These brats never left the Stanford frat house mentality, nor the neighborhood. Half of them moved right up the street from the Stanford campus to Sand Hill Road in a sheep-like cluster of "venture capital" offices. Here they swindle pension funds out of money based on hyped up pitches of fantastic new technologies. They collude together to rig markets and black-list anyone who tries to compete with them.

To these men, women are nothing more than “*baby ovens*” and “*trophy wives*” to show off to other men and must be “*upgraded*” every 4 years. They have organized their own sex trafficking network which flies hookers and male prostitutes to them from anywhere on Earth; pressures interns and secretaries into sex-for-jobs; run private oxytocin, scopolamine and cocaine date-rape drug distribution operations; sources up armies of Ghislaine Maxwell-like procurers for underage sex; promotes “One Touch”, NXVIUM, “Mission Control”, “Power Exchange”, “Blue Door”, etc. private sex clubs for themselves; and maintains a group of “beard” pretend wives to hide their gay lifestyles.

A carefully crafted network of crooked law firms, CPA’s, lobbyists and operatives protects their schemes. Massive bribes to the White House, Senators and law enforcement bosses keep them protected. They steal any technology they want and lobby the Patent office to change the laws to help them do it. 1/3 of them are radically involved in open-relationship homosexuality and seek underage participants.

Why hasn’t the FBI, or other law enforcement arrested them? These mobsters violate Anti-Trust laws, RICO Racketeering laws, tax evasion laws, money laundering laws, sex trafficking laws, political manipulation and bribery laws, and other laws EVERY DAY! They have more money and power than the FBI or any other law enforcement group! They truly believe they are “*untouchable*” and the lack of prosecution of their members reinforces that belief.

The Architecture Of A Patent Crime Empire

To operate a crime scheme you need to have an operational infrastructure that protects and feeds the beast. Here is how the Silicon Valley Mafia has set theirs up.

At the end of February in 2021, Mobster Peter Gotti, the one-time Gambino crime boss and successor to brother John “Dapper Don” Gotti, died in North Carolina where he was serving time in federal prison. Gotti, had been sentenced to 25 years in jail after being convicted in 2003 on racketeering and other charges. Peter Gotti served as the acting boss of the Gambinos from 1999 to 2002 after his younger brother, John, was sent to prison for murder and racketeering. Peter Gotti spent an estimated \$70,000 on failed attempts to hunt down Salvatore “Sammy the Bull” Gravano after the turncoat ratted out his brother to the feds, court papers say. Gravano helped authorities bring John Gotti down in exchange for a 1991 plea deal.

The arrest of each Gotti followed a standard police organized crime surveillance and capture program discussed in every law enforcement training manual. The process of arresting organized crime participants is well known and follows very standard procedures.

Those procedures, though, have an administrative brick wall in front of them when it comes to David Rubin, Elon Musk, Eric Schmidt, Larry Page, Reid Hoffman, Steve Westly and the rest of the Silicon Valley Cartel. Why do the Silicon Valley mobster oligarchs get a pass when Al Capone, the Gambino's and the Gotti's do not?

Stanford University has a class for that.

The “*How To Get Away With Organized Crime*” curriculum is a favorite of rich Chinese, East Indian, Middle Eastern, Russian and white bread oligarch families to send their kids to. They bribe Stanford with “Donations” to get their kids some good paper. John Doerr and Lori Loughlin were caught paying straight-up bribes. Hundreds of snoot box families have yet to be caught paying those bribes. Stanford University is a PAY-TO-PLAY college!

The Silicon Valley Cartel loves to organize a good coup. The coup d'état has been practiced in America often. The Smedley Butler “Business Plot” case is the most notorious version. In the words of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black, delivered at New York University in 1960 concerning the protections of the U.S. Bill of Rights:

*I cannot agree with those who think of the Bill of Rights as an 18th century straitjacket, unsuited for this age.. The evils it guards against are not only old, they are with us now, they exist today.. Experience all over the world has demonstrated, I fear, that the distance between stable, orderly government and one that has been taken over by force is not so great as we have assumed. Indeed, the plot that Butler exposed -- if what MacGuire claimed was true – is a sobering reminder to Americans. We were not immune to the sentiments that gave rise to totalitarian governments throughout the world in the 1930s. **We make a serious mistake when we assume, "It can't happen here!"***

The term “Coup” has also been used in a corporate context more specifically as *boardroom coup*. CEOs that have been sacked by behind-the-scenes maneuvering include Robert Stempel of General Motors (1992)[17][18] and John Akers of IBM (1993).[19][20]

Steve Jobs attempted management coups twice at Apple, Inc.; first in 1985 when he unsuccessfully tried to oust John Sculley and then again in 1997, which successfully forced Gil Amelio to resign.[21][22].

The Silicon Valley Cartel is dead-set on operating another social coup in America!

Who are these guys? They are sex abusers like the Kleiner Perkins frat boy staff who were sued by Ellen Pao for the misogyny culture of sexual deviancy and abuse that they promote as their corporate culture. They are tax evaders like Ray Lane. They are hooker-hiring sex traffickers like Google's Forrest Hayes who died from an excess of drugs and sex. They are cheaters like Google's David Drummond who destroyed his family by his addiction to infidelity. They are sex addicts who own sex penthouses and cavort with the notorious Wendy Deng like Eric Schmidt. Amid the World's Largest Corporate Sex Scandals Google CEO Eric Schmidt will now leave Alphabet's board. Schmidt is a

known womanizer despite being married for 37 years to Wendy Schmidt, who said in 2012 they started living separate lives because she felt like “a piece of luggage” following him around the world.

News outlets have been sniffing around Schmidt’s former flames looking for a Harvey Weinstein-like bombshell, a source close to Schmidt told The Post. They are mobster-class justice evasion lawyers like Wilson Sonsini and political bribe conduit lawyers like Perkins Coie. They are charged rapists and psychological sex manipulators like Joe Lonsdale.

When Kleiner Perkins offices were broken into by covert law enforcement operatives much was revealed. This was followed by the hack of all of John Doerr's emails' and the email of his top staff.

This was followed by the revelation that Doerr bribes Stanford University for special favors for his kids and for certain 'relationships'. Now Doerr must walk on pins and needles because he has been put on notice that even the slightest bribe, political manipulation or mobster-like tech black-listing will not go unnoticed.

A female employee called Tesla's factory a 'predator zone' at a meeting where workers described the constant sexual harassment at Tesla.

DNC chairman Eric Bauman, the head of the California Democratic Party, and the Los Angeles County Democratic Party., has is former assistant say he was first assaulted after falling asleep in a hotel and waking up to his boss performing oral sex on him, and that there were two more instances where he was forced to submit to Bauman.

Bay area party guests and Rothschild-linked Bronfman sisters donated millions to the sex cult whose leaders, Allison Mack and Keith Raniere, have been charged with child sex trafficking.

Goddard, a director, producer and theme park designer, has faced many sex abuse allegations. Eight former members of a Santa Barbara youth theater group in the 1970s alleged that Goddard molested or attempted to molest them. A ninth was said to have told others before he died that Goddard sexually assaulted him as a child. Goddard denied their allegations.

The Silicon Valley Mafia is The Sandhill Road Venture Capital frat boy company bosses in Palo Alto, their National Venture Capital Association (NVCA) partners and the tech companies (Google, Tesla, Facebook, Amazon, Twitter, LinkedIn, etc.) they control. They are sometimes referred to as "The Deep State". They have purchased California, New York and Washington, DC politicians (mostly Senators) who they also control.

They hire rogue ex-intelligence agents to operate Fusion GPS, Gawker/Gizmodo, Black Cube, ShareBlue, New America, In-Q-Tel, Podesta Group, Media Matters, etc. massive media attack programs against competitors, reporters and outsiders. They collude on black-lists, valuation controls, election manipulation, search engine rigging, domestic spying for political manipulation, stock rigging, insider trading, executive prostitute clubs, trophy wife assignments, the bribery of politicians and worse. They are felons who pay politicians to halt investigations and interdiction efforts.

They are widely covered in news media articles as: 'sex abusers, cult enthusiasts, elitists, rapists, woman beaters, probiosis abusers, sexual work extortion operators, extremists, arrogant clones of each other, tone deaf, echo-chamber reinforcing, misogynist, racist, manipulative, insecure, covertly gay,

corrupt, thieves' and other anti-social revelations. They are not limited to California and also operate out of New York and Washington DC.

They use their monopolistic control of the internet to massively and exclusively scale services that only they control and use to abuse the public's privacy, human rights, invention rights and information. They run their cartel like the old Italian Mafia once did.

The Department of Justice conducted a series of raids across California tech and media circles and arrested 238 people in connection with a Hollywood pedophilia network, but this story went totally ignored by almost all media outlets. According to police, the arrests included some entertainers, community leaders, white-collar professionals, a monk, and other high-ranking clergy members. The raids were conducted by the Regional Internet Crimes Against Children task force, working directly with the Justice Department. Codenamed "Operation Broken Heart III", the sweeping raids targeted offenders wanted for the sexual exploitation of children, child prostitution, sex tourism and possessing and distributing child pornography, said Deputy Chief Matt Blake. Silicon Valley oligarchs use these intermediate level people to source up sex victims to be delivered to their Woodside and Atherton mansions.

Michael Goguen, who had worked for a firm that funded Google and Paypal, "sexually and physically" abused Amber Laurel Baptiste over more than 13 years after picking her up at a Texas strip club, her lawsuit alleges. Baptiste, who claims she was brought to the United States from Canada by human traffickers at 15, said she endured "countless hours of forced sodomy" from the tech titan. The former stripper said Goguen made her endure demeaning sexual acts, sodomized her for "six hours at a time," and forced her to call him "king" and "emperor." Filed in San Mateo County, Calif., her suit details a life of torture and servitude as she was jetting around the globe to serve as the millionaire's plaything.

She claims Goguen had promised to save her from human trafficking but instead became an even worse predator himself. The Silicon Valley Mafia Cartel is the largest provider of dark money bribes to West Coast politicians including Feinstein, Pelosi, Harris, Brown, Reid, Boxer, Lee, et al.,. Those politicians and their families also covertly own the stock of the California tech companies and social media companies like Tesla, Solyndra, Abound, Google, Facebook, Netflix, etc. Larry Wallace, a senior staffer for Sen. Kamala Harris (D-CA) resigned over the discovery he was involved in a sexual harassment lawsuit and \$400,000 payout to the sexually abused victim while working for then California Attorney General

Kamala Harris. In related headlines we read: "ATTORNEY GENERAL THAT COLLUDED WITH KAMALA HARRIS EXPOSED AS SEX PERVERT!!!!"; "TOP DNC SEX PSYCHO MAY BE ALIGNED WITH SEX CULTS!"; "WHY IS EVERY DNC BIG SHOT TURNING OUT TO BE A SCREWED UP SEXUAL MESS!"

The Bay Area headlines reek of perversion: "ANOTHER Democrat Sex Cult Exposed: 'sexual servitude' at San Francisco-based 'orgasmic meditation' company: One Taste"; "NXIUM, ONE TASTE, EMO, THE WOODSIDE CLUB: WHY DO THE DEMOCRATS GET INTO SUCH KINK?"; "UNDERCOVER CAMERA'S IN SAN RAFAEL, CALIFORNIA AT 4TH STREET "DANCE/YOGA" BUILDING AND MILL VALLEY CITY BUILDING CATCH SEX-FOR-SALE ESCORTS AND KINK"; "THEY USE "MEET-UP" (THE DNC'S NETWORKING SITE) TO HUNT FOR VICTIMS TO SEDUCE"; ""HOT LITTLE RED HEAD" TURNS OUT TO BE THE TOP ESCORT IN MARIN COUNTY"!

In the latest case of Hollywood's and Silicon Valley's spiralling sexual abuse scandal, Variety reports that a veteran 58-year-old Disney executive has been charged with three felony counts of child sexual abuse. Jon Heely, the longtime director of music publishing at Disney, was arrested nearly a month ago and charged with three counts of lewd and lascivious acts on a child. One of the reported victims was 15. The other was abused for four years starting at the age of 11, according to the charges. Heely, who oversees the licensing of music from Disney films faces up to nine years and three months in prison according to The Daily News.

It is now time to sound the alarm bells on the economic prospects for the Millennial Generation in the Western world, but more importantly, at Stanford University. This generation of citizens aged 18 to 36, is the first in modern developed economies on course to have a lower standard of living than their parents. Housing affordability and a decaying job environment are some of the most pressing issues affecting Stanford Millennials. The future is bleak for this avocado and toast generation, as Western world economies have likely plateaued regarding economic growth. Surging debt and rising government bond yields are producing an environment that could lead to more hardships for this lost generation.

Tech oligarchs have taken full advantage of broke Millennials by offering “adult arrangements” for a roof over their heads. Yes, you heard this correctly, Millennials are trading sex for a place to sleep and sex for tuition at Stanford University. Sugar Babies now comprise a large portion of Stanford students. Kleiner Perkins and Greylock VC's hire them for sex. Google and Facebook executives use them like disposable sex toys. The student debt crisis in the US has gotten so bad, there's a growing group of young women — and some men — who are taking an unconventional approach to paying for college. Through dating websites like SeekingArrangement.com, and match.com, Sugar Babies, as they're called, partner up with wealthy, often older, men who want to spend money on them.

This trend was created by the Sand Hill Road tech oligarchs.

Some 2.5 million Sugar Babies identified as students in 2016 on SeekingArrangement.com. Many of these Sugar Babies turned to the site to find someone who will pay for their education so they can graduate debt, and worry, free. In exchange, Sugar Babies go to dinners, attend events, or accompany their Sugar Daddy, or daddies, on trips. In some cases, they provide companionship or foster a mentor-mentee relationship. In other situations, the terms of the agreement include physical intimacy.

Jermaine Gagnon, 28, told DailyMailTV how he narrowly escaped death when DNC financier Edward Buck injected him with crystal meth at his sex-toy filled apartment. Gagnon said Buck, 63, paid to fly him from Minnesota to Los Angeles, drugged him with a substance dissolved in Gatorade then injected him with crystal meth. The 28-year-old shared photos of Buck, wearing white long johns, crouched over him on a mattress during one of their nights together last year. Gagnon shared images of sex toys Buck had for their encounter, saying: 'He had this red and black toolbox with all types of fetish toys, like c**k rings, sex toys'. He added: 'He gave me some Tommy Hilfiger tighty whities, a muscle t-shirt and some long johns. White knee-high socks'. Gagnon said during one encounter Buck offered him a drink he suspected had been spiked, feeling woozy and weak shortly after drinking it. He said: 'He took my phone. I was so scared. I felt death walked into my soul. I called my mother. I said, 'I feel like he's going to kill me, I think I'm going to die'. Buck is now under investigation over the deaths of two black men, including one man who died of an apparent overdose at his apartment on Monday.

According to the testimony of a federal agent, Harold “H.L.” Moody, a former Democratic Party chairman, streamed live videos of children being raped, distributed child pornography to other pedophiles, and regularly smoked methamphetamine out of a glass pipe while seated at his desk during work hours. Our tax dollars at work, folks. Jason Bennett, a special agent for Homeland Security Investigations, said an undercover agent took “screen shots” of Moody sitting at his desk and chatting with pedophiles in a secret chatroom online on “more than one occasion” between Aug. 29 and Oct. 12.

Bennett described Moody as a “high-volume user” who logged in and out of a chat room solely devoted to child pornography several times a day, including 26 times in a two-day span. He was also a host of the private chat room, which Bennett explains indicates that Moody did something to receive such recognition.

This is the world of the tech oligarchs that get White House “Advisor” positions.

Tech magnate Elon Musk reportedly admits in an upcoming book that he once attended a somewhat well-known Silicon Valley “sex party.” Musk and his bro-friend: Steve Jurvetson, have been documented in a number of notorious sex scandals. Even worse is the headline that reveals: "Elon Musk Says Pedophile Accusation Against British Man Was Protected Speech But Ignores Fact That Musks Father Had Sex With His Own Daughter"

Dov Katz, head of the computer vision and machine learning group at Facebook-owned Oculus, has been charged in King County for attempted commercial sexual abuse of a minor. The 38-year-old tech exec allegedly attempted to contact what he believed to be was a 15-year-old girl for sex. The fictitious 15-year-old was actually an undercover police officer with the Tukwila Police Department, a city just south of Seattle. The news was first reported by KING 5, which said that Katz was arrested by Tukwila Police. An Israeli citizen who resides in California, Katz is forbidden to have contact with any minors, except in the presence of a responsible adult, according to charging documents. Katz allegedly responded to an online advertisement that offered sex in exchange for money, an ad which was posted by undercover police officer posing as a 15-year-old girl. Katz allegedly arranged a meeting at the Embassy Suites in Tukwila, offering to pay \$350 to have sex without a condom. When Katz arrived at the hotel with \$600 in cash, he was arrested by police.

Former Democrat CDC director Dr. Tom Frieden was arrested on sexual pervert allegations. Frieden was charged with forcible touching, sex abuse and harassment, according to police.

California gubernatorial candidate Gavin Newsom's past sexual misconduct disqualifies him from holding higher office, rival Democrat Amanda Renteria said Thursday, and he should resign from his position as lieutenant governor. "If he was in the Legislature right now, he'd be called out, and like what we've seen, being forced out," Renteria said in an interview with The Sacramento Bee. "We've got to be sending the message that the more power you have, the more responsibility you have to protect others."

As mayor of San Francisco more than a decade ago, Newsom had an affair with one of his city hall aides, who was also married to his campaign manager at the time.

Google employees have accused Google boss Rubin of sexual misconduct. A woman, with whom Mr. Rubin had been having an extramarital relationship, said he coerced her into performing oral sex in a hotel room in 2013, according to two company executives with knowledge of the episode. Google investigated and concluded her claim was credible, said the people, who spoke on the condition that

they not be named, citing confidentiality agreements. Mr. Rubin was notified, they said, and Mr. Page asked for his resignation. Google could have fired Mr. Rubin and paid him little to nothing on the way out. Instead, the company handed him a \$90 million exit package, paid in installments of about \$2 million a month for four years, said two people with knowledge of the terms. The last payment is scheduled for next month. Mr. Rubin was one of three executives that Google protected over the past decade after they were accused of sexual misconduct. In two instances, it ousted senior executives, but softened the blow by paying them millions of dollars as they departed, even though it had no legal obligation to do so. In a third, the executive remained in a highly compensated post at the company.

Each time Google stayed silent about the accusations against the men. Google executives have been caught having sex slaves.

The Rosewood Hotel is brimming with tech guys, some loudly talking about money. The college student at our table recommends the ribs—she’s been here before, on “dates” with her “daddies.” “There are a lot of tech guys,” she says. “They want the girlfriend experience, without having to deal with an actual girlfriend.” “The girlfriend experience” is the term women in the sex trade use for a service involving more than just sex. “They want the perfect girlfriend—in their eyes,” says Miranda, the young woman at our table.* “She’s well groomed, cultured, classy, able to converse about anything—but not bringing into it any of her real-world problems or feelings. Her adventures in “sugaring” started three years ago when she got hit on by an older guy and rebuffed him, saying, “Look, I’m not interested, so unless you’re offering to pay my student loans,” and he said, “Well . . . ?” After that, “he paid for stuff. He gave me money to help out with my living expenses.” This is how many of the skinny co-eds at Stanford University pay the bills and Stanford bosses look the other way.

In Silicon Valley, There Are Over 100 Services That Deliver Young Men And Girls To Rich Google And Facebook Executives For Dirty Sex. Most of the victims come from local colleges, universities, art schools and the Mission District, Haight Street and Noe Valley districts in San Francisco. They use Facade organizations like "Power Exchange", "Mission Exchange", "The Arena", "Orgasmic Meditation", "NXVIUM", "The Spinsters", "The Guardsmen", One Taste, etc. act as fronts for sexual transactions. The Rosewood Hotel has sex nights for the sale of women using sly hand signals. Almost every hotel on El Camino Real in Palo Alto has a prostitution activity going on around the clock.

Russian and Italian prostitutes fly in and out of San Jose and San Francisco airports so often that they are known as the "pus*y ports". Young, impossibly attractive, girls with tight mini skirts and a roller bag in the airport alone are now under constant surveillance by police.

One report recalls: "...At the hotel, Hillary Clinton Mega donor and John Podesta partner Wyss assaulted Long physically and sexually, according to her police complaint. “Me screaming, ‘No stop it,’” she wrote in her own handwriting to police. “He grabbed my teeth with his left hand and ripped my mouth open. He inserted a vibrator into my vagina and almost suffocated me by putting his fist into my mouth. I struggled and pushed. I thought for sure he was going to kill me,” she wrote. “I left that hotel room sick and in pain,” she told police in the statement. She returned to Boulder and “stayed in bed for weeks. The physical sickness of this event was devastating,” she told police. Wyss also allegedly threatened to stop his financial support for her daughter if she broke up with him, according to Long. “She’s probably one of the first who took on powerful men over sexual misconduct,” recalled Police Chief Tom Koby in an interview with The DCNF. He personally knew the Boulder resident and counseled her about her relationship with Wyss. “After the attack, I had breakfast with Jackie at the

Hotel Boulderado. She broke down during breakfast. This thing had happened and it was terrible. She was quite shaken and Jackie doesn't shake too easily," Koby said. "Hans had her in a bind in terms of helping Jackie heal her daughter, who had some serious health addiction issues," Kolby added. "That was what was keeping Jackie in the relationship and she didn't have a lot of money. She was still clinging to the hope she could save her daughter. And that she had these things she wanted to do with these organizations working on detention homes and shelters in Boulder and in Denver," Koby recalled..."

Amid allegations of sexual harassment, embattled freshman Democratic Rep. Ruben Kihuen vowed he will not resign from his post, despite calls from Democratic leaders that he step aside. Instead, Kihuen is digging in with a shocking allegation of his own, taking aim at the leaders of his own party. In an interview with ABC News, Kihuen, D-Nev., said party leaders knew last year about a former campaign staffer's allegations of misconduct but stood by his campaign nonetheless. Kihuen questioned why they are calling for his resignation now, more than a year later. "I do find it interesting that the DCCC, Leader [Nancy] Pelosi and Chairman Ben Ray Lujan -- they knew about these allegations last year,"

Kihuen said. "They looked into them. They didn't find anything, and they continued investing millions of dollars in my campaign. They went out there and campaigned for me."

A married senior official in President Obama's Department of Education was convicted of sex crimes and resigned for following women on the DC Metro and taking pictures up their skirts, DailyMail.com can exclusively reveal. William Mendoza, 42, the former executive director of the White House Initiative on American Indian and Alaska Native Education, stepped down after he was arrested and charged with attempted voyeurism in November, 2016, for the vile acts. Mendoza, who earned \$140,000 a year as a policy advisor in Obama's White House, tried to take photos and videos up women's skirts at least four times on his government-issued iPhones in July 2016 without their consent.

He was also caught looking at footage, apparently filmed in secret, of a woman in her underwear getting changed in a dressing room. It is not known if he recorded the video himself. When he took the indecent photos, he was supposed to be at work and was using a travel card funded by the taxpayer, according to documents obtained by DailyMail.com through a Freedom of Information Act request.

After California's then-Attorney General Kamala D. Harris announced felony pimping charges last year against the two owners of backpage.com — a classified-ad website that is a hub for sex trafficking and prostitution, one of the men cut a \$10,000 check to House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi's super PAC.

Mrs. Pelosi's political action committee, House Majority PAC, has resisted giving the money back, and an aide to Mrs. Pelosi said the California Democrat knows nothing about the contribution. The uproar over sexual harassment that began with the Harvey Weinstein scandal has intensified the scrutiny of political contributions linked to Backpage, which law enforcement officials say is the chief platform for activities far worse than harassment, including sexual slavery and child prostitution. Mrs. Pelosi isn't the only Democrat struggling to deal with the piles of cash that Backpage's owners spread around to candidates and state Democratic parties over the years. Even Ms. Harris, a California Democrat who is now a U.S. senator, ducked the issue. Her office wouldn't respond to repeated emails about Backpage money going to House Majority PAC and other Democratic organizations. Since 2010, the owners and their wives have shoveled about \$99,000 to candidates and about \$95,000 to Democratic parties in

Arizona, Colorado and New Mexico, according to federal campaign finance data collected by the Center for Responsive Politics.

Prominent Democrat donor Terry Bean was indicted earlier this month on two counts of sodomy and one count of sex abuse for allegedly having sex with a teenage boy. Bean was arraigned on the charges, TV station KGW8 reported. He pleaded not guilty and was taken into custody at County jail. The body of investigative journalist Jen Moore was found in her Washington D.C. hotel room on Monday after her investigation into an alleged sexual assault by President William J. Clinton. “In fact, just four weeks before her death, Moore filed details of the alleged victim’s claims with the Department of Homeland Security, detailing the allegations against Clinton. Moore contacted Homeland Security beginning on July 6th through July 9th, records show. A week later, she contacted the FBI with identical details about the victim and the shocking allegations against Clinton,”

A leading liberal think tank run by a longtime adviser to former presidential candidate Hillary Clinton is facing allegations of serious sexual harassment which went undealt with by management, a new report claims. The Centre for American Progress (CAP), headed by Clinton associate Neera Tanden, has released four policy proposal papers on dealing with sexual harassment in the workplace, but former staffers have come forward with stories of repeated harassment at the think tank, BuzzFeed reports.

Defy Ventures brings the gospel of entrepreneurship to an unlikely place: prisons. The nonprofit company founded by Catherine Hoke says it is dedicated to helping formerly incarcerated people start their own businesses and stay out of prison. “Transform the hustle,” the company’s tagline encourages.

Defy has received grants from Google. Facebook COO Sheryl Sandberg wrote a foreword to Hoke’s new memoir. Former U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara called Hoke’s work “incredibly inspiring” on his podcast. But while Defy woos Silicon Valley and Washington, D.C., scandal has rocked the company’s leadership. Last month, Defy fired its president after he blew the whistle on allegations of sexual harassment by Hoke and fraudulent statistics exaggerating the program’s successes.

Henry T. Nicholas III, the Silicon Valley billionaire founder of chip-maker Broadcom, has been arrested by police on drug trafficking charges. According to the Associated Press, Nicholas was arrested on suspicion of trafficking heroin, cocaine, meth and ecstasy. Security was called when Nicholas couldn’t get into his sex fuelled room at the Encore, a Las Vegas casino hotel. When security arrived, they reportedly found Nicholas with Ashley Fargo, the ex-wife of an heir to the Wells Fargo banking fortune. Fargo was passed out with a semi-deflated balloon in her mouth, but was revived by paramedics. According to reports, security subsequently found canisters of nitrous oxide inside the room, and a subsequent search by cops turned up more drugs inside a suitcase. Nicholas’s attorney, David Chesnoff, told the Associated Press that they will “deal with the facts in court.”

Multiple famous Silicon Valley lawyers have been found dead, hanged by their own hand while attempting to masturbate while choking themselves because they thought that choking would add to the sensation. A formerly powerful Democrat, Attorney Mark Benavides, has been found guilty on six individual counts of human trafficking in a grotesque and sex-filled criminal conspiracy. Mark Benavides, a well-known Democrat who ran for the 186th District Court in 2014, was accused by federal law enforcement of trading his legal services as an attorney for sex from his clients and then recording those manipulative sex-romps, according to local ABC affiliate KSAT. Benevides would then

promise the women that if they allowed him to engage in erotic sex that sometimes included physical torture, that he would offer them a legitimate defense in the courtroom.

Hundreds of leaked text messages between Kevin Tsujihara, actress Charlotte Kirk and partners Brett Ratner and James Packer show the powerful executive, under pressure, said repeatedly he would push for auditions as accusations of "extortion" and a proposed settlement agreement followed.

These tales of perversion and depravity could go on for HUNDREDS OF PAGES.

All of these people knew, or were financed by THE SILICON VALLEY CARTEL.

Are you beginning to see a trend here?

The Lawyers Target The Government Smash-And-Grab Candy Store

A group of Silicon Valley investors received some documents from some “friends”, either from Russian “business men or the CIA, or both, stating that there was “*A trillion dollars of lithium in Afghanistan*“. These documents, possibly acquired from the Russians, were passed around by Goldman Sachs & Silicon Valley VC’s. This group thought they could exploit Afghanistan, and other country’s, mining contracts on a commodity monopolization scheme fronting the use of the raw materials by “*Green-washing*” it to be used for “electric car and solar programs”, under the guise of, “*it’s ‘CleanTech’ the voters should love it*”, in order to try to make it pass Congressional oversight faster. Recent press disclosures confirm vast campaign funding, by mining companies, through back-door avenues, ie: the Guistra matter and others. The plotters estimated that they could personally acquire many trillions of dollars in profits, mostly at taxpayer expense, and control of government policy, upon successful execution of their scheme.

These investors were deeply affiliated with Goldman Sachs. Goldman Sachs was involved in almost every aspect, stock manipulation, application “winner”, profit funnel and deployment aspect of the case. Goldman created the computerized stock market “spoofing” algorithm process known as the “Flash Boy Pump” stock spoofing. This used Department of Energy and TARP cash award announcements to synthetically inflate stock values long enough to “skim” profits off those stock holdings. Goldman is now under many investigations for this kind of “Commodity rigging”.

These investors used their campaign donations, lobbyists, stock payola and PAC’s to acquire the services of a number of U.S. Senators and foreign diplomats via bribes. They primarily paid the Senators in stock options for those Senators, their families and business associates. The FEC and FTC have Congressional insider trading investigations under-way, over these very actions, which have been stone-walled by the very Senators who engaged in the insider trading.

So much money was moving that a scheme was created to pass the money through the U.S. Department of Energy and a new program, called TARP, so that the transactions appeared to be federal programs

The characters involved in the scandal have now been uncovered as highly unethical, disreputable, willing to break laws and moral codes and are held in low regard by the public. They formed a cartel now known as The Silicon Valley Cartel as a subset of The National Venture Capital Association (NVCA) with guidance from rogue CIA/In-Q-Tel associates James Breyer and Gilman Louie. One of the largest participants is Google, Inc. and it’s investors. The Cartel was recently exposed in the Silicon Valley “ANGELGATE” and “NO POACHING” collusion scandals and lawsuits

The best friend’s of the Silicon Valley Cartel were Steven Chu and Eric Holder. The cartel arranged, via the legal firm connected to both: Covington & Burling, to get them both nominated and appointed to the two federal agencies that control the money pass-through. Both of these individuals have been proven to have had previous business and personal relationships with the Cartel. Steven Chu sabotaged

any technologies or companies that competed with his, and his friends, stock investments. Both have been forced to quit.

The Cartel used consulting Company McKinsey for insider trading deal support and to author papers and reports which were distributed throughout Washington to say that certain very specific products and technologies were “trending in the new CleanTech industry”. In fact, every “trending company and technology” that McKinsey raved over was already owned and monopolized by the Cartel. At least one major McKinsey executive has gone to federal prison. A number of others are under surveillance and investigation.

As Secretary of Energy, it was noticed that Steven Chu gave quite a lot of U.S. tax dollars to Russian owned or controlled companies. It was subsequently discovered that the Silicon Valley Cartel had deep Russian connections and business relations with USSR businessmen, to assist in the mining of Afghan, and other Middle Eastern countries, for the personal gain of the Cartel. Steven Chu sabotaged over 200 applicants, for the federal programs, simply because they competed with the Cartel and were not part of the Cartel.

John Doerr ran Kleiner Perkins, one of the lead coordinators of the Scheme and the Cartel. He is called: “The Godfather of Silicon Valley”.

Elon Musk was a behind the scenes Google and Kleiner Perkins partner, Cartel organizer and cash conduiting agent. [THIS LINK](#) has many confirming data points . Elon Musk, a billionaire, has now received billions of free taxpayer dollars in out-right cash hand-outs, tax waivers, free or low-cost resources, stock pumps and federal NASA contracts. Musk’s companies would not exist today if not for taxpayer hand-out cash. No other living person has received this much taxpayer money from the Obama administration. No other living person has given so much money to the Obama administration through his companies, investors and partners, like Google. No other living person has had the Obama administration sabotage, terminate or rule against so many of his competitors. Federal records demonstrate this to be one of the most overt examples of a political campaign kick-back scheme in this decade. In Musk’s carefully orchestrated, self-aggrandizing, media campaigns, all mention of his true financial connections, extensive fraud lawsuits, and employee distrust is carefully expunged. Musk’s companies exploited the key minerals from the mining deals and both Tesla & Solyndra, who sit next door to each other, were kickback lobbied by Dianne Feinstein, whose family profited on both deals.

Vinohd Khosla was a key organizer in the Cartel and connected to Raj Gupta, now imprisoned. He has been involved in a notorious public lawsuit for taking over a famous California coastal beach.

Senators Feinstein, Reid, Pelosi and Boxer received the largest amount of stock, insider trading deals and campaign kick-backs from the Cartel. Feinstein’s family and associates received massive resources from the Tesla and Solyndra deals. They were, essentially, paid program facilitators. These Senators leveraged state tax officials, including Bill Lockyer of California, to exclusively, and extraordinarily, give tens of millions of dollars of additional taxpayer money, at a state level, to Cartel billionaire-owned companies: Tesla & Solyndra. Which sit on the same plot of land and have supplier contracts with the Senators families. These Senators took active steps to sabotage applicants who competed with Tesla, Solyndra & the Cartel, such as Gary D. Conley of SolFocus; who may have been murdered.

Eric Schmidt was the core lobbyist and director of a large part of the Cartel. He spent more time in the White House, directing policy, than most members of Congress. He used Google to put character assassination hit-jobs on competitors, reporters and politicians.

When whistle-blowers saw through the scheme, Cartel leaders Doerr and Schmidt would organize character assassination hit-jobs against those adversaries, sabotage their business and career databases with negative flags, create whisper campaigns and black list them via the National Venture Capital Association, which was controlled by a large number of Cartel members. The Cartel used its resources, concurrently, at Google and Gawker Media, to put media hit-jobs on Santorum, ALICE, Romney, whistle-blowers, and other adversaries by locking devastating hatchet jobs onto massive numbers of search engine pages controlled by each.

Recently disclosed documents and videos prove that the Cartel spent more time in the White House, from 2007 forward, than all of the members of Congress COMBINED. Additionally, the disclosures of financial connections between the Cartel members, The White House, campaign financing and federal policy decisions demonstrates the operation of a felony-level corruption activity.

The mining chemicals that the cartel sought to monopolize were “dumped” on the Cartel by the Russians via, possibly, doctored documents which overstated the volume and value of the materials and who knew that the materials were toxic, explosive and had no long-term economic viability. The Cartel did not investigate the materials usage and rushed to profiteer, driven By Goldman Sachs, who didn’t care about the long-term, they just wanted to “skim” their fees and “stock pumps” off the top.

The American GAO, Judicial Watch & Transparency Center have discovered that U.S. taxpayers lost additional billions of dollars as the result of tax waivers, credits and reductions given exclusively to Cartel companies as gifts in exchange for election services. In the FBI-raided Solyndra solar panel company alone, U.S. taxpayers lost over \$600M while Silicon Valley plotters profited by over \$180M in stock market skims and favorable tax write-offs.

Google executives and investors used Google, Inc. as a “central command” for lobbying, leverage, media stock manipulation, spying on competitors, media hit jobs and revenue profiteering. The upside was that it provided for the largest media, stock and information manipulation system ever devised. The downside is that it focused public, agency and law enforcement scrutiny on this central point until the voluminous indiscretions, finally, became highly visible.

The key White House staff who assisted in this scheme were: Rahm Emanuel, David Plouffe, Robert Gibbs, David Axelrod, Steve Rattner, Jay Carney and Bill Daily. When confronted about their involvement, historical records show that they all quit their White House jobs at the most desired positions in America, in a bad economy, to take far lower positions, thus implicating themselves, along with their emails, in culpability. These staffers worked harder than any other administration to cut-off the press, attack whistle-blowers and increase NSA domestic surveillance in order to delay the revelation of these crimes.

A key aspect of the scam was the “Pump & Go” stock swindle combined with pulling cash off-the-top by Sachs and the Cartel. In the following evidence set, you will notice a record setting number of huge

cash intakes and sudden bankruptcies immediately thereafter. That part of the scheme seems to have worked like this: 1.) Technically “ideal” companies were set-up, 2.) huge cash amounts were wired in from the U.S. Treasury. 3.) Huge “fees” were paid to VC’s, executives and Sachs, right when the money arrived at the tech company, while Sachs & the VC’s “pumped” the stock market valuations of those companies using the sudden “free money” from the Dept. of Energy to falsify valuation marketing. This gave short term, sudden, stock profits that they also grabbed, 4.) the companies were managerially abandoned and then 5.) filed bankruptcy. 6.) The VC’s and Sachs then filed tax loss credits, on the failures, in order to get a double profit upside. Investigators called this “unjust rewards”. This volume of award/failure scenarios has never occurred in the history of America, particularly with a series of same-type companies who had just received massive federal funding windfalls. It seems obvious that these sequential incidents were planned and coordinated. Investigators believe Kleiner Perkins and Goldman Sachs were the key organizers of this tactic. Time-tracking of financial details in the HSBC “Swiss Leaks” seems to confirm federal award/personal gain sequences.

Everybody who got DOE cash was a campaign financier.

Everybody who got denied, and then sabotaged, was a competitor to those exact same campaign financiers who did not pay any political bribes.

Solyndra was exploiting **Indium**, and a large number of other key chemicals, **from Afghanistan** that directly paid into the “*DOE insider profit pool*”.

Abound was exploiting key chemicals **from Afghanistan** that directly paid into the “*DOE insider profit pool*”.

Nissan’s Smyrna plant, **Tesla, A123, Ener1, Fisker** and **Ford** were **exploiting Lithium from Afghanistan** that directly paid into the “*DOE insider profit pool*”. Other “failed DOE winners” had the same connected materials supply routes.

The USAID federal agency passed around a marketing book, that we have a copy of, offering different opportunities to plunder Afghanistan mining corruption....but only if you help Obama!

In this Watergate-type scandal (Should we call it Lithium-Gate, instead?) Secretary of Energy Steven Chu appears to have been told to let no applicant through unless they were in the “*DOE insider profit pool*”. The pool consisted of Deloitte staff, Goldman Sachs staff, DOE staff, Silicon Valley venture capitalists and, possibly, at least two White House staff. Rahm Emanuel is known to have had an intimate connection with the Argonne labs lithium ion program research funding while in the White House and after he returned to Chicago. **Dianne Feinstein** personally arranged for, and opened, the NUMMI plant for Tesla. Her husband’s company CBRE were the real estate hooks for the Tesla, and next door, Solyndra property deals. Her staff and lobby people work there now. Her husband goes to Mongolia all the time for “special meetings” according to Sunshine. So one wonders if Feinstein got on the intelligence committee so she could see if she was about to get caught or if a savvy NSA section chief “helped” her get there on the premise of “*keep your friends close and your enemies closer*” so

the NSA could watch her in intimate detail. The recent hack of her files by intelligence officers seems to be indicative.

Many high level politicians made a grab for their piece of the trillion dollars so investigations keep getting squashed by them. Steven Chu killed off the non-toxic fuel cell, wind and natural gas programs while at DOE to give a clear runway to his “*DOE insider profit pool*”, **in which he participated.**

The Russian mining connections run throughout the above group but now that the U.S. is back in a Cold War with Russia, Russian insiders are delighted to spill the beans, on the whole deal, to reporters. One is even out taking competitive bids for exclusive whistleblower interviews.

The insider profit pool consisted of the same investors in the above efforts, who also happen to be the same people who nominated and lobbied for the appointment of [Steven Chu](#), according to his nomination docket. All of these people had a personal profit side deal in the same profit pool through stock holdings, trusts, revolving doors and repercussive gains. All of the above are connected in a very tiny business circle. The odds of that circle of 30, or so, people, out of 318 million Americans, being the only people to have access to these profits and federal funds, without rigging the program, is calculated on a book-makers metric at 12 billion to 1. Even now, one can easily see the disparity between the [NHTSA wave-through of the coddled White House campaign-backer funded Tesla \(hushed up by Tesla silent owner: Google\)](#) and the bone crunching hearings and fines that GM and Toyota have had to endure, at the same time, for less dangerous defects.

The Senate Ethics Committee members have hundreds of thousands of background documents on this matter but they have been stone-walled. The FBI has nearly a million documents on this matter and reporters are eager to see the anticipated indictments from years of surveillance of the key parties of interest. NSA, DIA and CIA have tens of millions of documents on this matter from nearly a decade of surveillance of parties of interest, but they are stalled up with inter-party politics. The press has vast amounts of this evidence. The Russians are shopping vast new repositories of disclosure. Within the year, expectations are high for a tsunami of enforcement activity. The recent record-breaking number of White House and Congressional “retirement announcements” may be the first wave of the storm. As [Richard Byrne Reilly](#) found out, the “*no comment*” responses are piling up. That is **always a good sign** that the “*We just got caught*” *Freak-Out Factor Frenzy* has begun among the Politicos.

While party mouth-foamers are trying to make the **Afghani-scam scandal** not about their party, with their constant drone of “*Nothing’s been proven...*” they are now realizing that it is not a Democrat Vs. Republican issue. It is about being for, or against, **Organized Crime**. It is about being part of, or not part of, **Organized Crime**. It is about losing their federal pensions because of crimes they may have **knowingly supported.**

When investigative reporters found that [Goldman Sachs](#) and Silicon Valley VC’s were involved in almost every single one of the DOE money deals, they had to ask why? How much did they make in, around and through the whole thing? Who was connected to them and decision makers? Would they

really rig a whole market (and a war?) just to get a few **TRILLION** dollars worth of lithium cornered? Looks like they did...

[Richard Byrne Reilly of VENTUREBEAT](#) reports that: “ The future of Silicon Valley’s technological prowess may well lie in the war-scarred mountains and salt flats of Western Afghanistan. United States Geological Survey teams discovered one of the world’s largest untapped reserves of lithium there six years ago. (**Editorial Team Note:** *Right about the time the DOE started rounding up the key ATVM and LG program insiders*) The USGS was scouting the volatile country at the behest of the U.S. Department of Defense’s Task Force for Business and Stability Operations. Lithium is a soft metal used to make the lithium-ion and lithium-polymer batteries essential for powering desktop computers, laptops, smartphones, and tablets. And increasingly, electric cars like Tesla’s.

The vast discovery could very well propel Afghanistan — a war-ravaged land with a population of 31 million largely uneducated Pashtuns and Tajiks, and whose primary exports today are opium, hashish, and marijuana — into becoming the world’s next “Saudi Arabia of lithium,” according to an internal Pentagon memo cited by the *New York Times*.

The [USGS survey report on Afghanistan](#) that detailed the findings also noted that, in addition to lithium, the country also contains huge deposits of iron ore, gold, cobalt, copper, and potash, among many other valuable minerals.

“The mineral wealth there is astonishing,” said professor Michel Chossudovsky of the Montreal-based Center for Research and Globalization, who has written extensively on Afghanistan.

A conservative estimate of the riches is \$1 trillion. In some circles, it’s as high as \$5 trillion.

Reasons for considering Elon Musk to be compromised in this whole DOE scam:

- All of his efforts involved the exploitation of lithium mining deals which were controlled by DOE insider-connected awardees. Tesla cars used lithium batteries, Nevada factory was to manufacture lithium batteries, Solar City was to store energy in lithium, Space X space systems used lithium systems
- Tesla and FBI-raided Solyndra sat on the same land, had the same conflicts of interest in management and operations and were funding-promoted by the same people
- Musk went to Russia to coordinate deals with many of the same people that are conflicted with many of the other parties herein and have ties to related illicit mining deals
- Musk lied about who ordered the NHTSA safety investigation into the Tesla car fires. It was the NHTSA, and not Musk, who wanted the safety investigation started. The investigation was never completed because Musk & Tesla paid cash to get it halted in exchange for mounting a cosmetic PR-mitigation ballistic explosion shield on the bottom of the car.
- Senators Dianne Feinstein and Harry Reid had stock ownership, staffing provision services relationships, construction company ownership, leasing company ownership, insider trading arrangements, public policy ownership, supplier ownership, property ownership, tax haven options and many other conflicts of interest between themselves and Musk
- Musk has stated, on record, that Tesla’s have had “no recalls”, in fact they have had many recalls, at least two for fires and explosions.

- Multiple main-stream, and independent news journals have published analysis of Musk’s financial
- Musk’s battery partner: Panasonic, has been publicly charged, by state agencies, with corruption, racketeering, dumping, employee deaths and other illicit activities
- Elon Musk did not create Tesla Motors, he took it over, in a hostile takeover action, from the actual founders, some of whom sued him for fraud and publicly called him a scam artist.
- The tens of billions of dollars that Musk has received from U.S. taxpayers do not equate to actual costs of operations. Everything that Musk has shown, or sold, could have been produced for much, much less. Non-manipulated forensic accounting seems to make it clear that some of that money is being used for other purposes.
- A number of Tesla’s have suddenly veered over cliffs, killing the drivers, oncoming drivers, pedestrian and bicyclists. Tesla has sought to cover this up, yet homicide lawsuits have now been filed against Tesla for this. Tesla has denied that the car is faulty, yet hundreds of internet user postings, detail numerous defects with the car. Additionally, 60 Minutes and many other news broadcasts have aired demonstrations of how easy it is to hack into, and take over. Tesla is said to be the most hackable car. In fact, around the time, that the Tesla China deal started to fall apart, a Chinese University student team demonstrated a full Tesla takeover by hacking remote control.
- Musk staff were caught sending out email notices, to potential buyers, to put deposits down, before then end of the federal reporting period, so that Musk could book the deposits as “fully paid car purchases” in order to falsify sales volumes so that he could cover that fact that he had sold less cars, after a bigger cash loss, than any car company in history. Tesla investors were asked to buy as many Tesla’s as they could, in order to inflate volumes.
- Musk has “cooked the books” in reporting profits in his federal filings by stating tax credits and taxpayer cash as profits and upside in an effort to manipulate stock valuations
- Over a five year test, the results of all internet-news media covering Elon Musk related stories was analyzed. Whenever negative news appeared about Musk activities, all Google and Kliener Perkins founded web assets would down-rank, or delete, the negative news while immediately pumping PR and hype news about Musk and his projects to hide the negative news. Musk has a financial, political, economic and personal relationship with Kliener Perkins and Google owners. This manipulation of stock valuation perceptions for public stock buyers, based on the use of monopolistic assets in a covert manner is a violation of securities laws and ethics.
- In the Department of Energy original LGP and ATVM filing application documents, which Lachlan Seward thought he had destroyed, the proposed metrics from Tesla Motors, compared with the known history as of today, demonstrate that Tesla missed almost every single milestone, by magnitudes, yet, not only did Steven Chu not cut off their funding, he increased it.
- The Section 136 law says that it was illegal for DOE to fund a car company on the verge of bankruptcy, or whose survival depends on the DOE money. Elon Musk has now been recorded saying that Tesla Motors was on the verge of bankruptcy, preparing massive severance packages for key staff and had no hope for survival without the DOE cash. Federal records demonstrate that Tesla used a temporary Detroit stock swap, arranged by DOE staff and Silicon Valley investors, to temporarily manipulate the numbers in order to create the surface appearance of a momentary positive debt-ratio. In fact, Tesla, of all applicants, had the worst debt ratio of any

applicant. Per the 136 law, Tesla should never have been funded. At the time of application, they had no factory building. Their cars were a hundred thousand dollars over budget, per car. They had no engineered design for production. They were facing staff revolts and they already had written warnings about the dangers of their battery systems.

- Musk has ordered his staff and engineers to never discuss or acknowledge the federal documents disclosing that his car batteries, and battery factory, emit cancer-causing, brain-damaging, liver and fetus damaging vapors when they out-gas during afire, explosion or thermal event, threatening firemen, occupants and bystanders.
- Multiple news media have reported that Musk sends spy emails to his employees, under false names, in order to find out who is whistle-blowing on his illicit actions. This has angered many former employees, some of whom have sued Musk. Many of those are willing to testify about Musk illicit actions.
- Internet IP, DNS, bot and dat-pack tracking has confirmed that Elon Musk related groups use automated shill and blogger farms to place large amounts of self-promotion, about Musk on Musk-partner held sites such as Think Progress, Motley Fool, Media Matters, Green Car Reports, Plugin-America, Reddit, and related covert ownerships as well as on all public social media in order to manipulate stock market valuation perceptions.
- Numerous failed marriages, and relationships, have left a trail of unhappy women who have testified, or relayed information to their friends, who have testified, about illicit activities by Musk

60 Minutes: Tesla and SpaceX: Elon Musk's industrial empire

Aired: 2014- Mar 30- CORRESPONDENT: Scott Pelley; Harry Radcliffe, producer..

Apparently it's fast and smoke-free. **(EXCEPT FOR THE TOXIC CANCER CAUSING SMOKE THE CAR EMITS WHEN ITS POORLY DESIGNED BATTERY PACK SPONTANEOUSLY BURSTS INTO FLAMES)** *The Tesla Model S is powered by 7,000 battery cells (EACH ONE ABLE TO EXPLODE AND SET THE BATTERIES NEXT TO IT OFF ON A CHAIN REACTION OF DEADLY EXPLOSIONS) linked to an electric motor. No engine, no transmission, no tailpipe. As this company video shows, the dash is dominated by a computer that's constantly connected to the Internet. (THIS ALLOWS ELON MUSK, HIS INVESTORS, THE NSA AND CHINESE HACKERS TO SPY ON YOU AT ANY TIME AND HACK YOUR TESLA AND FORCE IT TO DRIVE OVER A CLIFF AND KILL YOU AND YOUR FAMILY. MULIPLE TESLA'S HAVE SUDDENLY SWERVED OVER CLIFFS AND KILLED THEIR OCCUPANTS AND THOSE NEARBY) It has a fanatical (SOME MIGHT SAY THE TESLA FANBOYS ARE INSANE, OTHER SAY THEY ARE ALL JUST ELON MUSKS MEAT PUPPETS AND MALAYSIAN CLICK FARM FAKES) following. There's a waiting list (FALSIFIED BY ELON MUSK) that Elon Musk is trying to shorten building 600 Model S's a week in this high-tech plant (MADE FOR HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF CARS PER WEEK AND ACTING AS A FACADE BUILDING BECAUSE OF IT'S MASSIVE AMOUNT OF DEAD SPACE) in Northern California.*

Questions For Government Mooch Elon Musk:

Recently; Numerous ex-Tesla staff and contractors, former suppliers, federal investigators, investigative reporters, investors and ex-partners of Tesla Motors have provided facts about Tesla Motors which are disturbing to the public, Congress, and the market. Please provide clarification of the following charges and concerns in order to resolve outstanding issues between the public and Tesla Motors :

- Are Tesla and Google, essentially, the same entity by virtue of the same investors, agenda and stock market manipulations?
- When damaging news about Tesla emerges, do Tesla and Google investors place multiple stock-buy orders from a multi-billion dollar slush fund in order to make it appear that individual outside investors are excited by Tesla when, in fact, it is only a small internal group of investors “pumping the market”? Does Google “bury” any negative stories about Tesla in their searches on orders from Tesla/Google investors? Is that a violation of securities laws?
- It is said that the Tesla Model S has the most surveillance devices to watch, track, listen-to and broadcast the activities of the occupants, built into it than any other car in the world. Elon Musk has personally told reporters that his cars constantly watch the driver and occupants. Why is that? Why are Tesla and Google obsessed with spying on the public?
- In multiple recorded interviews, Elon Musk is on public record telling the news media that, after careful research, the NUMMI plant in Fremont California would be a very bad choice for Tesla? Why did that suddenly change? What participation did Senator Dianne Feinstein and her husband’s real estate Company CBRE have on that decision and the award of the loan to Tesla? Why do Senator Feinsteins staff now work for Tesla? Why did Glenn Greenwald call Feinstein’s actions “suspicious”? What political support or funding did Tesla or Google provide to any related political officials?
- From 2008 to 2010 numerous competing electric car companies have charged that Tesla Motors placed Tesla Motors “moles” inside of their companies to intelligence-gather and cause disruption. Is that true?
- Google and Tesla motors share the same venture capital investor groups and alliances. Numerous expert at Tech-Crunch, Valleywag and other industry journals have published articles about the fact that those VC’s actively collude with each other to lock competing technologies and companies out of the market and create business monopolies. Did Tesla investors and associates participate in such activities? If so, would that not be a violation of SEC laws?
- Did Tesla and/or Google reward certain politicians with campaign funding, web promotion, revolving door jobs for staff, and other incentives, in exchange for “hot-tracking” State and Federal taxpayer money for Tesla Motors?
- While other companies built consumer priced electric cars before and during Tesla’s existence, why did Tesla choose to build an unaffordable car and position the marketing of it to “the 1%” when the money for that car came from the 99% taxpayers?

- Numerous cities were told that they would have the Tesla car factory and then they stated, or sued Tesla, saying Tesla acted “in bad faith” and “used false and misleading information” to induce them to provide assurances which were used to pump the stock market. Why did Tesla lead so many cities on?
- The factory that builds your batteries and the U.S. Government states, in their formal technical documents, that when Tesla batteries are on fire they emit lethal, brain-damaging, carcinogenic, liver, lung and DNA damaging fumes and smoke. Why do you not inform the public of this danger in your literature?
- Lithium ion production kills and terminally sickens workers overseas. Multiple Tesla workers have been burned alive at your factory. OSHA has launched an investigation. What have you done to prevent the accidental and long term injuries to your staff and contractors?
- Bernard Tse, and other main Tesla Engineering staff including: electric engineer Doug Bourn, electrical engineer Andrew Ingram, Brian M. Finn, senior manager of interactive electronics and George Blankenship; while investigating battery purchases for Tesla Motors, received numerous white-papers and technical documents from LG Chem, Panasonic and the U.S. D.O.E and vast numbers of other battery-makers which specifically stated that lithium-ion batteries would be “stressed” and “likely to combust” when used in the configuration which Tesla intended. They stated that the batteries were “not intended for use in cars”. Why then, did Tesla still use them? What effect did the monopolistic ownership of lithium ion mining and manufacturing resources by Tesla and Google investors have on the decision to use lithium ion?
- Is it not a fact that a majority of your cars have been sold to your own investors or associates who act as “fluffers” against any bad PR?
- In multiple recorded interviews, Elon Musk is on public record stating that, at the time of application for the DOE loan Tesla was on the verge of bankruptcy. The DOE loan was mandated under a Federal law known as Section 136. This law stated that no car company could receive money if it was on the verge of bankruptcy. Past accountants of Tesla have stated that Tesla was on the verge of bankruptcy at the time of the loan application. Numerous Tesla staff and contractors have verified this. Did Tesla commit a felony and acquire “unfair advantage” per the GAO?
- Relative to the number of cars sold, why has Tesla had so many Tesla drunk driver related crashes, deaths and homicides. Why are Tesla drivers killing innocent pedestrians simply because the Tesla’s “smell bad” .?
- Psychographic, demographic and marketing studies have been published showing that Tesla drivers have a higher-than-average inclination towards drugs, strange sexual behavior and risk. Could this account for the number of Tesla crashes and deaths?
- Is it true that safety testing was done on Tesla cars without fully charged batteries and in a moisture-locked environment because Tesla staff knew that fully charged batteries and moisture in a crash WOULD cause a fiery explosion, as they already have?
- Is it not a fact that Google deletes, or hides any bad PR about Tesla on it’s network? Would this be considered stock market manipulation in violation of SEC laws?

- Numerous periodicals, including Valleywag, document the fact that Elon Musk sends spy emails to his employees, each with a few words changed in order to track them and see who might reveal anything damaging to regulators?
- Who are all of the property holders and lease-owners of the Tesla and Solyndra, past and current, real-estate?
- According to DOE staff, who were at DOE when the Tesla application was submitted, nothing that Tesla submitted was ever built by Tesla. In fact, these staff state that the vehicle that Tesla eventually sold was not even designed or engineered when Tesla was approved for the loan money, contrary to the Section 136 law requirement. They say that Tesla took the money and THEN hired people to figure out what they were going to do with it. As shown in the DOE files, the engineering of the shipping Tesla cars has no element that was submitted to DOE. Is that true?
- Elon Musks wives and founders have filed lawsuits and made public statements that he is a fraud and coerced them into participation. Is it proper fiduciary practice to allow Mr. Musk to continue with the company?
- Why did Tesla not have to pay the cash participation fee that the Section 136 law said everybody had to pay? Tesla staff stated, at numerous documented Silicon Valley open meetings that they got a “special applicant participation waiver”. Why did Tesla get that waiver?
- Did Tesla Motors provide falsified information in order to acquire it’s Federal funding?
- Did Tesla Motors provide falsified information in order to acquire it’s Federal waivers, tax deferrals, credits and discounts?
- Kleiner Perkins and certain silicon valley VC’s, all investors in a number of DOE “winners” (including Tesla, Fisker, Solyndra, A123 and others), organized meetings with a Dmitry Medvedev and other men known by the State Department, CIA, FBI and federal investigators to be involved in Russian mobsterism and then Ener1, Severstal and A123, dark-money funded and run by billionaires (many of whom own lithium mining interests) known by the State Department, the CIA and federal investigators to be involved in Russian mobsterism, were awarded taxpayer funds by Steven Chu, who was nominated by Kleiner Perkins. Was any of this a conflict of interest?
- Why is the only company to receive California State real estate exclusives, exclusive tax waivers, credits and stock enhancers and free rides on taxpayer backs also the same company who’s investors were the largest funders of certain State officials?
- Federal communications monitoring of text, voice and email communications of certain highly placed Senators, lobbyists and venture capitalists from 2005 to today should be made available to ALL federal criminal investigators. Have they been? Are one or more Senators blocking this effort because they are compromised?
- Why have so many fraud lawsuits been filed against Elon Musk and Tesla Motors?

- The head of the NHTSA (Strickland) Tesla investigation quit because of increased scrutiny. The facts, such as these, demonstrate that Tesla and Fisker never should have passed any NHTSA safety review. How can the public be assured that ongoing NHTSA investigations regarding Tesla will not be rigged?
- Did Tesla Motors provide falsified information in order to acquire it's State funding? Did Tesla Motors provide falsified information in order to acquire it's State waivers, tax deferrals, credits and discounts? Did Tesla investors bribe, or influence Congress people?
- Did Tesla report tax credits as revenue/sales in stock reports in order to trick investors into thinking Tesla was making profit that it was actually not making?
- Did Tesla staff or owners investors bribe, or influence Congress people? Did Tesla staff, owners or investors provider misleading information to investors? Was there a conflict of interest between Department of Energy staff and Tesla owners, investors or staff? Was there a conflict of interest between White House staff and Tesla owners, investors or staff? Was there a conflict of interest between Senate staff and Tesla owners, investors or staff? Did Tesla Motors use taxpayer money to hire off-shore staff?
- Marketing sales staff from the ad agencies for 60 Minutes, Consumer Reports, GQ, Fortune and other mainstream periodicals have stated that Elon Musk purchased “puff piece” stories about himself in those broadcasts and magazines and that none of those stories were internally generated. Is it good fiduciary practice for an executive to use corporate resources for personal glorification?
- Did Tesla Motors use taxpayer money to purchase supplies offshore that could have been purchased in the United States? Did Tesla Motors participate in a market rigging scam to rig lithium ion purchasing for its investors? Did Tesla Motors participate in a market rigging scam to rig the electric car market for its investors? Did Tesla Motors staff, or owners, sabotage competitors?
- Did Tesla Motors staff, owners or investors exchange campaign funding quid pro quo for business financing?
- Did Silicon Valley companies, owned by Tesla investors and campaign financiers, use internet technology to falsify information to the public in order to manipulate stock market perceptions in violation of SEC, RICO, and various other laws?
- Did Tesla Motors lie about the safety metrics of its lithium ion battery system?
- Was Tesla Motors holding safety metric data in its files which differed fully from the safety metrics data it provided to investors and NHTSA?
- Did Tesla Motors violate securities law by using false information to acquire a federal loan which it then used to falsify its stock metrics in order to “pump” it's stock?
- Did Deloitte accounting firm conspire with Tesla to manipulate market metrics in violation of RICO Statutes and did that firm manipulate Department of Energy review data on Tesla's behalf?
- A U.S. Senator officiated at the opening of the Tesla NUMMI plant and lobbied for Tesla's tax waivers, credits, acquisition of NUMMI and discounts and then that U.S. Senator had their staff work

in Tesla's offices. Is it a conflict of interest that this senator received campaign funding and this senator's family received real estate deals from the Tesla and, (next door to Tesla), Solyndra real estate deals?

- Did Welles Fargo conspire with Tesla to manipulate market metrics in violation of RICO Statutes?
- Did Goldman Sachs conspire with Tesla to manipulate market metrics in violation of RICO Statutes?
- Were Department of Energy staff manipulating Tesla funding data in order to favor Tesla and its campaign funding investors in violation of RICO Statutes?
- Were Department of Energy staff manipulating Tesla funding data in order to disfavor Tesla competitors and competitors to its campaign funding investors in violation of RICO Statutes?
- Did Tesla owners, staff or investors attempt to delay federal investigations and indictments by asserting influence in violation of RICO Statutes and numerous other laws?
- Documents show there have been more Tesla fires that actually occurred than Tesla has reported in the media. How many actual Tesla factory fires, test car fires and Tesla battery fires have actually occurred?
- Please provide an identification matrix showing campaign backers who were lithium ion investors who had had their contacts exert influence over NHTSA decisions regarding Tesla?
- The Secretary of energy was friends with all of your investors. We have been unable to find the name of even one person from OPM and Congressional nomination file wrapper for Steven Chu's nomination, who Chu did not later give DOE \$\$ or perks to. Why is that?
- The U.S. Post Office, The TSA, The DOE, The GAO, Panasonic and over 100 of the leading technical companies in the world say lithium ion batteries can spontaneously explode. Why do you not disclose this to your buyers in your literature?
- The Tesla can blow-up from its charger and/or its batteries. Are there other dangers that have also not been disclosed?
- Is Tesla operating in violation of the patents of any other company?
- By Elon Musk's own admission, at the time of the DOE loan application all of the car designs were \$100,000.00, PER CAR, over budget and they had no final design for a factory production run DFM. How could Tesla have gotten the loan with the worst debt ratio, the least engineering, the greatest financial risk and the least collateral of any applicant?
- Tesla lobbyists worked with Rahm Emanuel in the White House, to arrange their loan deal. Rahm Emanuel's Senior Finance Aide was recently arrested for bribes, kickbacks, corruption and money Laundering. Steve Rattner, The West Wing "Car Czar", who Tesla investors worked with to secure the Tesla loan, was also indicted for corruption. Almost everyone at DOE involved in your loan was forced to quit or fired. Does this call your dealings into question?

- Rolls-Royce Holdings said the U.K.'s Serious Fraud Office has opened a formal investigation into bribery and corruption of government officials for cars for the 1%. Does this worry you?
- The NHTSA said that Elon Musk lied about Fire Safety Review approval and who made the request for recall and investigation. Should we trust Elon Musk?
- Tesla got another \$34 MILLION of our tax money in exclusive campaign finance kickbacks for billionaires from the State of California. Why did Tesla billionaires need a few million of our tax money in a recession when people have no jobs?
- The German Tesla "Safety Review" was exposed as "Sham" in that they conducted no safety review and were just told to "pass the car" by your bankers at Deutsche Bank! Why did you not disclose that the German's conducted no testing of your battery system of any nature?
- In Tesla's own filed patent applications you state that your batteries WILL explode spontaneously and kill and injure people and burn down their homes. Why did you not disclose this in buyers documentation?
- Tesla is MORE likely to catch on fire than gasoline car"per Bloomberg & MIT. Why did you not disclose this?
- Lithium Ion is "nearly impossible to extinguish, and "acts like solid rocket fuel" say firefighters. Tesla never supplied required battery company CO2 fire extinguishers to car owners. Why not?
- Federal Investigators say you are using "exploding flashlight batteries that were never intended to be used in cars, in an improperly shielded box" to power the car instead of commercial energy storage technology. They say your car has "85% less lithium crash protection on the Tesla than ANY OTHER ELECTRIC CAR". All other companies had to recall EXCEPT Tesla. Why not? What special leverage did you have?
- Over 150 defects and problems per model about the Tesla have been documented on user-forums and in the press including: "Doors lock you in and out. Bad if car on fire!"; "George Clooney Rips Tesla: 'Why Am I Always Stuck On The Side Of The F*cking Road?"; "Tesla "Satisfaction" survey authored by it's own investors/fanboys"; "Tesla seat vibration causes Anal Itching!"; "VAMPIRE POWER DEFECT slams entire Tesla Model S fleet!"; "Numerous defects documented by owners online." When the NUMMI factory was in use by GM and Toyota only 5 defects per model car produced there occurred. Even after you bought brand new robots, why did the Tesla cars get worse in a pre-configured factory with billions of dollars of past car preparation?

How The Crony Capitalism Promoted By Silicon Valley Tech Lawyers Is Destroying America

- **Big Tech Crony Capitalism - The Real Cause Of Society's Problems**

- **In the 2021 COVID “Stimulus Bill”, Silicon Valley wants \$100M to pack people on an underground train tunnel that will CAUSE COVID exposure but Pelosi wants that cash for her Silicon Valley crony buddies**

Submitted by [Tyler Durden](#) per [Richard Ebeling via EpicTimes.com](#).

Since the economic downturn of 2008, the critics of capitalism have redoubled their efforts to persuade the American people and many others around the world that the system of individual freedom and free enterprise has failed.

These critics have insisted that it is unbridled capitalism, set loose on the world, which is the source of all of our personal and society misfortunes. We hear and read this not only in the popular news media and out of the mouths of the political pundits. We see it also in the election of a radical socialist to the leadership of the British Labor party, and a self-proclaimed “democratic socialist” riding high in the public opinion polls for the Democratic Party’s nomination to the U.S. presidency.

The first observation to make is that many if not most of the social and economic misfortunes that are most frequently talked about are not the product of a “failed” free enterprise. The reason for this is that a consistently practiced free enterprise system no longer exists in the United States.

The Heavy Hand of Regulation

What we live under is a heavily regulated, managed and controlled interventionist-welfare state. The over 80,000 pages of the Federal Register, the volume that specifies and enumerates all the Federal regulations that are imposed on and to which all American businesses are expected to comply, is just one manifestation of the extent to which government has weaved a spider’s web of commands over the business community.

The Small Business Administration has estimated that compliance costs imposed on American enterprise by this mountain of regulations maybe upwards of \$2 trillion a year.

At the same time, the tangled web of corrupt government-private sector relationships is also reflected in the size and cost of special interest lobbying activities connected with the Federal government.

According to the non-partisan Center for Responsive Government, in 2014 there were almost 12,000 registered lobbyists working in Washington, D.C. Their job is to influence the writing of legislation that serve special interest groups attempting to obtain sectorial tax breaks, anti-competitive regulations or market restrictions, redistributions of wealth, or taxpayer funded subsidies and protections from the realities of free market competition and trade, or to advance various ideologically motivated “causes.”



Spending Big Money to Plunder Others

The Center for Responsive Government, which tracks who lobbies and for what purposes and causes through the targeting of specific holders of or contenders for Federal elected office, including the Presidency and both Houses of the U.S. Congress, estimated that in 2014 lobbyists spent nearly \$3.25 billion in the pursuit of privileges for some at the expense of others in society.

Just alone in 2013-2014, over \$500 million dollars was spent on lobbying activity by the financial, insurance, and real estate sectors. Ideological and single-issue groups spent more than \$352 million. Lawyers and lobbyists spent \$151.5 million; health industry companies spent \$142 million; and labor unions “invested” \$140.6 million on lobbying.

Communications and electronic companies spent \$116 million; energy and natural resource sector, \$115 million; agribusiness, \$77 million; construction companies, \$67.7 million; transportation firms, \$61 million, and defense companies, \$25.4 million.

Based on the Senate Office of Public Records, the Center for Responsive Government calculates that lobbyists spent close to \$41 billion on lobbying activities over the last 15 years, since the beginning of the twenty-first century.

These billions of special interest-serving dollars have influenced and affected the spending of trillions of dollars of Federal government expenditures over the same decade and a half. The lobbyists work with and use those who hold high political office so the special interest and ideological groups who employ them can plunder many others in American society; they can be viewed as among the most successful enterprisers in the country.

The Best Politicians Money Can Buy

But the symbiotic relationship between politicians and special interest groups of all types does not begin or end with the formal lobbying for legislative, regulatory and fiscal privileges and favors in the halls of Congress and the White House in Washington, D.C.

It goes on all year round all over the country in the form of campaign and electioneering contributions to get those elected or reelected who can be depended upon to direct the powers of government in ways that interest groups and ideological activists desire and from which they hope to benefit.

Again according to the Center for Responsive Politics, in 2013-2014, individuals and PACS donated over \$1.6 billion to 1,671 candidates of both major political parties running for office in the Senate and the House of Representatives. Democratic Party candidates received \$736 million, while Republican Party candidates received \$901.5 million.

While it may seem unseemly to suggest such a thing, these amounts for legislative lobbying and campaign funding, of course, do not include more millions of dollars that grease the palms of those in political power or who want to be in those lofty positions that represent funding that are outside the official channels in the form of “gifts,” travel junkets, off-the-books expense accounts, and out-and-out bribes of one type or another.

The real world of corrupted and corrupting crony capitalism includes more than lobbying expenditures and campaign contributions to have ringside seats in the halls of political plunderland.

The media has been in a frenzy with the revelations that the Volkswagen automobile company manipulated information about emission standards on its diesel vehicles to deceive environmental regulators in both the United States and Europe. This is being portrayed by many in the media as another example and “proof” of the consequences of unbridled capitalism, when left outside of sufficiently tight and demanding government regulation and intense oversight.



Government Partnerships and the Volkswagen Scandal

However, a closer look shows that this is, instead, another example of the result arising from government, business and labor union “partnerships.” In Germany, labor union representatives sit on the executive boards of large companies and corporations that work closely with various levels of the German government to attain political and “social” goals and objectives very different and separate

from what a truly free market company does in pursuing peaceful and honest profits in the service of consumer demand on open, competitive markets.

On September 25, 2015, *The New York Times* quoted a former Volkswagen executive who said:

“There’s no other company where the owners and the unions are working so closely together as Volkswagen. [Volkswagen] guarantees jobs for over half the supervisory board. What management, the government and the unions all want is full employment, and the more jobs, the better. Volkswagen is seen as having a national mission to provide employment to the German people. That’s behind the push to be No. 1 in the world. They’ll look the other way about anything.”

In such a politicized market economy, working for and serving “national” and “social” interests become the guiding principle of business decision-making. Not only does it lead to wasteful and inefficient economic business operations having less or sometimes nothing to do with cost-effective management and allocation of labor and resources to make better, newer and less expensive products, it also corrupts the individuals participating in these activities.

Breaking one or more regulatory standards imposed by government on these enterprises is merely one way of “doing business” to advance other political goals such as “jobs” and “full employment” that are expected as part of the “partnerships” with local and national-level politicians and labor union leaders.

The only thing expected from the business enterprises in these intricate political webs is: Don’t get caught. If you do, then your political partners become like Captain Renault, the prefect of police in the 1942 movie “Casablanca.” When Renault orders the closing of Rick’s Café, the owner asks him on what grounds. Renault declares that he is “shocked, shocked” to discover that there is gambling going on in the café. At which point the roulette coupé appears with a stack of franc banknotes in his hand and says to Renault, “Your winnings, Sir.”

Volkswagen got caught, and will pay handsomely in financial and other penalties that will, no doubt, be imposed by the U.S. and European governments. And all the time, Volkswagen’s political partners, especially in Germany, who fostered and worked with the company to play its part in the “game” of government interventionism that has nothing to do with market-oriented enterprise, will sanctimoniously condemn the greedy and “selfish” conduct of profit-hungry businessmen.

What all these examples and facts about lobbying activities, campaign funding and government-business partnerships highlight is the pervasive extent to which “capitalism” as it now exists in the United States or Europe – or in fact all other parts of the world – has nothing to do with free market, laissez-faire capitalism.



Corrupting Hand of the Interventionist State

The Austrian economist, Ludwig von Mises, described this twisted, corrupted, and politicized capitalism over 80 years ago, in 1932, in an essay on “The Myth of the Failure of Capitalism,” published shortly before the coming of Hitler and the Nazi movement to power:

“In the interventionist state it is no longer of crucial importance for the success of an enterprise that the business should be managed in a way that it satisfies the demands of consumers in the best and least costly manner.

“It is far more important that one has ‘good relationships’ with the political authorities so that the interventions work to the advantage and not the disadvantage of the enterprise. A few marks’ more tariff protection for the products of the enterprise and a few marks’ less tariff for the raw materials used in the manufacturing process can be of far more benefit to the enterprise than the greatest care in managing the business.

“No matter how well an enterprise may be managed, it will fail if it does not know how to protect its interests in the drawing up of the custom rates, in the negotiations before the arbitration boards, and with the cartel authorities. To have ‘connections’ becomes more important than to produce well and cheaply.

“So the leadership positions within the enterprises are no longer achieved by men who understand how to organize companies and to direct production in the way the market situation demands, but by men who are well thought of ‘above’ and ‘below,’ men who understand how to get along well with the press and all the political parties, especially with the radicals, so that they and their company give no offense. It is that class of general directors that negotiate far more often with state functionaries and party leaders than with those from whom they buy or to whom they sell.

“Since it is a question of obtaining political favors for these enterprises, their directors must repay the politicians with favors. In recent years, there have been relatively few large

enterprises that have not had to spend very considerable sums for various undertakings in spite of it being clear from the start that they would yield no profit. But in spite of the expected loss it had to be done for political reasons. Let us not even mention contributions for purposes unrelated to business – for campaign funds, public welfare organizations, and the like.

“Forces are becoming more and more generally accepted that aim at making the direction of large banks, industrial concerns, and stock corporations independent of the shareholders . . . The directors of large enterprises nowadays no longer think they need to give consideration to the interests of the shareholders, since they feel themselves thoroughly supported by the state and that they have interventionist public opinion behind them.

“In those countries in which statism has most fully gained control . . . they manage the affairs of their corporations with about as little concern for the firm’s profitability as do the directors of public enterprises. The result is ruin.

“The theory that has been cobbled together says that these enterprises are too big to allow them to be managed simply in terms of their profitability. This is an extraordinarily convenient idea, considering that renouncing profitability in the management of the company leads to the enterprise’s insolvency. It is fortunate for those involved that the same theory then demands state intervention and support for those enterprises that are viewed as being too big to be allowed to go under . . .

“The crisis from which the world is suffering today is the crisis of interventionism and of national and municipal socialism; in short, it is the crisis of anti-capitalist policies.”

How different is today, in its essential qualities, from Mises’ description of the interventionist state and government-business “partnerships” during those years between the two World Wars?

Real Free Markets Mean Privileges for None

If what we have today is what is widely referred to as “crony capitalism,” then how might we define and explain what a truly free market capitalism would be like? Let me suggest that the following seven points capture the essence of a real free economy:

All means of production (land, resources, capital) are privately owned;

The use of the means of production is under the control of private owners who may be individuals or corporate entities;

Consumer demands determine how the means of production will be used;

Competitive forces of supply and demand determine the prices of consumer goods and the various factors of production including wages of workers;

The success or failure of individual and corporate enterprises is determined by the profits and losses these enterprises earn in free competition with their rivals in the market place;

The free market is not confined to domestic transactions, and includes freedom of international trade;

Government is limited in its activities to the enforcement and protection of life, liberty, and honestly acquired property against, violence and fraud.

In a real free market, there is no place for politicians to offer privileges and favors, because there are none to sell. There is no motive or gain for special interest groups to spend huge sums of money in campaign contributions or lobbying expenses, because political benefits for some at others' expense cannot be bought.

Wasteful and corrupting "partnerships" between government and business enterprises cannot occur because political authority is restrained from any task other than the securing of each individual's right to his life, liberty, and peacefully acquired property.

The Silicon Valley Oligarchs had a crony lobbyist team manipulate every government funding program since Obama took office!

Google and the Obama White House, sitting in a tree? The search giant's relationship with the president stretches back to 2007 and is cozy as can be

- Google employees donated \$1.6 million to President Barack Obama's two White House bids
- The company told Daily Mail Online that it has spoken with the Federal Trade Commission about antitrust concerns; it was investigated in 2011 but later let off the hook
- In the 2012 election, the company's search algorithm customized results for Obama but sabotaged and down-ranked all results for Republican Mitt Romney
- Google execs who have left to work in the White House include Obama's chief technology officer
- Hillary Clinton also poached her new tech chief from Google this week

By [David Martosko, Us Political Editor For Dailymail.com](#)

When President Barack Obama dined with a dozen technology business leaders in California four years ago, it was Google executive chairman Eric Schmidt who sat at the head of the table.

Obama sat on one side, between the late Apple co-founder Steve Jobs and Facebook pioneer Mark Zuckerberg, but the place of honor was no accident.

Google executives and employees donated more than \$1.6 million to Obama's two White House campaigns, and the online search giant parachuted top talent into both.

One result has been a coziness with the U.S. government's executive branch that few other companies can match – marked by access for lobbyists, mentions in nearly half of Obama's State of the Union addresses, and a personnel feeder trough serving the White House with new senior hires.

BEGINNING: In 2007 Barack Obama had an on-stage cameo with Google's then-CEO Eric Schmidt as part of a presidential candidate series



INFLUENCE: Schmidt (far left) shared the head of the table with the spouse of a venture capitalist whose firm owned 20 per cent of Google, as President Obama dined with tech leaders in 2011

There have even been allegations that Google's up-close-and-personal relationship with the West Wing earned it a reprieve from what would have been an earth-shaking Federal Trade Commission antitrust lawsuit.

Google has insisted it never received special treatment in that case, punctuating its denials with an animated GIF of a laughing baby as a jab at the news outlet that leveled the charge.

White House visitor logs suggest a different kind of story for the company whose motto is 'Don't be evil.'

Employees of the Silicon Valley behemoth have been in the White House more than 230 times since Obama took office – approximately once per week. At least 190 of those meetings were with senior officials.

More than 60 featured Google lobbyist Johanna Shelton.

Overall, according to [The Wall Street Journal](#), Google spent \$16.8 million on lobbying last year. That's four times the amount spent by Apple, whose market capitalization is twice as big.

It needed that muscle in 2011, after the FTC found Google [allegedly manipulated](#) search results in ways that favored its own for-profit products. Amazon and eBay were among the companies who complained that Google was engaging in practices that violated antitrust laws.

The Journal reviewed emails showing that Google co-founder Larry Page met directly with FTC officials in late 2012 to discuss a settlement. About the same time, White House visitor logs show, Google chairman Eric Schmidt met with Obama senior adviser Pete Rouse.

REVOLVING DOOR? Google vice president Megan Smith left her job to become Obama's chief technology officer

Lobbyist Joanna Shelton and General Counsel Kent Walker met with Jason Furman, then the newly minted chair of the president's Council of Economic Advisers. Furman followed up with a meeting with FTC chairman Jon Leibowitz.

The government closed its investigation two months after Obama won re-election.

READY FOR HILLARY: Stephanie Hannon, director of product management, civic innovation and social impact at Google, has become the Hillary Clinton campaign's top technology guru

Google agreed to change its business practices but dodged a potential 10-figure fine – and saved the cost of litigating a years-long case that could have resulted in breaking up the company into smaller, more market-competitive units.

Both Google and the [FTC](#) said at the time that there was no undue influence.

Google pilloried the Journal, which first suggested a link between the company's access and the investigation's outcome, saying the meetings its executives held with administration officials involved discussions about 'everything but' the antitrust investigation.

In a blog post, the company cited ‘patent reform, STEM education, self-driving cars, mental health, advertising, Internet censorship, smart contact lenses, civic innovation, R&D, cloud computing, trade and investment, cyber security, energy efficiency and our workplace benefit policies.’

The [written defense](#) Google published took specific aim at Journal publisher Rupert Murdoch, and included an animated GIF of a laughing baby in a high chair.

But a Google spokesperson confirmed Thursday on background that company executives has talked with the FTC about unspecified antitrust concerns in the past. The spokesperson declined to be quoted or named.

Schmidt is a one-man case study of the kinds of influence a multibillionaire tech titan can wield in Washington when the stars align.

LEFT-HAND MAN: Schmidt (right) got a prime seat at the table when newly minted President Obama met with a group of CEOs in February 2009

‘EVANGELIST’: Online pioneer Vint Cerf is Google’s top ‘Internet evangelist’ and also a member of Obama’s National Science Board

His ascent in Obama’s world began in 2007 when the future president visited Google’s California headquarters for a one-on-one [interview](#), staged for the benefit of the company’s employees, then 16,000 strong.

Schmidt asked him about Iran, Pakistan, and Guantanamo Bay.

‘Close down Guantanamo,’ Obama replied, ‘restore Habeas Corpus, say no to Renditions, no to warrantless wiretaps.’

The exposure was vital: Obama ended up lapping the field in fundraising in the high-tech sector.

Obama offered Schmidt his choice of cabinet slots after the 2012 election – either Treasury or Commerce – and was even prepared to create a new ‘Secretary of Business’ position for him.

He declined all three but accepted a post on the President’s Council of Advisers on Science and Technology. He continues to evangelize about both his company and the president’s agenda, including ‘net neutrality’ regulations that have big Internet service providers up in arms.

Schmidt’s roots with Obama run deep. When the future president visited his campaign headquarters on Election Day in 2012, Schmidt was there overseeing final efforts to leverage ‘Big Data’ to nudge last-minute voters to the polls.

He was by then already a donor to Obama’s White House bids, contributing the maximum amount allowed by law both times.

Schmidt’s specialized software gave then-Senator Obama access to high-tech voter targeting algorithms that Republican John McCain couldn’t match.

HIGH LIFE: Google Ideas director Jared Cohen co-wrote a book with Princess Beatrice of York in 2013, three years after he left the Obama State Department to work for the search giant

ELECTION KINGS: Michael Slaby (left) and Justin Vincent (right) were key architects of Obama’s data-mining and voter-targeting software efforts, and both were emigres from Google

And Michael Slaby, the chief integration and innovation officer of Obama For America, the president's campaign organization came over from a job as technology strategist for Tomorrow Ventures – Schmidt's venture capital fund.

OFA also boasted former Google software engineer Justin Vincent as its senior codewriter, and former YouTube/Google lead Web developer Angus Durocher as its lead online software engineer.

Google itself was accused publicly of favoring Obama's 2012 re-election campaign in a more visible way.

Customized search results would appear when users typed 'Obama' into a search window, but entering 'Romney' yielded no such help.

Google [claimed](#) at the time that it was the result of a computer algorithm, not human intervention.

This week the president's new initiative linking global warming with public health includes a specific buy-in from Google.

The company, the White House says, will 'donate ten million hours of high-performance computing' and help scientists to create 'early warning capabilities' for climate change-related disasters and related risks for diseases.

Some of that work could conceivably be performed by former White House staff who have joined Google, just as the president counts several former Google executives among his advisers.

Former secretary of state Hillary Clinton this week hired away a top tech talent from Google for her presidential campaign-in-waiting.

Stephanie Hannon, formerly Google's top dog on product management for 'civic engagement,' will help her navigate the digital waters in 2016.

Poaching seasoned Google veterans is a maneuver the Obama White House has perfected.

Megan Smith, a former vice president at the company, is now the administration's chief technology officer.

Angus Durocher, a computer engineer who left Google to work for the Obama campaign, tweeted this photo of himself and Vice President Joe Biden when he was at work in the campaign's New Hampshire nerve center

The deputy CTO position was held for Obama's first two years by another Google emigre, Andrew McLaughlin. He left the administration in 2011 after a reprimand for sharing details of government policy matters with his former coworkers via a personal email address.

Shortly after Obama moved into 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, former Google project manager Katie Stanton became his director of citizen participation. Sonal Shah, a former Google global development chief, moved to Washington the same month to lead the White House Office of Social Innovation.

And Vint Cerf, a widely acknowledged 'father of the Internet,' serves on Obama's National Science Board.

Cerf has worked for Google since 2005 as a vice president and its 'chief Internet evangelist.'

Read more: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3032394/Google-Obama-White-House-sitting-tree-search-giant-s-relationship-president-stretches-2007-cozy-be.html#ixzz3WsJsXBA4>
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Enabling Corruption By Building Sicko Frat Boys

The lives and upbringing of the Silicon Valley Rape-Culture boys

What kind of family structure, school life and social programming could cause such deviant, and warped, behavior by this small group of “privileged” elitist white males from dynastic families?

There are now millions of articles detailing the hookers, rapes, intern coercion, avoidance of hiring women who are not secretaries, avoidances and racism of blacks, massive numbers of misogynistic statements and actions, elitism, white male frat house attitudes, abusive marriages, political bribes, collusion, HR wage fixing schemes and more, that the Silicon Valley billionaires have pervasively engaged in.

One-Percent Jokes and Plutocrats in Drag: What I Saw When I Crashed a Secret Society



The secret party that no outsider was ever supposed to see was a clone version of the West Coast Bohemian Club events for the same bunch of sociopath “elites”

Recently, our nation’s financial chieftains have been feeling a little unloved. Venture capitalists are comparing the persecution of the rich to the plight of [Jews at Kristallnacht](#), Wall Street titans are saying that they’re [sick of being beaten up](#), and this week, a billionaire investor, Wilbur Ross, [proclaimed](#) that “the 1 percent is being picked on for political reasons.”

Ross’s statement seemed particularly odd, because two years ago, I met Ross at an event that might single-handedly explain why the rest of the country still hates financial tycoons – the annual black-tie induction ceremony of a secret Wall Street fraternity called Kappa Beta Phi.

Adapted from Kevin Roose’s book [Young Money](#), published today by Grand Central Publishing.

“Good evening, Exalted High Council, former Grand Swipes, Grand Swipes-in-waiting, fellow Wall Street Kappas, Kappas from the Spring Street and Montgomery Street chapters, and worthless neophytes!”

It was January 2012, and Ross, wearing a tuxedo and purple velvet moccasins embroidered with the fraternity’s Greek letters, was standing at the dais of the St. Regis Hotel ballroom, welcoming a crowd of two hundred wealthy and famous Wall Street figures to the Kappa Beta Phi dinner. Ross, the leader (or “Grand Swipe”) of the fraternity, was preparing to invite 21 new members — “neophytes,” as the group called them — to join its exclusive ranks.

Looking up at him from an elegant dinner of rack of lamb and foie gras were many of the most famous investors in the world, including executives from nearly every too-big-to-fail bank, private equity megafirm, and major hedge fund. AIG CEO [Bob Benmosche](#) was there, as were Wall Street superlawyer Marty Lipton and Alan “Ace” Greenberg, the former chairman of Bear Stearns. And those were just the returning members. Among the neophytes were hedge fund billionaire and major Obama donor Marc Lasry and Joe Reece, a high-ranking dealmaker at Credit Suisse. **[To see the full Kappa Beta Phi member list, [click here.](#)]** All told, enough wealth and power was concentrated in the St. Regis that night that if you had dropped a bomb on the roof, global finance as we know it might have ceased to exist.

During his introductory remarks, Ross spoke for several minutes about the legend of Kappa Beta Phi – how it had been started in 1929 by “four C+ William and Mary students”; how its crest, depicting a “macho right hand in a proper Savile Row suit and a Turnbull and Asser shirtsleeve,” was superior to that of its namesake Phi Beta Kappa (Ross called Phi Beta Kappa’s ruffled-sleeve logo a “tacit confession of homosexuality”); and how the fraternity’s motto, “*Dum vivamus edimus et biberimus*,” was Latin for “While we live, we eat and drink.”

On cue, the financiers shouted out in a thundering bellow: “***DUM VIVAMUS EDIMUS ET BIBERIMUS.***”

The only person not saying the chant along with Ross was me — a journalist who had sneaked into the event, and who was hiding out at a table in the back corner in a rented tuxedo.



Several Kappas at the table next to me, presumably discussing the coming plutocracy.

I'd heard whisperings about the existence of Kappa Beta Phi, whose members included both incredibly successful financiers (New York City's Mayor Michael Bloomberg, former Goldman Sachs chairman John Whitehead, hedge-fund billionaire Paul Tudor Jones) and incredibly unsuccessful ones (Lehman Brothers CEO Dick Fuld, Bear Stearns CEO Jimmy Cayne, former New Jersey governor and MF Global flameout Jon Corzine). It was a secret fraternity, founded at the beginning of the Great Depression, that functioned as a sort of one-percenter's Friars Club. Each year, the group's dinner features comedy skits, musical acts in drag, and off-color jokes, and its group's privacy mantra is "What happens at the St. Regis stays at the St. Regis." For eight decades, it worked. No outsider in living memory had witnessed the entire proceedings firsthand.



A typical Kappa neophyte in drag (left) chats up a vet. This explains much about why the Biden and Silicon Valley Administration's love the whole “transgender” thing

I wanted to break the streak for several reasons. As part of my research for [my book, *Young Money*](#), I'd been investigating the lives of young Wall Street bankers – the 22-year-olds toiling at the bottom of the financial sector's food chain. I knew what made those people tick. But in my career as a financial journalist, one question that proved stubbornly elusive was what happened to Wall Streeters as they climbed the ladder to adulthood. Whenever I'd interviewed CEOs and chairmen at big Wall Street firms, they were always too guarded, too on-message and wrapped in media-relations armor to reveal anything interesting about the psychology of the ultra-wealthy. But if I could somehow see these barons in their natural environment, with their defenses down, I might be able to understand the world my young subjects were stepping into.

So when I learned when and where Kappa Beta Phi's annual dinner was being held, I knew I needed to try to go.

Getting in was shockingly easy — a brisk walk past the sign-in desk, and I was inside cocktail hour. Immediately, I saw faces I recognized from the papers. I picked up an event program and saw that there were other boldface names on the Kappa Beta Phi membership roll — among them, then-Citigroup CEO Vikram Pandit, BlackRock CEO Larry Fink, Home Depot billionaire Ken Langone, Morgan Stanley bigwig Greg Fleming, and JPMorgan Chase vice chairman Jimmy Lee. Any way you count, this was one of the most powerful groups of business executives in the world. (Since I was a good 20 years younger than any other attendee, I suspect that anyone taking note of my presence assumed I was a waiter.)

I hadn't counted on getting in to the Kappa Beta Phi dinner, and now that I had gotten past security, I wasn't sure quite what to do. I wanted to avoid rousing suspicion, and I knew that talking to people would get me outed in short order. So I did the next best thing — slouched against a far wall of the room, and pretended to tap out emails on my phone.



The Kappa Beta Phi neophyte class of cross-dressing billionaires.

After cocktail hour, the new inductees – all of whom were required to dress in leotards and gold-sequined skirts, with costume wigs – began their variety-show acts. Among the night’s lowlights:

- [Paul Queally](#), a private-equity executive with Welsh, Carson, Anderson, & Stowe, told off-color jokes to [Ted Virtue](#), another private-equity bigwig with MidOcean Partners. The jokes ranged from unfunny and sexist (Q: “What’s the biggest difference between Hillary Clinton and a catfish?” A: “One has whiskers and stinks, and the other is a fish”) to unfunny and homophobic (Q: “What’s the biggest difference between Barney Frank and a Fenway Frank?” A: “Barney Frank comes in different-size buns”).
- [Bill Mulrow](#), a top executive at the Blackstone Group (who was later appointed [chairman](#) of the New York State Housing Finance Agency), and [Emil Henry](#), a hedge fund manager with Tiger Infrastructure Partners and former [assistant secretary of the Treasury](#), performed a bizarre two-man comedy skit. Mulrow was dressed in raggedy, tie-dye clothes to play the part of a liberal radical, and Henry was playing the part of a wealthy baron. They exchanged lines as if staging a debate between the 99 percent and the 1 percent. (“Bill, look at you! You’re pathetic, you liberal! You need a bath!” Henry shouted. “My God, you callow, insensitive Republican! Don’t you know what we need to do? We need to create jobs,” Mulrow shot back.)
- [David Moore](#), [Marc Lasry](#), and [Keith Meister](#) — respectively, a holding company CEO, a billionaire hedge-fund manager, and an activist investor — sang a few seconds of a finance-themed parody of “YMCA” before getting the hook.
- [Warren Stephens](#), an investment banking CEO, took the stage in a Confederate flag hat and sang a song about the financial crisis, set to the tune of “Dixie.” (“*In Wall Street land we’ll take our stand, said Morgan and Goldman. But first we better get some loans, so quick, get to the Fed, man.*”)

WELCOME TO SILICON VALLEY



SEX... POWER... TOO MUCH MONEY...
WHAT DO YOU GET A 'PRINCE'

HOME OF SEX ABUSE, RAPE, IDEA THEFT, WHITE ELITISTS, HOOKERS, CORRUPTION, BRIBERY, ASSHOLES, WHITE HOUSE FINANCING, PRIVACY RAPE, GOOGLE & FACEBOOK!

A few more acts followed, during which the veteran Kappas continued to gorge themselves on racks of lamb, throw petits fours at the stage, and laugh uproariously. [Michael Novogratz](#), a former Army helicopter pilot with a shaved head and a stocky build whose firm, Fortress Investment Group, had made him a billionaire, was sitting next to me, drinking liberally and annotating each performance with jokes and insults.

“Can you fuckin’ believe Lasry up there?” Novogratz asked me. I nodded. He added, “He just gave me a ride in his jet a month ago.”

The neophytes – who had changed from their drag outfits into Mormon missionary costumes — broke into their musical finale: a parody version of “I Believe,” the hit ballad from *The Book of Mormon*, with customized lyrics like “I believe that God has a plan for all of us. I believe my plan involves a seven-figure bonus.” Amused, I pulled out my phone, and began recording the proceedings on video. Wrong move.



The grand finale, a parody of "I Believe" from The Book of Mormon

“Who the hell are you?” Novogratz demanded.

I felt my pulse spike. I was tempted to make a run for it, but – due to the ethics code of the *New York Times*, my then-employer – I had no choice but to out myself.

“I’m a reporter,” I said.

Novogratz stood up from the table.

“You’re not allowed to be here,” he said.

I, too, stood, and tried to excuse myself, but he grabbed my arm and wouldn’t let go.

“Give me that or I’ll fucking break it!” Novogratz yelled, grabbing for my phone, which was filled with damning evidence. His eyes were bloodshot, and his neck veins were bulging. The song onstage was now over, and a number of prominent Kappas had rushed over to our table. Before the situation could escalate dangerously, a bond investor and former Grand Swipe named Alexandra Lebenthal stepped in between us. Wilbur Ross quickly followed, and the two of them led me out into the lobby, past a throng of Wall Street tycoons, some of whom seemed to be hyperventilating.

Once we made it to the lobby, Ross and Lebenthal reassured me that what I’d just seen wasn’t *really* a group of wealthy and powerful financiers making homophobic jokes, making light of the financial crisis, and bragging about their business conquests at Main Street’s expense. No, it was just a group of friends who came together to roast each other in a benign and self-deprecating manner. Nothing to see here.

But the extent of their worry wasn’t made clear until Ross offered himself up as a source for future stories in exchange for my cooperation.

“I’ll pick up the phone anytime, get you any help you need,” he said.

“Yeah, the people in this group could be very helpful,” Lebenthal chimed in. “If you could just keep their privacy in mind.”

I wasn’t going to be bribed off my story, but I understood their panic. Here, after all, was a group that included many of the executives whose firms had collectively wrecked the global economy in 2008 and 2009. And they were laughing off the entire disaster in private, as if it were a long-forgotten lark. (Or worse, sing about it — one of the last skits of the night was a self-congratulatory parody of ABBA’s “Dancing Queen,” called “Bailout King.”) These were activities that amounted to a gigantic middle finger to Main Street and that, if made public, could end careers and damage very public reputations.

After several more minutes spent trying to do damage control, Ross and Lebenthal escorted me out of the St. Regis.

As I walked through the streets of midtown in my ill-fitting tuxedo, I thought about the implications of what I’d just seen.

The first and most obvious conclusion was that the upper ranks of finance are composed of people who have completely divorced themselves from reality. No self-aware and socially conscious Wall Street executive would have agreed to be part of a group whose tacit mission is to make light of the financial sector's foibles. Not when those foibles had resulted in real harm to millions of people in the form of foreclosures, wrecked 401(k)s, and a devastating unemployment crisis.

The second thing I realized was that Kappa Beta Phi was, in large part, a fear-based organization. Here were executives who had strong ideas about politics, society, and the work of their colleagues, but who would never have the courage to voice those opinions in a public setting. Their cowardice had reduced them to sniping at their perceived enemies in the form of satirical songs and sketches, among only those people who had been handpicked to share their view of the world. And the idea of a reporter making those views public had caused them to throw a mass temper tantrum.

The last thought I had, and the saddest, was that many of these self-righteous Kappa Beta Phi members had surely been first-year bankers once. And in the 20, 30, or 40 years since, something fundamental about them had changed. Their pursuit of money and power had removed them from the larger world to the sad extent that, now, in the primes of their careers, the only people with whom they could be truly themselves were a handful of other prominent financiers.

Perhaps, I realized, this social isolation is why despite extraordinary evidence to the contrary, one-percenters like Ross keep saying how badly persecuted they are. When you're a member of the fraternity of money, it can be hard to see past the foie gras to the real world.

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(Above) This is billionaire Jacque Littlefield, also connected to interesting mineral mining deals, standing next to the fully operational armored division he kept in his garage in Woodside, California in Silicon Valley. He was the friend and neighbor of Elon Musk, John Doerr, Eric Schmidt and the other suspects. He had an around-the-clock maintenance crew who kept his tanks and military equipment fully functional, at all times. His functioning armored division was larger, and better maintained, than that of many South American dictatorships. When asked why he had all of that in his massive, custom built garage, he replied: “just in case”.

Why did the key investors of Tesla meet with persons and groups from the Russian government and business sectors who State Department has identified as having mob connections? Could it have to do with all of the trillions of dollars

The Psychology of The Silicon Valley Billionaire: Why So Many Of Them Are Sociopaths

Why do billionaires have islands for sex orgy's, jet planes for pedophiles, pedophile child murder clubs, hire a hooker-a-day, put hit-jobs on competitors, hire character assassination teams, cheat on their taxes even though they can afford to pay them, ignore the law, abuse people in public, treat women like cattle, fire people on a whim, abuse waiters, go through wives like butter, manipulate Congress and have the life-style of Sodom and Gomorrah?

Because they can or because they are too mentally disturbed to know better?

Why do Mark Zuckerberg, Elon Musk, John Doerr and Eric Schmidt feel like it is there job to take over the U.S. Congress and mold government into their personal sociopathic vision?

What Silicon Valley Thinks of Women

BY NINA BURLEIGH / JANUARY 28, 2015 5:41 PM EST

As the World Deflates / The End of Childhood

Newsweek

02.08.2015

**What
Silicon
Valley
Thinks
of Women**



NEWSWEEK

Why can't they just buy an insanely large McMansion in Atherton, California and the world's most expensive fishing pole and just go fishing all over the world?

Why does Vinod Kohsla have to get in this giant lawsuit with the whole state of California so he can shut down part of California's pristine Pacific Ocean park system for his personal Frat Boy club?

Why did London's super-money and political elite round up young boys from the poor side of town, sexually abuse them, then kill them and think this was an Ok organization to have around?

Why are Gary D. Conley, Wall Street Reporter David Bird and a large number of people, who whistled on billionaires, dead or missing?

As everyone has seen, these are the daily stories in the news. These people actually do these things on a regular basis. They only hang out with other billionaires, who also do the same crimes, infidelities and extremes so they all think they can get away with these kinds of crimes. This does not just affect the billionaires. Their actions harm millions of innocent victims. Let's take a look at the problem:

There are about 50 American creative inventors that have gotten shafted by Kleiner Perkins, Eric Schmidt, Steve Jurvetson, and the Silicon Valley Cartel, via an organized system of theft, and arrogance, that is quite audacious. Each, and every, time these domestic creators invented a major thing, which had never existed before, the U.S. Government, the industry and potential customers; said that these inventors were the first ones to invent that thing. Not a single one of these VC's had ever worked on, been involved in, or developed anything like it before.

Then, one of a handful of, closely associated, Silicon Valley VC's, asks one of the inventor's to show them their new invention under the guise of "*maybe investing in it*".

Then the VC copies it, while running media troll attacks on the inventor's effort, in order to clear the market.

The VC's then market a 100% copy of the invention, via a Kleiner, or Draper, associated "spin-off" and never pay the inventor's a dime.

The VC's set up a legal structure designed to cost the inventor's millions of dollars to sue those VC's for the rip-offs. On top of that, the VC's already have most of the law firms working for them, and threaten the firms, with revenue cut-offs, if they help any of the inventors. In addition to their "No Poaching Conspiracy", the VC's also have a "No Sue Conspiracy", going on at the same time. The VC's also bribe federal elected officials to keep them protected.

The FBI, The SEC, The FTC, and attorney generals, are supposed to protect citizens from such crimes, and abuse, but the bosses of the regulatory agencies have a great fear of upsetting campaign financiers; so not much gets done. This is one of the reasons the public has no faith in Congress any more. This VC scam is part of a process called "The Slip" and it is a grifter's scam to steal things from unsuspecting members of the public, in this case American Inventors. The Slip has been

commercialized, organized, and computerized by Silicon Valley billionaires in a very systematic program of intellectual theft.

Why would these VC's risk legal battles and a lifetime of hatred from these inventors? It is called "Arrogance"

The media, public and sociology has clearly analysed Silicon Valley culture and confirmed, in tens of thousands of news reports and studies that Silicon Valley is run by:

"A private male frat-house insider-club, from Yale and Stanford, who revel in their misogyny, racism, and mine-is-bigger-than-yours hubris, and use more prostitutes than any other American region in the nation."

These "privileged" white males do not EVER want anyone to know that they didn't create many of the things that they made their billions off of. Many of those things, the VC's just stole. They made Silicon Valley into a Kinko's copy center for other people's ideas.

Inventor Mike Chieky, digital media creator Micheal Arrington, and vast numbers of other creators didn't have the symmetrical facial structure of the frat boys, they didn't have the family connections of the "approved" elites and they didn't hang out at the Woodside community center or hire the \$2000.00 per hour hookers that some of the VC's did. They just "didn't fit in". They didn't have "the look". They "didn't play the game". They didn't get invited in.

The VC's say: *"In Silicon Valley you are either a tool or you are The Machine"*.

Many of Google's products were created by other's, before Google was even a real company, and simply stolen by Google.

The same for Apple.

Guess who just funded the massive lobbying effort, in Washington DC, to make inventors "illegal" and remove any legal protections for inventors? The investors of Google, Apple and the Kleiner Perkins Cartel!

State and federal officials have been assisting the Silicon Valley Cartel in terminating American innovation because the Cartel bribes them, with campaign funding, to do so.

The Cartel went very big, on their game-plan, recently. As one Silicon Valley insider described some recent, epic, VC scams: ***"If you type ["Silicon Valley Cartel No Poaching"](http://www.duckduckgo.com) into www.duckduckgo.com you will see quite a lot of news stories about how Kleiner and the Boys rigged the Valley so that no Paki's (Indian H1-B workers) could get hired by other VC holdings, so that they would get booted back to India before they could make IP ownership claims. This followed right on the heels of the "AngelGate Scandal" where the VC's were caught red-handed colluding to rig the VC industry against founders..."***

VC insiders Ravi Kumra and Forrest Hayes were murdered by their hookers. \$2000.00 bucks an hour doesn't buy the kind of gal it used to.

Kleiner VC: Vinohd Khosla, has gotten himself sued and hated by California for taking the States favourite beach away, just for his friends. As the lawyer suing Khosla says: “it is about his sheer Arrogance”.

Kleiner VC, and Founder: Tom Perkins, was in the news recently for called poor people: “Nazi’s” for not appreciating how wonderful the VC’s are.

VC Joe Lonsdale is facing rape and abuse charges. Cartel boss, and Kleiner head, John Doerr just got, famously, sued by his own partner for sex and misogyny abuse. Kleiner associate: Ray Lane was nailed for massive tax fraud.

As if the arrogance could not get more outlandish, VC Tim Draper just ran a failed ballot initiative to try to make Silicon Valley it’s own state so that they could build a border-line, away from those filthy “poor’s” in East Palo Alto. These VC’s appear to have some major issues.

This gang of white, yuppie, elitists created the National Venture Capital Association and their private CIA hit-squad: In-Q-Tel, who funded the spy portions of Google, Facebook, Linkedin and the other privacy abuse ops. They never miss an opportunity for a good collusion.

The problem is, these boys created a glass bubble that was so air-tight, they never saw what was coming from the outside: What came was Mike Judge’s “Silicon Valley” TV show expose; public disdain of their arrogance; hundreds of Snowdens, created by their abuse of their own workers; Ellen Pao; The fall of the main-stream media, that they thought they owned; the realization that frat houses housed “rape factories” and men who were socially programmed to abuse; and the general trend towards really not liking arrogant pricks all that much.

Will law enforcement and regulatory agencies ever do their jobs and take action against these abusers? Will any legal recourse ever exist to halt the abuse of America’s innovation treasure: It’s creative inventors?

Thanks to leakers, hackers, whistle-blowers and investigations, the insider rigging of industries is now out on the table and it is a dirty, dirty scene. The shiny towers of Sandhill Road hide a cesspool of corruption and Mafioso-like double-dealing.

It is time to take a look at a Valley that has turned into a Pit!

Meet John, One Of The Godfathers Of The Mob

John Doerr's Kleiner Perkins, and other "Venture Capital" groups run a cartel to try to control energy, auto, internet and other industries.

Why are almost all of the venture capitalist males from one of a handful of schools who all attended the same fraternities and were in the same clubs and who predominantly only fund others from that group, or companies with others in controlling positions, in those companies?

These VC's have all overtly aligned with the following organizations: ACA, WBAA, NASVF, NACO, beAngels, Angel Associated, HBAN and the Bilderberg protocols.

They have meetings where they agree on what groups of company types to fund and which disruptive technologies to agree, together, to shun, in order to protect their current investments. Isn't that a monopolistic practice? Shouldn't the justice department be suing and regulating them?

You can read about this story:

"Bullivant, House & Bailey law firm represented high profile investors from around the U.S. and Canada against a well-known venture capitalist and a former Big 5 accounting firm. Claims of conversion, breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract were brought against the venture capitalist. Claims of fraud, accounting malpractice, breach of contract, conspiracy, and aiding and abetting were brought against the accounting firm. The jury awarded more than \$60 million in compensatory and punitive damages in favor of our clients. The case showed that VC's operate on an organized crime modus operando." In <http://www.growvc.com/blog/2010/09/venture-capital-conspiracy-theory-in-the-free-world/>

You can also read about this story which exposes Silicon Valley VC collusion: "Wow! Really? No Way! Wow!...this was my reaction to the 'revelation' of a post by Michael Arrington's "[So a Blogger Walks Into A Bar...](#)"

These true accounts of what happens when Tech Crunch's Mike Arrington walks into a Silicon Valley bar has all the trappings of a gangster movie. For starters, the bar, a group of powerful tech investors meeting, colluding, plotting against any competition, an agenda on how to control the industry and monopolize and this is NOT a movie! Here is an extract of Mike's account: *"I've never seen a more guilty looking group of people. But that alone isn't that big of a deal. Lively conversations often die quickly when I arrive, and I've learned not to take it personally. But I did sniff around a little afterwards, and have spoken to three people who were at that meeting. And that's where things got interesting."*

This group of investors, which together account for nearly 100% of early stage startup deals in Silicon Valley, have been meeting regularly to compare notes. Early on it was mostly to complain about a variety of things. But the conversation has evolved to the point where these super angels are actually colluding (and I don't use that word lightly) to solve a number of problems, say multiple sources who are part of the group and were at the dinner.

Is there room for price fixing, total control and a greed based structure in the free market world? Is this really best for startups? For entrepreneurs? For Silicon Valley which is a renowned culture known for promoting innovation and talent in startups? This entire scenario is wrong on so many different levels but knowing this is what can happen within closed doors here are some changes critical to a culture which reflects the values of an entrepreneurial community and a better future for startups:

1. We need transparency. This is very evident from what we've just witnessed.
2. Do things in the open and on the record. Why can't investors, entrepreneurs and other stakeholders work in a transparent environment online where there is automatic accountability and governance through open interactions and a community that can see what's going on?
3. The system has to benefit all parties involved. Entrepreneurs, investors and others. It needs to be fair and favor innovation. Bring up the best. Mystique, lack of transparency, complex rules are not benefit of anything but greed
4. There is no room for protectionism in a free market. We don't need early stage capital markets to be exclusive to a select few who control everything. We need to make it more inclusive and involve as many as possible. The more support, the more investors, more and better companies will be born.

“ At Bucks Restaurant in Woodside, California every morning a group of venture capitalists meet for breakfast strategy sessions. Alas, with the age of the iphone, many of those meetings have been recorded by equally hungry entrepreneurs and now posted on YouTube. Before some of them were removed, it was stunning to see the audacious and mercenary mindsets of these people in their search-and-destroy mentality regarding competing interests...”

The now famous Kleiner Perkins sex abuse law suit has revealed some juicy inside information about the reduction of women and competitors in the industry to “targets and termination goals”... There are hundreds of tales like this that can be easily researched. So the question is: Was part of the DOE energy funding failure because a group of venture capitalists, including Goldman Sachs, rigged the system? Did these VC's contribute campaign finances in exchange for control of certain industries? Who met with these VC's during the staging period, while they still worked for the government, that then left well paying government jobs to go work in the private sector?

A Dear John Letter – Silicon Valley Version:

Dear John Doerr:

Mr. Doerr, Federal law enforcement agents, U.S. Senators, intelligence agency officers, well known journalists, private investigators, your ex-employees, lawyers and others tell us that you:

- Ripped-off many people's intellectual property by having your people ask to look at entrepreneur's technologies, under the guise of "considering an investment", when all you wanted to do was spy out things you could steal.
- You then rolled out 100% copies of entrepreneur's technologies under, other names, funded by your operation.
- YOU organized the Silicon Valley "No-Poaching Conspiracy" and screwed over quite a large number of workers.
- You put plants into entrepreneurs companies. These were "moles" who actually worked for you, and you sent them in to damage and disrupt many small start-up companies because their technology was beating your competing copycat attempts.
- You ran a mining commodity scam, with your Russian "business partners" and some crooked senators, to try to take over the lithium and silicon mineral markets working with Elon Musk and the Solyndra crowd.
- When you got caught doing that, you put a hit job on the people you didn't like, using the contract character assassination groups: "Media Matters", "Think Progress", New America Foundation, "In-Q-Tel", "Gawker Media" and people like John Podesta, Lois Lerner and Sidney Blumenthal.
- Your ex partners have "Nazi" issues, tax evasion issues, a taking-over-California-beaches issue, a felony issue... and well, let's just say, you really hang around with a lot of Dicks!
- You pretty much destroyed Silicon Valley and turned it into a misogynistic, frat-boy club, abusing, black-hating nightmare of a place.
- You caused events, which caused the demise of Gary D. Conley, and other people
- You traded "CleanTech" cash for campaign finance conduit schemes and database/search engine rigging in order to manipulate elections using your company holding: Google.
- You financed and promoted Steven Chu and Eric Holder into office in order to effect your "CleanTech Kick-Back Scheme".

We see even more about you that is pretty bad, and pretty well documented in the media. You sound like a pretty twisted guy with some deeply disturbed power-trip motivations.

So here's the deal. Mobster-like people should, by law, be shut down and run out of town. With the new transparent, open, world that we live in, that now seems pretty do-able.

Let's see if everybody on the internet, without breaking a single law, can track down every one of your assets, false fronts, off-shore tax havens, illicit deals, political bribes, PAC's, homes, lovers, videos, victims, lies, public policy manipulations, Russian "pals", backdoor deals, and every portfolio asset you have on Earth. Let's see how the shoe fits on the other foot.

Let's see if the world can tweet all that at hashtag #Johnsxbadguy

Let's see if they can torrent all of it with keyword: johnsxbadguy-tor

Let's see if anybody comes up to you, at your next speaking engagement, or restaurant visit, and arrests you in a citizen's arrest.

Let's see if the class-action that led to the anti-poaching lawsuit, against your gang, can be re-invoked as a RICO Racketeering lawsuit against your whole company.

The international law enforcement crowd is pretty busy with all of the ruckus in the Middle East. The citizens of the world will now help those beleaguered law enforcement people, by gathering some files on you. After all, your Guistra-esque mining manipulations in Afghanistan, Bolivia and other regions caused some of the very instability, and corruption, that law enforcement now has to deal with.

Well John, this has been fun.

See you in Hell.

Love,
The World Outside of Your Douchebag Glass Bubble

Can Kleiner Perkins and Goldman Sachs Rig Stock Market Prices Via Direct Electronic Back Door Links to Stock Market Servers? YES!

- So why isn't anybody doing anything about it?
- Are the White House and the Fed protecting the campaign backing Musk/Doerr companies in the stock market, no matter how bad they are actually doing?
- The Book, and coming film: "FLASH BOYS" details this trick
- Small traders already being indicted for Flash Boy tricks but big boys ignored because they are campaign backers
- Direct evidence of rigging of Tesla Motors stock market ticker data exposed
- Doesn't allowing this to continue destroy the value and credibility of the NYSE?
- Should campaign backers get to break the system just because they want to?

One inventor/CEO crossed John Doerr, and Kleiner Perkins, and got a character assassination hatchet job article put out on him. The victims name was Mike Chieky.

"Killing Mike Chieky: Silicon Valley"

Kleiner VC's want total control of "Green Energy", but only **their** version, so they "kill" off the outsiders!

The Verge published an article, by a writer who, his targets say, is "a hired character assassin". The article covers a prolific inventor who is painted as a "criminal" because he has invented "too many things". The writer clearly set out to do a malicious hatchet job on the guy, including fake post-story blog comments by the same attackers. Let's look at both sides of the case.

The price of being a creator is high, but the price of conflicting with the Silicon Valley VC's is PR death.. or, in the case of Gary Connely, Real death

(An investigation charges Silicon Valley VC's with causing, or ordering, his death. The story is almost the same as Chieky except Connely ended up with a bullet in his head)

Chieky built and sold a number of things for a few decades; like Edison, Tesla, Marconi, and tens of thousands of other inventors. As with all people gifted with the use of more brain than the rest of us, he was abrupt and had poor social skills, like Facebook's Mark Zuckerberg, featured in films as a hopeless socio-pariah. The writer had no ability to comprehend the way that Chieky communicates and paints him from an acrimonious perspective without giving Chieky any response outlet or counter-point within the story. The writer clearly didn't want to hear feedback from Chieky, or his partners, he wanted to "kill" him in the media.

Giving the writer the benefit of the doubt: So what if Chieky was a dick in his personality style. Steve Jobs is famous for being a dick. Half of the Google execs are screwing their staff and cheating on their wives in glorious ValleyWag technicolor dick-ness. Larry Ellison is glorified for Dick-hood. Being A DICK IN SILICON VALLEY seems to be the main ingredient to success. So why destroy Chieky for using short sentences and speaking efficiently without platitude embellishment, as autistics do? There are a vast number of pictures of Steve Jobs with an equally bad haircut and eye-glass selection as Chieky. Did Jobs deserve to die for that? Does Chieky?

Chieky is autistic, according to his ex employees. Should Ben Popper be destroying the lives of war veterans that have no legs? Should Ben Popper be destroying the life of Mark Zuckerberg because he has Aspergers Syndrome? Do only those in the Frat boy club get a pass on not treating their disability as a sin? What publisher let's his staff write and deliver stories that tell disabled American's that they will never be looked at as actually enabled in special ways?

Chieky spent his life creating and building things to improve the lives of American's, and people around the world, and this is how we pay him back? All of his inventions are for the greater good. One article like this ruins one's life forever. Did Chieky actually deserve it? Where is the counterpoint. If Chieky actually is "evil" as the article says, then let's string him up. But if the author is evil, then re-size the noose. Where is the counterpoint from Chieky and his representatives to the charges in the article?

Chieky seems to have made the mistake of crossing the path of these GREEN ENERGY VC guys and accidentally competing with John Doerr's grand schemes for controlling "clean energy resources". Do Draper, Khosla, Perkins, Doerr and the rest, get to destroy those that are not in "the frat boy club" with impunity?

Chieky is terrifying to the Silicon Valley VC's because he has 1.) a proven history of inventing things that obsolete their older investments, 2.) a proven history of getting funded and 3.) a proven history of launching products. The three skills that no Stanford frat boy VC can stand because they can't do it. The VC's are little money automatons and not "creators". The VC's can only grub up cash from pension funds and banking groups as they follow each other like sheep.

Alas, The Verge published the article in all countries and thus gives Chieky the right to file defamation lawsuits overseas, where there are no SLAPP laws protecting tabloids. Cyber bully laws can now be enforced in a large number of states and countries. Writer Popper may have also violated ADA laws.

Kleiner Perkin's runs black-lists, funding blockades of competing start-ups, attacks on competitors, sex trafficking hooker contracts, and total control of Silicon Valley start-up potential.

The Silicon Valley Cartel Has Bought Every California Senator

When U. S. Senators Harry Reid and Dianne Feinstein realized they could each make billions of dollars, personally, via their family stock holdings and campaign funds, they didn't waste a minute stabbing their own constituents in the back to get at that cash.

California and Nevada Green Car Companies, Solar Companies, Energy Technology Companies, Green Builders and Transit Companies were hacked off at the knees because they competed with the stock assets that Reid and Feinstein had acquired in their kick-back deals.

These other applicants were all "GREEN COMPANIES": supposedly the Democrat's favorite things. It doesn't matter, though, how "green" your company was, if it was in the path for the "green cash" from Tesla or Solyndra. Two of the favored companies who paid the kick-backs to federal officials.

Is the argument from Feinstein's office that: "there just wasn't enough money left at the Department of Energy" true? No, it is a 100% out-right lie. The Federal GAO, the people that watch for corruption, state that there has always been, and still is, billions, and billions and billions of dollars, set aside EXCLUSIVELY for these companies, that was never used. In Fact, there was always more than enough money to fund every single applicant.

Staff from ZAP Motors, Redwood Solar, Aptera and dozens of other companies have specifically stated that Harry Reid, Dianne Feinstein and their Cheif's of Staff, personally wrote to them, spoke with them and lied to them.

Under Eric Holder, (who is Feinstein's, Reid' and Steven Chu's buddy) refused to take any action. Now it is Lynch's turn.

Harry Reid sabotaged the applicants for Department of Energy Funds if they competed with Kleiner Perkins companies who were funding the campaigns of Reid and Feinstein through PAC's and family trusts.

Further, Recent disclosures, such as the following, shed disturbing light on the depths of this criminal; behavior:

"Did the LA TIMES Article on Elon Musk Kick-Backs actually disclose an organized crime operation involving some very famous people?"

The LA TIMES just ran an article which exposes Elon Musk's funding system, based on Government hand-outs. Musk rushed to hold a press conference to claim the amount of taxpayer cash, he has received, was "just a pittance". Few, though, find over FIVE BILLION DOLLARS of tax waivers, credits, employment freebies, buildings, exclusive contracts, and other taxpayer provided goodies, to be "a pittance" in these tough times.

While it is true that Musk has now received more taxpayer hand-outs, than any individual in American history, one could argue that he is just a lucky business man.

But, just for the purpose of theoretical discussion, what if some of the darker theories about Musk's coincidental windfalls have some merit?

Let's jump right to the most sinister interpretation of things.

One of the whispered rumours, on the web holds that in 2007, right when Musk's silent partners, Eric Schmidt and John Doerr started, practically, living at the White House in a lobbying frenzy, the Democrats finally acknowledged that they really were the party of the poor, because they were flat broke. So some of them came up with the idea of creating a Department of Energy fund called the "ATVM Fund", loading it up with \$25 Billion kick-back dollars of taxpayer cash, awarding it only to Schmidt/Doerr/Musk related companies, and shutting out all of their competitors.

Indeed, history shows that the fund actually was created. It really got \$25 Billion, in a unique legal manner, which made the \$25 Billion irrevocable. Schmidt/Doerr/Musk's buddy: Steven Chu, was put in charge of it. He hired their friends to staff his office.

See where this is going?

So, per this theory, Musk is actually a kick-back conduit, protected by the White House, to spiff the DNC campaign funds...according to this theory. Which is just a theory. It couldn't really happen, right? The White House wouldn't prop up a guy just to keep him quiet and keep kick-back cash flowing.. right?

So this theory is kind of ironic because, in an amazing coincidence, everything that Musk get's involved in, is exactly stuff that the White House is promoting.

In an even more bizarre coincidence, to pull a scam like this off, the Schmidt/Doerr/Musk Cartel would need the help of U.S. Senators Reid and Feinstein, the most beloved American politicians in history.

This whole theory must have come out of the fact that Reid and Feinstein made billions of dollars off of Schmidt/Doerr/Musk Cartel stock investments, "Flash Boy" stock manipulations, and campaign contributions, but, that was, of course just another funny coincidence. They even ran, and built, some of the properties that these Department of Energy "winners" companies sat upon. But, again, coincidence!

The main reason one might cast doubt on this theory is that there are so many hard facts to prove it, that it is just too good to be true, right?

All of the profitable chemicals that Tesla and Solyndra were going to buy and sell in volume were controlled by the investors in Kliener Perkins and commodity-managed by their partners: Goldman Sachs.

Musk's companies have poor business volume, but show a profit whenever there is bad news thanks to

Kleiner rushing out to “Flash Boy” purchase Tesla stock, with an automated stock buying system, in order to pump the stock. Federal, and private investigator, records show that this actually happened. It has also been proven that only Google, Reddit and the other Kleiner-controlled web-news-media mask all negative Musk/Tesla news in perfect synchronization with the stock pumps, when no other publications on the planet do. Again, these are just coincidences. If people were consciously doing those kinds of things it would be mobster-ism on a Godfather-class scale.

Originators of the scam, from the White House side, were Emanuel, Plouffe, Axelrod, Rattner and Gibbs. Emanuel, Plouffe, Axelrod, Rattner and Gibbs suddenly quit the White House, at the peak of their career, for reasons that don't make sense. The fact that one of them was indicted for stock market fraud only goes to strengthen concerns.

So, even if this really had happened, the brave and fearless protector of ethics and morality: Mr. Eric Holder, would have cracked right down on his friends here who he knew personally, and had dinner with, and had the same lawyers with ”oh,.. well..” but anyway. Eric would have jumped on them, right? The White House wouldn’t order the Justice Department and the FBI to ignore Elon Musk, John Doerr and the Silicon Valley Cartel as a kick-back protection order, now would they?

Mobsters kill people. Rajeev Motwani, David Bird, Gary D. Conley, 3 Tesla engineers and a large bunch of others did, certainly, die under mysterious circumstances, and they were all people that this cartel would want dead, but to say that these billionaires are off murdering their adversaries using mysterious CIA stealth murder tricks is overly intriguing.

Of course, as we all now know, every single one of those companies in the ATVM Fund scam grabbed the cash, paid their CEO and Goldman Sachs insiders off-the-top, and immediately went bankrupt in the largest government-funded sequential business-failure suite in history. While some argue that a secret GOP Task Force discovered the plot and forced all of the Kleiner Cartel DOE “Winners” to collapse, in punishment, this is probably another coincidence."

Are these coincidences or intentionally ignored facts? Is The White House ordering law enforcement to ignore this issue because they know that a number of their top former senior staff are required to be arrested?

Here is the main argument against this theory, Mobsters are big greasy looking guys with bulbous broken noses and slicked back pompadours. These Musk and Kleiner people wear khaki's and black turtlenecks. KHAKI'S for god-damn sakes!!

Is Dianne Feinstein a Crook? Did she, and her family, engage in criminal corruption and the "rectal hydration" of American taxpayers?

You never heard so much about "rectal hydration", "anal pumping" and "deep injection butt tubes" until Dianne Feinstein showed up, but did she apply the political equivalent of these techniques to the American taxpayer? Did she dive deep into the dark crevasses of political corruption and gouge out huge globs of special interest, kickback and insider trading cash in a very unethical and illegal manner?

Let's take a look. What are the facts and what do they show?

Given any other American citizens, if you ask the question, "What are the odds that any person would have this many conflicts of interest?"

The answer would come back: "It is nearly impossible for these conflicts of interest to have existed unless there was an organized criminal operation underway designed to deceive the taxpayers!"

Herb Newman is her relative in Sausalito California at Newman Search. He ran hiring for Solyndra, Tesla and other Feinstein schemes. He runs Chinese insider deals with Feinstein's husband. He has been working with China (you know, the one's hacking every computer in America) since 1972 with the sole purpose of hanging out with the People's Republic of China. This was shortly after completing his degree in Political Science and International Relations at UC Davis and completing two years towards an MBA at Golden Gate University. In 1973 Mr. Newman arrived in Canton at the invitation of the Chinese Council for the Promotion of International Trade. (CCPIT). He and his company MVTC was one of fifty businesses to be invited to the Canton Trade Fair held in Kwangchow China. He and his associate Darryl Schoon, are on travel watch-lists. His participation in Tesla, Solyndra and Feinstein related public policy scams is a complete conflict-of-interest.

Her family owned the land, construction company, leases, contracts, insiders stocks and liaisons for these operations.

California State Controller Bill Lockyer, and a large number of State Tax Officials, gave The Silicon Valley Cartel HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF DOLLARS of exclusive kick-backs and payola routed through Side-by-Side neighbors and hard-wired insiders: Tesla and Solyndra. All of their competitors were denied the same benefits and blockaded from accessing the same resources, in order to financially, and criminally, protect the Cartel and their stock market holdings, which many State officials also held stock in. Dianne Feinstein's family holdings also included the same stock gifts from the Cartel, as payola. Additionally, stock exchanges, stock market valuation bumps, free real estate, cheap real estate, aircraft resources, tax credits, write-offs, and other favors were provided by State officers exclusively to Tesla a Solyndra while being denied, or blockaded from their competitors.

It's easy to dismiss conspiracy theorists who claim that the 9/11 attacks were staged by the U.S. government or that Princess Diana was actually murdered. But just because some accusations are far-fetched, that doesn't mean that conspiracies don't ever happen.

To the contrary, history is filled with examples of real-life conspiracies. Recently, forensic scientists used a computerized tomography (CT) scan to examine the mummy of the Egyptian pharaoh Ramesses III, who died in 1155 B.C., and spotted a wide, deep wound in his throat, probably caused by a sharp blade. That confirmed what Egyptologists already had discovered by perusing ancient papyrus scrolls \ 97 that Ramesses had been the victim of a conspiracy by members of his harem, who murdered him in an attempt to seize power [source: ScienceDaily].

But it's also revealing that the conspirators against Ramesses didn't get away with their deed, apparently because they were overheard discussing their plot. Before long, they were arrested and eventually executed [source: Records of the Harem Conspiracy].

As former Nixon White House aide G. Gordon Liddy \97 a key figure in the notorious Watergate scandal and cover-up \97 noted, the big problem with conspiracies is that people can't keep their mouths shut [source: Shermer]. That tendency to blab may stem from a desire to take credit for an ingenious plot, but it also may have something to do with the stress of duplicity. A 2012 study published in the *Journal of Experimental Psychology* found that secret-keeping exacted a physical toll on subjects, increasing the effort needed to perform tasks, and even making hills that they had to climb feel steeper.

So it's no wonder that the bad stuff gets out, eventually

The Silicon Valley Cartel Uses The CIA For Dirty Tricks Schemes

AFI reporters feel that they have sourced evidence that details a cartel activity among the National Venture Capital Association leaders. Their members are also the same people who founded and run In-Q-Tel. These same people are also the people who lobby federal executive policy, mostly to benefit their personal stock portfolios. It is implied that the NVCA/IQT Cartel decide who gets government contracts in exchange for certain campaign resources. The top woman at the NSA was fired for running a privateering operation, per Glenn Greenwald. The Washington Post reported on the corruption in spy land when Silencers for Navy kills squads were pawned off for manufacture to a friends California car shop. The number of spies using government resources for personal profit is high but nobody has achieved greater notoriety than a Elon Musk's, Eric Schmidt's and John Doerr's silent partners at a little rogue spy operation called: IN-Q-TEL

You see, billionaires like to play at being “spies”. They feel a sexual rush from knowing that they controlled an election or monopoly. It is the pure ecstasy of narcissistic power and hubris combined with the absolute arrogance of white elitist privilege.

BULLET POINTS REGARDING IN-Q-TEL:

- Charged by Congress and Consumer Groups with HUNDREDS of violations of Constitutional, tax, securities and commercial laws
- [TechCrunch, Arrington, Buzzfeed & Alex Jones expose In-Q-Tel staff and VC's as leaders of "Angel-Gate Scandal" & illegal "National Venture Capital Association Blacklisting & Market Control Collusion Cartel"](#). Congress & S.E.C. asked to investigate.
- Why was In-Q-Tel so involved with Google and Tesla in a covert manner?
- 6+ tons of cocaine confiscated by federal police, from IQT airplanes
- Owners of the Rendition Airplanes. Featured in Feature films: “RENDITION”, “WAG THE DOG” and “KILL THE MESSENGER
- ACLU claims IQT owns the controlling rights in most of the domestic spying companies (over 300 of them) plus controls Google and Facebook activities
- IQT/NAF/AFGHAN WAR PROFITEERS/VC INVESTORS/FRATERNITY GROUP are All The SAME group of people
- Epstein Investigations close in on corrupt billionaire club

- Evolved from liaison office to unregulated, potentially criminal and mercenary, endeavor. “Blackwater” in pin-stripe suits.
- Spins PR as “helping technology grow” but investigators say it has become a private political spy service for Silicon Valley billionaires
- Cult-like frat-house atmosphere at their companies devoted to control of outcomes at any cost. Almost no blacks or women in their groups.
- IQT member, or associate, connected to almost every banking group arrested or charged by DOJ
- Per Congressional investigators IQT resources missed the boat on ISIS, Benghazi and over 1300+ other recent intelligence failures
- “If you went to Stanford or Harvard and were in the “approved” Fraternities, you could be in the In-Q-Tel Spy Club where dot com billionaires get to lord it over White House policy in order to enrich their personal stock portfolios.” Web News
- Now proven that IQT “spying by computer” approach is a failed concept. Computers are always wrong on how the human mind will process social events.
- Uses taxpayer dollars to sell hit jobs to corporations and bankers = illegal
- IQT Afghan War lithium/indium/Solyndra venture with Silicon Valley VC’s, has now cost American taxpayers over \$6 TRILLION dollars in losses per GAO, Time Magazine, Treasury

According to one senior Congressional staffer: “In-Q-Tel was supposed to be a small office that was to help young entrepreneurs sell their wares to government agencies. Congress has been unable to examine them, or do oversight on them, because they hide behind a non-profit cover. This lack of regulation caused the Silicon Valley VC’s to believe they could get away with anything and use In-Q-Tel as a private profiteering weapon for their own stock portfolios and their private political schemes. Now we have an out-of-control operation, undertaken by a rogue group, that may, very well, be breaking quite a number of laws...”

One contracted investigator said: “If you run all of the names on the suspect lists into xKeyScore, LucidWorks, Palantir, TX-7 or similar sets of crime search engines; matrix their credit cards and then cross reference them with the database file of every major escort service, your response screen lights up like a Christmas tree. These people hire lots of ladies. Then, if you run them with a ‘peeling program’ which strips away their corporate fronts and matrix their holdings via the Cayman’s, The Ukraine and Switzerland, you find that one chunk of them likes to off-shore their tax avoidance into the same little nooks. Mostly, it is the ones from Silicon Valley, but there is much to behold when you scan this group. [Ryals has reported them to the SEC for years](#) but the new Congress will not like the DNC leverage that In-Q-Tel has been using to acquire Democratic initiatives. The Democrat IQT never saw the GOP Congress coming...”

Chris Byron- New York Post:

“There are many sensible ways the CIA could have gone about developing the technologies it needs, but funneling money into Wall Street via an outfit like In-Q-Tel was never one of them. So it will be a good thing for Wall Street – and for America, too – if the CIA’s next spymaster simply shuts the operation down.” (Contact Chris Byron via Twitter)

Alex Jones: “I will tell you something about them that will shock you...” (Available for background interviews)

The Corbett Report: “...they should be shut down..” (Available for background interviews)

“IN-Q-Tel was born in the Harvard and Stanford Frat Houses of the rich and “elite”. As the world has now seen, these frat houses teach young white men that date-rape and the use of women as disposable play things is the norm, outsiders and people of color are to be shunned, “greed is not only good” – it is the apex of your life, and the only thing that matters is beating your frat brothers in business coups to show who has the biggest penis.

You saw the Jewish holocaust and said: “How could those people do such a thing?”. You saw genocide in Africa and said: “How could those people do such a thing?” You saw Enron and Madoff and a host of epic crimes against the public and you said, in each case: “How could those people do such a thing?”

It is called Dissociation. The IN-Q-TEL leaders lost track, they lost morality and they let blind greed and boys club rules overcome decency and the law.” – **LATIMES RESEARCHER**

From Another Investigative News Report: “IN-Q-Tel (IQT) is NOT the CIA. In fact, over half of the actual CIA feel that IQT are “Yuppie spy wanna-be A-holes” and a “stain on the intelligence community.” Actual intelligence agents say that IN-Q-Tel began as a small business liaison office that avoided circumspection because they got to whisper “CIA” whenever they felt pressure from law enforcement or Congress. IQT is the modern day equivalent of the Watergate Burglars; political hit-men and a dirty-deeds-for-hire cabal.

This small office quickly grew to an out of control, rogue spy operation with no oversight, no controls, layers upon layers of false corporate fronts, and an agenda written by a special interest group of billionaires and investment banks. They went from protecting taxpayers to abusing the taxpayers on behalf of tycoons. They use U.S. taxpayer dollars and Silicon Valley tycoon cash to sell their spy services to The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and other lobby groups. Conflict-of-interest? You might say so!

When the FBI and DEA confiscated IQT’s airplanes and found six tons of Cocaine, when IQT was shown to own the “Rendition” airplanes, when the largest privacy abuse in American history all tracks back to IQT’s bank accounts, when the trillion dollar loss in Afghanistan is tracked back to a trillion dollar stock scam connected to IQT’s tycoons..... you have to just stop and go...hmmmm?

Some Congressional and journalism investigators feel that IQT has fallen as close to the definition of “organized crime” as you can get. Investigations say that IQT engages in “activities that stretch the bounds of morality and the law”; and run the most sinister of political hit-jobs, muckraking, lobbying and spying on American’s that are so in the news these days. Edward Snowden exposed a database called xKEYSCORE as well as many other systems which find “bad guys”. When you run the In-Q-Tel characters through these bad-guy finders, you discover that a group of White House staff, pretend spies, lobbyists, tabloid owners, Russian mobsters and Silicon Valley tycoons all share the same deep financial, stock and political connections.

The attack plan is a classic set of take-down playbook moves. A client orders the termination of every possible source of revenue of the target (usually an individual or small company who got in the way), in order to terminate the target’s ability to respond or litigate and as retribution for the attackers perceived slight.

The attackers employ character assassination, they plant moles in the target’s business and “Honey Traps” in personal venues, they hack, They use DNS redirection to send the target to fake LinkedIn and Facebook sites, They shut down the targets business with DDOS attacks, they use unfair business competition tactics by stealing technology and flooding the market with clone technology, and they manipulate public policy against the target via lobbying and bribery in Washington DC, among their dirty tricks.

In-Q-Tel has spent over a decade, and billions of your tax dollars, trying to automate spying on people and mood manipulation, by taking over Silicon Valley; yet none of their technology saw Benghazi, ISIS, or thousands of other missed intelligence indicators. The plain fact is, computers always fail with social projection, they always get it wrong, when trying to calculate what the human mind will do. The IQT approach put the nation at greater risk by hyping and selling a failed solution. Human minds will never work like computers unless IQT’s Google builds it’s human robots to replace us all.

It is illegal for the CIA to spy domestically. The NSA does not do that much domestic spying, they mostly analyze spy data provided by “contractors” like Axciom and the IQT “pool”. IQT sells their services to anybody willing to pay. It appears that no deed is too dirty for IQT. IQT financed, runs and coordinates the largest array of domestic spying gear, data harvesting and mood manipulation companies in America. If you pull up a list of all of the companies that IQT financed and owns stock in, you will hold a list of every domestic spying operation in the USA. If you pull up an FBI (The FBI and CIA pretty much hate each other) cross reference of IQT, New America Foundation, Silicon Valley VC’s and campaign backers; you find that it is a list of all of the same names and financial connections.

Who watches the watchers at IQT? **NOBODY!**“...

CHARACTER ASSASSINATION, AND CAREER HIT-JOBS, BY HIGHLY PLACED POLITICAL ENTITIES USING TAXPAYER MONEY

Government sponsored character assassination delivered by Google, Gawker Media, IN-Q-Tel and New America Foundation; all of whom are financially, politically and operationally connected. Eric

Schmidt ran and funded New America Foundation; Ran Google; Partnered and funded In-Q-Tel; hired, along with his associate: Elon Musk, In-Q-Tel executives; Worked with Gawker Marketers along with In-Q-Tel; was, himself and Google, funded by In-Q-Tel; funded the top 4 political campaigns, that all of those parties aggressively supported; and managed a business plan, that ran between all of those efforts, to ruin competitors and those who did not think like him, in any way possible.

The Silicon Valley Cartel and The Obama White House took over Gawker and Gizmodo media for their most notorious spy-like attacks.

In 2002, a **failed** British journalist named Nick Denton started *Gawker*, a **bitchy** gossip blog run out of his Manhattan apartment. Over 10 years later, *Gawker* and its sister sites have become the biggest names in clickbait “journalism,” pulling down millions of visitors a month and making its owner a millionaire several times over. The secret to Denton’s success? He took the aggressive, **lynch mob mentality** of British tabloids, which **specialize in ruining people’s lives**, and injected it into [America’s comparatively placid, Oprahfied media market](#).

In particular, *Gawker*, *Jezebel*, *Valleywag*, and their sister sites specialize in witch hunts: digital vigilantism against those who fail to keep up with leftist orthodoxy. [Geoffrey Miller](#), [Pax Dickinson](#), [Justine Tunney](#), [Violentacrez](#): the list of people whom *Gawker* has garroted for “racism” or “misogyny” could fill a phone book. With an army of Twitter twits behind it, Gawker Media truly is the moral majority of the left, **instigating mob action** against those who sin against the religion of *tolerance*. *Gawker*’s provocations are even encouraging real-world violence now, as *Valleywag*’s overfed man-baby of an editor Sam Biddle [eggs on attacks against San Francisco tech workers](#) from the safety of the East Coast.

“Which makes the revelation that Denton has been allowing trolls to terrorize his female employees all the more delicious.”

For the past few months, 4chan has been engaged in a trolling operation against *Jezebel*, [posting pictures of rape and gore porn in the comments section](#). Despite the fact that these shocking and disgusting images are stressing out staffers to the point where they’re developing PTSD, Denton has steadfastly refused to do anything about the problem. *Jezebel*’s staff recently snapped and [posted an open letter on the site](#) demanding that Gawker Media do something, calling 4chan’s trolling “a very real and immediate threat to the mental health of *Jezebel*’s staff and readers.”

Fat chance of this happening, however. [As others have pointed out](#), Gawker Media’s business model depends on getting clicks; indeed, [their writers are paid according to how many page views their articles get](#). Since comments help drive traffic to websites, fighting 4chan’s rape porn trolling will reduce *Gawker*’s profitability. Not only that, [Google itself ranks web pages according to how many comments they have](#), as comments are extremely difficult to fake. Fewer comments means a lower page rank, which translates into less search traffic and less money for Denton to blow on exotic vacations with his boy-toy hubby. If Gawker Media was willing to testify in federal court as to [why](#)

[they should be allowed to rip off their interns](#), you can bet your bottom peso that they aren't going to do jack about this.

Gawker Media Attack Specialist Adrian Covert of San Francisco. Now under 24/7 electronic surveillance for “suspicious activities”

And there's the punch line. Gawker Media, the company that gets people fired from their jobs for making “sexist” jokes, has been creating a hostile work environment for its women staffers for *months*. They're the leftist equivalent of a priest who rails against homosexuality only to be caught molesting altar boys in the confessional booths. In staying silent on this for so long, Dodai Stewart, [Lindy West](#), and *Jezebel's* other star employees have shown themselves to be frauds. They don't care about feminism, “fat shaming,” or whatever cause they're screeching about today; all they care about is money and power. And now we have the proof.

Please share this article by using the link below. When you cut and paste an article, Taki's Magazine misses out on traffic, and our writers don't get paid for their work. Email editors@takimag.com to buy additional rights. http://takimag.com/article/gawker_media_hypocrites_vs_douchecanoes/print#ixzz3CCvoAIP4

[Denton Sweats Over Decline in Web Ad Revenues – CBS News](#)

Gawker Media's Nick Denton has made a horrible prediction regarding internet adspend for the next year: ... **Gawker's** Denton Sweats Over Decline in Web **Ad Revenues**. Shares Tweets Stumble ... But the web **ad** economy as a whole will be the beneficiary of **falling** budgets.

cbsnews.com/news/gawkers-denton-sweats-over-decline-i...

Nick Denton charged with ordering phone-hacking, helping Anonymous hackers, stealing Mitt Romney's tax records, hiding money in Russia and Caymans and MORE...

IS GAWKER MEDIA THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY'S “PLAUSIBLE DENI-ABILITY” HIT SQUAD? STILL MORE...

[‘Straight To Hell:’ Reflections On Annie, Gawker ...](#)

I feel like I'm probably going straight to **hell** for all of this. But, given all the other shitty ... Emily Ratajkowski entertainment expats facebook **Gawker Gawker Media** gender hipsters Hollywood Hugh Hefner inter-racial dating internet Jezebel Julia Allison korea liberalism ...

migukin.wordpress.com/2014/08/06/straight-to-hell-reflections-o...

[More from migukin.wordpress.com Advertisers Ditch Gawker Media In Droves. “Brand Tainted” says Forbes Exec. Gawker's](#)

[Terror](#)– John Cook of Gawker; now of Greenwald – NOT CIA'S FRIEND!

Gawker Tries to Reveal Identity of CIA Agent Behind Bin Laden Kill

By [Jana Winter](#)

The Gawker website is under fire for trying to expose the CIA agent who may have helped lead the effort to kill [Usama Bin Laden](#) — despite efforts by the U.S. government and media to keep his identity secret for security reasons.

Using the largest character assassination engine ever created. The Large Hadron Collider of defamation, Schmidt and his little Cartel went to work on enemies of his ideology. These were hit-jobs, using taxpayer dollars, against American born taxpayers, inside America, on U.S. soil because some politician or, campaign backer billionaire, wanted to hide their crimes.

It is not just the trade-craft of the CIA that the Sand Hill Road oligarchs borrow from. They steal the tools of EVERY spy agency!

Journalist Glenn Greenwald, through whom document-leaker Edward Snowden previously rattled the entire National Security Agency, is now confirming Western intelligence networks strategize to place “trolls” on the Internet to undermine, discredit and destroy critics.

[In an article posted on website Greenwald help create called the Intercept](#), Greenwald reports secret documents from the GCHQ – the United Kingdom’s version of the NSA – reveal “how western intelligence agencies are attempting to manipulate and control online discourse with extreme tactics of deception and reputation-destruction.”

He cites documents from the “previously secret” Joint Threat Research Intelligence Group in the U.K., which describe injecting “all sorts of false material onto the Internet in order to destroy the reputation of its targets” and to use “social sciences and other techniques to manipulate online discourse and activism to generate outcomes it considers desirable.”

“To see how extremist these programs are, just consider the tactics they boast of using to achieve those ends: ‘false flag operations’ (posting material to the Internet and falsely attributing it to someone else), fake victim blog posts (pretending to be a victim of the individual whose reputation they want to destroy), and posting ‘negative information’ on various forums.”

The document lists a “Disruption Operational Playbook” and subheadings titled “Infiltration Operation, Ruse Operation, Set Piece Operation, False Flag Operation, False Rescue Operation, Disruption Operation, Sting Operation.”

[Get “Disinformation: Former Spy Chief Reveals Secret Strategies for Undermining Freedom, Attacking Religion, and Promoting Terrorism” at WND’s Superstore](#)

Regarding how to “discredit a target,” the instructions include, “Set up a honey-trap, change their photos on social networking sites, write a blog purporting to be one of their victims, email/text their colleagues, neighbors, friends etc.”

[Sam Rolley at the Personal Liberty blog](#) wrote that his organization for years has been “warning readers that the well-connected and ruling elite, displeased by this newfound proletariat freedom, have

been prolific in attempts to undermine and marginalize information provided by any media outlet unwilling to obey the same unspoken rules that govern the content choices of major media outlets.”

“Now, thanks to the efforts of National Security Agency whistleblower Edward Snowden and journalist Glenn Greenwald, readers no longer have to take the word of ‘paranoid’ bloggers who relate tales of paid government trolls lurking in comment sections and other concentrated top-down efforts to muddy the information provided by alternative media,” Rolley said.

He warned that the “most disturbing confirmation provided in the newly publicized intelligence documents is that spy agencies in Western nations with free speech guarantees have been given carte blanche authority from political leadership to target private individuals and organizations deemed uncooperative with the will of the state with ruthless online reputation-destruction efforts.”

Greenwald said the discussion of many of the techniques “occurs in the context of using them in lieu of ‘traditional law enforcement’ against people suspected (but not charged or convicted) of ordinary crimes or, more broadly still, ‘hacktivism,’ meaning those who use online protest activity for political ends.”

Rolley said it takes “no stretch of the imagination – even for those who have resisted considering the possibility of malevolent intent on government’s part – to assume that the mission of organizations like the NSA and GCHQ is ultimately more about quelling citizen dissent than stopping citizen bloodshed at the hands of terrorists.”

“The mere existence of documents like those published this week,” Rolley said, “provides that the nefarious and long-suspected Internet activities of Western propagandists are not just plausible – they have very likely occurred in the comment sections and social media posts of articles like the one you are reading now.”

WND columnist Eric Rush highlighted the outrageous idea of government agents trying to destroy the reputations of critics.

“It is worth noting that in 2008, Cass Sunstein, an Obama adviser and the White House’s former head of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs ... wrote a paper proposing that the U.S. government engage teams of covert agents and independent, ideologically kindred surrogates to employ *precisely the aforementioned methods* to achieve their objectives,” Rush said.

Greenwald said the “point is that, far beyond hacktivists, these surveillance agencies have vested themselves with the power to deliberately ruin people’s reputations and disrupt their online political activity even though they’ve been charged with no crimes, and even though their actions have no conceivable connection to terrorism or even national security threats.”

Greenwald said the British organization, GCHQ, in response to his questions, said only that it does not comment on intelligence matters.

“Furthermore,” the agency said, “all of GCHQ’s work is carried out in accordance with a strict legal and policy framework which ensures that our activities are authorized, necessary and proportionate, and that there is rigorous oversight, including from the Secretary of State, the Interception and Intelligence Services Commissioners, and the Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee.”

“Whatever else is true,” Greenwald wrote, “no government should be able to engage in these tactics: what justification is there for having government agencies target people – who have been charged with no crime – for reputation-destruction, infiltrate online political communities, and develop techniques for manipulating online discourse?”

WND previously has reported on leftist trolls operating online, including those with thousands of postings that would be unlikely to come from someone submitting comments during free time.

The report at the time said the trolls were performing a “disinformation” function typical of counter-intelligence efforts by intelligence agencies to confuse political enemies and refute or deflect opposing political views that are less susceptible to refutation by more traditional methods of debate and argumentation.

Typically, trolls operating on WND forums were defending Obama by posting specious and diversionary arguments with the goal of changing the subject and obscuring topics that could damage Obama, such as his birth records, life narrative, political history and policy preferences, including his current positions as president.

One was found to have posted nearly 4,800 comments over a two-year period. Another operated under different user names used various email addresses and nine different IP addresses to post 15,200 comments over 787 days on WND.com and FoxNews.com, as well as several smaller news websites, some of which had a local focus or interest.

The report confirmed many of the trolls banned from participating in WND forums appeared to have been operating on a professional level.

Read more at <http://www.wnd.com/2014/02/govt-handbook-for-internet-trolls-uncovered/#lZFg1EdYRI9iTSC8.99>

The Venture Capital Scam Of The NVCA

America was always viewed as the “Great Innovator of the World”. That is no longer the case, thanks to a group called the National Venture Capital Association (NVCA).

They conspire, collude, and coordinate who gets funded and who gets shut-down. If you compete with their boys, they blacklist you. If your new product might threaten their holdings, they use their Gust database and VC-Link and other data mining services to make sure you never get any money for your idea, no matter how great it is.

In a well known scandal called: “AngelGate”, a group of VC’s were documented having one of the weekly collusion meetings they all attend, to decide which insiders get to play the game and who gets rolled over. The founders of the NVCA are the same people involved in the sinister In-Q-Tel organization and the various “public information foundations” that are now under intense scrutiny for public policy manipulation.

Even though they helped fund the internet, the VC’s are not the smartest tools in the shed. They are not the “idea guys”. They move like sheep in a herd. They are the ones that steal the ideas from the actual “idea guys”. They did not have the vision to see that the internet was about to become their biggest enemy.

When a VC see’s an idea guy/gal’s idea pitch they are thinking three things: 1.) “Can I get some free market research from this guy? 2.) Will this product compete with my portfolio and should I kill it? 3.) Is it really a good idea that I can steal and pass over to another NVCA VC so they can copy it and the idea guy will never be able to trace the theft back to me?”

There is a reason they call them “vulture capitalists”. The biggest myth about Silicon Valley venture capital money is that any outsider, who isn’t in the Stanford frat club, will ever see any of that money.

For the very insider, good-ole-boy, money to stay in the tight little insider circle, a facade of “the American Dream for ideas” had to be perpetrated. Now that all of the entrepreneurs can compare notes, valuations, IP thefts, patent protection sabotage and VC lies on the open internet and see that the entrepreneurs are just getting harvested and plucked like chickens.

The VC’s and campaign billionaires want everybody spied on, in their country, so they can get a heads-up on when the game is up, and try to forestall that day with disinformation. Always slow to the table though, the NVCA manipulations have yet to realize that the day has already passed them by.

Investigators say that, Democratic party operatives David Plouffe, Rahm Emanuel, Steven Rattner, Bill Daly, David Axelrod and Robert Gibbs arranged with Silicon Valley investors to take over the lithium battery industry in order to monopolize the trillions of dollars of lithium, and related mining deals, in Afghanistan.

They say that they traded federal funding for campaign support assisted by Harry Reid and Dianne Feinstein, who received numerous stock and cash kickbacks in the scheme.

They say they used the money to fund political campaigns. They used the Silicon Valley investors internet companies to manipulate voter perceptions and web searches in favor of their agenda. The Silicon Valley investors received: favorable federal laws, tax gifts, free federal loans, stock bumps and other perks.

The Silicon Valley investors mining resources exploitation companies: Abound, Solyndra, Fisker, Ener1, Tesla, and many, many more, that received the Department of Energy kickback funds, managed by Steven Chu, have all either failed, been raided, been charged with fraud or otherwise turned out to be disasters because they were based on a financial fraud skimming scheme instead of a good business plan.

One Mr. Zhang had only five years of experience before jumping to the top intellectual property job at Baidu. Baidu is one of the largest technology companies with \$23B in revenue and 21,000 employees. This would place the company around 130th on the [Fortune 500](#) list; along with U.S. Bank, Time Warner, and Goodyear. It appears that the Facebook IPO feeding frenzy was orchestrated in both the U.S. and China. This supports the hypothesis that the NASDAQ “glitch” was a smokescreen.

Breaking News! Jan. 29, 2014—S.E.C. Chair Mary L. Schapiro held stock in both Facebook & Baidu (China) *before* the Facebook IPO via her investment in [T. Rowe Price Growth Stock Fund \(PRGFX\)](#), which was up to \$600,000, according to [Schapiro’s financial disclosure](#).



Mary L. Schapiro, Chair, S.E.C.; held stock in Facebook and Baidu before the Facebook IPO, along with *Leader v. Facebook* judges and Patent Office; ignored whistleblower warnings. *Photo: NYTimes*.

In addition to warnings about fabricated mobile revenues, her S.E.C. agency also *ignored* numerous whistleblower warnings of improper “dark pools” activity, including failure to disclose to investors that Facebook had been judged guilty on 11 of 11 federal counts of infringing Columbus innovator Leader Technologies’ U.S. Patent No. 7,139,761 for social networking—the core technology engine running Facebook. Evidently, Schapiro knew about Facebook Chairman James W. Breyer’s intention to exploit Leader’s technology in China also, where his father, John P. Breyer, operates IDG-Accel-China.

Fig. 1—Sands Capital Management, LLC injected Chinese influence into Obamacare. Sands Capital, the 7th largest fund investor in the May 2012 Facebook IPO, secretly acquired over \$200 million in

Athenahealth holdings just as President Obama moved Todd Y. Park, Athenahealth’s founder, from HHS to the White House, on Mar. 9, 2012..



Gordon K. Davidson, Fenwick & West LLP; current Facebook securities and patent counsel; Leader Technologies former corp. counsel (c.a., 2001-2004). *Photo: Fenwick & West.*

At the same time, Sands Capital secretly slipped in its holding in Baidu, Inc., sometimes called the Chinese Facebook. Baidu is notoriously controlled by the Chinese Communist Party. Baidu’s CEO, Robin Yangong Li, started his job in Jan. 2004—the same month Mark Zuckerberg started Facebook after stealing Leader Technologies’ source code via attorney firm Fenwick & West LLP, we believe.

Facebook also went public during this same time (with Fenwick & West LLP as their lead securities and intellectual property counsel). Again, Sand Capital did not provide proper notice of its Facebook stock acquisition.

The juxtaposition of these three notice failures, combined with HealthCare.gov’s claim that its software platform running on Facebook and other “open source” software, signals obvious collusion to deprive Leader Technologies of its private property rights—government confiscation of property.

It also proves Chinese meddling in America’s data infrastructure and the Obama White House cabinet.

This picture shows the logo of Baidu on its headquarters. *Photo: AFP/Getty Images/Forbes/via @daylife).*

(Jan. 28, 2014)—Washington DC-based [Sands Capital Management, LLC](#), the seventh largest fund investor in Facebook, failed to file three critical Facebook, Athenahealth, and Baidu-China (“the Chinese Facebook”) disclosures with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (S.E.C.) during the period of May-August 2012.

These disclosures would have signaled serious conflicts of interests within the Obama administration, especially the complicity of Wall Street and the White House’s Silicon Valley donors with likely undue Chinese influence over Obamacare.

Pres. Obama and Todd Y. Park blatantly violated conflict of interest laws



Todd Y. Park, U.S. CTO; HealthCare.gov architect; Athenahealth, founder; Castlight Health, founder.
Photo: White House.

These Sands Capital filing failures occurred just as President Obama moved Todd Y. Park as chief technology officer (CTO) of Health and Human Services to the White House on Mar. 9, 2012. By this time, Park had *already* embedded his Athenahealth and Castlight Health technology deeply into HealthCare.gov.



Ann H. Lamont, Director of Todd Y. Park’s Castlight Health; former director of Todd Y. Park’s Athenahealth; former director of NVCA with James W. Breyer, Accel Partners, among other Facebook cartel principals; Mng. Prtnr. Oak Investment Partners; husband Edward is grandson of JPMorgan Chase & Co. founder Thomas W. Lamont. [Lamont is a heavy investor in Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanely and JPMorgan](#)—Facebook’s underwriters. *Photo: Stanford.*

However, [Todd Y. Park](#) was the founder of both Athenahealth and Castlight Health. His brother, Edward Y. Park, is the chief operating officer of Athenahealth. JPMorgan insider and Obama campaign financier, [Ann H. Lamont](#), was an Athenahealth director with Park and his brother.

NVCA: Cesspool of White Collar Corruption



James W. Breyer, Facebook; Managing Partner. Accel Partners LLP; NVCA Fmr. Chairman (2004).
Photo: Der Spiegel.

Ann H. Lamont is also an investing partner with Facebook’s James W. Breyer. She is also a fellow former director with Breyer at the [National Venture Capital Association \(NVCA\)](#).

Reporting new stock acquisitions to the S.E.C. is routine. “Form SC 13G” reports are an essential tool used by investors to know when funds add new stocks to their portfolios. Without those notices, new acquisitions can easily be missed. Independent stock analysts like [Morningstar](#) monitor them and create daily alerts of new acquisitions to the market as well as to watchdogs.



Frank M. Sands, Sr., Sands Capital Management, LLC. Failed to file timely notices. *Virginia.edu*



Frank M. Sands, Jr., Sands Capital Management, LLC. Failed to file timely notices. *Virginia.edu*

Had Sands Capital filed timely, accountability questions could have been triggered. As it happened, they slipped the holding quietly onto their quarterly reports, thus avoiding transparency.

The activities of these companies impact American healthcare and data security priorities. America was not given the opportunity to scrutinize this activity until now, ***after the damage*** has been done.

#1: ATHENAHEALTH, INC.

Fig. 2—Sands Capital Management, LLC ATHENAHEALTH, INC. holdings—Holdings Reports, SEC EDGAR. Yellow highlighted rows show reporting periods in which no notices of acquisitions were filed by compliance officer, Robert C. Hancock. These notices are important filings for fraud watchdogs.

Fig. 3—Sands Capital Management, LLC ATHENAHEALTH, INC. holdings—Value Reports, SEC EDGAR. The yellow highlighted box shows the periods where no acquisition notices and no-fraud certifications were filed. In short, Sands Capital acquired over \$200 million in Athenahealth stock without regulatory oversight. S.E.C. Chairman [Mary L. Schapiro](#) had financial holdings in funds invested in Athenahealth, e.g., [Vanguard Extended Market \(VEXMX\)](#).

On May 14, 2010, 506,000 shares of Athenahealth appeared out of thin air on the [Sands Capital Management, LLC quarterly report](#). More and more stock just started appearing each quarter, all without acquisition notices.

Then on May 14, 2012, hundreds of millions more shares appeared out of thin air—214 million more. Just a few weeks earlier, President Obama had appointed Todd Y. Park as U.S. chief technology officer. Park had already deeply embedded Athenahealth's software code into the bowels of HealthCare.gov. In fact, no notices of acquisition were filed for Athenahealth until Feb. 2013.

Why is this S.E.C. irregularity significant?

The public has an interest in insuring that government vendors and officials are trustworthy. HealthCare.gov is making false “open source” intellectual property claims, but since HealthCare.gov is not a transparent development, no public scrutiny is possible.

The federal confiscation of private properties continues unabated. The agenda is very evidently being railroaded.

In addition, the involvement of the Chinese government in U.S. infrastructure raises critical national security questions.

Todd Y. Park’s ethics disclosures are missing

Tellingly, Parks’ ethics disclosure is missing from the [U.S. Office of Government Ethics](http://www.usdoj.gov/oea/) website. By contrast, even Hillary R. Clinton’s is there. Parks’ close relationships with associates of Athenahealth, Castlight Health, Baidu-China and Sands Capital Management, LLC show that any decision he has made involving these players benefits him personally.



Robert Kocher, MD, Director, Castlight Health, founded by U.S. CTO, Todd Y. Park; former member, National Economic Council; special adviser to Barack Obama on Health Policy (chief architect of Obamacare). *Photo: Washington.edu.*

Hindsight being 20-20, it should be noted that [Robert Kocher, MD](http://www.brookings.edu/bio/robert_kocher), President Obama’s chief healthcare policy adviser on Obamacare, had matriculated by 2011 to: (1) Castlight Health as director along with Ann H. Lamont, Todd Y. Parks’ other company, (2) Park’s venture capitalist, Venrock, and (3) McKinsey & Co. and the Brookings Institution, who are both Facebook’s COO, Sheryl K. Sandberg’s former clients.



Lawrence "Larry" Summers. Director, Square; Adviser, Andreessen-Horowitz; mentor to Facebook’s Sheryl K. Sandberg, Russian oligarchs Yuri Milner and Alisher Usmanov; former director, Barack Obama’s National Economic Council (2008 bailout); believed to be one of the prime movers behind the Facebook cartel. *Photo: Life.*

Kocher’s other boss at the White House, National Economic Council chairman [Lawrence “Larry” Summers](http://www.brookings.edu/bio/lawrence_summers), also works for the Brookings Institution. In short, Kocher’s post-administration job hunt appears to have been political revolving door payback.

Events are being coordinated

In addition, the list of funds pouring cash into Athenahealth and Castlight Health is a clone of Facebook's and Baidu's lists. Blackrock, Morgan Stanley, T. Rowe Price, Fidelity, Vanguard, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan, etc. The evidence is clear. These funds are ***coordinating*** these events while the U.S. Congress and American people are sidelined.

It appears time for Congress to take control, pass legislation to return confiscated properties, impeach and replace many corrupted judges, change the legal discipline procedures by putting lay people in charge, put wrongdoers in jail, establish a Special Prosecutor, and call a Constitutional Convention to change the elements of our system that let this happen.

Our system of government appears to have been badly damaged by unscrupulous people, mostly lawyers, who no longer respect our laws, and clearly do not intend to follow them.

Silicon Valley Watcher – at the intersection of technology and media: A Top Story..

...the plaintiffs had strengthened and that it was less than a \$20m settlement paid by Lucasfilm, Intuit, and Pixar who were also part of the **collusion**. The National Venture Capital Association (**NVCA**) and...

siliconvalleywatcher.com/mt/archives/top_stories/

National Venture Capital Association (NVCA) collusion

AFI researchers have already proven NVCA connections with James W. Breyer, Accel Partners, LLP, Facebook's first chairman and largest shareholder, among six of the ten top mutual fund investors in the Facebook IPO, namely (1) Goldman Sachs, (3) Fidelity, (4) T.Rowe Price, (5) Morgan Stanley, (6) Blackrock and (9) Vanguard.

Sands Capital's association with Todd Y. Park ties Sands Capital to the NVCA as well through Castlight and Athenahealth director, Ann H. Lamont. This now proves that at least seven out of the ten top institutional investors in Facebook were colluding with James W. Breyer to steal Leader Technologies' social networking invention. The Baidu association shows that the collusion also incorporates Breyer's designs for China.

#2: BAIDU, INC.

Fig. 4—Sands Capital Management, LLC BAIDU, INC. holdings, SEC EDGAR. Yellow highlighted rows show reporting periods in which no notices of acquisition were filed by compliance officer, Robert C. Hancock. These notices are important filings for fraud watchdogs.

Fig. 5—Sands Capital Management, LLC BAIDU, INC. holdings, SEC EDGAR. The yellow highlighted box shows that no acquisition notices and no-fraud certifications were filed. In short, Sands

Capital acquired over \$2 billion in Baidu stock without regulatory oversight. These holdings commenced concurrent to the appointment of Todd Y. Park to U.S. CTO on Mar. 9, 2012, after Park had led the development of HealthCare.gov at Health and Human Services, including the embedding of his Athenahealth and Castlight Health software in the HHS infrastructure.

[Jim Breyer – Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia](#)

James W. “Jim” Breyer (born 1961) is an American venture capitalist, founder and CEO of **Breyer Capital**, an investment and venture philanthropy firm, and a partner at Accel Partners, a venture capital firm.

[W en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jim_Breyer](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jim_Breyer)

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WHITE HOUSE SCANDAL SPREADS TO LEADER V. FACEBOOK ... **Collusion** (Allegations) Trade Secrets Theft; Market Manipulation ... **James W. Breyer**, Accel Partners LLP; Facebook director; client of Fenwick & West LLP since the 1990’s; ...

americans4innovation.blogspot.com/2013/05/white-house-scandal-spreads-to-le...

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The First: Jim **Breyer** is speaking at Collision 2015 Posted by: Hugh Gallagher – Posted at: 4:45 pm on December 4, 2014 Category: News

collisionconf.com/news/jim-breyer-collision

The next Sands Capital holding to appear out of nowhere is Baidu, Inc. Closely aligned with China’s Communist government, Baidu is sometimes called “the Chinese Facebook.” [Facebook](#) is rumored to have partnered with Baidu. Baidu notoriously violates human and intellectual property rights. This alliance was concurrent with [James W. Breyer’s](#) movement of tens of billions of venture capital funds out of the United States and into the control of his reclusive father, John P. Breyer, chairman, IDG-Accel-China.

Not only did Sands Capital fail to file a notice of acquisition, but their quarterly report on Aug. 14, 2013 reveals a whopping 12,539% jump in holdings. **That is an unregulated \$867 million change in value.** To our knowledge, neither the market nor regulators even noticed. This destroys the basic principle of transparency.

These risks certainly deserve serious investigation before permitting these people to get access to America's healthcare and data infrastructure. As Eric Snowden proved, it doesn't take much to copy millions of files into the hands of one's adversaries.

Most notable about the sudden appearance of the Baidu Inc. holding is that it occurs just as Athenahealth's founder, Todd Y. Park, is moving from his position as the chief architect of HealthCare.gov at HHS to [Chief Technology Officer for the United States by President Obama, on Mar. 9, 2012](#). And, it occurred at the same time as Sands Capital's 214 million unregulated share acquisition.

On Mar. 29, 2012, just 20 days after Pres. Obama's appointment of Park, [Baidu filed a Form 20-F](#), which is a financial disclosure equivalent to an S-1 public stock prospectus. The timing is six weeks before the Facebook IPO.

[On p. 98, Baidu discloses](#) that its three principal shareholders are:

[Baillie Gifford and T. Rowe Price](#) were #2 and #3 behind Goldman Sachs in the Facebook IPO just six weeks later.

Fig. 6—Robin “Handsome Reward” Yangong Li was installed as CEO of Baidu in Jan. 2004, the very same month that Mark Zuckerberg claims to have built Facebook “in one to two weeks” Leader Technologies said it took them \$10M and 145,000 man-hours to invent social networking. They finished debugging a critical module on Oct. 28, 2003, the same night Zuckerberg hacked the House sites at Harvard. *Photo: L'Express.*

Evidently, Baidu's [Robin Yanhong Li](#) was self-conscious about his newfound wealth, hence the Freudian name he gave for his stock holding—Handsome Reward. Who was doing the rewarding? The evidence is overwhelming. It is James W. Breyer and the Facebook cartel who made Robin Li their front boy in China, just like they made Mark Zuckerberg their front boy in the U.S.

Big Lies

The world cannot hope to advance when its core infrastructures are founded on these Big Lies. Any engineer worth his salt knows that a good building cannot be built upon a corrupt foundation. This is both a law of physics, and a Law of God.

Baidu and Facebook CEOs started the same month—Jan. 2004



Robin Y. Li, CEO, Baidu, Inc.; appointed Jan. 2004, the same month James W. Breyer, Accel Partners LLP, picked Mark Zuckerberg to start Facebook with stolen code from Columbus innovator Leader Technologies. *Photo: RudeButGood.*

Robin Y. Li became CEO of Baidu in Jan. 2004. Coincidentally, that is the *very same month* Mark Zuckerberg claims he started Facebook (“[in one to two weeks](#)”) and launched it on Feb. 4, 2004. The name of his British Virgin Islands hide away for his Baidu holdings probably says it all—Handsome Reward.

The common denominator between the Chinese and American Facebooks is James W. Breyer. At that time was chairman of the National Venture Capital Association, managing partner of Accel Partners LLP, soon to be if not already largest Facebook shareholder, and fellow client of Fenwick & West LLP with Columbus innovator Leader Technologies, Inc.—the proven inventor of social networking. Robin Li’s handsome reward is his willingness to be Breyer’s Chinese front face.

Worried about signaling Chinese involvement

Sands Capital appears to have been worried about the appearance of impropriety? Had they disclosed Baidu in a timely way, eyebrows would have been raised about possible Chinese involvement in the Obama cabinet, as well as in American healthcare and data infrastructure. Something is clearly amiss, otherwise, why would the Baidu nondisclosure be such an outlier in Sands Capital Management, LLC’s SEC reporting?

American securities watchdogs were busy chewing on bones Breyer threw their way

Fig. 7—Administration and Judicial Watchdogs were busy chewing on their Facebook cartel bones. The United States top law enforcement officers and regulators, namely Eric H. Holder, Mary L. Schapiro, Rebecca M. Blank and David J. Kappos were *silent* during Sands Capital’s misconduct. They were busying chewing on the bones that the Facebook cartel had already thrown them. The current Commerce Secretary, Penny S. Pritzker, continues the deafening silence. *Graphic: Clker.com.*

But lest we wonder where our U.S. securities regulators were during this shell game, the Facebook cartel had that covered too. They had already ensured for S.E.C. Chair [Mary L. Schapiro](#), Commerce Secretary #1 [Rebecca M. Blank](#), Commerce Secretary #2 [Penny S. Pritzker](#), Patent Office Director [David J. Kappos](#), Attorney General [Eric H. Holder](#) and Chief Justice [John G. Roberts, Jr.](#) were well cared for.

Among the five Obama administration senior officials alone, they hold at least 177 Facebook “dark pools” funds. In fact, no one in the Obama administration or judiciary had more Facebook cartel dark

pool funds than Chairman Schapiro and Secretary Blank. See two previous posts. These dogs won't hunt. They're too well fed.

#3: Facebook, INC.

The next Sands Capital holding to appear out of thin air is Facebook, Inc. Again, they did not file a Form SC 13G acquisition notice in their [May 14, 2012 reporting](#), which is just four days before the May 18, 2012 Facebook IPO. We're taking bets that Sands Capital will blame it on the NASDAQ "glitch." The purpose of the glitch appears to us to be a smoke screen for these sorts of shady activities.

Then, without filing the stock acquisition notice Form SC 13G subsequently, like they did on all their other stock purchases (except Athenahealth and Baidu), on [Aug. 13, 2012](#) they simply include their Facebook holding of 11.6 million shares valued at \$362 million on their quarterly report.

Why such blatant disregard for SEC disclosure rules? Rules that Sands Capital appears to follow otherwise?

AFI researchers have lived with this cartel conduct for years now, and they believe Sands Capital was determined to get in on the HealthCare.gov "Datapalooza" that Todd Y. Park would bring them via Athenahealth. [Datapalooza](#) is the actual name Mr. Park gave to his dubious "open government" giveaways of healthcare data while CTO at HHS.

AFI researchers believe it is likely that Sands Capital kept the Baidu transactions below the radar screen in order to avoid awkward questions about Park's role in Baidu, Athenahealth and Facebook financings and business activity, especially surrounding Obamacare and HealthCare.gov.

Notices of stock acquisitions are part of America's securities fraud watchdog infrastructure

Readers should know that independent stock monitoring analysts like Morningstar use automated tools that send alerts/notices when companies file notice of new acquisitions. No such alerts occurred for Athenahealth, Facebook or Baidu ***because the notices were never filed.***

Fig. 8—S.E.C. Certifications are legal evidence. When a fund compliance officer signs an S.E.C. filing, he or she is signing an affidavit that is enforceable as evidence in court. If that person lies or in some other way willfully misrepresents the facts, it is the same as lying under oath in a courtroom. The problem for Sands Capital's Robert C. Hancock is that intentional withholding of certifications, with the intent to deceive the public, is illegal since the omission misleads the public who must then rely on inaccurate information.

Sands Capital's compliance officer Robert C. Hancock avoided liability by not signing

Sands Capital's chief compliance officer, Robert C. Hancock, may have been trying to avoid personal liability by not signing what would otherwise be fraudulent representations of truthfulness. Corporate officers like Hancock can be personally liable if they sign knowingly false certifications under oath. It's the same thing as knowingly making a false statement in court.

Here's the SC 13G acquisition certification Hancock avoided signing for initial Athenahealth, Baidu and Facebook stock disclosures:

“Item 10. Certification: By signing below I certify that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, the securities referred to above were acquired and are held in the ordinary course of business and were not acquired and are not held for the purpose of or with the effect of changing or influencing the control of the issuer of the securities and were not acquired and are not held in connection with or as a participant in any transaction having that purpose or effect.

SIGNATURE: After reasonable inquiry and to the best of my knowledge and belief, I certify that the information set forth in this statement is true, complete and correct.”

Here's an example of a later Athenahealth SC 13g acquisition certification that Hancock did sign on [Feb. 13, 2013](#), so he knows what to do, he just didn't do it when Athenahealth stock was first acquired.

Hancock was probably choking on the clause in red above: “... were not acquired and are not held for the purpose of or with the effect of changing or influencing the control of the issuer of the securities and were not acquired and are not held in connection with or as a participant in any transaction having that purpose or effect.”

Hancock may have refused to sign the Athenahealth, Baidu and Facebook certifications because he knew that:

1. Athenahealth was an inside job among selected funds, companies and individuals to control certain markets and global events;
2. Baidu, like Facebook, was a fabrication of James W. Breyer, Accel Partners LLP, and Facebook's largest shareholder; therefore, everything about these stock maneuvers was designed to manipulate the cartel's global agenda, which included the creation of a Chinese repository, potentially for exported U.S. healthcare and other data; and
3. Facebook & Baidu were both running on software property stolen from Columbus innovator, Leader Technologies; therefore, these offerings were used to generate funds for the express purpose of misappropriation of patents, copyrights and trade secrets that would cause and effect the manipulation of the U.S. healthcare sector, among others.

Presumably, Hancock would want to stay out of jail by refusing to put his signature on a form where he clearly knew there was ***an intent to influence business and political events***. Tellingly, he signed ***all*** of his other certifications during this period.

What U.S. judge or regulator is complaining?

Who would complain about Sands Capital's failure to file the S.E.C. Form SC 13G notices of acquisition of Facebook, Baidu and Athenahealth stock?

Click [Official's Name](#) to view his or her financial disclosure.



Not S.E.C Chairman [Mary L. Schapiro](#)—she held a boatload of “dark pool” Fidelity, Vanguard, AllianceBern, TIAA-CREF and T. Rowe Price funds.



Not Commerce Secretary #1 [Rebecca M. Blank](#)—she held TIAA-CREF, Vanguard and Fidelity funds.



Not Commerce Secretary #2 [Penny S. Pritzker](#)—she holds up to \$23.4 million Morgan Stanley, JPMorgan and Goldman Sachs Facebook dark pools.



Not Attorney General [Eric H. Holder](#)—he held T. Rowe Price and Fidelity funds. In fact, Holder held Fidelity Contrafund, the largest single Facebook mutual fund stock holder, valued at \$413 million.

Photos: Holder–Huffington Post; Pritzker–White House; Blank–U.S. London Embassy; Schapiro–NY Times.

Who in the judiciary would complain?

Click [Judge’s Name](#) to view his or her financial disclosure.



Not *Leader v. Facebook* Chief Justice [John G. Roberts, Jr.](#)—he held Microsoft, T. Rowe Price, Fidelity, Janus, Vanguard and Blackrock funds, including Fidelity Contrafund.





Not *Leader v. Facebook* Federal Circuit Judges [Alan D. Lourie](#), [Kimberly A. Moore](#) and [Evan J. Wallach](#)—they held Fidelity, Vanguard and T. Rowe Price funds, including Fidelity Contrafund.



Not *Leader v. Facebook* District Court Judge [Leonard P. Stark](#)—he held Vanguard and Fidelity funds.



Not *Leader v. Facebook* Patent Office Director [David J. Kappos](#)—he held over a million dollars of Vanguard funds.

Photos: Kappos–Politico; Stark–udel.edu; Wallach–Fed. Cir.; Lourie–Fed. Cir.; Moore–mit.edu; Roberts–sltrib.com.

The victims are complaining

On Nov. 19, 2008, [Leader Technologies](#) filed a patent infringement lawsuit against Facebook. Leader proved that Facebook stole the engine that runs Facebook, yet were ruled against anyway by the biased judges mentioned above, based on fabricated evidence.

In May 2012, Facebook IPO investors began filing class action lawsuits, claiming they had been defrauded and damaged by the NASDAQ “glitch.”

Complaints have been filed to inspectors general seeking justice.

Others have filed complaints too, like Paul Ceglia and Rembrandt Social Media.

America’s regulatory mechanisms are supposed to help prevent waste, fraud and abuse, not aid and abet it. The latter is called state-sponsored terrorism and totalitarianism.

In the case of the HealthCare.gov debacle, and the theft of Leader Technologies’ social networking invention, the failure of the S.E.C. to police Sands Capital Management LLC enabled them to press their hidden agenda using fraudulent funds.

That agenda has led to a disastrous HealthCare.gov architecture, corrupted by Athenahealth conflicts of interest, using Leader Technologies’ software which has become a mess of hacked pieces and parts. The agenda also threatens America’s healthcare data security since Sands Capital took its Facebook IPO winnings and bought \$2.2 billion in the Baidu Inc. sometime between Feb-Aug 2013.



Fig. 9—Robert C. Hancock, Chief Compliance Officer, Sands Capital Management, LLC. Misled the American public by failing to file stock acquisition reports in a timely manner for Facebook, Baidu and Athenahealth. These failings concealed substantial Chinese influences regarding Obamacare and American data infrastructure. *Photo: Sands Capital.*



Fig. 10—Jonathan Goodman, Chief Counsel, Sands Capital Management, LLC; former partner, Gibson Dunn LLP (Facebook’s *Leader v. Facebook* law firm, and also counsel to the Federal Circuit and Federal Circuit Bar Association). *Photo: Sands Capital.*

A solid democratic house cannot be built upon a foundation of regulatory corruption

Questions for Sands Capital’s compliance officer Robert C. Hancock would be why he did not submit the notices of new stock acquisition forms with his signed certifications for Athenahealth, Baidu and Facebook. If he had done this, perhaps over six million Americans would not be struggling to replace their cancelled healthcare plans because the program would never have begun.



Thomas G. Hungar, Gibson Dunn LLP. Failed to disclose conflicts of interest in *Leader v. Facebook*; counsel to the Federal Circuit and Microsoft (one of Facebook’s largest stockholders); Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. is a personal mentor. Gibson Dunn LLP also represents the U.S. in *U.S. v. Paul Ceglia (Ceglia v. Zuckerberg)* where U.S. attorney Preet Bharara was formerly employed by Gibson Dunn—an obvious conflict. *Photo: Gibson Dunn LLP.*

Hancock’s ethics counsel is none other than another former Gibson Dunn LLP attorney, [Jonathan Goodman](#). Goodman was at Gibson Dunn LLP with Thomas G. Hungar during the *Leader v. Facebook* case. Goodman’s other former firm, Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, just received [David J. Kappos](#), former director of the U.S. Patent Office, as a new partner. Kappos only arrived after he had ordered an unprecedented 3rd reexamination of Leader Technologies’ patent. Kappos had purchased more than a million dollars of Vanguard “dark pool” funds, all on [Oct. 27, 2009](#), within weeks of his appointment by President Obama.

Robert C. Hancock's ethical lapses have damaged millions of Americans

Apparently, Hancock was advised by Goodman/Gibson Dunn LLP that it was ethically acceptable **not** to file the Athenahealth, Baidu and Facebook stock acquisition notices.

Mr. Goodman's former firm, Gibson Dunn LLP, swirls at the center of everything that has gone horribly wrong with this Obama administration, including the *Leader v. Facebook* judicial corruption scandal.

Had Hancock filed in a timely manner, questions about Todd Y. Park's Athenahealth duplicity could have been raised. Athenahealth's close associations with Chinese interests could have been scrutinized. Sands Capital's role in the Facebook pump and dump IPO scheme would have become visible. Hancock's failure to file and certify did not allow regulatory mechanisms to work.

Fig. 10—Pres. Barack H. Obama. *Photo: jeannotramambazafy.overblog.com*

Questions for President Obama

Given the suspicious timing of your appointment of Todd Y. Park to oversee America's healthcare and digital infrastructure:

1. How much do you know about SANDS CAPITAL'S collusion with the Chinese?
2. What are you going to do about it?
3. What assurances can you give us that the tech people you have hand picked are worthy of America's trust?
4. Will the new systems really protect Americans' privacy, property and security?
5. Did you know that your Securities Chair held stock in Facebook and Baidu *before* the Facebook IPO?



Photo: Politico.



Photo: Wikipedia.

Why didn't your personal White House counsels from Perkins Coie LLP, namely Robert F. Bauer and Anita B. Dunn, husband and wife respectively, submit ethics pledges and financial disclosures? Did you know that Facebook was one of their clients?

7. Where are Todd Y. Park's financial disclosures and written ethics pledges?
8. Did you know that a [Florida judge was ordered to recuse himself](#) from a case where he was Facebook Friends with one of the litigating attorneys? What do [your 50 million "likes"](#) say about your appointment of two of the four judges in the *Leader v. Facebook* case, not even counting all their financial holdings in Facebook, or the [Patent Office's "likes"](#)?

Summary of ethical standards to which the persons above swore solemn public oaths to uphold

Judges— Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges, [Canon 2](#):

"A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities."

Judges—U.S. Courts.gov, Guide to Judiciary Policy, [Ethics and Judicial Conduct, p. 20-2](#):

"Canon 3C(3)(c) provides that a financial interest 'means ownership of a legal or equitable interest, however small,' with certain exceptions not applicable to this situation. Ownership of even one share of stock by the judge's spouse would require disqualification." Many types of mutual fund holdings are not exempt from this policy (p. 106-1 thru 4).

"a judge who chooses to invest in such mutual funds should evaluate whether his or her 'interest' in the fund might be affected substantially by the outcome of a particular case, which would require recusal under Canon 3C(1)(c)" (p. 106-3). [If the largest tech IPO in American history—Facebook—does not apply, then this policy is meaningless sophistry.]

Executive Branch Employees—Standards of ethical conduct for employees of the executive branch [5 C.F.R. §2635.501](#):

"avoid an appearance of loss of impartiality in the performance of his official duties"

Attorneys—Model Rules of Professional Conduct, [Preamble \[6\]](#):

"a lawyer should further the public's understanding of and confidence in the rule of law and the justice system because legal institutions in a constitutional democracy depend on popular participation and support to maintain their authority."

Directors—Business Judgment Rule, [Parnes v. Bally Entertainment Corp.](#), at 1246:

"The business judgment rule 'is a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company [and was not based on self-dealing].'"

The 2008 finance crisis was not an accident it was caused by an out of control industry and at the wheel was chief economic advisor Larry Summers, Summers who played a MAJOR role in the Deregulation of Derivatives, And became PRESIDENT of HARVARD in 2001 And New that FACEBOOK was stolen, and new of the THEFT OF Leader Technologies' when the Winklevoss made a complaint to Lawrence Larry Summers PRESIDENT of HARVARD they were tolled to piss of Summers wanted

THE FACEBOOK CLUB for him self but summers needed that suck up little shit mark zuckerberg to do it, But the IDEA FACEBOOK was not the Winklevoss nor was it Mark Zuckerberg IDEA,

WAYNE CHANG KNOWS HOW FACEBOOK WAS STOLEN

Wayne Chang filed a lawsuit against the Winklevoss brothers knowing that facebook was stolen, Chang said that the Winklevoss brothers merged their company, called ConnectU, with Chang's web development company to make a new company: The Winklevoss Chang Group (WCG). Chang complained that the Winklevosses "expressly agreed that the litigation between ConnectU and Facebook was an asset of ConnectU and an asset of WCG," according to BusinessInsider. Chang never got any money when the Winklevosses received \$65 million as part of the settlement but the \$65 million was just a fuck of from mark zuckerberg Larry Summers and James W. Breyer. Even the "like" button was stolen from the family of the late Dutch inventor, Johannes Van Der Meer

More of Larry Summers friends

chief economic advisor Larry Summers Henry Paulson of Goldman Sachs and Geithner to pay Goldman Sachs 100 cents on the dollar Paulson and Bernanke ask congress for \$700 billion to bail out the banks. BUT NO BAILOUT FOR LEHMAN BROTHERS GONE AND THE ORDERS CAME FROM GOLDMAN SACHS TO LARRY SUMMERS NOT TO BAIL THEM OUT?? just so Goldman Sachs can be number ONE? IN 1999, at the urging of Summers and Rubin congress passed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and cleared the way for future mergers, in 1998 someone tried to regulate them it was Brooksley Born but Larry Summers kill this, Summers had 13 bankers in his office and directing her to stop Greenspan Rubin and SEC chairman Arthur Levitt issued a joint statement condemning Born the securities and exchange commission agency conducted no major investigation in to the bank during the bubble and 146 people were gutted from the securities enforcement division? When David contacted securities and exchange commission about LEHMAN BROTHERS GOLDMAN SACHS AND LARRY SUMMERS AND FACEBOOK there were only four people WORKING THERE and then down to just ONE?? and his job was to turn the lights out

OBAMA picked Mary Schapiro the former CEO of FINRA to run the securities and exchange commission who held stock in both Facebook and Baidu (China) before the Facebook IPO via her investment in T. Rowe Price the securities and exchange commission agency also ignored numerous whistleblower warnings of improper "dark pools" activity, (PAY OF)

Larry Summers + President Barack Obama picked Mary Schapiro the former CEO of FINRA to run the securities and exchange commission who held stock in both Facebook and Baidu (China) before the Facebook IPO via her investment in T. Rowe Price the securities and exchange commission agency also ignored numerous whistleblower warnings of improper "dark pools" activity, (PAY OF)

Larry Summers + President Barack Obama (appointed Leonard P. Stark to the judge's seat in Delaware Federal District Court eight days after Stark's court allowed Facebook to get away with jury and court manipulation of an on-sale bar verdict which was attained without a single piece of hard evidence; Barack and Michelle Obama were evidently protecting their 47 million "likes" on Facebook)

Larry Summers + President Barack Obama new found friends, Facebook cartel had it all covered, They had it all already S.E.C. Chair Mary L. Schapiro, Commerce Secretary #1 Rebecca M. Blank, Commerce Secretary #2 Penny S. Pritzker, Patent Office Director David J. Kappos, Attorney General Eric H. Holder and Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. were well cared for.

Larry Summers + President Barack Obama + Baidu(China) All had back door keys to the NSA then add your healthcare (Obamacare), financial (Wall Street), telephone and online data (NSA) to your Dark Profile, and you have the ultimate Big Brother file on every person on the planet and CHINA HAD THE BACK DOOR KEYS TO THE NSA???? with facebook and their repeated breaches of security and their now ubiquitous intrusions on people's privacy?

Larry Summers + Facebook The 2008 finance crisis was not an accident it was caused by an out of control industry and at the wheel was chief economic advisor Larry Summers, Summers who played a MAJOR role in the Deregulation of Derivatives, And became PRESIDENT of HARVARD in 2001 And New that FACEBOOK was stolen, and new of the THEFT OF Leader Technologies' when the Winklevoss made a complaint to lawrence larry summers PRESIDENT of HARVARD they where tolled to piss of summers wonted THE FACEBOOK CLUB for him self but summers needed that suck up little shit mark zuckerberg to do it, The 2008 finance crisis was not an accident it was caused by LARRY SUMMERS?

Larry Summers + election manipulation on FB Since that data was not equally available to the opposition, use of this data about you amounts to election manipulation. The fact that so many foreigners are associated with Facebook amounts to foreign influence on U.S. elections, which is illegal. This undue influence hurts every American. Ditto for the sovereign elections in Germany, France or any other country, like fucking Germany ASS-HOLE The Facebook Club run by Larry Summers used the promise of wild Facebook IPO returns as the currency for their plans to install Barack Obama as President and press their global data gathering agenda

Larry Summers + FB + Robin Y. Li Robin Y. Li became CEO of Baidu in Jan. 2004. Coincidentally, that is the very same month Mark Zuckerberg claims he started Facebook ("in one to two weeks") and launched it on Feb. 4, 2004. The name of his British Virgin Islands hide away for his Baidu holdings probably says it all—Handsome Reward. Sands Capital appears to have been worried about the appearance of impropriety? Had they disclosed Baidu in a timely way, eyebrows would have been raised about possible Chinese involvement in the Obama cabinet, as well as in American healthcare and data infrastructure. Something is clearly amiss, Robin Y. Li NEW THAT FB WAS STOLEN and that it was Larry Summers who was running FACEBOOK ow shit?

Larry Summers + friends chief economic advisor Larry Summers Henry Paulson of Goldman Sachs and Geithner to pay Goldman Sachs 100 cents on the dollar Paulson and Bernanke ask congress for \$700 billion to bail out the banks. BUT NO BAILOUT FOR LEHMAN BROTHERS GONE AND THE ORDERS CAME FROM GOLDMAN SACHS TO LARRY SUMMERS NOT TO BAIL THEM OUT?? just so Goldman Sachs can be number ONE? Paulson was a dick who did not know how to work out shit if someone stuck a spade up his ass

President Obama claimed last night that there was “not even a smidgen of corruption” in the IRS scandal. Really now Mr. President? How can any self-respecting person make such a claim about a sprawling government agency with 106,000 employees? Such a claim telegraphs the massive corruption that we have proved exists within this administration. An administration where Yes is No and wrong is right. Given that, a No from Obama means a Yes.

Here’s an excerpt from the New York Times article:

Mr. O’Reilly responded that there were “unanswered questions” and asked again if there was corruption in the I.R.S.

“There were some boneheaded decisions,” the president said.

“But no mass corruption?” Mr. O’Reilly asked.

“Not even mass corruption — not even a smidgen of corruption,” Mr. Obama said.

SOURCE: “Obama Is Tackled by O’Reilly in Pre-Game Interview” by Peter Baker, Feb. 22, 2014, The New York Times http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/03/us/politics/obama-is-tackled-by-oreilly-before-game.html?_r=0

A couple of additional items to inform your congressperson about along with the overwhelming conflicts of interest already presented here David Kappos encouraged his employee’s, of whom include the judges that work for the USPTO, to use Facebook. He states on the USPTO website. “I’m confident our Facebook presence will complement the USPTO Web site as a means of communicating and connecting with the public and our stakeholders in the intellectual property community.

On the other hand, Chief Justice Roberts at the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals Annual Conference in 2011 said that he recommends to the law clerks not to use social media, Facebook and Twitter, because a person could gain insight by stray comments and that would not be good. Justice Breyer, who has a Twitter and Facebook account, stated at a House Appropriations Subcommittee, “Judges wear black robes so that they will resist the temptation to publicize themselves,” Breyer said. “Because we speak for the law, and that is to be anonymous. So I wouldn’t want to have followers on the tweeter or the Facebook page but for my children, and I can get in touch with them anyway.”

So the question is, If Chief Justice Roberts discourages law clerks from using Facebook and Justice Breyer is against using it publicly, then why in the world would Kappos open a Facebook account for the USPTO, and encourage the patent office employees, which includes 50-100 patent judges, to use it and then open a Directors reexam at the same time against Leader?

His conduct appears suspect and corrupt!

[Rain Onyourparade](#)

Check out this Russian (OK, Ukrainian) risk to HealthCare.org.

Belarus link to HealthCare.gov raises concerns over possible cyber attack,

<http://fxn.ws/1gJ1auQ>

The Ukrainian software official, Valery Tsepka told a local radio station in Minsk that U.S. Health & Human Services is “one of our clients” and that “we are helping Obama complete his insurance reform.”

HHS was run by Todd Park, the guy with the Chinese connections also. What’s wrong with American programmers for American healthcare. This breach of U.S. sovereignty by this President is just criminal.

There is no information missing here. Form 13g is only used when a fund acquires more than 5% of a publicly traded company. That’s why you don’t see these disclosures here. No conspiracy afoot; this is just basic SEC procedure.

And I am pretty shocked that you have explicitly accused Fenwick and West of providing source code to Mr. Zuckerberg? Fenwick is a very well regarded firm and I cannot even begin to imagine something like that ever happened. But in any event I think you are setting yourself up for a very nasty libel lawsuit.

[K. Craine](#)

Mark. The 5% rule is SC 13G/A, 13d-1(a). However, your conclusion is misleading, hopefully not knowingly so. The rule for investment companies is much more strict. The rule (a) you cite mainly applies to corporations and their holders, which can include an investment company’s holdings. But, an investment company has stricter reporting rules for its portfolio investments. It must report everything, not just more than 5% holdings. Rule 13 has four main sections, you cited only (a). It also has Rule 13d-1(b), Rule 13d-1(c) and Rule 13d-1(d). <http://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/17/240.13d-1>

Easier to follow regarding investment companies is 15 U.S. CODE § 80A-8 – REGISTRATION OF INVESTMENT COMPANIES

<http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/15/80a-8>

We’ll use Sands Capital’s other filings to disprove your statement. Sands Capital has filed many reports for investments of less than 5%.

Here are some examples:

CREE, INC. on Feb. 14, 2012 – 249,600 shares representing ***0.22% ownership***.

<http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/895419/000102006612000004/cree0212.txt>

FMC TECHNOLOGIES, INC. on Feb. 14, 2012 – 11,144,206 shares representing ***4.68%

ownership***. <http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1020066/000102006612000007/fti0212.txt>

VARIAN MEDICAL SYSTEMS, INC. on Feb. 13 – 56,650 shares representing ***0.05% ownership***

<http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/203527/000102006612000002/var0212.txt>

We could go on. Bottom line. Investment companies must report “in the public interest or for the protection of investors.” 15 U.S. CODE § 80A–8(b).

Almost forgot to mention. Feb. 4 (yesterday) was the 10th anniversary of Mark Zuckerberg’s, James W. Breyer’s, Accel Partners LLP’s, Fenwick & West LLP’s theft of Leader Technologies’ U.S. Patent No. 7,139,761 invention.

“Lithium ion batteries, when they burn, cause brain cancer, liver cancer and other, potentially lethal, toxic poisoning. Certain regulators are told to “ignore these issues” because certain lithium ion investors donated cash to certain campaigns. The chemicals for lithium ion batteries come from countries which needed to be invaded in order to monopolize the mining of those chemicals. Certain politicians are told to “ignore these issues” because certain lithium ion investors engaged in war profiteering in order to control those minerals.

The FAA has issued numerous warnings and videos showing that lithium ion batteries do spontaneously self-ignite and crash airplanes. Numerous people have been killed in lithium ion plane crashes. Certain regulators are told to “ignore these issues” because certain lithium ion investors donated cash to certain campaigns. Flight MH370 was carrying tons of lithium ion batteries in it’s cargo hold.

Lithium ion batteries have self-ignited and set numerous children and senior citizens on fire. They have set homes on fire. They have set offices on fire. They have set Apple Stores on fire. You constantly hear about passenger airlines being forced to land because passengers “smell smoke in the cabin”. This is almost always a lithium ion battery going off in the cabin and exposing all of the passengers to it’s carcinogenic ignition vapors. There have been multiple recalls of Tesla for fires including the battery charger cord setting homes on fire and the need for an entire titanium add-on plate to cover the whole underside of the Tesla. Tesla’s have now been involved in many deaths.

Silicon Valley investors took over the lithium ion battery market, along with Goldman Sachs (recently called before Congress for this very same “commodity manipulation”), because they knew they were getting large government hand-outs from the Department of Energy in exchange for campaign contributions.

Lithium ion batteries lose their power and memory over a relatively short time. Lithium ion batteries blow up when they get wet or bumped. Fisker Motors went out of business when millions of dollars of Fisker cars, using lithium ion batteries, got wet and all blew up. Tesla battery packs have blown up, on multiple occasions, from simply hitting bumps in the road. Manufacturing these kinds of batteries is so

toxic that even China, a country known for the most minimal regulations, has closed a huge number of battery factories because of the massive numbers of deaths they caused to workers and nearby residents.

Journalists have published a glut of articles exposing cover-ups about the dangers and corruption involved with lithium ion batteries. The U.S. Government and numerous groups have filed charges against Panasonic, and similar battery companies for bribery, corruption, dumping, price fixing and other unethical tactics.

Every key investor in lithium ion was also a campaign donor who also received huge federal cash from the Department of Energy in the same funding cycle in which they paid campaign contributions. By driving a Tesla, in addition to the common public perception that it is a “douche-bag car”, there is something far worse about driving it. You are making a public statement to the world that you support organized crime by driving this car. Here is why: Investigators say that, political operatives David Plouffe, Rahm Emanuel, Steven Rattner, Bill Daly, David Axelrod and Robert Gibbs arranged with Silicon Valley investors to take over the lithium battery industry in order to monopolize the trillions of dollars of lithium, and related mining deals, in Afghanistan. The Afghan war has now cost American’s over 6 trillion dollars, with almost nothing to show for it.

They say that they traded federal funding for campaign support assisted by Harry Reid and Dianne Feinstein, who received numerous stock and cash kickbacks in the scheme. They say they used the money to fund political campaigns. They used the Silicon Valley investors internet companies, (mostly Google), to manipulate voter perceptions and web searches in favor of their agenda. The Silicon Valley investors received favorable federal laws, tax gifts, free federal loans, stock bumps and other perks. The Silicon Valley investors companies that used the Afghan minerals: Abound, Solyndra, Fisker, Ener1, Tesla, and many, many more, that received the Department of Energy kickback funds, managed by Steven Chu, have all either failed, been raided, been charged with fraud or otherwise turned out to be disasters because they were based on a financial fraud skimming scheme instead of a good business plan. Anyone who spoke out about details of the scam, particularly journalists, had a character assassination hit-job ordered on them by Axelrod, Gibbs and Carney; using tabloid fronts that they controlled.

All of these facts are known, in great detail, by many investigators. Nearly a million pages of evidence exist. A Special Prosecutor is required to perform proper prosecutions. No matter what political party you belong to: This is organized crime against the public and you are supporting it if you drive a Tesla. All of this information can now be validated, and confirmed, on any law enforcement or investigative

Nearly \$27 billion dollars was invested by venture capitalists in 2012. That \$27 billion was invested across 3,723 deals, making the average deal hover at a little over \$7 million.

While that number may seem staggering to many people, it's about average for VC investments made since the dot com bubble burst between 2000 and 2001, according to the [National Venture Capital](#)

[Association](#) (NVCA). Yes, the economic impact of the dot com bubble was horrendous, but it did spawn a renewed sense of innovation in startup development.

Companies are running leaner than ever, and because of that VCs are more willing to invest in companies who don't pride themselves on their burn rate. Still, raising venture capital funding can be a risky business if you aren't realistic about what to expect.

Here are some things to think about if you are considering raising your first round.

1. Statistically, you will fail

The venture capital investment process is a complicated one and potential companies are vetted thoroughly before they are committed to. With that being said, just because your company is backed by a major VC you aren't guaranteed success.

Think about those 3,723 deals that happened in 2012. In that same year there were only 49 IPOs and 449 mergers and acquisitions (M&A) deals. Granted, those exits came from companies that were invested in probably a decade ago, it is still an interesting ratio to consider.

Micah Rosenbloom, a venture partner at [Founders Collective](#), said that historically, only one out of every 10 companies that a firm invests in with a given fund will be successful. That's not to say that all of the remaining companies will fail, though. According to Tomasz Tunguz, a partner at [Redpoint Ventures](#), "Typical portfolio company failure rates across the industry defined as either shutdowns or returning capital are roughly 40%-50%."

This isn't to discourage hopeful founders that are seeking capital, but to ground your expectations in reality. Besides, entrepreneurship is about having the courage to fail, right? The fact that you are more likely to fail is a fact of life for venture-backed companies, it is not an expectation for the VCs making the investment.

"You never invest in a company thinking that it will fail," Tunguz said.

A VC investment in your company does not guarantee success, but it does mean you have someone in your corner who believes you have what it takes to make this thing work. Once you have a VC in your corner, you have to make sure you are in sync on what it will take to make this a worthy investment. More importantly, you have to know how long it will take for this investment to pay off.

2. There is a timeframe for ROI

"Typical venture funds are structured as 10 year commitments for the limited partners who invest in the fund," Tunguz said.

Venture capital firms are ten-year vehicles for investors, but that doesn't mean that all companies will be ten years old when they return on the investment. Rosenbloom mentioned that initial investments are made in the first three years. After the portfolio has been established, a firm will typically make follow-on investments over the remainder of the fund's lifecycle.

Ten years may sound like a long time, but you have to consider how long companies like Coca-Cola have been around (since 1892) and some companies that were started in the 2000s have a comparable valuation to Coke. Founders Collective is usually the first institutional round in a company, and Rosenbloom said that they aren't looking for the next cool invention.

"As a venture capital firm, we are not in the business of funding inventors or inventions, we are in the business of funding fast-growing companies," Rosenbloom said.

Considering the first three years as initial investments, a company could only have seven years to "make it." Some VCs, like Rosenbloom, consider seven years the average age for ROI, and the data from NVCA supports that claim.

The NVCA reported in their [2013 Yearbook](#) that, of the 49 IPOs that happened in 2012, the median age for IPO was 7 years old and the mean age for a company to IPO was 8 years old. While some have argued that it is taking longer for startups to mature, Tunguz argues, "The gestation period will likely fall some because of the tremendous exit activity in M&A and IPOs in the last 24 months."

To help you make it through the whirlwind of growth that can happen after an investment, you have to know how much capital you need and when you need it.

3. You can take too much funding

"All too often, entrepreneurs will think of raising a Series A round from a reputable VC as the end goal and don't think they can be successful unless they do so. So they reprioritize raising capital over building a valuable product or service and usually end up asking for too much money too soon which ends up in a failed fundraising attempt or a raise on bad terms for the entrepreneur," said Hrach Simonian, a principal at [Canaan Partners](#).

As I mentioned in a [previous article](#), knowing how much money you need can make all the difference in your venture capital experience. It starts by understanding how much money you need and only raising that much money. Raising too much money can force entrepreneurs to make decisions they aren't ready to make.

"If you raise too much money, you have to swing for the fences," Rosenbloom said.

You want the amount of money you raise to coincide with the benchmark you are trying to hit. If you don't have a specific benchmark in mind (which you really should), a good rule of thumb is to consider the amount of capital it takes to sustain your operations for 18 months, then add 25-50 percent for added flexibility and seek to raise that amount of money.

Tunguz said that raising too much capital is far from the gravest sin to be committed by an entrepreneur, "But having a huge sum of money in the bank can entice founders to dramatically increasing burn rate or diffuse the company's energy among many projects. It can be challenging to maintain the same execution discipline created by the scarcity of capital when the bank account is overflowing."

Another risk of raising too much capital is setting the bar too high for your exit. By doing so you will run the risk of not being able to grow into the expectation that was set by raising a large amount of money.

Remember to raise enough to get yourself to the next stage where you can assess whether or not you need to raise more money. Keep in mind that once you choose a firm and raise those funds, that VC will probably get a permanent seat on your board of advisors. Choose carefully, because you are usually stuck with that investor for good.

4. You can't fire your VC

Too many founders abdicate their due diligence when it comes to the firms they end up pitching. Each venture capital firm has its own general focus on specific sectors or verticals. Taking that to a more granular scale, each partner within each specific firm maintains investments in a focused area of expertise.

Founders typically don't appreciate the incentive structure on the side of the fund, which is based on the size and the dynamics of that fund. Understand how the fund makes money to determine if it is a good fit for you. The size of the fund will be a good determinant for whether or not your company will present a quality investment opportunity for the partners.

You have to think of your VC firm as another partner in your business. This leads to one of the single most important aspects of your startup/VC relationship: Make sure your goals for your company line up with your VC's goals for his or her investment. By aligning your goals with those of your VC, you can help potentially avoid a disaster scenario.

"The disaster scenario is that the founding team wants to do something different than the board," Tunguz said.

The risk/reward curves are different for entrepreneurs than they are for VCs, and board members (including your VC) have a legal responsibility to take into account the goals of the investors. So, if your company is losing steam and an acquisition opportunity comes along that is in the best interest of your investors, they might push you to take it, even if it means you don't get paid.

But, of course, you can avoid all that potential heartache by not taking funding to begin with.

5. Failure isn't death

Micah Rosenbloom describes venture capital as jet fuel. If you want to drive somewhere 100 miles away, you'll probably drive there. If you want to get from New York to Los Angeles, you're going to have to fly, and you will need fuel to power that jet.

Venture capital gives you potential—the potential for major success and the potential to fail spectacularly. The good news here—the gospel of venture capital if you will—is that failure is not the end of the story if you play your cards right. Despite stereotypes, most VCs are actually looking to build relationships with entrepreneurs, not just make money off of them.

"The Valley is small, and life is long," Tunguz said.

According to Tunguz, when it comes to his work at Redpoint Venture, great relationships are the motivation, because even if you fail it's not the end of the world. What is much more important is how you fail and how transparent you are throughout the process. If you keep people informed when you hit a snag and ask for help with a problem, you can build trust with your investors.

Venture capital investors want to know that you will be a good steward of the funds they placed under your control. If you can prove yourself a highly competent entrepreneur and someone who will push as hard as they can to make an idea work, failure will not mean the end of your career as an entrepreneur. At that point, even if you fail, past investors and people involved with your company will be far more likely to fund your next project if they trust the way you work.

As an entrepreneur, burning bridges is unwise. Treat people with respect to build social capital, but don't see them as just a resource either. Other than that, always remember that if you're going to fail, fail big and go down swinging.

About Conner Forrest - Conner Forrest is a Staff Writer for TechRepublic. He covers Google and startups and is passionate about the convergence of technology and culture.

Silicon Valley's Secret Mainstream Media Control Directives

This is the document that the Silicon Valley Cartel never want you to see. You have heard of the term: “*The Mainstream Media*”, right? The Silicon Valley oligarchs now own and control 95% of the “*Mainstream Media*”. This is the playbook they use to control the media and public perceptions:

Never print a copy of this document or show it to anyone outside of a Google secured conference room.

We are a business and every voter is a consumer and a tool for the effort. Their data is our fuel. “Politics” is entirely about business and controlling our revenue interests.

These are the directives to all media editors and media owners:

✂ In the handling of those in the media audience rather than refer to the opponent as the “Party” or “the Administration” refer to the Candidate by name only.

✂ Use only our internal news wire service and private Google Docs. Our system will send out a political clip-sheet every week, to thousands of “thought leaders” and “influencers”. We will send out memes, cartoons, editorials, and articles to 200,000 news contacts. Rural newspapers are so desperate for copy that many will print whatever our Service sends them, including documents that are basically press releases disguised as editorials endorsing whatever political position we advance.

✂ Pretend that you are the Voice of the People. Use radio ads, sponsored by the PAC false-front groups with the word “Citizens” or “taxpayers” in the name.

✂ Attack, attack, attack. You can't wage a defensive campaign and win! Use millions of our troll-farms, click-processors and meat-puppet algo's to push the message. Nobody has the influence server array volume that we have.

✂ Keep it simple. Rhyming is good. The low intellect voter's in the South love rhymes. Never explain anything. The more you have to explain the more difficult it is to win support.

✂ Say the same thing over and over again. We have to get a voter's attention seven times per slogan to control their intentions. Anybody that hears the same thing seven times is programmed to it for life. Remember, most citizens have the IQ of a child.

‡ Subtlety is your enemy. Words that lean on the mind are no good. They must dent it. Simplify, simplify, simplify. A wall goes up when you try to make Mr. and Mrs. Average American Citizen work or think.

‡ Fan flames. We need more partisanship in this country. Never shy from controversy; instead, win the controversy. The average American doesn't want to be educated; he doesn't want to improve his mind; he doesn't even want to work, consciously, at being a good citizen, But there are two ways you can interest him in a campaign, and only two that we have ever found successful. You can put on a fight or you can put on a Show. So if you can't fight, PUT ON A SHOW! And if you put on a good show, Mr. and Mrs. America will turn out to see it. Talk about sex changes, immigration, dead polar bears, whales and all of the things that get the public emotionally riled up.

‡ Winner takes all. If you launch a campaign for a new car, your client doesn't expect you to lead the field necessarily in the first year, or even the tenth year, But in politics, they don't pay off for PLACE OR SHOW! You have to win, if you want to stay in business. We must win each election at any cost. Data manipulation is not "cheating", it is "being clever"! Deal with the blow-back AFTER you we win the election because then WE CONTROL the federal budget.

‡ This must be a campaign that makes people hear the beat of drums and the thunder of bombs. . . . This must be A CALL TO ARMS IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA AND DIVERSITY!

‡ Where the men go, the women will follow. Focus on male emotional trigger slogans first. Women are sheep when it comes to the campaign.

‡ Always, and only, use our pre-screened 15 minute talking script. Try not to speak for more than fifteen minutes. The dumber people get bored. Never speak for more than half an hour.

‡ Reject any health care issues that affect our supporters ability to make money. Say often: "You can't beat something with nothing"

‡ Lobby your local newspaper editors. Have your staff make in-person drop-by's to every newspaper office to persuade editors to change their positions. Buy them lunch with unlimited menus. Many of these newspapers do a vast amount of advertising business with us and received hundreds of words of free copy, each week, from our news services. They will not risk losing our advertising dollars when the internet is killing their business. We can cut out all of the newspapers supporting any opposition goal in 70 days if we stay on our goal. We have the budget to spend 10 dollars against every individual dollar the opposition campaign spends to push it.

‡ Mention "Politically-Controlled social limits." often. Make the public think that the opposition wants to control their bedroom

antics and limit their sex. Citizens flip out if they think the government will limit how kinky they can get.

✂ In private conversations with Senators, use this talking point:

" We need you to vote against all Compulsory privacy bills pending before the Legislature. We have enough data regimentation in this country now. Certainly we don't want to be forced to go to A media source, or to pay extra for free media. That system was born in "Nazi Germany" and is part and parcel of what our boys are fighting overseas to stop. Let's not adopt media limits on Google and Facebook here."

✂ This must be a campaign to arouse and "alert the American people in every walk of life, until it generates a great public crusade and a fundamental fight for freedom, any other plan of action, in view of the drift toward right wing despotism all over the world, would invite disaster."

✂ Our counter-measures campaign has now been distributed, by the hundreds of thousands, to reporters and editors, among others, and to every member of Congress.

✂ A Top immediate objective is the defeat of the compulsory privacy protection programs as Silicon Valley will lose most income if we can't surveil the public. The long-term objective is to put a permanent stop to the agitation for socialized web in this country by (a) awakening the people to the danger of a politically-controlled, government-regulated privacy system; (b) convincing the people, through a Nation wide campaign of education, of the superior advantages of private web, as practiced in America, over the State-dominated media systems of other countries.

✂ We must educate every politician in the United States about the dangers of privacy rights to their political funding.

✂ Hitler and Stalin all have used the opiate of free internet to deaden the pain of lost liberty and lull the people into non-resistance. Old World contagion of compulsory privacy rules, if allowed to spread to our New World, will mark the beginning of the end of modern technology institutions in America. It will only be a question of time until the railroads, the steel mills, the power industry, the banks and the farming industry are nationalized. We must stop these Conservatives on the front line before they take this to our porches.

✂ We must use unions and tree-huggers, Grassroots Campaigns, Inc., Moveon, BLM, etc. to put people on the streets of every major city with clipboards to collect money and distribute propaganda. Encourage

your staff to engage them in long-winded conversations to cut down their through-put

‡ Our campaign is carrying its case to the people of America in a grass roots crusade which we hope, with your help, and the help of tens of thousands of others, will reach every corner of this country. We have billions of dollars booked on this grass-roots effort. We WILL turn the oppositions sensible, popular, and urgently needed legislative reform into a bogeyman so scary that, no American will want it.

‡ The great need is to go on the offensive and to attack.

‡ Politics is just like show business. . . . You begin with a hell of an opening, you coast for a while, and you end with a hell of a closing. We have a great closing!

‡ Voters are basically lazy tools, basically uninterested in making an effort to understand what we're talking about, Reason requires a higher degree of discipline, of concentration; impression is easier, Reason pushes the viewer back, it assaults him, it demands that he agree or disagree; impression can envelop him, invite him in, without making an intellectual demand. . When we argue with citizens we demand that he make the effort of replying. We seek to engage his intellect, and for most people this is the most difficult work of all. The emotions are more easily roused, closer to the surface, more malleable. Voters are, simply, idiots. Treat them as such and keep them amused by the shiny object.

‡ We are leading men's minds, this is the reason Washington must be in the hands of the most ethical, principled people: US! We are people with real concern for the world. We are smarter than the average person and more technologically advanced. We know what is truly right.

The Names Of The Cartel Membership

These are the people known as "The Deep State", "The Silicon Valley Cartel", "The Tech Mafia", et al:

“To date, every single one of the targets that attacked us: 1.) have been sued; 2.) investigated by the government and our private investigators; 3.) had case files opened on them by the IRS, DOJ, GAO, FBI, FEC, SEC, FTC and others; 4.) placed under surveillance; 5.) had whistle-blowers and ex-staff expose them; 6.) been tracked across every social media post that has ever been made about them; 7.) had all of their illicit campaign funding and covert PAC cash exposed; 8.) had all of their family trust and shell corporation hiding places tracked and exposed by AI forensic software that works around-the-clock and 9.) placed on law enforcement watch-lists. Even the “untouchables” like Musk, Tesla, Google, Facebook, et al, now have nut-crunching law-suits filed against them, with more coming. There is no place to hide! You tried to kill us and we killed you back you criminal scum-bags!”

The following Parties participated in the scam, thought they were “untouchable” and found out that the arm of the law is very long, the hatred of the public for corruption is profound and that hundreds of public service groups have identified, tracked and assisted in their termination. This is the current list of the primary political mobster-scammers in this corruption who are all connected by financial, email and forensic FBI, SEC, FTC and CIA-class evidence. It is well known that every significant hacking and surveillance tool from the CIA, NSA, Fire-Eye and the FSB has been leaked on to the internet. Every teenage hacker is now exposing the last 20 years of these crooks crimes. These are not all of them. These are just some of the most audacious ones.

They are all under deep investigation, surveillance and targeted for 100% legal termination using all the info found freely on the web and whistle-blower tips:

The Mob Bosses That Colluded, Organized and Planned These Srock Market Schemes Together:

- **Google/Alphabet/YouTube** – Hiding under the guise of "Alphabet"; Charged with manipulation by multiple nations and national organizations; charged with crimes; charged with privacy harvesting frauds against the public; raided for tax fraud; loss of public trust; charged with campaign rigging by TV shows, presidential candidates, federal investigators and news media; under investigation for stock market pumping;
- **Steven Chu** – Secretary of Energy (Sent packing/fired/forced to resign. Sued for corruption, publicly shamed by news media and Congress. Under ongoing investigation and surveillance)
- **The NVCA, AKA National Venture Capital Association**, is the lobbyist and Cartel organizer behind much of the misdeeds of this group, they bribe politicians, organize anti-patent campaigns and promote a RICO-violating anti-trust law violating set of tactics to protect their members and to harm competitors, most of the women and blacks that have worked at the NVCA have said they experienced abuse. The NVCA has set-up a tactical program to put a

global funding blockade on any group, CEO or inventor who competes with their existing companies.

- **SpaceX** and their Star Link Web satellites are a domestic spying operation. They send all of the data that goes over their links to privacy abusers, data harvesters, and political spying operations. Friends don't let friends use Star Link. Any 14 year old hacker can hack into Star Links web streams. Star Link is a danger to global privacy on an epic scale.
- **Lachlan Seward** – Manager to Steven Chu (Sent packing/fired/forced to resign. Sued for corruption. publicly shamed by news media and Congress. Under ongoing investigation and surveillance))
- **Rahm Emanuel** – White House strong-arm (Sent packing/fired/forced to resign and his Chicago finance head was indicted for Corruption)(Under ongoing investigation and surveillance)
- **Robert Gibbs** – White House press secretary (Sent packing/fired/forced to resign)(Under ongoing investigation and surveillance))(accused of political bribery and kickbacks; tax evasion, and more...)
- **David Axelrod** – White House strategist (Sent packing/fired/forced to resign)(Under ongoing investigation and surveillance))(accused of political bribery and kickbacks; tax evasion, and more...)
- **Barack Obama** – White House leader (Under investigation. Universally disdained in the press. shunned by his own party)
- **Larry Summers** – White House finance head (Fired)(Under ongoing investigation and surveillance))(accused of political bribery and kickbacks; tax evasion, and more...)
- **Bill Daley** – White House strong-arm (Sent packing/fired/forced to resign)(Under ongoing investigation and surveillance))
- **Steve Rattner**- White House Car Deals Director working in the West Wing and then with In-Q-Tel (Fired- Indicted in NY State for SEC Fraud/Corruption)(Under ongoing investigation and surveillance))
- **Eric Holder** – Attorney General- DOJ. Eric Holder was nominated and appointed by the very individuals who ran the scam, created the marching orders, got the insider cash and ordered the hit jobs on their competitors. He ran the cover-up and halted any investigations into the crimes in order to protect his corrupt backers and business partners. He has been financially connected to every person, group and business who is charged with organizing and operating the scam. (Forced to resign) (Charged with staff & VC Protections and blockade of FBI and Special Prosecutor deployments in order to run the cover-up)(Under ongoing investigation and surveillance)

- **Larry Page** – Owner- Google (Under ongoing investigation and surveillance)(accused of political bribery and kickbacks; tax evasion, and more...)
- ***Eric Schmidt – Owner- Google (Under ongoing investigation and surveillance)(accused of political bribery and kickbacks; tax evasion, and more, a national coalition is actively exposing his sexual perversions, sex penthouses, etc...)***
- **John Doerr** – Owner – Kleiner Perkins. “Godfather” – Silicon Valley Cartel (Under ongoing investigation and surveillance))(accused of political bribery and kickbacks; tax evasion, and more...)(All of his personal assets, investments and portfolio holdings are under investigation and targeted for extinction)
- **Steve Westly** – Campaign Bundler (Under ongoing investigation and surveillance))(accused of political bribery and kickbacks; tax evasion, and more...)(All of his personal assets, investments and portfolio holdings are under investigation and targeted for extinction)
- **Richard Blum** – Senator Feinsteins Husband (He is now under investigation. Has had contracts interdicted by Congressional action)(accused of political bribery and kickbacks; tax evasion, and more...)
- **Ray Lane** – VC (Charged with Federal Tax Fraud)(Under ongoing investigation and surveillance))(accused of political bribery and kickbacks; tax evasion, and more...)
- **Elon Musk** – CEO – Tesla (Under ongoing investigation and surveillance) & in multiple lawsuits for fraud)(Now uncovered as largest individual recipient of government payola in history)(accused of political bribery and kickbacks; tax evasion, and more...) (All of his personal assets, investments and portfolio holdings are under investigation and targeted for extinction) He cuts up and tortures animals for his Neuralink, spies on citizens with his SpaceX and runs an EV monopoly and causes genocide with his cobalt and lithium mines with his corrupt Tesla cars. His life is devoted to weird sex, drugs, political bribes and stock market manipulations.
- **Andy Bechtolsheim** – VC- Insider campaign backer (He is now under investigation)(accused of political bribery and kickbacks; tax evasion, and more...)
- **Vinod Khosla** – VC Campaign backer (Under ongoing investigation and surveillance)(in multiple lawsuits)(accused of political bribery and kickbacks; tax evasion, and more...Exposed in 60 Minutes and CNN news coverage)
- **Martin LaGod** – VC Campaign backer from Firelake (Under ongoing investigation and surveillance)(assets, investments and stock portfolio tracked and targeted)(All of his personal assets, investments and portfolio holdings are under investigation and targeted for extinction)
- **Latham and Watkins** - Extremist law firm known for rigging public policy decisions, running attacks on candidates and manipulating the law to the advantage of Silicon Valley oligarchs

- **Ira Ehrenpreis** – VC Campaign backer (He is now under investigation)(accused of political bribery and kickbacks; tax evasion, and more...) (All of his personal assets, investments and portfolio holdings are under investigation and targeted for extinction)
- **Eric Strickland** – Head of Auto Safety agency (Sent packing/fired/forced to resign)(he is now under investigation. Charged with cover-up of Tesla and GM auto dangers he had known about)
- **Tom Perkins** – VC Campaign backer (He is now under investigation, slammed by public and media)(accused of political bribery and kickbacks; tax evasion, and more...)
- **In-Q-Tel, Inc.** – CIA off-shoot associated with **Eric Schmidt, Google**, Elon Musk and the Cartel leaders. Ran “hit-jobs” on Silicon Valley VC adversaries and reporters (Sued, under investigation, exposed in multiple documentaries, under investigation for Cocaine trafficking) They claim to be a "charity" but they are a dirty tricks spy operation.
- **Tim Draper** – VC Campaign backer (Under ongoing investigation and surveillance))(accused of political bribery and kickbacks; tax evasion, and more...)(All of his personal assets, investments and portfolio holdings are under investigation and targeted for extinction)
- **Lloyd Craig Blankfein** – Head of Goldman Sachs and liaison in almost every single CleanTech company scam (Under ongoing investigation and surveillance))(accused of political bribery and kickbacks; tax evasion, and more...) (All of his personal assets, investments and portfolio holdings are under investigation and targeted for extinction)
- **Raj Gupta** – McKinsey Fixer (Indicted, Jailed)(he is now under investigation)
- **Jacque Littlefield** - Ran a private army out of Woodside, California (Dead)
- **Roger Boas** – Ran San Francisco Child sex ring brothels, for SF City Hall officials, with crooked San Francisco Cops and embezzled money from San Francisco City Hall
- **Brian Goncher** – Deloitte VC intermediary (Under ongoing investigation and surveillance)) (accused of political bribery and kickbacks; tax evasion, and more...)
- **John Molinari** – Old school San Francisco North Beach Mobster. Ran for Mayor. Lied about district. Daughter removed from him due to abuse.
- **Goldman Sachs** – Financial packager (Suspected of staging most of the TARP/DOE deals for personal gain & insider payouts)(Under ongoing investigation and surveillance). Elon Musk's Go-To Book Cookers and stock manipulators
- **Kleiner Perkins** – Campaign funding VC who (Received massive windfalls from Russian mining & tech start-up rigging. Sued. Under ongoing investigation and surveillance)(Offices broken into by federal investigators) All assets being tracked and terminated.)
- **Draper Fisher** – VC firm (Campaign funder who received massive windfalls from Russian mining & tech start-up rigging)(Under ongoing investigation and surveillance)

- **Mckinsey Consulting** – Government services contractor (Supplied DOE manipulation staff, manipulated white-papers to Congress and lobbying manipulation for the scam)(Under ongoing investigation and surveillance)
- **John Denniston** – Kleiner Perkins stock market manipulation boss
- **Dianne Feinstein** – Senator (He is now under investigation) Wife of Silicon Valley Cartel Member Richard Blum(accused of political bribery and kickbacks; tax evasion, and more...) (Under ongoing investigation and surveillance)
- **Harry Reid** – Senator- Solar factory guru, Congress lead (Accused of political bribery and kickbacks; tax evasion, and more, ran scams with Elon Musk...Forced out of Congress in shame) (Under ongoing investigation and surveillance)
- **Senator Calderone** – Senator (Indicted & charged with corruption)
- **Leland Yee** – Senator (Indicted & charged with corruption)
- **Lois Lerner** – IRS head charged with running political hit-jobs (Sent packing/fired/forced to resign)(She is now under investigation. Shamed in news media)(Under ongoing investigation and surveillance)
- **James Brown Jr** – Obama HHS Programming lead in California (Arrested for corruption)
- **Daniel Cohen** – DOE Legal counsel (Sent packing/fired/forced to resign)(Under ongoing investigation and surveillance)
- **Perkins Coi** – Law firm who sold lobby manipulation services (Under federal investigation)
- **Jonathan Silver** – DOE VC (Sent packing/fired/forced to resign)((Under ongoing investigation and surveillance)(Shamed in media for epic failures)
- **Bill Lockyer** – Calif State finance head ((Under ongoing investigation and surveillance) and charged with corruption by media. Assets and ownerships under investigation)
- **Steve Jurvetson** – VC who manipulated Senate staff for Tesla cash ((Under ongoing investigation and surveillance) All assets being tracked and terminated.)
- **Matt Rogers** – Mckinsey corruption operator reporting to Steven Chu (Under ongoing investigation and surveillance)(All assets being tracked and terminated.)
- **Steve Spinner and Alison Spinner**- Mckinsey corruption operator reporting to Steven Chu with secret connection inside Solyndra (Under ongoing investigation and surveillance) All assets being tracked and terminated.)

Their Assassin Operatives That Run The Hit Jobs And Attacks For Them:

- **Gawker Media (Jezebel, Gizmodo, Jalopnik, Gawker)** – Sued; Bankrupt; under investigation for tax fraud and campaign finance disclosure evasion
- **Jay Carney** – White House press lead (Forced to resign) (Under ongoing investigation and surveillance)
- **David Plouffe** – White House money packager. Arranged deals between VC campaign Donors (Forced to Resign. Under ongoing investigation and surveillance)
- **John Cook** – Nicholas Guido Denton’s character assassination expert
- **Nicholas Guido Denton** – Defamation-for hire boss of tabloid empire also charged with abuse of young boys
- **John Herrman** - Nicholas Guido Denton’s character assassin
- **Adrian Covert** - Nicholas Guido Denton’s character assassin
- **Patrick George** - Nicholas Guido Denton’s character assassin
- **Gabrielle Darbyshire** - Nicholas Guido Denton’s character assassin

- Investigations have also revealed that the White House and California Senators hired the character assassination and defamation attack services: *Cardinal & Pine; Pacronym, Acronym; The Americano; Investing in US; Shadow Inc; Courier Newsroom; IN-Q-Tel; Gawker Media; Jalopnik; Gizmodo Media; K2 Intelligence; WikiStrat; Podesta Group; Fusion GPS; Google; YouTube; Alphabet; Facebook; Twitter; Think Progress; Media Matters); Black Cube; Correct The Record; Orbis Business Intelligence, Undercover Global Ltd; Stratfor; Jigsaw; ShareBlue/Acronym; Versa LLC; American Ledger; Supermajority News; New Venture Fund; Sixteen Thirty Fund; Cambridge Analytica; Sid Blumenthal; States Newsroom; Hopewell Fund; Open Society.; David Brock; AmpliFire News; American Bridge; Plouffe Consulting; Pantsuit Nation; MotiveAI; American Bridge 21st Century Foundation; Priorities USA; PR Firm Sunshine Sachs; The American Independent Foundation; Covington and Burling; BuzzFeed; The American Independent; Perkins Coie; Secondary Infektion; Wilson Sonsini* and thousands more to run hit-jobs, character assassinations, dirty tricks and economic reprisal attacks on any applicants who reported the crimes. Each of those companies are now under federal and civil investigation. Most of these businesses offer the service of manipulating elections and news coverage in order to steer stock market profits into the pockets of billionaire clients at the expense of the taxpayer and Democracy. They hide their transactions via money-laundering. All of these services, when

focused on individual citizens, are lethal.

- **A.J. Delaurio**, as well as through its pseudonymous authors, including: **Adam Dachis, Adam Weinstein, Adrien Chen, Alan Henry, Albert Burneko, Alex Balk, Alexander Pareene, Alexandra Philippides, Allison Wentz, Andrew Collins, Andrew Magary, Andrew Orin, Angelica Alzona, Anna Merlan, Ariana Cohen, Ashley Feinberg, Ava Gyurina, Barry Petchesky, Brendan I. Koerner, Brendan O'Connor, Brent Rose, Brian Hickey, Camila Cabrer, Choire Sicha, Chris Mohny, Clover Hope, Daniel Morgan, David Matthews, Diana Moskovitz, Eleanor Shechet, Elizabeth Spiers, Elizabeth Starkey, Emily Gould, Emily Herzig, Emma Carmichael, Erin Ryan, Ethan Sommer, Eyal Ebel, Gabrielle, Bluestone, Gabrielle Darbyshire, Georgina K. Faircloth, Gregory Howard, Hamilton, Nolan, Hannah Keyser, Hudson Hongo. Heather Deitrich, Hugo Schwyzer, Hunter Slaton, Ian Fette, Irin Carmon, James J. Cooke, James King, Jennifer Ouellette, Jesse Oxfeld, Jessica Cohen, Jesus Diaz, Jillian Schulz, Joanna Rothkopf, Jordan Sargent, Joseph Keenan Trotter, Josh Stein, Julia Allison, Julianne E. Shepherd, Justin Hyde, Kate Dries, Katharine Trendacosta, Katherine Drummond, Kelly Stout, Kerrie Uthoff, Kevin Draper, Lacey Donohue, Lucy Haller, Luke Malone, Madeleine Davies, Madeline Davis, Mario Aguilar, Matt Hardigree, Matt Novak, Michael Ballaban, Michael Dobbs, Michael Spinelli, Neal Ungerleider, Nicholas Aster, Omar Kardoudi, Pierre Omidyar, Owen Thomas, Patrick George, Patrick Laffoon, Patrick Redford, Rich Juzwiak, Richard Blakely, Richard Rushfield, Robert Finger, Robert Sorokanich, Rory Waltzer, Rosa Golijan, Ryan Brown, Ryan Goldberg, Sam Faulkner Bidle, Sam Woolley, Samar Kalaf, Sarah Ramey, Shannon Marie Donnelly, Shep McAllister, Sophie Kleeman, Stephen Totilo, Tamar Winberg, Taryn Schweitzer, TaylorMcKnight, Thorin Klosowski, Tim Marchman, Timothy Burke, Tobey Grumet Segal, Tom Ley, Tom Scocca, Veronica de Souza, Wes Siler, William Haisley, William Turton and others writing under pseudonyms**

The Google/Alphabet/YouTube Cartel executives have colluded to cross-protect each other in their frat boy club of sex trafficking, perversions, sex cults, political bribes, money laundering and other warped deeds. A corporate cover-up team of crisis-PR experts and shredding admins stand ready to hide all the dirt on a moments notice These sickos have more money to spend on their crimes than any State governments have to spend on catching them. Together, they have more money than the FBI, NSA and the SEC COMBINED! They buy their way out of any prosecution.

These people are a “*Cartel*”, “*A Mafia*”, “*An organized crime group*”, and other things that the legal system has specific definitions and laws for. Why do they get legal immunity?

They hire crooked lawyers from Wilson Sonsini, Morrison Foerster, Perkins Coie, Covington & Burling, Latham Watkins and hundreds of other firms pay them billions of dollars to delay their arrests.

They hire crooked CPA’s from Deloitte, Mossack Fonseca & Co and hundreds of other firms to cook their books, launder money and create offshore bolt-holes to delay their arrests.

They hire crooked lobbyists from McKinsey, Podesta, Karan Bhatia Associates and hundreds of other dirty firms to bribe politicians via covert routes to delay their arrests, give them law waivers and rig the justice system to hide them from justice.

They hire sick attack dog operatives from Fusion GPS, Gawker Media, Gizmodo Media, Psy Group, Black Cube and hundreds of other dirty firms to run character assassinations, hit-jobs, black-lists and spy-type attacks on anyone they don’t like.

They don’t deserve to operate or function freely in America. They deserve prison for their epic crimes and abuses against society.

The Twisted Sociopath: Eric Schmidt

You can't open a newspaper without reading about some bizarre *Dr. Strangelove* antics that Eric Schmidt is up to. Schmidt's warped sex scandals are notorious, ie:

[Inside Google Chairman Eric Schmidt's Lavish Sex Palace](https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2013/07/eric-schmidt-penthouse-new-york-photos-apartment.html)

 <https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2013/07/eric-schmidt-penthouse-new-york-photos-apartment.html>

To be fair, nobody knows for sure exactly what goes on in **Eric Schmidt's** \$15 million **penthouse** at 31 W. 21 st Street. For all we know, the Google chairman — who is separated from his wife — just...

[Google Executive Chairman Eric Schmidt Buys Sex Penthouse ...](https://www.eteknix.com/google-executive-chairman-eric-schmidt-buys-sex-penthouse/)

 <https://www.eteknix.com/google-executive-chairman-eric-schmidt-buys-sex-penthouse/>

News outlets have dubbed it the '**Sex Penthouse**'. **Schmidt** had a net worth of 8.2 billion dollars according for Forbes as of March of this year. Who knows the real reasoning behind purchasing ...

[Eric Schmidt, Google CEO, owns \\$15m sex penthouse - video ...](https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x2q7406)

 <https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x2q7406>

Eric Schmidt, Google CEO, owns \$15m **sex penthouse**. TomoNews US. Follow. 6 years ago | 111 views. Google CEO **Eric Schmidt**, the guy you entrust your online privacy to, is clearly a man of passion. Among his interests, the 58-year-old's apparently particularly fond of banging. In addition to the roster of attractive and accomplished women in his ...

[Eric Schmidt, Google CEO, owns \\$15m sex penthouse on Vimeo](https://vimeo.com/126222235)

 <https://vimeo.com/126222235>

This is "**Eric Schmidt**, Google CEO, owns \$15m **sex penthouse**" by International News Resources on Vimeo, the home for high quality videos and the people who...

[Google CEO and serial womanizer Eric Schmidt spends 15 ...](https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2377785/Google-CEO-serial-womanizer-Eric-Schmidt-spends-15-million-dollars-private-doorman-Manhattan-penthouse-totally-soundproofed.html)

<https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2377785/Google-CEO-serial-womanizer-Eric-Schmidt-spends-15-million-dollars-private-doorman-Manhattan-penthouse-totally-soundproofed.html>

Google CEO and serial womanizer **Eric Schmidt** spends \$15 million on private, no doorman Manhattan **penthouse** and then has it totally soundproofed The billionaire Google boss has spent millions on a...

[eric schmidt sex penthouse - The Global News Times](#)

<https://globalnewstimes.wordpress.com/tag/eric-schmidt-sex-penthouse/>

Google boss **Eric Schmidt** has splashed out \$15 million on a sprawling Manhattan **penthouse** in the trendy Flatiron District to be close to at least two of his female friends ... Some men like multi-partner **sex**; so do some women.

Married Eric Schmidt, CEO of Google, has sex penthouse in ...

<https://www.democraticunderground.com/10023340965>

Married **Eric Schmidt**, CEO of Google, has **sex penthouse** in NYC, seeks 'bikini babes' on Instagram. (Original post)

Tag - Eric Schmidts Sex Penthouse - OMERTA - THE FEATURE FILM

[https://ethics-committee.com/index.php?tag/Eric Schmidts Sex Penthouse](https://ethics-committee.com/index.php?tag/Eric%20Schmidts%20Sex%20Penthouse)

Elon Musk **sex** scandal; Elon Musk Stock Scams; Elon Musk troll farm; elon musks lies; Energy Dept Corruption; Energy Dept Slush Fund; Epstein **sex** island; **Eric Schmidt sex** scandal; **Eric Schmidts Sex Penthouse**; Exploiting Afghanistan; Facebook; Facebook Censorship; Fake News; Feinstein Corruption; Feinstein Payola; Feinsteins Corruption; Flash Boy ...

Eric Schmidt may still be married but he's NYC's hottest ...

<https://pagesix.com/2019/08/03/ex-google-ceo-eric-schmidt-may-still-be-married-but-hes-nycs-hottest-bachelor/>

The hottest bachelor in NYC right now is 64 — and married. But that's not stopping gorgeous women from lining up to date former Google CEO **Eric Schmidt**, who is said to be worth \$13.3 billion ...

Eric Schmidt's Love Life Has Seen Many Women: Here Are Some

 <https://www.ibtimes.com/eric-schmidts-love-life-has-seen-many-women-here-are-some-2631945>

Eric Schmidt's sudden departure as executive chairman of Google's parent company, Alphabet, had many speculating a Harvey Weinstein-like saga, given the tech tycoon's womanizing ways.

Google's Eric Schmidt's Manhattan Penthouse - Variety

 <https://variety.com/2013/dirt/real-estalker/googles-eric-schmidts-manhattan-penthouse-1201236234/>

Google's **Eric Schmidt's** Manhattan **Penthouse** ... Page Six column at The New York Post printed and posted a juicy ditty about the apparently quite active romantic life of **Eric Schmidt** ...

Google chairman Eric Schmidt: Instagram girls, yachts and ...

<https://www.gq-magazine.co.uk/article/eric-schmidt-google-scandal>

The internet's sweet revenge on Google chairman **Eric Schmidt** By Chris Ayres 5 January 2014 How Google's executive chairman is gaining a reputation as a playboy, thanks to a deleted Instagram...

[Google's top lawyer accused of repeated romances with ...](#)

<https://nypost.com/2019/08/29/googles-top-lawyer-accused-of-repeated-romances-with-underlings/>

Aug 29, 2019 In 2013, Page Six reported that **Schmidt** spent \$15 million on a private, no-doorman Manhattan **penthouse** said to be a love nest to accommodate his multiple affairs. Blakely said she joined Google's...

[Wall Street 2 Apartment Now Google Boss's Sex Penthouse ...](#)

<https://ny.curbed.com/2013/7/25/10215938/wall-street-2-apartment-now-google-bosss-sex-penthouse>

According to a report from the Post, the 31 West 21st Street **penthouse** that once played the role of Shia LaBeouf's character's apartment in Wall Street sequel Wall Street: Money Never Sleeps, which...

[On the Market: Toll Brothers' Park Avenue Development ..](#)

<https://observer.com/2013/07/on-the-market-toll-brothers-park-avenue-development-revealed-at-last-eric-schmidts-so-called-sex-penthouse-buyers-demand-apartments-fully-stocked/>

Google's **Eric Schmidt** gives \$15 M. to create hilly terrain on Governor's Island. **Schmidt** also spent \$15 M. on a Chelsea **penthouse**, allegedly for use as a **sex** pad. Towels, toiletries and all ...

[Married ex-Google exec Eric Schmidt back on with Alexandra ...](#)

<https://pagesix.com/2020/06/22/ex-google-exec-eric-schmidt-back-on-with-alexandra-duisberg/>

Still-married former Google big **Eric Schmidt** has been spending time with his on-again-off-again gal pal, Alexandra Duisberg, again. The pair were rumored to be engaged last July: We exclusively...

[The Many Women of Eric Schmidt's Instagram](#)

valleywag.gawker.com/the-many-women-of-eric-schmidts-instagram-913796517

If there's one thing you should know about Google's Director of Open Marriage Engineering, **Eric Schmidt**, it's that he loves to fuck. He's also following a select, interesting assortment of people...

[Google Boss Has Amazing \\$15 Million Sex Fortress - Gothamist](#)

<https://gothamist.com/news/google-boss-has-amazing-15-million-sex-fortress>

Hey ladies, let go of your panties and step inside Google boss **Eric Schmidt's** fully soundproofed \$15 million **penthouse** at 31 W. 21st St., where he keeps up several high-profile affairs, according ...

[Google Boss Enjoys \\$15 Mil Manhattan Sex Penthouse](#)

valleywag.gawker.com/google-boss-enjoys-15-mil-manhattan-sex-penthouse-909299764

Schmidt has also spent millions getting the 6,250-square-foot duplex — which has four bedrooms and a large entertainment area with a wet bar opening onto a 3,300-square-foot terrace — soundproofed,...

[Eric Schmidt Has A Psychotic Need To Control Governments ...](#)

[american-corruption.com/
Eric_Schmidt_Has_A_Psychotic_Need_To_Control_Governments_And_Society.html](http://american-corruption.com/Eric_Schmidt_Has_A_Psychotic_Need_To_Control_Governments_And_Society.html)

When one types "**Eric Schmidt Sex Penthouse**" in any search engine, many questions are raised. Even without these issues, shifting the military's path isn't any easy process. While Mr. **Schmidt** has helped generate reports and recommendations about know-how for the Pentagon, few have been adopted .

[Here's Google's Eric Schmidt's Sex Pad | The Blemish](#)

<https://theblemish.com/2013/07/heres-googles-eric-schmidts-sex-pad/>

Wendy **Schmidt** has somewhat accepted an open marriage with Google exec **Eric Schmidt** and he's taken full advantage of that fact with a \$15 million **sex penthouse** at 31 W. 21st St. The place was ...

[Political Ambition, Sexual Secrets - Why Did Eric Schmidt ...](#)

<https://sputniknews.com/analysis/201712221060257653-eric-schmidt-resignation-politics-sexual/>

According to Lapinski, it is notable that **Schmidt's** resignation was announced mere hours after US President Donald Trump issued an executive order that blocks transactions of the property of persons involved in human rights abuses, human trafficking and corruption.. During the 2016 US presidential race, **Schmidt** played an instrumental role in Hillary Clinton's campaign, acting as what Lapinski ...

[Eric Schmidt Has \\$15 Million Extramarital Sex Pad — And ...](#)

<https://www.mic.com/articles/56553/eric-schmidt-has-15-million-extramarital-sex-pad-and-his-wife-is-ok-with-it>

Eric Schmidt Has \$15 Million Extramarital **Sex** Pad — And His Wife Is OK With It. ...

The **penthouse** apartment, ... **Schmidt** also reportedly had a 3-year love affair with TV personality Kate Bohner.

[The Oldest Houses In NYC; Google Boss Has NYC Sex Penthouse](#)

<https://miami.curbed.com/2013/7/26/10215310/the-oldest-houses-in-nyc-google-boss-has-nyc-sex-penthouse>

2) Flatiron District: Google executive **Eric Schmidt** refused to have a doorman and sound-proofed his 6,250-square-foot **penthouse** so he can bring lady friends back to the place and, uh, enjoy their ...

[Eric Schmidt - Wikipedia](#)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eric_Schmidt

Eric Emerson Schmidt (born April 27, 1955) is an American businessman and software engineer. He is known for being the CEO of Google from 2001 to 2011, executive chairman of Google from 2011 to 2015, executive chairman of Alphabet Inc. from 2015 to 2017, and Technical Advisor at Alphabet from 2017 to 2020. In 2017, Forbes ranked **Schmidt** as the 119th-richest person in the world, with an ...

[Is Eric Schmidt's Departure Indicative of 'Womanizing ...](#)

<https://nlpc.org/2017/12/22/google-immune-sexual-misconduct-revelations/>

Eric Schmidt. On the same day an Associated Press survey of its member editors determined that workplace sexual harassment was the No. 1 story of 2017, Google's corporate parent company Alphabet said its CEO, **Eric Schmidt**, will leave as chairman of its board of directors. The development comes as Google became the subject of a recent report about corporation-wide mistreatment of women ...

Eric Schmidt was instrumental in getting Google to buy into robot companies. Eric Schmidt's Sex robots 'will make make women interchangeable with technology'. Many feel that the government is “lagging behind” in efforts to tackle Eric Schmidt’s sex robots, experts have warned

Human-like robots are sold as substitutes for women and are marketed as “companions”, “girlfriends” or “wives”, a coalition of academics, abuse victims and activists have claimed politicians are ignorant of the potential dangers.

“At a time when pornography, prostitution and child exploitation is facilitated and proliferated by digital technology turning it into a global profitable industry; these products further promote the objectification of the female body and as such constitute a further assault on human intimacy,” the campaign for human robots that Schmidt is pushing, seems like a sick and twisted effort. The Google Dynamics robots have been exposed running their robots past gauntlets of humans who kick and beat them. Creating synthetic beings for one to beat is not a good trend for society.



Through an obscure startup named Rebellion Defense, former Google CEO Eric Schmidt attempts to buy his way into the Biden White House.

BY JONATHAN GUYER

Days after winning the November election, Joe Biden announced the names of those staffing his transition. Big Tech landed prominent spots. Among the hundreds of personnel on the agency review teams serving the president-elect, there was one from Uber, two from Amazon, and one from Google. And then there were two people from Rebellion Defense, a shadowy defense startup.

The announcement sent Washington insiders scrambling to look up the company. No major defense contractors appeared on the list. “It’s sure odd that a year-old startup like Rebellion winds up with two employees serving on a presidential transition team,” Ken Glueck, the executive vice president of the tech company Oracle, told me.

What is Rebellion Defense? With a *Star Wars* allusion as its name, this firm is not your typical contractor. Rebellion launched in the summer of 2019 to craft artificial-intelligence (AI) software for the defense industry. Trade publications gushed about how innovative it was. It quickly raised \$63 million, with the conspicuous backing of its board member Eric Schmidt. Schmidt is best known as the former CEO of Google, but he’s also a billionaire investor and an influential consultant to key government bodies.

Schmidt serves as chairman of an advisory board to the White House and Congress called the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence. From official positions, he has advocated for the Defense Department and intelligence agencies to adopt more machine-learning technology. Meanwhile, as a venture capitalist, he has invested millions of dollars in more than a half-dozen national-security startups that sell those very technologies back to the government.

Government watchdogs consider those dual roles a conflict of interest. “He’s got many, many financial incentives to ensure that the Department of Defense and other federal agencies adopt AI aggressively,” said John Davisson, senior counsel for the nonprofit Electronic Privacy Information Center.

The Biden administration will need to tread carefully to avoid Big Tech taking over functions of government. Early in Obama’s presidency, Google representatives attended more than one White House meeting a week, leading some to jokingly call the administration Google.gov. More than 250

Google employees moved back and forth between the company and government during the Obama years. Schmidt is now poised to have even more sway within the new White House.

GOOGLE RAPIDLY GREW in the '90s. Its board hired Eric Schmidt as CEO in 2001 to offer a businessman's edge to the startup's eccentric founders. Schmidt, a top executive at early tech stalwarts Sun Microsystems and Novell, served in that role for a decade. He then became executive chairman of Google's new parent company, Alphabet, as the highly valuable, publicly traded search engine giant expanded into new fields, like artificial intelligence and national security.

Schmidt personifies the bonds between tech and government. He was a frequent visitor to the Obama White House and sent strategy memos to presidential candidate Hillary Clinton. When Obama's healthcare.gov website overheated, the administration brought him in to clean up the mess. In November 2016, Schmidt wore a "staff" badge at Clinton's election-night party.



ROMUALD MEIGNEUX/SIPA

Eric Schmidt in 2018

For Schmidt, the big prize was the national-security sector. In the 1960s and '70s, the Defense Department was by far the largest investor in research and development nationwide. The internet, of course, was at first a military platform. But by the 1990s, the Defense Department was spending more money on big weapons systems than on innovating the next big thing. The CIA and NSA had, through research conduits, provided seed money to Google in the early '90s, but soon the latest innovations were coming from Silicon Valley to government, not the other way around. By 2003, Google was

selling technology to the NSA to help it sort through a barrage of data, in a project that came with Google tech support.

The Pentagon and intelligence agencies had fallen behind. Part of it had to do with the rigidity of the defense bureaucracy, the difficulty of bringing in outside talent from tech companies, and the convoluted processes of government contracting that privilege massive defense companies. All the while, the private sector was outspending the Defense Department almost 5 to 1 on new research.

Eight days after Obama was sworn in, he brought on Schmidt to offer an outsider's view on how to run defense operations more like a tech company. Obama's final defense secretary, Ash Carter, created a position for Schmidt on the Defense Innovation Board, which was pushing for what was mainstream in the private sector, but seen as radical in government offices—that the Defense Department needed new software. Carter and Schmidt jointly selected the other advisers.

Schmidt, then the executive chairman of Google's parent company, had suddenly obtained unprecedented access to political leadership and global military operations. He traveled to some 100 military installations worldwide, where he was quick to point out the Pentagon's technological limitations. By the end of Obama's second term, Schmidt had gathered a huge amount of influence within national-security circles. Lt. Gen. Jack Shanahan, the founding head of the Pentagon's newly formed Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, told me that Schmidt was “a mentor to us.”

As board chair, Schmidt pushed the Obama administration to bring artificial intelligence, new software, and cloud computing into the department. He was “poking a finger in the secretary of defense's chest saying, ‘You don't get it. You don't see what's happening on the outside. AI is going to transform everything we do and you guys are stuck in the past,’” Shanahan said.

In 2017, Google won a \$17 million contract from the Pentagon to examine drone footage using artificial intelligence, to enable drones to sift through potential targets with more precision. A year later, a dozen of the company's employees resigned in protest. Schmidt had promoted Big Tech playing a bigger role in national security, and now his own engineers had embarrassed him. (He said he had played no role in getting Google the government contract.) Lt. Gen. Shanahan ran that initiative, which became known as Project Maven. In press reports, the word “controversial” was almost always tagged onto it. Schmidt has been thoroughly bipartisan. He sat next to Steve Bannon at Trump's first convening of tech executives, and soon advocated that the Trump administration do more with AI. In 2018, Congress in its annual military-funding bill established an independent commission on artificial intelligence that would operate out of the Pentagon and advise Congress. The board's first chairperson was Eric Schmidt.

Once Schmidt joined the new National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, he started telling Congress to use AI in everything. “It's kind of a shitshow,” said someone with knowledge of the commission's day-to-day operations. Eager to proselytize AI, commissioners knew little about the complicated laws that apply to different agencies and departments. The person described the commission as “constantly on a gerbil wheel generating content that was useless.”

The commission, in what lends the appearance of conflict of interest, hosts its reports on Google Drive and uses Gmail as its email platform. A spokesperson informed me that the commission's staff selected Google's federally approved suite of office products "without any input" from Schmidt.

Vice Chair Bob Work said in a statement, "Collectively, the Commission members monitor for potential conflicts of interest at our meetings and ensure our conversations do not veer into improper discussions of particular commercial interests."

"Schmidt wields a tremendous amount of power in this space, and we thought it was pretty alarming. It seemed like an obvious conflict of interest," said Davisson, the lawyer with the privacy advocacy nonprofit EPIC. "It spoke to the strangeness of someone with so many financial entanglements chairing this commission."

Each member of the commission submits an ethics disclosure. For most commissioners, these documents run between 7 and 11 pages; Schmidt's financial disclosure is 38 pages long.

Even Schmidt himself, who declined to speak with the *Prospect* through spokespeople, has acknowledged that there can be confusion. In November 2019, he alluded to his potential conflicts when he moderated the commission's first public event. "It's a real tragedy we don't wear hats anymore," Schmidt joked as he gestured toward a top Google official and Lt. Gen. Shanahan sitting next to him. "I'm probably the only person who can say this in the entire world: I work with and for both of them." Of course, as he tried to toggle between those two roles, it was clear that he was wearing no hat at all. It was impossible to tell on whose behalf he was speaking.

"There's a general concern in the tech community of somehow the military-industrial complex using their stuff to kill people incorrectly, if you will," Schmidt said.

As the three of them talked through the work Google had done for the Defense Department, Schmidt effectively used the government event to market Google's services to the audience of defense and AI experts. He asked the general and the Google official to each explain how Project Maven, the drone program that had led to the resignation of Google engineers, was even more successful than the media had reported.


Schmidt left Alphabet in June 2019. He was increasingly out of step with his engineers' views of defense work, a mismatch that he himself admitted. "There's a general concern in the tech community of somehow the military-industrial complex using their stuff to kill people incorrectly, if you will," Schmidt said.

He proposed a solution: Tech entrepreneurs should establish new companies to fulfill contracts for soldiers and spies. "My guess is what will happen is that there will be tech companies founded that are more in alignment with the mission and values of the military," he said.

And he put that into practice. A month after retiring, Schmidt's venture capital firm invested in Rebellion Defense.

REBELLION’S FOUNDERS MODELED the company after the specialized Pentagon unit where many of them had worked before leaving to start the new business enterprise. The unit was a small operation called the Defense Digital Service, which brought in software experts from companies for short tours of service. Schmidt was an early fan, and he told Congress in April 2018 that the unit should be expanded to hundreds of people.

Members of the Defense Digital Service saw themselves as a band of outsiders within the Pentagon. They even put a plaque that said “Rebel Alliance” on the unit’s door. Its first director was Chris Lynch, a techie from Seattle who had founded a number of forgettable startups, including a word-game app and a hot-or-not site called CelebHookup. Lynch failed upward into a competitive position in the U.S. Digital Service, an Obama initiative, and then quickly parlayed that into a newly fashioned role at the Pentagon. Lynch spoke quickly and deployed buzzy slogans. He went out of his way to lambaste Google engineers who didn’t want to work on killing machines.



ANDREW HARRER/BLOOMBERG VIA GETTY IMAGES

Chris Lynch in 2016 when he was director of the Pentagon’s Defense Digital Service

Lynch continued to work for the Defense Digital Service during the Trump administration and was given responsibility for leading the Pentagon’s transition to a single cloud, the incredibly complex \$10 billion JEDI program. (The JEDI contract ended up going to Microsoft, after Trump allegedly personally vetoed Amazon as a prime vendor.)

Now that he had learned how to navigate the Defense Department, Lynch set out to move into the private sector. He co-founded Rebellion Defense in 2019 with British counterpart Oliver Lewis and Nicole Camarillo, who was still working for the Pentagon. A pitch deck for investors touted “her present leadership role in U.S. Army Cyber Command.” The trio started calling around to venture capitalists for funding.

Rebellion would do what Google would not. The pitch seemed tailor-made for Eric Schmidt.

Rebellion called themselves “a modern day Manhattan Project.” They emphasized their recent knowledge of the Pentagon and Congress as a “substantial head start to the early-stage startups attempting to build products that are to be sold into government.” Their three initial labs would include using AI for the military and policing, protecting large data systems, and creating the ultimate antivirus system. Each one would be worth billions of dollars. “The mission of national defense must be *the* place to be in tech,” Rebellion’s founders wrote. “This is an unconstrained ‘Project Maven.’” Rebellion would do what Google would not. The pitch seemed tailor-made for Eric Schmidt.

One venture capitalist, who declined to be identified because he said he did not want to jeopardize existing relationships, said the pitch was weak. Rebellion wasn’t providing a new product. Its founders were selling their know-how of the Pentagon, their experience working on contracts on the inside, and their relationships with senior brass. “It was pretty obvious that this among other startups were designed to capture outstanding military and intelligence AI contractors,” the investor told me. “If you can offer a big hammer with the letters ‘AI’ on the side, they’ll hand you a bag of money.”

Rebellion positioned itself as devotees of scrappy Luke Skywalker, but its backers looked a lot more like Darth Vader. In 2019, the firm raised \$63 million with help from a murderers’ row of venture capitalists, \$13 million more than the founders had hoped to initially secure. The Founders Fund, co-founded by Trump ally Peter Thiel, chipped in. So did James Murdoch, son of the tabloid magnate, whose investment firm Lupa Systems has been buying up media outlets. Ted Schlein, a lesser-known name on Rebellion’s board, was perhaps even more influential. Schlein is a trustee of the CIA-backed venture capital firm In-Q-Tel, and brings in-depth knowledge of what spy agencies are investing in. And then there was the heaviest hitter of them all, Eric Schmidt.

Rebellion set up a website where it listed all of its key personnel. For board member Eric Schmidt, there was no bio. Instead, beside his photo there was a link that led directly to his profile on the Defense Innovation Board, the body advising Congress and the Pentagon on how to allocate resources toward the exact technology Rebellion was selling. It suggested that there was no firewall between Schmidt’s work for the government and the private sector. Soon, Schmidt would be dropping by the Rebellion office to chat.

Rebellion’s founders were selling their know-how of the Pentagon, their experience working on contracts on the inside, and their relationships with senior brass.

The company’s website had slogans to target national-security customers (“Rebellion Defense builds for the warfighter”) as well as ones that would resonate with Silicon Valley engineers (“Join the Rebellion”). Lynch even changed the greeting on his D.C. apartment’s call box to “We are the Rebellion.” (Rebellion Defense through a spokesperson declined to comment on the record or make staff available for interviews.)

In addition to the major investors and the hoodie-wearing hacker types on their team, Rebellion also needed buttoned-up former executives from the Defense Department. Its business side was composed of “a permanent team of national defense bureaucracy hackers” and “government procurement

experts”—people who were perfectly placed to snag highly coveted defense contracts. Bob Daigle has been the money man at the Pentagon. From 2017 to 2019, he served as the director of the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office, an office he had worked in at a senior level during the George W. Bush administration. Daigle’s job was to make sure every project was in budget, and now he was a founding executive of Rebellion. Tony Ierardi had been doing similar work for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He retired as a lieutenant general in fall 2019 after almost four decades in the military and became the company’s chief of staff. (Like Schmidt, Daigle and Ierardi had time for another job, too. Both serve as consultants for Pallas Advisors, which Jim Mattis’s tech consigliere Sally Donnelly founded last year with a formidable roster of former top officials.) Another adviser to Rebellion, David Recordon, directed IT in the Obama White House and “modernized contracting strategies” for administration staff, according to his profile. Former Defense Secretary Ash Carter also advises the company.

The founders had told investors that they would “create a multi-billion dollar challenger to the global defense industry,” and by 2020, Rebellion was getting contracts and growing. It added an office in Seattle and expanded its presence in London, where it recently recruited the former chief of staff of the Ministry of Defense. “We’re hiring (a lot),” one staffer posted on LinkedIn in November. Rebellion has 85 employees listed on the social media platform—and 19 job openings. This was quite a leap for a startup.

Rebellion acts like a tech company. It emphasizes its jaunty culture, plays up the *Star Wars* references, and filmed an intentionally cheesy Christmas video where staffers each sing along to Mariah Carey. In actual fact, this is a defense company.

Government awards flow to Rebellion in part because the company sponsored high-profile research that says the government should use their products. For example, in 2020, Rebellion funded the Center for Strategic and International Studies to urge the defense sector to use more machine learning in collecting and analyzing intelligence—the exact products that Rebellion peddles. (A CSIS spokesperson said, “We stand behind the independence of our scholars and the quality of their analysis.”) Now, the people that Rebellion has been paying to write those think-tank reports are joining the Biden administration, too. The co-chair of that Rebellion-funded task force at CSIS was Avril Haines, now Biden’s director of national intelligence; its website listed Kathleen Hicks as a senior adviser, and Biden announced in December that she would be number two at the Pentagon.

SCHMIDT’S INFLUENCE is now assured within the Biden administration. In September, he was a featured speaker at a Biden campaign fundraiser with Michèle Flournoy, a former defense official who has been consulting for Schmidt’s philanthropy. Now, Schmidt is feeding the pipeline of those in national-security positions who will owe him their start in the business. Through his charitable organization Schmidt Futures and with the advice of former Obama officials at the consulting firm WestExec Advisors, he is launching an initiative to seed more tech talent into the Pentagon and intelligence agencies.

Rebellion’s future is secured in two ways—through contracts and connections. In November, it won what could grow into the company’s biggest award to date, a contract to create a single data-sharing network for the Air Force. And then there was the transition team announcement, where the company joined the big leagues of Amazon and Google.

A year before, in its initial pitch to investors, Rebellion had said, “Traction inside of the Department of Defense and its allies is the primary driver of success—mission matters.” Now, by their own terms, they’ve won.

“The fact that they got two people on the landing teams was eyebrow-raising to say the least,” said Luther Lowe, who runs Yelp’s public-policy efforts in Washington. (Yelp has been a persistent critic of Google, and by association Eric Schmidt.)

Victor Garcia, who lists his job as “engineering rebel,” helped coordinate the Department of Defense’s transition. Engineering manager David Holmes helped coordinate the Education Department and the Social Security Administration’s transition. In January, the Biden team also appointed David Recordon, who advised Rebellion at its inception, to the Office of Management and Administration as director of technology.

Here was Schmidt, on all sides of all transactions. If he needed to reach someone in the Biden administration, he had plenty of options for who to call.



Illustration by Roberto Parada

It is widely documented that Eric Schmidt coordinated the use of the entire Google empire to manipulate politics and government funds, ie:

[This psychologist claims Google search results unfairly steer voters to the left. Conservatives love him - Los ...](#)

 <https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-google-search-bias-elections-20190322-story.html>

Mar 22, 2019 The idea that **Google** is subtly pushing masses of voters to the left has the ring of conspiracy, and thus the work of Robert Epstein is warmly embraced by conservative lawmakers — as well as a ...

[Google search algorithms are not impartial. They can be biased, just like their designers.](#)

<https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/google-search-algorithms-are-not-impartial-they-are-biased-just-ncna849886>

Google search results are not objective truths, and those who use the service should be aware of its biases. The first **result** for "black girls" now is the site Black Girls Code , which encourages ...

[Report: Google News' search results aren't rigged but they are biased - HotAir — Politics, Culture, Media ...](#)

 <https://hotair.com/archives/john-s-2/2018/10/16/report-googles-search-results-arent-rigged-biased/>

This study completed 123 different measurements of the political **bias** of **Google** News and **Google** News **search results** over 14 days from August 23 to September 5, 2018. This produced three summary views of the political **bias** of **Google** News... The aggregate **result** indicates that the overall **bias** of **Google** News is 65% left, 20% center, 16% right.

[Google likely shifted undecided voters in 2018 election, researcher says - Student News Daily](#)

 <https://www.studentnewsdaily.com/example-of-media-bias/google-likely-shifted-undecided-voters-in-2018-election-researcher-says/>

Compared to **search** engines Bing and Yahoo, Epstein and his team found the **results** from **Google** were "significantly more liberal than non-**Google** **search results** on all 10 days leading up to and including **Election** Day and in all 10 positions of **search results** on the first page of **search results**," according to the summary of a paper Epstein plans to present at the annual meeting of the Western Psychological Association in Pasadena, California, in April.

[Google's Results Are Biased Towards Liberal Websites - The Bipartisan Press](#)

 <https://www.thebipartisanpress.com/politics/googles-results-are-biased-towards-liberal-websites/>

Bias: The purpose of the study was to determine the political **bias** of **results in Google**. I used data from MediaBiasFactCheck.com. Domain Authority: To account for other ranking factor, I used Moz's

Domain Authority Metric. In general, when the same content is published at the same time, the website with a higher D.A. will rank higher. **Bias Offset**

[Google liberal bias: study shows 40% of search results lean left | CanIRank](#)

www.canirank.com/blog/analysis-of-political-bias-in-internet-search-engine-results/

Among our findings were that top **search results** were 40% more likely to contain pages with a "Left" or "Far Left" slant Although internet **search** engines like **Google** play an increasingly prominent role shaping voter opinions and perception of issues and candidates, their ranking algorithms aren't designed to provide a fairly balanced ...

[Google Has a Striking History of Bias Against Black Girls - TIME | Current & Breaking News | National & World Updates](#)

<https://time.com/5209144/google-search-engine-algorithm-bias-racism/>

Safiya Noble, author of 'Algorithms of Oppression,' tackles the **bias** behind **Google's** algorithm, which has produced racist **search results**.

[Shocking Research: How Google Could Manipulate and Control the Outcome of the 2020 Election \[Videos\]](#)

<https://www.electionforum.org/politics/how-google-could-manipulate-and-control-the-outcome-of-the-2020-election/>

The **results** of his scientific analysis in both cases were disturbing...

The **Google search results** in 2016 - which account for over 92% of worldwide internet searches - were significantly biased in favor of Hillary Clinton in all 10 positions on the first page of **search results** in both blue states and red states.

[Donald Trump is right: Google results are biased against Republicans](#)

<https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2018/09/10/trump-google-youtube-search-results-biased-against-republicans-conservatives-column/1248099002/>

Sep 10, 2018 In one infamous example, a **Google search result** listed "Nazism" as an official ideology of the California GOP. North Carolina Sen. Trudy Wade, a Republican, was shocked to discover that the ...

[Teen's Research Suggests Media Bias in Google Search Results Can Influence Political Opinions | AllSides](#)

<https://www.allsides.com/blog/teen-proves-media-bias-google-search-results-can-influence-political-opinions>

A middle-schooler recently used AllSides **Media Bias** Ratings to dissect how **bias in Google search results** might influence people's political opinions.. We love when our

audience uses our tools to investigate **media bias**. But it's even better to see a teenager apply those resources to researching a tool that holds power over what hundreds of millions of people see and read.

[Google, YouTube anti-conservative bias raises alarm about 2020 election meddling - Washington Times](https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/jun/26/google-youtube-anti-conservative-bias-raises-alarm/)

<https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/jun/26/google-youtube-anti-conservative-bias-raises-alarm/>

Jun 26, 2019 **A** man walks past a building on the **Google** campus in Mountain View, Calif. Alphabet Inc., **Google's** holding company, reports financial **results** Monday, Feb. 1, 2016.

[Could Google's Search Algorithm Affect the Election of the Next US President?](https://techtheday.com/googles-search-algorithm-could-affect-the-election-of-the-next-us-president/)

<https://techtheday.com/googles-search-algorithm-could-affect-the-election-of-the-next-us-president/>

The Study, Experiments. Initially, Epstein and Robertson did controlled simulations of the way **Google search results** affect voters. Mock voters (the study subjects) were granted access to information about the prime minister **elections in** Australia in 2010 and 2008, and then allowed to look for information about the candidates using a simulated **search** engine.



Not only can Schmidt's political SWAT Team take over an American White House, they love to take over the Middle East, as well. Schmidt was the coordinator between the CIA and Google's Wael Ghonim in the creation of the "Arab Spring" political riots:

[Google's Wael Ghonim: A Leader for Egyptian Protesters? - TIME](#)

content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2047006,00.html

Wael Ghonim is talkative and confident, just like many in the new generation of Arabs who are out to change their world — and prosper in it — by way of technology. He once pointed out that Norway,...

[How Wael Ghonim Sparked Egypt's Uprising - Newsweek](#)

N<https://www.newsweek.com/how-wael-ghonim-sparked-egypts-uprising-68727>

At its center was a bespectacled techie named **Wael Ghonim**, a 30-year-old father of two, and **Google's** head of marketing in the Middle East.

[Wael Ghonim: Inside the Egyptian revolution | TED Talk](#)

https://www.ted.com/talks/wael_ghonim_inside_the_egyptian_revolution

Wael Ghonim is the **Google** executive who helped jumpstart Egypt's democratic revolution... with a Facebook page memorializing a victim of the regime's violence. Speaking at TEDxCairo, he tells the inside story of the past two months, when everyday Egyptians showed that "the power of the people is stronger than the people in power."

Recently, Eric Schmidt shocked Silicon Valley with a surprise announcement Thursday that he's stepping down as executive chairman of Google's parent company, Alphabet.

The 62-year-old tech tycoon — who, according to Google co-founder Sergey Brin, was originally tapped as CEO in 2001 to provide "adult supervision" for himself and Larry Page — said in a statement that he will remain at Alphabet as a "technical advisor."

"In recent years, I've been spending a lot of my time on science and technology issues, and philanthropy, and I plan to expand that work," Schmidt said.

One source close to Schmidt said the move would allow him to have a more "hands-on role" in developing artificial intelligence for defense.

Eric Schmidt stepping down as executive chairman of Alphabet

Schmidt has also been spending more time on his foundation, which focuses on sustainability, the source said.

But the timing of Schmidt's sudden move — along with the fact that Alphabet waited three days to disclose that Schmidt had told the company he was stepping down, according to a filing — raised questions. Schmidt is a known womanizer despite being married for 37 years to Wendy Schmidt, who

said in 2012 they started living separate lives because she felt like “a piece of luggage” following him around the world.

But the insider could not deny Schmidt’s well-documented romantic past and said the techie’s entanglements were “consensual” and that there are “no complaints” against the exec or “settlements” from the company.

In 2013, Page Six first reported that Schmidt spent \$15 million on a private, no-doorman Manhattan penthouse in the Flatiron District. The abode was fully soundproofed and said to be a love nest to accommodate his multiple affairs.

Schmidt has been linked to women including TV presenter Kate Bohner, PR exec Marcy Simon, and Danya Perry, who is chief of litigation and deputy general counsel to billionaire Ronald Perelman.

Previously, Gawker reported that Google employees got irked in 2007 when Simon briefly got hired by Google’s Android team while she was in a relationship with Schmidt.

Elsewhere, however, Schmidt’s reported dalliances appear to have been with non-Google employees.

One source spotted Schmidt with glamorous Manhattan socialite Ulla Parker — ex-wife of Wall Street veteran Kevin Parker — last summer.

According to another source, “it could be just that, in the current environment, we’ve reached a tipping point. It is now unacceptable for the head of a public company to be running around with multiple mistresses while his wife is at home.”

Alphabet declined to comment beyond the press release per Alexandra Steigrad.

Schmidt will rig the politics of ANY country with mega tech psych warfare tools. He took a stab at Cuba. ric Schmidt, a board member of Google's parent company Alphabet, met Monday with Cuba's new president to discuss improving Cuban internet connectivity, one of the world's lowest.

"The benefits of the internet to the world are extraordinary. And it's important that Cubans have access to the internet at the same level or even better than everyone else," said Schmidt, who stepped down from his post as executive chairman early this year.

He met with Cuban leader Miguel Diaz-Canel about seeking a dialogue even though US-Cuban relations have worsened under American President Donald Trump.

Alongside US Senator Jeff Flake -- a supporter of ending the US trade embargo on Cuba, the Americas' only one-party Communist state -- Schmidt said internet connectivity is key to Cuba's future.

"It's important for the development of the country," he stressed.

Diaz-Canel and Schmidt discussed US-Cuban relations and possible areas of cooperation, Cuban officials said.

Theirs was the first US delegation to meet with the new Cuban president, who was sworn in April 19.


Just over four million Cubans, under half the population, have limited internet access through public screens and wi-fi areas.

The state telephone company says it is in testing on adding data service to smartphones.

Ties between Havana and Washington have cooled considerably since Trump took office in January 2017.

The Trump administration has tightened restrictions on US travelers to Cuba.

And the State Department said it will permanently scale back its mission in Havana, which had already been operating with reduced staff since September 2017, when diplomats and relatives were evacuated over a health incident.



Eric E. Schmidt

ERIC SCHMIDT LOVES SPIES. SCHMIDT LOVES HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CIA'S IN-Q-TEL. SCHMIDT BELIEVES THAT EVERY PERSON SHOULD BE SPIED ON EVERY DAY.

Spooky spy operations get an investment from In-Q-Tel, the CIA's venture capital firm, according to a [document](#) obtained by *The Intercept*. *Eric Schmidt promotes these kinds of deals. These investments are designed to manipulate national politics.*

Yet among the 38 previously undisclosed companies receiving In-Q-Tel funding, the research focus that stands out is social media mining and surveillance; the portfolio document lists several tech companies pursuing work in this area, including Dataminr, Geofeedia, PATHAR, and TransVoyant.



In-Q-Tel's investment process.

Screen grab from In-Q-Tel's website.


Those four firms, which provide unique tools to mine data from platforms such as Twitter, presented at a February "CEO Summit" in San Jose sponsored by the fund, along with other In-Q-Tel portfolio companies.

The investments appear to reflect the CIA's increasing focus on monitoring social media. Last September, David Cohen, the CIA's second-highest ranking official, spoke at length at Cornell University about a litany of [challenges](#) stemming from the new media landscape. The Islamic State's

“sophisticated use of Twitter and other social media platforms is a perfect example of the malign use of these technologies,” he said.

Social media also offers a wealth of potential intelligence; Cohen noted that Twitter messages from the Islamic State, sometimes called ISIL, have provided useful information. “ISIL’s tweets and other social media messages publicizing their activities often produce information that, especially in the aggregate, provides real intelligence value,” he said.


The latest round of In-Q-Tel investments comes as the CIA has revamped its outreach to Silicon Valley, [establishing](#) a new wing, the Directorate of Digital Innovation, which is tasked with developing and deploying cutting-edge solutions by directly engaging the private sector. The directorate is working closely with In-Q-Tel to integrate the latest technology into agency-wide intelligence capabilities.



Datamirr directly licenses a stream of data from Twitter to spot trends and detect emerging threats.

Screen grab from Datamirr’s website.

Datamirr directly licenses a stream of data from Twitter to [visualize](#) and quickly spot trends on behalf of law enforcement agencies and hedge funds, among other clients.



Geofeedia collects geotagged social media messages to monitor breaking news events in real time.

Screen grab from Geofeedia's website.


Geofeedia [specializes](#) in collecting geotagged social media messages, from platforms such as Twitter and Instagram, to monitor breaking news events in real time. The company, which counts dozens of local law enforcement agencies as clients, [markets](#) its ability to track activist protests on behalf of both corporate interests and police departments.



PATHAR mines social media to determine networks of association.

Screen grab from PATHAR’s website.

PATHAR’s product, Dunami, is [used](#) by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to “mine Twitter, Facebook, Instagram and other social media to determine networks of association, centers of influence and potential signs of radicalization,” according to an investigation by *Reveal*.



TransVoyant analyzes data points to deliver insights and predictions about global events.

Screen grab from TransVoyant’s website.

TransVoyant, founded by former Lockheed Martin Vice President Dennis Groseclose, provides a similar service by analyzing multiple data points for so-called decision-makers. The firm touts its ability to monitor Twitter to spot “gang incidents” and threats to journalists. A team from TransVoyant has worked with the U.S. military in Afghanistan to integrate data from satellites, radar, reconnaissance aircraft, and drones.

Dataminr, Geofeedia, and PATHAR did not respond to repeated requests for comment. Heather Crotty, the director of marketing at TransVoyant, acknowledged an investment from In-Q-Tel, but could not discuss the scope of the relationship. In-Q-Tel “does not disclose the financial terms of its investments,” Crotty said.

Carrie A. Sessine, the vice president for external affairs at In-Q-Tel, also declined an interview because the fund “does not participate in media interviews or opportunities.”

Over the last decade, In-Q-Tel has made a number of public investments in companies that specialize in scanning large sets of online data. In 2009, the fund partnered with Visible Technologies, which

specializes in reputation management over the internet by identifying the influence of “positive” and “negative” authors on a range of platforms for a given subject. And six years ago, In-Q-Tel [formed](#) partnerships with NetBase, another social media analysis firm that touts its ability to scan “billions of sources in public and private online information,” and Recorded Future, a firm that monitors the web to [predict events](#) in the future.

Unpublicized In-Q-Tel Portfolio Companies

Company	Description	Contract
Aquifi	3D vision software solutions	
Beartooth	Decentralized mobile network	
CliQr	Hybrid cloud management platform	Contract
CloudPassage	On-demand, automated infrastructure security	
Databricks	Cloud-hosted big data analytics and processing platform	
Dataminr	Situational awareness and analysis at the speed of social media	Contract
Docker	Open platform to build, ship, and run distributed applications	Contract
Echodyne	Next-generation electronically scanning radar systems	Contract
Epiq Solutions	Software-defined radio platforms and applications	Contract
Geofeedia	Location-based social media monitoring platform	Contract
goTenna	Alternate network for off-grid smartphone communications	Contract
Headspin	Network-focused approach to improving mobile application performance	Contract
Intersect	Inside threat detection using analytics, machine learning, and big data	
Keyssa	Fast, simple, and secure contactless data transfer	
Kymeta	Antenna technology for broadband satellite communications	
Lookout	Cloud-based mobile cybersecurity	

Mapbox	Design and publish visual, data-rich maps	Contract
Mesosphere	Next-generation scale, efficiency, and automation in a physical or cloud-based data center	Contract
Nervana	Next-generation machine learning platform	
Orbital Insight	Satellite imagery processing and data science at scale	
Orion Labs	Wearable device and real-time voice communications platform	
Parallel Wireless	LTE radio access nodes and software stack for small cell deployment	
PATHAR	Channel-specific social media analytics platform	Contract
Pneubotics	Mobile material handling solutions to automate tasks	
PsiKick	Redefined ultra-low power wireless sensor solutions	Contract
PubNub	Build and scale real-time apps	
Rocket Lab	Launch provider for small satellites	Contract
Skincential Sciences	Novel materials for biological sample collection	
Soft Robotics	Soft robotics actuators and systems	
Sonatype	Software supply chain automation and security	Contract
Spaceflight Industries	Small satellite launch, network, and imagery provider	Contract
Threatstream	Leading enterprise-class threat intelligence platform	
Timbr.io	Accessible code-driven analysis platform	
Transient Electronics	Dissolvable semiconductor technology	Contract
TransVoyant	Live predictive intelligence platform	

TRX Systems	3D indoor location and mapping solutions	
Voltaiq	SaaS platform for advanced battery analysis	
Zoomdata	Big data exploration, visualization, and analytics platform	Contract

Bruce Lund, a senior member of In-Q-Tel’s technical staff, noted in a 2012 [paper](#) that “monitoring social media” is increasingly essential for government agencies seeking to keep track of “erupting political movements, crises, epidemics, and disasters, not to mention general global trends.”

The recent wave of investments in social media-related companies suggests the CIA has accelerated the drive to make collection of user-generated online data a priority. Alongside its investments in start-ups, In-Q-Tel has also developed a special technology laboratory in Silicon Valley, called Lab41, to provide tools for the intelligence community to [connect the dots](#) in large sets of data.

In February, Lab41 [published](#) an article exploring the ways in which a Twitter user’s location could be predicted with a degree of certainty through the location of the user’s friends. On Github, an open source website for developers, Lab41 currently has a [project](#) to ascertain the “feasibility of using architectures such as Convolutional and Recurrent Neural Networks to classify the positive, negative, or neutral sentiment of Twitter messages towards a specific topic.”

Collecting intelligence on foreign adversaries has potential benefits for counterterrorism, but such CIA-supported surveillance technology is also used for domestic law enforcement and by the private sector to spy on activist groups.

Palantir, one of In-Q-Tel’s earliest investments in the social media analytics realm, was exposed in 2011 by the hacker group LulzSec to be in [negotiation](#) for a proposal to track labor union activists and other critics of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the largest business lobbying group in Washington. The company, now celebrated as a “tech unicorn” — a term for start-ups that reach over \$1 billion in valuation — distanced itself from the plan after it was exposed in a cache of leaked emails from the now-defunct firm HBGary Federal.

Yet other In-Q-Tel-backed companies are now openly embracing the practice. Geofeedia, for instance, promotes its research into Greenpeace [activists](#), student [demonstrations](#), minimum wage [advocates](#), and [other](#) political movements. Police departments in Oakland, Chicago, Detroit, and other major municipalities have [contracted](#) with Geofeedia, as well as private firms such as the Mall of America and McDonald’s.

Lee Guthman, an executive at Geofeedia, [told](#) reporter John Knefel that his company could predict the potential for violence at Black Lives Matter protests just by using the location and sentiment of tweets. Guthman said the technology could gauge sentiment by attaching “positive and negative points” to certain phrases, while measuring “proximity of words to certain words.”

Privacy advocates, however, have expressed concern about these sorts of automated judgments.

“When you have private companies deciding which algorithms get you a so-called threat score, or make you a person of interest, there’s obviously room for targeting people based on viewpoints or even unlawfully targeting people based on race or religion,” said Lee Rowland, a senior staff attorney with the American Civil Liberties Union.

She added that there is a dangerous trend toward government relying on tech companies to “build massive dossiers on people” using “nothing but constitutionally protected speech.”

Eric Schmidt has convinced Nancy Pelosi that his electronic psychological warfare system can control which candidates rise to power:



Eric Schmidt Has A Psychotic Need To Control Governments And Society

- Eric Schmidt does not think twice about hiring assassins, media hit-job operators, Black Cube and Fusion GPS hatchet job providers and bribe-positive lobbyists

In July 2016, Raymond Thomas, a four-star general and head of the U.S. Special Operations Command, hosted a guest: Eric Schmidt, the chairman of Google.

General Thomas, who served within the 1991 gulf war and deployed many times to Afghanistan, spent the higher half of a day showing Mr. Schmidt around Special Operations Command's headquarters in Tampa, Fla. They scrutinized prototypes for a robotic exoskeleton suit and joined operational briefings, which Mr. Schmidt needed to study extra about as a result of he had recently begun advising the military on technology.

After the go-to, as they rode in a Chevy Suburban towards an airport, the conversation turned to a form of artificial intelligence.

"You absolutely suck at machine learning," Mr. Schmidt informed General Thomas, the officer recalled. "If I got under your tent for a day, I could solve most of your problems." General Thomas said he was so offended that he needed to throw Mr. Schmidt out of the car, however refrained.

Four years later, Mr. Schmidt, 65, has channeled his blunt assessment of the military's tech failings into a private campaign to revamp America's defense forces with extra engineers, extra software program and extra A.I. In the method, the tech billionaire, who [left Google last year](#), has reinvented himself because of the prime liaison between Silicon Valley and the national security community.

Mr. Schmidt now sits on two government advisory boards aimed toward bounce beginning technological innovation in the Defense Department. His confidants embrace former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and ex-Deputy Defense Secretary Robert Work. And by means of his personal enterprise capital agency and a \$13 billion fortune, Mr. Schmidt has invested millions of {dollars} into more than half a dozen defense start-ups.

In an interview, Mr. Schmidt — by turns thoughtful, pedagogical and hubristic — stated he had embarked on an effort to modernize the U.S. military because it was "stuck in software in the 1980s."

He portrayed himself as a successful technologist who didn't consider in retirement and [who owed a debt to the country](#) for his wealth — and who now had time and perception to resolve one of America's hardest issues. The purpose, he stated, "should be to have as many software companies to supply software of many, many different kinds: military, H.R. systems, email systems, things which involve military intelligence, weapons systems and what have you."

Mr. Schmidt is urgent ahead with a Silicon Valley worldview the place advances in software program and A.I. are the keys to determining nearly any situation. While that philosophy has led to [social](#)

[networks that spread disinformation](#) and different unintended penalties, Mr. Schmidt stated he was convinced that making use of new and comparatively untested technology to complex conditions — together with lethal ones — would make service members extra environment friendly and bolster the United States in its competition with China.

His techno-solutionism is difficult by his ties to Google. Though Mr. Schmidt left the corporate's board final June and has no official working function, he holds \$5.3 billion in shares of Google's parent, Alphabet. He also stays on the payroll as an adviser, incomes a \$1 annual wage, with two assistants stationed at Google's Silicon Valley headquarters.

That has led to allegations that Mr. Schmidt is placing Google's financial pursuits forward of different concerns in his protection work. Late final yr, a federal court ordered a congressional advisory committee he leads to flip over data that would make clear whether or not Mr. Schmidt had advocated his business interests whereas heading the group.

Mr. Schmidt stated he had adopted guidelines to keep away from conflicts. "Everybody is rule-bound at the Pentagon, and we are too," he stated.

Google and the Defense Department declined to touch upon Mr. Schmidt's work.

Even without these issues, shifting the military's path isn't any easy process. While Mr. Schmidt has helped generate reports and recommendations about know-how for the Pentagon, [few have been adopted](#).

"I'm sure he'll be frustrated," stated Representative Mac Thornberry, a Republican of Texas who nominated Mr. Schmidt in 2018 to an advisory committee on A.I. "Unlike the private sector, you can't just snap your fingers and make it happen."

Mr. Schmidt acknowledged that progress was sluggish. "I am bizarrely told by my military friends that they have moved incredibly fast, showing you the difference of time frames between the world I live in and the world they live in," he stated.

But he stated he had little intention of backing down. "The way to understand the military is that the soldiers spend a great deal of time looking at screens. And human vision is not as good as computer vision," he stated. "It's insane that you have people going to service academies, and we spend an enormous amount of training, training these people, and we put them in essentially monotonous work."

'You Want to See These Things'

Mr. Schmidt's first brush with the military got here in 1976, whereas he was in graduate college on the University of California, Berkeley. There, he centered on research on distributed computing, funded by cash from Darpa, an analysis arm of the Defense Department.

The work catapulted Mr. Schmidt into his technology profession. After finishing his graduate studies in pc science, he labored at various tech firms for more than twenty years, together with the networking software maker Novell. In 2001, Google appointed him chief govt.

The search engine firm was then in its infancy. Its 20-something founders, Larry Page and Sergey Brin, were contemporary out of a Stanford University doctorate program and had little business expertise. Mr. Schmidt was hired to assist information them, offering “adult supervision,” which he did — after which some.

Mr. Schmidt [took Google public in 2004](#) and built it right into a behemoth, diversifying into smartphones, cloud computing and [self-driving cars](#). The success turned him right into an enterprise movie star. In 2009, he served as a tech adviser to the Obama administration.

In 2011, with Google price almost \$400 billion, the corporate introduced Mr. Page was able to resume the C.E.O. reins. Mr. Schmidt turned govt chairman.

In that function, Mr. Schmidt took on new tasks, many of which introduced him to Washington. In 2012, he participated in categorized briefings on cybersecurity with Pentagon officers as half of the Enduring Security Framework program. In 2015, he attended a seminar on the banks of the Potomac River, hosted by then-Defense Secretary Ash Carter, on the use of know-how inside the government.

“It was all interesting to me,” Mr. Schmidt stated. “I didn’t really know much about it.”

He additionally traveled to North Korea, Afghanistan and Libya whereas writing a guide about know-how and diplomacy, and dabbled in politics, lending technical assist to Hillary Clinton within the run-up to her 2016 presidential marketing campaign.

His enterprise capital fund, Innovation Endeavors, was lively too. It invested in start-ups like Planet Labs, which operates satellites and sells the imagery to protection and intelligence companies, and Team8, a cybersecurity firm based by former Israeli intelligence members.

At the 2016 World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, Mr. Carter requested Mr. Schmidt to fulfill. He had a proposal: Could Mr. Schmidt lead the Defense Innovation Board, a civilian advisory group tasked with bringing new technology to the Pentagon?

“We were in one of these dumpy hotels, and there he is with his small entourage walking in, and he basically said to me, ‘This is what I want to do. You’d be the perfect person to be chairman,’” Mr. Schmidt said.

Mr. Schmidt said he turned down the function as a result of he was busy and had no military background. But Mr. Carter argued that Mr. Schmidt’s tech experience was wanted, because the U.S. military — which had as soon as been a middle of innovation — was falling behind companies like Google and Facebook in software and A.I.

Mr. Schmidt finally agreed. (Mr. Carter didn’t reply to requests for remark.)

As head of the Defense Innovation Board, Mr. Schmidt started touring navy bases, plane carriers and plutonium strongholds. The journeys, which took Mr. Schmidt to about 100 bases in locations like Fayetteville, N.C., and Osan, South Korea, have been a definite break from his well-heeled life in Silicon Valley.

“You want to see these things,” Mr. Schmidt stated. “I received the nuclear missile tour. Things which are exhausting. I received a tour of [Cheyenne Mountain](#) so I might perceive what their actuality was.”

One of the primary journeys was to Tampa to go to General Thomas, who is named Tony, the place Mr. Schmidt saw maps and reside video feeds displayed on huge screens. “Eric’s observation was that a huge part of what the military does is it sits and watches,” stated Josh Marcuse, the then executive director of the Defense Innovation Board who was on the journey.

The visits made tangible what Mr. Carter had told Mr. Schmidt about how the military was lagging in technology. Mr. Schmidt quickly made ideas to vary that.

Some of his concepts have been impractical. Eric Rosenbach, then the chief of workers to Mr. Carter, recalled Mr. Schmidt as soon as telling him that the Pentagon can be higher off if it employed nobody however engineers for a year.

Others have been helpful. At an Air Force facility in Qatar in 2016, Mr. Schmidt visited officers who scheduled flight paths for the tankers that refueled planes. They used a white board and dry-erase markers to set the schedule, taking eight hours to finish the duty.

Mr. Schmidt stated he recalled considering, “Really? This is how you run the air war?” Afterward, he and others on the Defense Department labored with the tech company Pivotal to ship software to the officers.

On one other journey to a navy base in South Korea in 2017, an intelligence analyst complained to Mr. Schmidt that the software program he used to evaluate surveillance movies from North Korea was clunky.

“Let me guess,” Mr. Schmidt said, according to a Defense Department aide who traveled with him. “You don’t have the flexibility to change that.”

In December 2017, Mr. Schmidt stepped down as Google’s chairman however remained on the board. He said he was seeking a brand new chapter.

“If I stayed as chairman, then next year would have been the same as the previous year, and I wanted a change of emphasis,” said Mr. Schmidt. “As chairman of Google, what I did is I ran around and gave speeches, and went to Brussels and all the things that Google still does today. It’s much better to work on these new things for me.”

Google declined to comment on Mr. Schmidt’s departure as chairman.

By then, Mr. Schmidt’s ties to Google had induced issues in his protection work. In 2016, Roma Laster, a Defense Department worker, filed a complaint on the company elevating considerations about Mr. Schmidt and conflicts of curiosity, Mr. Marcuse stated.

In the complaint, [earlier reported by ProPublica](#), Ms. Laster, who labored with the Defense Innovation Board, said Mr. Schmidt had requested a service member what cloud computing providers their unit

used and whether or not they had thought-about options. She stated Mr. Schmidt confronted a battle of interest as a result of he worked for Google, which additionally gives cloud services.

Mr. Marcuse, who now works at Google, said Mr. Schmidt was “scrupulous and diligent” in avoiding conflicts. Mr. Schmidt said he adopted the principles forbidding conflicts of interest. Ms. Laster didn’t reply to requests for remark.

Mr. Schmidt quickly received caught up in one other situation between Google and the military. Google had signed a contract in 2017 to assist the Pentagon to construct methods to automatically analyze drone footage to identify particular objects like buildings, vehicles, and people.

Mr. Schmidt was a proponent of the hassle, known as Project Maven. He stated he inspired the Pentagon to pursue it and testified in Congress in regards to the undertaking’s deserves, however was not concerned within the company’s selection of Google.

But the [effort blew up](#) in 2018 when [Google employees protested](#) and stated they didn’t need their work to result in deadly strikes. More than 3,000 staff signed a letter to Mr. Pichai, saying the contract would undermine the general public’s belief within the firm.

It was a black eye for Mr. Schmidt. Military officers, who stated Project Maven was not getting used for deadly missions, condemned Google for abandoning the contract. Google staff additionally criticized Mr. Schmidt’s ties to the Pentagon.

“He has very different goals and values than the engineers at his company,” stated Jack Poulson, a Google worker who protested Mr. Schmidt’s military work and who has since left the company.

Mr. Schmidt said he sidestepped discussions about Project Maven as a result of of conflict-of-interest guidelines, however wished he might have weighed in. “I would have certainly had an opinion,” he stated.

Last April, Mr. Schmidt [announced](#) he deliberate to go away Google’s board. He had helped create an A.I. middle backed by the Pentagon in 2018 and had additionally turn into co-chair of the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, a brand new group advising Congress on developing A.I. for defense.

A month after leaving Google, Mr. Schmidt invested in Rebellion Defense, a software program start-up based by former Defense Department staff that analyzes video gathered through drone. His enterprise agency later put more cash into the company, and Mr. Schmidt joined its board.

The funding led to extra bother. The Electronic Privacy Information Center, a nonprofit privateness and civil liberties group, sued the A.I. commission last September for failing to show over data. EPIC said the group was stacked with industry executives like Mr. Schmidt and others from Microsoft, Amazon and Oracle, who could potentially sway the government in favor of their companies’ interests.

Mr. Schmidt was underneath scrutiny as a result of of Rebellion Defense and the way he might push the government to make use of the start-up’s services, EPIC said.

“We don’t have any public disclosure about what information Eric has provided to the commission about his business interests,” said John Davisson, a legal professional at EPIC.

In December, a district court dominated the A.I. fee should disclose the data requested by EPIC. The fee has launched a whole lot of pages of paperwork, most of which don’t contain Mr. Schmidt or his companies. EPIC stated extra data are set to be launched.

Chris Lynch, the chief executive of Rebellion Defense, said Mr. Schmidt suggested the company solely on hiring and growth. Mr. Schmidt said he didn’t advocate for the Defense Department to purchase technology from the start-up.

He has continued plowing forward. In November, he unveiled a \$1 billion dedication by means of Schmidt Futures, the philanthropic agency that he runs along with his spouse, Wendy, to fund education for those who want to work in public service.

Google's Eric Schmidt's 'open marriage' and his string of ...

<https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2371719/Googles-Eric-Schmidts-open-marriage-string-exotic-lovers.html>

Eric Schmidt, Google's executive chairman, has embarked on a string of affairs with younger women, including a vivacious TV presenter who dubbed him 'Dr Strangelove', a leggy blonde public ...

Eric Schmidt may still be married but he's NYC's hottest ...

<https://pagesix.com/2019/08/03/ex-google-ceo-eric-schmidt-may-still-be-married-but-hes-nycs-hottest-bachelor/>

The hottest bachelor in NYC right now is 64 — and married. But that's not stopping gorgeous women from lining up to date former Google CEO **Eric Schmidt**, who is said to be worth \$13.3 billion ...

Google's top lawyer allegedly had affairs with multiple ...

<https://www.theverge.com/2019/8/29/20837232/google-david-drummond-chief-legal-officer-cheating-wife-affair-policies>

Blakely says "blatant womanizing and **philandering**" was commonplace among some Google executives, an allegation which has been reported about Google higher-ups like **Eric Schmidt**, Sergey Brin, and ...

Google's top lawyer accused of repeated romances with ...

<https://nypost.com/2019/08/29/googles-top-lawyer-accused-of-repeated-romances-with-underlings/>

Aug 29, 2019 Google's top lawyer routinely ignored company rules regarding dalliances with underlings — and pointed to the lecherous ways of top Googler **Eric Schmidt** to justify his **philandering**, an ...

TomoNews | Google's philandering exec Eric Schmidt cares ...

us.tomonews.com/google-s-philandering-exec-eric-schmidt-cares-about-his-privacy-not-yours-2923454

Google's **philandering** exec **Eric Schmidt** cares about his privacy, not yours 2013/07/23. NSFW Google exec **Eric Schmidt** is a love machine at age 58, which is quite an achievement considering how dorky he looked during what should have been his sexual prime three decades ago. For all you dudes who have trouble with the ladies, **Schmidt** is living ...

EXCLUSIVE: Google boss Schmidt spending big ... - Page Six

<https://pagesix.com/2013/07/25/exclusive-google-boss-schmidt-spending-big-bucks-on-womanizing/>

Eric and Wendy **Schmidt** (Getty) Schmidt has been seeing pianist Chau-Giang Thi Nguyen (pictured here with former fiance Brian Grazer) (Getty) Google boss **Eric Schmidt** is spending millions to keep his ...

Married billionaire Eric Schmidt's girlfriend says they'll ...

<https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-7319869/Married-billionaire-Eric-Schmidts-girlfriend-says-theyll-kids-using-frozen-embryos.html>

Married billionaire **Eric Schmidt's** alleged mistress, 32, 'asked the 64-year-old ex-Google CEO to fertilize her frozen eggs, but he declined' - but she still hopes the pair will have FIVE babies ...

The Many Women of Eric Schmidt's Instagram - Gawker

valleywag.gawker.com/the-many-women-of-eric-schmidts-instagram-913796517

If there's one thing you should know about Google's Director of Open Marriage Engineering, **Eric Schmidt**, it's that he loves to fuck. He's also following a select, interesting assortment of people on Instagram, and by interesting I mean a lot of models and women in swimwear.

Google's philandering exec Eric Schmidt cares about his ...

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=72w1CIEZW8s>

Google exec **Eric Schmidt** is a love machine at age 58, which is quite an achievement considering how dorky he looked during what should have been his sexual prime three decades ago. For all you ...

Former Lover Exposes Eric Schmidt - American Intelligence ...

<https://aim4truth.org/2019/07/02/former-lover-exposes-eric-schmidt/>

The following is a transcript of an interview with a Google/Facebook/DARPA insider that was conducted with a member of the Anonymous Patriots, a citizen journalist group aligned with the American Intelligence Media. The person interviewed wishes to remain anonymous and for purposes of the interview will be called Jane Doe. This conversation took place on...

[How Amazon and Silicon Valley Seduced the Pentagon ...](https://www.propublica.org/article/how-amazon-and-silicon-valley-seduced-the-pentagon)

<https://www.propublica.org/article/how-amazon-and-silicon-valley-seduced-the-pentagon>

How Amazon and Silicon Valley Seduced the Pentagon. Tech moguls like Jeff Bezos and **Eric Schmidt** have gotten unprecedented access to the Pentagon.

In the United States' current polarized political environment, the constant publishing of articles with vehemently opposing arguments has made it almost impossible for Google to rank information properly.

So says [billionaire Eric Schmidt](#), Chairman of Google's parent company, Alphabet, speaking at the [Halifax International Security Forum on Saturday](#).

"Let's say that this group believes Fact A and this group believes Fact B and you passionately disagree with each other and you are all publishing and writing about it and so forth and so on. It is very difficult for us to understand truth," says [Schmidt](#), referring to the search engine's algorithmic capabilities.

"So when it gets to a contest of Group A versus Group B — you can imagine what I am talking about — it is difficult for us to sort out which rank, A or B, is higher," Schmidt says.

Ranking is the holy grail for Google. And when topics have more consensus, Schmidt is confident in the algorithm's ability to lower the rank of information that is repetitive, exploitative or false. In cases of greater consensus, when the search turns up a piece of incorrect or unreliable information, it is a problem that Google should be able to address by tweaking the algorithm, he says.

"I view those things as bugs as a computer scientist, so if you are manipulating the information and then our system is not doing a good enough job of properly ranking it ... as a computer scientist, I can tell you, this stuff can be detected," says Schmidt. Essentially, Schmidt has admitted that Google's search software is useless and that Google rigs results, by hand, per Google's bias towards kinky sex, homosexuality and socialism.

How Eric Schmidt Keeps Blacks And Poors Out Of His Neighborhood

- Trophy wives and under-cover homosexuals are the core of where Eric Schmidt lives
- Elitist and snooty, this is who runs Silicon Valley's political control tower
- Blacks are not welcome in the areas where Schmidt lives or the companies owned by him.

Atherton, California – home to Silicon Valley heavyweights like Eric Schmidt and Nick Clegg – isn't technically a gated community. But its laws create walls of their own proves Vivian Ho. If fences make good neighbors, then Atherton, California should be full of good neighbors. In America's most expensive zip code, an abundance of wrought-iron fences, sturdy brick walls and towering hedgerows abound. Some gated mansions sit in gated neighborhoods that sit behind barricades of large oak trees – veritable fortresses fortified with everything but a moat.

The exclusive town of 5.6 sq miles has been the priciest place to live in the country for four years running. But the residents of Atherton will be first to say that their little leafy community at the heart of Silicon Valley – home to tech billionaires, venture capitalists, the former Google chief executive Eric Schmidt, the former deputy British prime minister Nick Clegg and the Fox News populist Steve Hilton – does in fact have good neighbors. For all the wealth, they say – median home prices and home sales ranging between \$7m and \$8.65m and a median household income of \$525,000 – the community doesn't flaunt its money. Residents drive Teslas instead of Lamborghinis, take nice vacations instead of living ostentatiously. This is no Bel Air or Beverly Hills, they say, but a sleepy suburb like that out of *The Andy Griffith Show*. “Yes, the vast majority of people have worked very hard and been very successful,” said Steve Seabolt, vice-president of the Menlo Circus Club, a private social club in Atherton that includes an equestrian center, pool and tennis court. “People are friendly and warm. And compared to a lot of other communities, it's remarkably understated. You don't see a lot of Rolls-Royces or Bentleys. That's just not how people live.”

But there's a reason why Atherton has remained pricey – and that's by being a not-very-good neighbor to the rest of California. According to housing advocates, the town has set up legal boundaries to remain exclusive and put up obstacles against efforts to build affordable housing during a statewide housing crisis. Eric Schmidt is a promoter of this policy of exclusion.

Some groups are worried about Schmidt to the point that they sent this letter to Joe Biden:

To President-elect Joseph R. Biden, Jr.:

We write to you as a broad coalition of organizations representing millions of Americans who want to ensure that the Internet isn't dominated by a handful of corporations and remains free and open. We wish to congratulate you on your historic victory and look forward to working closely with your administration.

*In reviewing your transition's disclosure of its agency review teams, we were struck and concerned by the apparent widespread influence of people with close professional ties to Google generally and more specifically Eric Schmidt, a former CEO of Google with a current multi-billion dollar stake in the company.¹ Even more concerning are recent reports indicating that Schmidt is being considered for a position in the White House.² According to reporting by the *Financial Times*, “Eric Schmidt, the former Google chief executive, has been a big fundraiser, and is being talked about to lead a new technology industry task force in the White House.”³*

We are writing to convey our concern about the prospect of Mr. Schmidt leading such a task force, given that the Department of Justice filed suit against Google on October 22, 2020 in response to the company's well-documented anticompetitive behavior. According to the Department of Justice, “[a]s

one of the wealthiest companies on the planet with a market value of \$1 trillion, Google is the monopoly gatekeeper to the internet for billions of users and countless advertisers worldwide. For years, Google has accounted for almost 90 percent of all search queries in the United States and has used anticompetitive tactics to maintain and extend its monopolies in search and search advertising.”⁴

The suit against Google has the potential to be the most important antitrust case in a generation. Especially as you work to build our economy back better after the pandemic, keeping markets open and competitive is key for expanding economic opportunity, incentivizing innovation, and protecting consumers. As such, we believe that it sends the wrong message—and could have a chilling effect on U.S. antimonopoly policy moving forward—to have an individual who served at both the helm of Google and its parent company Alphabet Inc. at such a high position in government.

In fact, recent polling conducted by the organization Demand Progress confirms that the American people agree that this is the wrong path forward, even across party lines. When asked whether you should refuse to appoint executives, lobbyists, or lawyers from Big Tech companies that are currently being sued by the DOJ or state attorneys general for engaging in anticompetitive behavior into your administration, 58 percent said yes and only 14 percent said no.⁵ The American people are divided on many things, but not on what they view as fundamental issues of legal and economic justice like this one.

In addition to his history as an executive at a corporation currently the subject of a historic federal lawsuit, Schmidt’s personal conduct also raises serious flags. According to reporting by Recode, Schmidt has recently taken advantage of the Republic of Cyprus’s de facto “passport-for-sale” program that allows wealthy foreign nations to effectively purchase citizenship.⁶ According to the report, “[Schmidt’s] move is a window into how the world’s billionaires can maximize their freedoms and finances by relying on the permissive laws of countries where they do not live.” The report further postulates that Schmidt is pursuing Cypriot citizenship not only for the purpose of being able to travel freely within the European Union, but also possibly to access a “favorable personal tax regime”. In a time of historic wealth inequality, it would send a dangerous message to appoint a billionaire currently in the process of effectively purchasing citizenship for the likely purpose of benefiting from foreign taxation laws to such a high profile role in the Executive Branch.

You have made it clear that you intend to work to bridge the partisan divide and to be a President for all Americans, not just those who voted for you. It’s clear that taking a harder line against Google and other corporations engaged in anti-competitive behavior would be a unifying move, which would be hindered by putting a Google luminary in a position of public trust. What’s more, as you approach your first 100 days in office, the appointment of Schmidt risks fracturing a Democratic coalition that your campaign and so many others worked so hard to build over the past several months. While the appointment of Schmidt may attract praise from certain elites in both Washington and Silicon Valley, it risks alienating an overwhelming majority of the electorate, including within the Democratic base, who want to see the economic power of major corporations reined in.

Congratulations again on your historic election victory, and we are excited to work with your administration in the months and years ahead.

Sincerely,

Open Markets Institute

Communications Workers of America

Action Center on Race & the Economy

Accountable Tech

Artist Rights Alliance

Demand Progress

Fight for the Future

Liberation in a Generation

MPower Change

Partnership for Working Families

Progressive Change Campaign Committee

Revolving Door Project

SumOfUs

Tech Inquiry

Jillian C. York (Individual)

Footnotes:

1 See, e.g.: the team lead for the Council of Economic Advisors agency review team is closely associated with Schmidt Futures; a member of the Department of the Treasury team is affiliated with Sidwalk Labs, a sister organization to Google; one individual on the Department of Defense team and one on the Social Security Administration team are associated with Rebellion Defense, a small company associated with Schmidt; and multiple individuals spread across the transition are associated with WestExec, another firm closely associated with Schmidt. For more,

see: <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/12/us/politics/biden-administration-corporate-influence.html>

<https://theintercept.com/2018/07/22/google-westexec-pentagon-defense-contracts/>

2<https://fortune.com/2019/12/05/page-and-brin-google-control/>

3<https://www.ft.com/content/44f738e8-eb6f-4394-b833-6b3207ce31bf>

4<https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-sues-monopolist-google-violating-antitrust-laws>

5<https://mailchi.mp/6f08b79429c6/demandprogressnewpoll>. Opposition to the appointments of big tech executives like Eric Schmidt follows other recent polling from Demand Progress showing that voters across party lines support the federal lawsuit against Google. Recent polling by Demand Progress showed that 49% of those surveyed across party lines supported a Biden Administration continuing the lawsuit against Google compared to a mere 28% opposed and that 62% of respondents are concerned about the threat that the power of big technological companies... .poses to the U.S. economy. <https://www.axios.com/exclusive-poll-shows-bipartisan-support-for-tech-antitrust-action-c3794ff5-120d-44d8-bac1-58b033efbd8a.html>. Similarly, a recent survey conducted by Public Policy Polling found that a bipartisan majority of Americans are in favor of reigning in the power of big tech companies, with a massive 70% of those surveyed supporting federal intervention to break up tech monopolies.

<https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/new-poll-shows-bipartisan-majority-of-americans-want-congress-to-rein-in-big-tech-301151327.html>

<https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/11/9/21547055/eric-schmidt-google-citizen-cyprus-european-union>

The Sex Slaves Of Andy Rubin

Racing Eric Schmidt for the lead position as top sex pervert is 'good ole Andy'

SEX SHAME CLAIMS - Ex-Google exec 'ran sex ring and paid thousands to "own" women and "share" them with pals' wife claims

- By Guy Birchall and Bradford Betz

A MILLIONAIRE former Google exec has been accused by his wife of running a sex ring and lavishing hundreds of thousands on mistresses that he allegedly "shared" with pals for threesomes.

The sensational claims against Android co-founder Andy Rubin emerged in a legal battle over his fortune in a court in California.



Former Google exec Andy Rubin has been accused of running a 'sex ring' in a lawsuit filed by his soon to be ex-wifeCredit: Getty Images - Getty

The lawsuit, filed by Rie Hirabaru Rubin in San Mateo County, seeks to annul a prenuptial agreement she signed before their 2009 marriage.

The civil complaint alleges that Rubin concealed millions of his Google earnings from his wife by depositing the money in a separate bank account and making selected payments, some of which went to other women, [BuzzFeed](#) reports.

It is also claimed that Rubin ran a “sex ring” while working at Google – a claim made in another lawsuit by a Google shareholder earlier this year that said Rubin paid “hundreds of thousands of dollars to women to be, in Rubin’s own words, ‘owned’ by him.”

Rie Rubin’s lawyers accused him of paying for the expenses of several mistresses “in exchange for offering them to other men” so that he could either watch or join in for threesomes.

£70M GOLDEN HANDSHAKE

Rubin left Google in 2014 after a female employee accused him of forcing her to perform oral sex in a hotel room earlier that year.

He ultimately left the company with a £70million golden handshake.

The tech firm claims no employees dismissed over sexual harassment claims since 2016 have received payouts.

Multiple Google employees have since gone public with their annoyance over how the claims and subsequent investigation were handled.

Rubin’s attorney Ellen Stross has called Rie Rubin’s complaint “full of false allegations.”

She said in a statement: “This is a garden variety family law dispute involving a wife who regrets her decision to execute a prenuptial agreement.

“It is full of false claims, and we look forward to telling our side of the story.”

Rubin worked at Apple in the late 1980s where he acquired the nickname “Android” because of his love of robots.

He took that moniker for the tech company he founded in 2003.

Rubin joined Google in 2005 after it bought Android and oversaw it becoming an open-source operating system for smartphones.

He moved away from that side of operations in 2013 to manage Google’s robotics division but left the following year to pursue other ventures.

It later emerged that he had been accused of sexual misconduct while at the tech giant.

Rubin was one of the founders of smartphone operating system Android which was bought by Google in 2005

Android co-founder, Andy Rubin, who Google reportedly paid \$90 million to leave the company after a sexual misconduct investigation, has been accused of running a sex ring.

The accusations appear in documents revealed by [Buzzfeed News](#) showing Rubin’s estranged wife had complained she was convinced to sign a pre-nuptial agreement under false pretenses while pregnant.

The New York Times revealed last year that Google ousted Rubin after finding he had coerced an employee into oral sex in 2013, but rather than firing him, they agreed to pay him around \$2 million a month for four years if he resigned.

The New York Times also reported two other senior executives received similar sweetheart deals by Google following sexual misconduct accusations.

The complaint alleges Rubin opened a secret bank account to receive these payments, using them to make payments in the “hundreds of thousands of dollars” to other women, who he would allegedly “loan out” to other men.

Rubin allegedly emailed one woman in August 2015 telling her she “will be happy being taken care of”.

“Being owned is kinda like you are my property, and I can loan you to other people,” Rubin allegedly said in the email.

Andy Rubin joined Google after the company acquired Android in 2005.

His estranged wife alleges that in the years they were married his net worth ballooned from around \$10 million to \$350 million.

[Android Co-Founder Accused Of Running Sex Slave Ring ...](#)

 <https://conservativedailypost.com/android-co-founder-accused-of-running-sex-slave-ring/>

Android co-founder and former Google exec **Andy Rubin** has found himself at the center of a lawsuit filed by his soon-to-be ex-wife, who is accusing him of, among other things, running a **sex ring** with one of several mistresses.

[Top Google Executive Kept A Sex Slave | Shift Frequency](#)

 <https://www.shiftfrequency.com/top-google-executive-kept-a-sex-slave/>

Andy Rubin, the Google exec in charge of the Android operating system, was accused of sexually assaulting a fellow Google staffer and telling his ex-wife “you are my property, and I can loan you to other people.”

[Top Google Executive Kept A Sex Slave, Report Says - News ...](#)

<https://newspunch.com/google-exec-sex-slave-report/>

Andy Rubin, the Google exec in charge of the Android operating system, was accused of sexually assaulting a fellow Google staffer and telling his ex-wife “you are my property, and I can loan you to other people.”

[Android creator Andy Rubin ran sex ring, cheated estranged ...](#)

<https://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/ny-20190704-rblqrtucmzgexl7ip7zdhroo6y-story.html>

Andy Rubin, inventor of the Android and a disgraced ex-Google exec, allegedly cheated his then wife out of millions, while keeping several mistresses and running what amounted to a **sex** ring ...

[Ex-Google exec 'ran sex ring and paid thousands to "own ...](#)

<https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/9425655/ex-google-exec-ran-sex-ring-that-saw-him-pay-thousands-to-own-women-and-share-them-with-pals/>

A MILLIONAIRE former Google exec has been accused by his wife of running a **sex** ring and lavishing hundreds of thousands on mistresses that he allegedly "shared" with pals for threesomes. The...

[sex slave | Shift Frequency](#)

<https://www.shiftfrequency.com/tag/sex-slave/>

Sean Adl-Tabatabai - A top Google executive who kept a **sex slave** was protected by other higher-ups at the Big Tech giant, according to a New York Times report.. **Andy Rubin**, the Google exec in charge of the Android operating system, was accused of sexually assaulting a fellow Google staffer and telling his ex-wife "you are my property, and I can loan you to other people."

The Forrest Hayes Sex Death Yacht

KILLED BY HIS GOOGLE HOOKER

Google executive was killed by prostitute who injected him with lethal dose of heroin and left him to die on his yacht

Alix Tichelman, whose boyfriend died from a heroin overdose two months before the killing, was jailed for five years following the death of dad-of-five Forrest Timothy Hayes

- [Mark Hodge](#)

A MILLIONAIRE Google executive died after a high-class prostitute injected him with a deadly dose of heroin – before stepping over his dying body to leave his yacht.

Call girl [Alix Tichelman](#), 30, was sentenced to five years in jail after CCTV footage on the tragic father-of-five Forrest Timothy Hayes's 50ft luxury boat proved she gave him the lethal dose of the drug in 2013.



Alix Tichelman was sentenced to five years following the death of Google exec Forrest Timothy Hayes
Credit: timstewartnews@gmail.com



Hayes, 51, died after the prostitute gave him a lethal dose of heroin on board his luxury yacht in California
Credit: timstewartnews@gmail.com

Divorcee Hayes, 51, who had a top job with search giant Google, had met Tichelman several times for drug-fuelled sex sessions via escort website Seeking Arrangement.

In May 2015, Tichelman pleaded guilty to felony involuntary manslaughter and administering drugs and served nearly three years behind bars before being released because of good behaviour.

The troubled hooker, whose father is also a CEO of a large tech company in California, also lost her former boyfriend to a heroin overdose.

The man, a 53-year-old monkey trainer, allegedly died two months before Hayes although his death was ruled accidental.

Cops arrested Tichelman [eight months after Hayes death](#).

CCTV footage gathered by police is said to have shown the then 26-year-old prostitute gather her belongings and step over the Silicon Valley exec's unconscious body to finish her glass of wine.

She was then filmed lowering a blind before leaving the boat without calling 911.

Hayes body was discovered the following day on the yacht in Santa Cruz Small Craft Harbour, California.



Tichelman has been released from prison after serving three years but was detained by immigration officials and risks being deportedCredit: AKKennedyxx/Twitter



Tichelman pleaded guilty to felony involuntary manslaughter and administering drugsCredit:
AP:Associated Press


But during the trial, defence attorney Larry Biggam pointed out that heroin addict Tichelman had injected herself before administering the lethal dose.

He argued that the powerful drugs had clouded her judgement and that there was no reason for the call girl to kill her most lucrative client, reports [KSBW](#).

Canadian-born Tichelman was detained by immigration cops in California following her release from prison on March 29.

Despite bail documents incorrectly stating that the former prostitute had dual citizenship it has now been confirmed that she is not an American citizen and risks being deported, reports KSBW.





Tichelman, whose boyfriend died of a heroin overdose two months before Hayes, is the daughter of a wealthy tech CEO Credit: AKKennedyxx/Twitter

Speaking with the [New York Post](#), ICE spokesman James Schwab confirmed the convict was being held by immigration officials.

He said: “Ms Tichelman was taken into custody by deportation officers with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) March 29. Department of Homeland Security databases indicate Ms. Tichelman has multiple prior criminal convictions, including convictions for involuntary manslaughter and a felony drug charge. She will remain in DHS/ICE custody pending removal proceedings.”

Forrest Timothy Hayes, Rajeev Motwani, Gary D. Conley, and other Silicon Valley major players, had first-hand, inside knowledge of who at Google, and how Google, was rigging national elections, manipulating news media and controlling the White House for personal gain. They all died suddenly and strangely in manners which many think were murders designed to shut them up!

Inside The \$40 Million Anal Sex-Slave Case Rocking Silicon Valley

- Married *Pretty Boy* frat house Google VC vs anal sex mistress
- Understanding the legal maneuverings behind the case that shocked the V.C. world.



BY EMILY JANE FOX



BY LIDO VIZZUTTI/A.P. IMAGES.

- A venture capitalist from one of the tech industry's most revered firms is at the center of a sexual-abuse case heating up in a California court.

Last week, **Michael Goguen**, a longtime partner at Sequoia Capital, the legendary venture-capital firm, parted ways with the company in light of allegations that he sexually abused a young woman with whom he was involved for more than a decade. The suit, filed by **Amber Laurel Baptiste** in the

California Superior Court in San Mateo, is over a breach of contract. (Gougen allegedly failed to follow through with a \$40 million settlement to which they agreed.)

The **complaint** itself is terrifying. Baptiste alleges that Gougen abused her “sexually, physically, and emotionally for 13 years,” beginning when the two met in 2001. In 2014, when “she could no longer tolerate his behavior,” Gougen signed an agreement to settle the claims for \$40 million, paid over four installments. The complaint claims that Gougen paid Baptiste \$10 million, but refused to relinquish the remainder of the \$30 million. (Gougen denied the allegations in a statement on LinkedIn over the weekend. Sequoia Capital says it agreed to separate from Gougen upon hearing of the claims. “We decided that Mike’s departure was the appropriate course of action,” the company noted in a statement.)

The suit, not surprisingly, has become the talk of Silicon Valley. The technology industry is, after all, familiar with stories of sexual misconduct and misogyny. According to “**Elephant in the Valley**,” a recent survey of more than 200 veteran female tech workers, 60 percent of those who responded said they were the target of unwanted sexual advances, and 65 percent of those people were targeted by their superiors; one-third said they felt afraid for their personal safety because of work-related circumstances. Despite its culture of enlightenment, the Valley can indeed still be a place in which men land jobs by sending “bikini shots” from a “nudie calendar” and go on to **boast about this kind of a coup**; or a place where a filthy-rich entrepreneur can **kick and hit his girlfriend 117 times on video** and subsequently blog that it was “all overblown drama because it generates huge volumes of page views.” Even the venerated Sequoia has not been immune to similar, though less prurient, chatter. Last fall, its chairman, **Michael Moritz**, created a stir when talking about how his firm, which has zero female partners, looks very hard for women to hire. He noted, somewhat clumsily, that Sequoia is not prepared to “**lower [its] standards**” simply to hire based on gender. “If there are fabulously bright, driven women who are really interested in technology, very hungry to succeed, and can meet our performance standards, we’d hire them all day and night,” he told Bloomberg’s **Emily Chang** in December. Moritz may have been trying to express a form of gender blindness, but the tech press largely folded the comment into a prevailing narrative of inequality.

The allegations against Gougen, however, go far beyond any issues of gender inequality or workplace respect. In her complaint, Baptiste claimed that she met Gougen after she was brought to the U.S., in 2001, to work as an exotic dancer. Over the course of their relationship, she alleges that Gougen promised to sponsor her education in return for sex; he verbally abused her and required that she refer to him as “a king and an emperor;” she also claims that she was the victim of “countless hours of forced sodomy,” including an incident that landed her in a London hospital after she “hemorrhaged” blood on the bathroom floor of a hotel room. She said that Gougen agreed to pay her medical expenses, and beginning in 2010, would funnel money through two companies—an LLC called Je Ne Se Que Enterprises and a charitable organization called Every Girl Counts. She also claimed that Gougen passed onto her a strain of human papillomavirus (H.P.V.).

In his counter-complaint, Goguen claims that none of the allegations are true. The document states that he and Baptiste were in a consensual, loving relationship that simply went wrong when he tried to sever ties. “Consumed by anger, obsession and jealousy . . . Ms. Baptiste hatched a plan to get her vengeance,” the complaint states. “To accomplish her scheme, Ms. Baptiste launched a campaign of harassment designed to inflict as much pain as possible on Mr. Goguen and his family.” The filing also outlines the “affectionate monikers” she used toward him, including “Prince Charming,” “My Sweet Sweet Sunshine,” and “the most wonderful man in my whole world.” And it includes illustrations of provocative photos she sent him, to suggest that “it defies logic and common sense that an alleged victim of ‘rape,’ ‘abuse,’ and ‘sexual slavery’ would send such provocative photos to the alleged perpetrator.” He also notes there is no way to test for male H.P.V.

The complaint, and the counter-complaint, are both afflictive, sickeningly so in their own right. But they are part of a larger narrative of what has become a de facto playbook used when people in power are accused of rape. Recent history is littered with numerous examples in which wealthy people accused of assault—in the court of public appeals, or in a real courtroom— file a countersuit that drills holes into the alleged victim, their claims, and their credibility. Similar moves have played out in incidents of campus assault allegations. Late last year, **Bill Cosby** countersued seven of the dozens of women who had previously accused him of sexual assault and defamation, claiming they had made “malicious, opportunistic, and false and defamatory accusations of sexual misconduct” against him, according to his lawyer. For powerful people, noted **Randall Kessler**, an attorney at Kessler & Solomiany and a litigation professor at Emory University Law School, the best defense can be a good offense.

“We have seen perpetrators pull out Facebook messages, texts, voice mails. They are often times used in countersuits to say that whatever was done was consensual,” said **Jennifer Marsh**, the vice president of victim services at the Rape, Abuse and Incest National Network. It is part of the way a person in power continues their control over the situation. “That power imbalance allows a perpetrator to control and manipulate their victims, and perpetrators purposely look for victims they have the ability to control.”

Both Baptiste’s and Goguen’s complaints agree that they came to an agreement that would have him pay her \$40 million in four installments. Both agree that he provided her with the first payment of \$10 million, but missed the remaining three. They disagree on how they got the agreement, and what went wrong from there. He claims she violated the terms of the settlement, which the complaint repeatedly refers to as the “Extorted Agreement,” by contacting him after it was signed. He then decided to “stand and face her” rather than quietly “satisfying Ms. Baptiste’s exorbitant financial demands.”

Baptiste tells a different story. Her complaint alleges that once Goguen stopped paying her medical expenses, she hired a lawyer and sent him a draft of the complaint. She claims that she ended up firing her own attorney, and instead, Goguen’s own representation drafted the settlement, which they both

signed in May of 2014. “Putting aside the pretty horrific allegations with respect to personal issues, the other side drafted a settlement agreement and that settlement agreement was signed by both parties,” Baptiste’s current attorney, **Patricia Glaser**, told me. “We’re not suing for the abuses. We are suing in a very simple, straight-forward ‘you promised us \$40 million and you paid us \$10 million of it and then reneged on the other \$30 million.’ To use the word extortion is not only logically inconsistent, but completely untrue.” (Goguen’s attorney did not respond to requests for comment.)

Baptiste is asking for the remaining \$30 million guaranteed to her under the settlement agreement, plus legal fees, and damages. Goguen, who is now without a job, asked the court to void the agreement, and Baptiste to pay back the \$10 million he already paid her along with damages for the allegations she made. Filing a countersuit and pushing this closer to a court date could be a way to drive down the payout, Kessler explained—a reminder to the alleged victim that they stand to lose more by pressing ahead. “They’re saying, ‘If you go to court, you may walk away worse off than you already are. You may have to pay lawyers fees. So you should think hard about dropping the case.’”

[Tech titan Michael Goguen of Sequoia Capital 'kept Amber as anal sex slave ...](#)

<https://www.news.com.au/finance/tech-titan-michael-goguen-of-sequoia-capital-kept...>

Tech titan **Michael Goguen** of Sequoia Capital ‘kept Amber Baptiste as a **sex** slave for 13 years’
WARNING: Disturbing content. A top venture capitalist has been accused of violently raping and

[Ex-stripper describes 13-year nightmare as tech titan's ...](#)

<https://nypost.com/2016/03/14/ex-sequoia-capital-partner-countersues-in-sex-abuse-case>

A Silicon Valley venture capitalist has been sued for \$40 million by a woman who claims he used her as a virtual **sex** slave for 13 years. **Michael Goguen**, who had worked for a firm that funded Google...

[The Secret Life Of Goguen And His \\$10M Infidelity](#)

<https://www.fa-mag.com/news/the-secret-life-of-goguen-and-his--10m-infidelity-25786.html>

Michael Goguen liked his privacy. In the world of startups, full of bombast and self-promotion, the soft-spoken venture partner at Sequoia Capital specialized in quieter, more technical areas: He ...

[Whitefish Police Chief Sues Wealthy Philanthropist; Goguen ...](#)

<https://flatheadbeacon.com/2019/12/20/whitefish-police-chief-sues-wealthy...>

Michael Goguen pictured in 2018. Beacon File Photo ... a woman who in 2016 brought a separate lawsuit against **Goguen** alleging a breach of contract in a salacious money-for-sex scandal that made ...

Larry Page Steals Technology And Sexually Loves Elon Musk

LARRY PAGE AND GOOGLE BASE THEIR BUSINESS MODEL ON STEALING YOUR TECHNOLOGY

- How Larry Page's Obsessions Became Google's Business
- Boyfriend Elon Musk Conspires With Page
- Page Caught Skulking Around Tech Parties To Steal Ideas

By [CONOR DOUGHERTY](#)

Three years ago, Charles Chase, an engineer who manages Lockheed Martin's nuclear fusion program, was sitting on a white leather couch at Google's Solve for X conference when a man he had never met knelt down to talk to him.

They spent 20 minutes discussing how much time, money and technology separated humanity from a sustainable fusion reaction — that is, how to produce clean energy by mimicking the sun's power — before Mr. Chase thought to ask the man his name.

"I'm Larry Page," the man said. He realized he had been talking to [Google's billionaire co-founder](#) and [chief executive](#).

"He didn't have any sort of pretension like he shouldn't be talking to me or 'Don't you know who you're talking to?'" Mr. Chase said. "We just talked."

Larry Page is not a typical chief executive, and in many of the most visible ways, he is not a C.E.O. at all. Corporate leaders tend to spend a good deal of time talking at investor conferences or introducing new products on auditorium stages. Mr. Page, who is 42, has not been on an earnings call since 2013, and the best way to find him at Google I/O — an annual gathering where the company unveils new products — is to ignore the main stage and follow the scrum of fans and autograph seekers who mob him in the moments he steps outside closed doors.

But just because he has faded from public view does not mean he is a recluse. He is a regular at robotics conferences and intellectual gatherings like TED. Scientists say he is a good bet to attend Google's various academic gatherings, like Solve for X and Sci Foo Camp, where he can be found having casual conversations about technology or giving advice to entrepreneurs.

[Google's Co-Founder. It's Emasculating.](#)

[Google Announces Stock Buyback as Earnings Rise](#)

[European Publishers Play Lobbying Role Against Google](#)

[Google Goal in Restructuring as Alphabet: Autonomy](#)

[Google to Reorganize as Alphabet to Keep Its Lead as an Innovator](#)

Mr. Page is hardly the first Silicon Valley chief with a case of intellectual wanderlust, but unlike most of his peers, he has invested far beyond his company's core business and in many ways has made it a reflection of his personal fascinations.

He intends to push even further with Alphabet, a holding company that separates Google's various cash-rich advertising businesses from the list of speculative projects like self-driving cars that capture the imagination but do not make much money. Alphabet companies and investments span disciplines from biotechnology to energy generation to space travel to artificial intelligence to urban planning.

Investors will get a good look at the scope of those ambitions on Feb. 1, when the company, in its fourth-quarter earnings report, will disclose for the first time the costs and income of the collection of projects outside of Google's core business.

As chief executive of Alphabet, Mr. Page is tasked with figuring how to spin Google's billions in advertising profits into new companies and industries. When he announced the reorganization last summer, he said that he and Sergey Brin, Google's other founder, would do this by finding new people and technologies to invest in, while at the same time slimming down Google — now called Google Inc., a subsidiary of Alphabet — so their leaders would have more autonomy.

"In general, our model is to have a strong C.E.O. who runs each business, with Sergey and me in service to them as needed," Mr. Page wrote in a letter to investors. He said that he and Mr. Brin would be responsible for picking those chief executives, monitoring their progress and determining their pay.

Google's day-to-day management was left to Sundar Pichai, the company's new chief executive. His job will not be about preventing cancer or launching rocket ships, but to keep Google's advertising machine humming, to keep innovating in emerging areas like machine learning and virtual reality — all while steering the company through a thicket of regulatory troubles that could drag on for years.

Mr. Page's new role is part talent scout and part technology visionary. He still has to find the chief executives of many of the other Alphabet businesses.

And he has said on several occasions that he spends a good deal of time researching new technologies, focusing on what kind of financial or logistic hurdles stand in the way of them being invented or carried out.

His presence at technology events, while just a sliver of his time, is indicative of a giant idea-scouting mission that has in some sense been going on for years but is now Mr. Page's main job.

In the investor letter, he put it this way: "Sergey and I are seriously in the business of starting new things."

An Interest in Cool Things

Mr. Page has always had a wide range of interests. As an undergraduate at the University of Michigan, he worked on solar cars, music synthesizers and once proposed that the school build a tram through campus. He arrived at Stanford's computer science doctorate program in 1995, and had a list of initial research ideas, including self-driving cars and using the web's many hyperlinks to improve Internet search. His thesis adviser, Terry Winograd, steered him toward search.

“Even before he came to Stanford he was interested in cool technical things that could be done,” Mr. Winograd said. “What makes something interesting for him is a big technical challenge. It’s not so much where it’s headed but what the ride is like.”

Inside Google, Mr. Page is known for asking a lot of questions about how people do their jobs and challenging their assumptions about why things are as they are. In an interview at the Fortune Global Forum last year, Mr. Page said he enjoyed talking to people who ran the company’s data centers.

“I ask them, like, ‘How does the transformer work?’ ‘How does the power come in?’ ‘What do we pay for that?’” he said. “And I’m thinking about it kind of both as an entrepreneur and as a business person. And I’m thinking ‘What are those opportunities?’”

Another question he likes to ask: “Why can’t this be bigger?”

Mr. Page declined multiple requests for comment, and many of the people who spoke about him requested anonymity because they were not supposed to talk about internal company matters.

Many former Google employees who have worked directly with Mr. Page said his managerial modus operandi was to take new technologies or product ideas and generalize them to as many areas as possible. Why can’t Google Now, Google’s predictive search tool, be used to predict everything about a person’s life? Why create a portal to shop for insurance when you can create a portal to shop for every product in the world?

But corporate success means corporate sprawl, and recently Google has seen a number of engineers and others leave for younger rivals like Facebook and start-ups like Uber. Mr. Page has made personal appeals to some of them, and, at least in a few recent cases, has said he is worried that the company has become a difficult place for entrepreneurs, according to people who have met with him.

Part of Mr. Page’s pitch included emphasizing how dedicated he was to “moonshots” like interplanetary travel, or offering employees time and money to pursue new projects of their own. By breaking Google into Alphabet, Mr. Page is hoping to make it a more welcoming home for employees to build new businesses, as well as for potential acquisition targets.

It will also rid his office of the kind of dull-but-necessary annoyances of running a major corporation. Several recently departed Google staff members said that as chief executive of Google, Mr. Page had found himself in the middle of various turf wars, like how to integrate Google Plus, the company’s struggling social media effort, with other products like YouTube, or where to put Google Now, which resided in the Android team but was moved to the search group.

What Is Separated Under Alphabet?

- Google: search, advertising, maps, YouTube and Android.
- Calico, an anti-aging biotech company
- Sidewalk, a company focused on smart cities
- Nest, a maker of Internet-connected devices for the home
- Fiber, high-speed Internet service in a number of American cities
- Investment arms, such as Google Ventures and Google Capital
- Incubator projects, such as Google X, which is developing self-driving cars and delivery drones

Such disputes are a big reason Mr. Page had been shedding managerial duties and delegating the bulk of his product oversight to Mr. Pichai, these people said. In a 2014 memo to the company announcing Mr. Pichai's promotion to product chief, Mr. Page said the move would allow him to "focus on the bigger picture" at Google and have more time to get the company's next generation of big bets off the ground.

People who have worked with Mr. Page say that he tries to guard his calendar, avoiding back-to-back meetings and leaving time to read, research and see new technologies that interest him.

Given that he is worth in the neighborhood of \$40 billion and created the world's most famous website, Mr. Page has the tendency to attract a crowd when he attends technology events. At last year's Darpa Robotics Challenge, he was trailed closely by a handler who at times acted as a buffer between Mr. Page and would-be cellphone photographers. That commotion could annoy anyone, but it is particularly troubling for Mr. Page, who, because of damaged vocal cords, speaks just above a whisper and sometimes uses a microphone in small meetings.

At home in Palo Alto, Mr. Page tries to have the most normal life possible, driving his children to school or taking his family to local street fairs, according to people who know him or have seen him at such events.

And at Google, even events that are decidedly not normal aspire to a kind of casualness. Take the Camp, an exclusive and secretive event that Google holds at a resort in Sicily and where invitees have included Elon Musk, the chief executive of Tesla Motors and SpaceX, Lloyd C. Blankfein, the chief executive of Goldman Sachs, and Tory Burch, the fashion designer.

One attendee, who asked to remain anonymous because guests were not supposed to discuss the gathering, recalls being surprised by how much time Mr. Page spent with his children.

In public remarks, Mr. Page has said how important his father, Carl V. Page, a computer science professor at Michigan State University who died in 1996, was to his choice of career.

"My dad was really interested in technology," Mr. Page said at Google I/O in 2013, the last time he took the stage at the event. "He actually drove me and my family all the way across the country to go to a robotics conference. And then we got there and he thought it was so important that his young son go to the conference, one of the few times I've seen him really argue with someone to get in someone underage successfully into the conference, and that was me."

People who work with Mr. Page or have spoken with him at conferences say he tries his best to blend in, and, for the most part, the smaller groups of handpicked attendees at Google's academic and science gatherings, tend to treat him like a peer.

The scope of his curiosity was apparent at Sci Foo Camp, an annual invitation-only conference that is sponsored by Google, O'Reilly Media and Digital Science.

The largely unstructured "unconference" begins when each of its attendees — an eclectic batch of astronomers, psychologists, physicists and others — write something that interests them on a small card and then paste it to a communal wall. Those notes become the basis for breakout talks on topics like scientific ethics or artificial intelligence.

The last conference was held during a weekend in June on Google's Mountain View, Calif., campus, and Mr. Page was there for most of it. He did not host or give a speech, but mingled and went to talks,

just like everyone else. That impressed investors and computer scientists who did not expect to see so much of him, but researchers who had come from outside Silicon Valley barely noticed.

“I have a vague memory that some founder type person was walking through the crowd,” said Josh Peek, an assistant astronomer at the Space Telescope Science Institute in Baltimore.

Another benefit of these gatherings for the reserved Mr. Page is that they are mostly closed to the news media.

A Forward Thinker

When Mr. Page does talk in public, he tends to focus on optimistic pronouncements about the future and Google’s desire to help humanity. Asked about current issues, like how mobile apps are challenging the web or how ad blockers are affecting Google’s business, he tends to dismiss it with something like, “People have been talking about that for a long time.”

Lately, he has talked more about his belief that for-profit companies can be a force for social good and change. During a 2014 interview with Charlie Rose, Mr. Page said that instead of a nonprofit or philanthropic organization, he would rather leave his money to an entrepreneur like Mr. Musk.

Of course, for every statement Mr. Page makes about Alphabet’s technocorporate benevolence, you can find many competitors and privacy advocates holding their noses in disgust. Technology companies like Yelp have accused the company of acting like a brutal monopolist that is using the dominance of its search engine to steer consumers toward Google services, even if that means giving the customers inferior information.

Financially speaking, Mr. Page is leaving his chief executive job at Google at a time when things could not be better. The [company’s revenue continues to grow](#) about 20 percent a year, an impressive figure for any business, but particularly so for one that is on pace to generate approximately \$60 billion this year.

In fact, the company’s main business issue seems to be that it is doing too well. [Google is facing antitrust charges in Europe](#), along with investigations in Europe and the United States. Those issues are now mostly Mr. Pichai’s to worry about, as Mr. Page is out looking for the next big thing.

It is hard to imagine how even the most ambitious person could hope to revolutionize so many industries. And Mr. Page, no matter how smart, cannot possibly be an expert in every area Alphabet wants to touch.

His method is not overly technical. Instead, he tends to focus on how to make a sizable business out of whatever problem this or that technology might solve. Leslie Dewan, a nuclear engineer who founded a company that is trying to generate cheap electricity from nuclear waste, also had a brief conversation with Mr. Page at the Solve For X conference.

She said he questioned her on things like modular manufacturing and how to find the right employees.

“He doesn’t have a nuclear background, but he knew the right questions to ask,” said Dr. Dewan, chief executive of Transatomic Power. “‘Have you thought about approaching the manufacturing in this way?’ ‘Have you thought about the vertical integration of the company in this way?’ ‘Have you thought about training the work force this way?’ They weren’t nuclear physics questions, but they were extremely thoughtful ways to think about how we could structure the business.”

Dr. Dewan said Mr. Page even gave her an idea for a new market opportunity that she had not thought of. Asked to be more specific, she refused. The idea was too good to share.

Doris Burke contributed reporting from New York.

GOOGLE'S LARRY PAGE - TECH MOBSTER

Google's Larry Page Proves, Yet Again, That He Is All BS And No Substance As His Election Rigging And Flying Cars Crash

- Larry Page never learned his lesson: *"History isn't kind to men who play god"*
- Page is Elon Musk's bromance boyfriend and they rig elections, campaign finance, stock markets and sex parties together
- His billionaire balloon ride project in NASA's Silicon Valley blimp hanger is a disaster
- Larry Page helps run a Silicon Valley organized tech crime empire: <https://vcracket.weebly.com> and <https://www.thecreepylines.com>
- Page steals his ideas from small inventors and then finances U.S. Patent Office blockades against those inventors per <http://invent111.com>
- Page sneaks around at tech events to steal ideas: <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/24/technology/larry-page-google-founder-is-still-innovator-in-chief.html>

Political influence from outside groups covertly funded by Larry Page, for example via Google's massive army of lobbyists and crooked law firms, is far more than just cold hard cash in the form of direct campaign contributions. A large portion of the people who run political election programs, ie: "Campaign Managers" are no more than mobsters who run various financial shake-down and transparency evasion efforts. For Larry Page, though, they just make one phone call and Larry has his covert operations people do the rest.

[The Washington Post reports on many bribery matters](#), for example, that the Larry Page and the Palo Alto Mafia of High Tech billionaires has donated less than \$4 million publicly visible dollars to members of Congress in the last 18 years.... BUT.. In an era where some Senate races cost nearly \$100 million, \$4 million seems like very little... In fact, Larry Page has provided over a billion dollars in non-reported political campaign financing.

Here are other ways the Larry Page and the Larry Page and the Palo Alto Mafia of High Tech billionaires bribe their way into policy and politics:

BRIBE: Larry Page and the Palo Alto Mafia of High Tech billionaires also give to party committees and the national party. A maxed-out donation to the national party quickly increases campaign spending to more than \$100,000. Any organization – or person – can also give \$33,400 to a party committee. Finally, state and local parties can each receive a \$10,000, quickly allowing campaign finance totals to soar to nearly half-a-million dollars.

BRIBE: While the organization has to follow campaign limits, its members can make their own political donations, also following campaign finance limits noted above. But with millions of members,

political clout builds quickly. Larry Page and the Palo Alto Mafia of High Tech billionaires have people like Steve Spinner and Steve Westly who use computerized manipulation systems to get members to over donate.

BRIBE: Larry Page and the Larry Page and the Palo Alto Mafia of High Tech billionaires has a politically active membership on the social networks they own. With more than five million members, the Facebook and Google constantly communicates with its members about immigration and climate issues that affect Larry Page and the Palo Alto Mafia of High Tech billionaires stock market holdings and advising them how to vote. The organization is also constantly increasing its voter rolls by registering people to vote.

BRIBE: Larry Page and the Palo Alto Mafia of High Tech billionaires also activates its membership when elected officials are facing climate-related legislation, resulting in phone calls and emails and letters to Congress. In addition, lawmakers' votes are noted and advertised to their issue-oriented membership.

BRIBE: Larry Page and the Palo Alto Mafia of High Tech billionaires has its a massive number of their own super PAC's and 501c4 political organization which can run hundreds of their own political campaigns. The groups combined spent more than \$40 million in the midterm elections on Senate and Congressional candidates, according to the Center for Responsive Politics. A lot of that money was spent on political advertising on television, radio and digital, and on direct mail.

BRIBE: Larry Page and the Palo Alto Mafia of High Tech billionaires tip off Senator's staff as to which stocks to have their Goldman Sachs brokers buy and which laws to manipulate that will pump those stocks that the families of Sen. Reid, Harris, Pelosi, Feinstein, etc. have already insider traded. Why do you think Nancy Pelosi and Dianne Feinstein have \$100M in their bank accounts from only a \$170K per year salary? (ie: If Tesla Motors went bankrupt would Nancy Pelosi and Dianne Feinstein, who own covert stock in Musk's companies, go bankrupt?)

BRIBE: Political attackers spend over \$30M, part of that using taxpayer resources, attacking each victim that exposes them. This is proven in the financial transaction records from hired attackers: [Google](#), [Gawker](#), [Deadspin](#), [Gizmodo](#), [Jalopnik](#), Think Progress, Media Matters, Facebook shadow-banning, troll farms, Media Matters, Black Cube, Fusion GPS, et al. (All of whom are now being forced out of business by federal and public investigations). Jury and FBI-compliant evidence proves the assertions. Hiring services, that wipe out a Senator's adversaries, is an overt form of bribery and Dark Money financing by Oligarchs.

BRIBE: There are hundreds of other such examples. We witnessed these crimes, frauds and political money laundering actions but the FEC, FBI, DOJ, FTC and others refuse to arrest the suspects because the suspects share business ventures with regulators and law enforcement executives!!!

Certain California State officials, Obama White House Staff and Federal Agency staff accepted bribes from Silicon Valley Oligarchs and Investment Bank Cartels. They were bribed with: Billions of dollars of Google, Twitter, Facebook, Tesla, Netflix and Sony Pictures stock and stock warrants which is never reported to the FEC; Billions of dollars of Google, Twitter, Facebook, Tesla, Netflix and Sony Pictures search engine rigging and shadow-banning which is never reported to the FEC; Free rent; Rare-Earth mining rights; Male and female prostitutes; Cars; Dinners; Party Financing; Sports Event Tickets; Political campaign printing and mailing services "Donations"; Secret PAC Financing; Jobs in Corporations in Silicon Valley For The Family Members of Those Who Take Bribes And Those Who

Take Bribes; "Consulting" contracts from McKinsey as fronted pay-off gigs; Overpriced "Speaking Engagements" which are really just pay-offs conducted for donors; Gallery art; Private jet rides and the use of Government fuel depots (ie: Google handed out NASA jet fuel to staff); Recreational drugs; Real Estate; Fake mortgages; The use of Cayman, Boca Des Tores, Swiss and related money-laundering accounts; The use of HSBC, Wells Fargo, Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank money laundering accounts and covert stock accounts; Free spam and bulk mailing services owned by Silicon Valley corporations; Use of high tech law firms such as Perkins Coie, Wilson Sonsini, MoFo, Covington & Burling, etc. to conduit bribes to officials; and other means now documented by us, The FBI, the FTC, The SEC, The FEC and journalists.

Senior White House staffer Steve Rattner was indicted for stock market securities fraud, Former President's campaign manager and Uber executive David Plouffe has been fined \$90,000 for illegally bribing Chicago mayor Rahm Emanuel (Obama's former Chief of Staff, on behalf of the ride-hailing company, the Chicago Tribune reports.

In another case, White House buddies Marty Nesbitt and Harreld Kirkpatrick III formed a private equity investment firm called Vistria created to interface to the 2012 election.

A curious pattern began to emerge. The White House administration would attack industries with government power, which led to substantially lower valuations for these companies. Nesbitt and Vistria, or others close to the White House, could then acquire those assets for pennies on the dollar. For example: The for-profit higher education schools like University of Phoenix, ITT Technical Institute, and DeVry University; In 2013, White House staff blamed the schools for taking advantage of students by saddling them with student debt, ruining their credit and making a profit on it. The White House ordered the Federal Trade Commission to go after them. In the case of the University of Phoenix, its parent Apollo Education Group was suspended after a Federal Trade Commission investigation in 2015. The following year, three companies, including Vistria, swooped in to buy what remained of Apollo at a price 90% below its share price before the investigation. As Vistria's education investment portfolio bulged, a number of White House Education Department officials, including Secretary of Education Arne Duncan, ended up taking high-level jobs with Vistria.

In another instance both the Vice President and Secretary of State were deeply [involved in trade and security talks with China](#) even as that country began its aggressive campaign to expand its military and physical presence in the South China Sea. Contrary to standard diplomatic practice, however, both played "good cop," not seriously confronting China on its misbehavior. These two officials were close friends from their years spent together in the Senate. Their families went into business together in 2009. They created a number of equity and real estate investment firms allied to Rosemont Capital, the alternative investment fund of the Heinz Family Office. Over the next seven years, as the Vice President and Secretary of State negotiated sensitive and high-stakes deals with foreign governments, Rosemont entities secured a series of exclusive deals with those same foreign governments. In December of 2013, for instance, when one of those politicians traveled to China for talks. He brought his family along. While there, the father soft-pedaled China's clear aggression, and played up the bilateral trade partnership. Ten days after the trip concluded, China's central bank, the Bank of China, set up a \$1 billion investment joint venture called Bohai Harvest RST. For the record, the "RS" referred to Biden's son's firm, Rosemont Seneca.

That's [questionable enough](#); But months later, in July 2014, the Secretary of State traveled to China, also for talks. He talked little of China's clear aggression, but did conspicuously note that "China and

the United States represent the greatest economic alliance trading partnership in the history of humankind." He should know. In the ensuing months, Chinese government-linked firms took major stakes in several of the firms owned or controlled by their family, and provided them with massive funding totaling billions of dollars. Nor is [this the only scandal](#) involving these guys.

While we can provide hundreds of thousands of such examples, it is up to YOU, as a citizen, to call these public figures (who are your EMPLOYEES) to task when it occurs and remove them from office in special elections, mid-term.

Google's Larry Page Proves, Yet Again, That He Is All BS And No Substance As His Election Rigging And Flying Cars Crash

- Page is Elon Musk's bromance boyfriend and they rig elections, campaign finance, stock markets and sex parties together
- His billionaire balloon ride project in NASA's Silicon Valley blimp hanger is a disaster
- Larry Page helps run a Silicon Valley organized tech crime empire: <http://dig-innovations.net> and <https://vcracket.weebly.com> and <https://www.thecreepylines.com> and <http://nationalnewsnetwork.net> and <http://londonworldwide.com>
- Page steals his ideas from small inventors and then finances U.S. Patent Office blockades against those inventors per <http://invent111.com>
- Page sneaks around at tech events to steal ideas: <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/24/technology/larry-page-google-founder-is-still-innovator-in-chief.html>

In 2017, success seemed to be just around the corner for Kitty Hawk, the secretive flying car company that's bankrolled by Google co-founder Larry Page and run by Sebastian Thrun, the Stanford AI and robotics whiz who had launched Google's self-driving car unit. Kitty Hawk had just shown off a prototype of the Flyer, a single-seat, battery-powered aircraft intended to be a low-altitude fun machine for use over water, like a jet ski on rotors, with handling that would make flying as easy as driving. "I'm excited that one day very soon I'll be able to climb onto my Kitty Hawk Flyer for a quick and easy personal flight," [Page said](#) at the time. The startup promised to put Flyer in eager buyers' hands by the end of the year.

Late that year the Mountain View, California-based company also began flight-testing a more ambitious project in New Zealand: a two-seat electric self-flying taxi called Cora that Kitty Hawk says will enable city dwellers to soar over gridlocked streets. "Just imagine travelling at 80 miles an hour in a straight line at any time of day without ever having to stop," Thrun [told the Guardian](#) a few months after Cora was unveiled. "It would be transformational to almost every person I know."

Two years later, however, Kitty Hawk's promise to bring personal flying to the masses has failed to take wing yet amid technical problems and safety issues with Flyer and unresolved questions about its practical use, according to four former Kitty Hawk employees who were among six who spoke

to Forbes on the condition of anonymity due to non-disclosure agreements. At the same time, it may have given up control of Cora, sources suggest.

Kitty Hawk confirmed to Forbes that, after unveiling a more polished version of the Flyer last year, it has decided not to sell the one-seater to individuals and has returned deposits to would-be buyers. Behind closed doors, Flyer encountered problems, including frequent breakdowns and fires involving batteries, electric motors and wiring, two former engineers said. Last year, the Mountain View Fire Department was called to put out an early morning blaze at the Flyer building, city records show; former employees said the fire at the Google-owned building involved damaged batteries that had been pulled out of a Flyer that had crashed the previous day in flight testing under remote operation.

“No person has ever been harmed or exposed due to undue risk in over 26,000 test flights with over 100 prototype vehicles,” wrote Shernaz Daver, an advisor to Kitty Hawk, in an email response to a list of questions sent by Forbes. She did not comment directly on the fires or reports of breakdowns or problems with its batteries.

Intent on bringing Flyer to market quickly, management in several instances brushed off workers who expressed worries that problems with the aircraft could endanger passengers, two former employees say. At least two members of the flight test team were let go after questioning the safety of the aircraft, they say, and some other members of the Flyer team who spoke up quit or jumped to another program at Kitty Hawk. Those individuals declined to comment when reached by Forbes.

“It was a pattern — if you talked about safety you were done, so you just didn’t,” said one former employee. “That’s just how it had to be if you wanted to keep getting a paycheck.”

Daver did not directly comment on reports of employee departures, but said employees at Kitty Hawk are required to report safety-related issues to their managers, or through a confidential digital channel directly to the general counsel and human resources, and can anonymously discuss safety concerns with an external safety director.

Kitty Hawk got off to an earlier start than many of the scores of startups now attempting to build electric urban air taxis, and the deep pockets of Page, who has a nearly \$60 billion fortune, have been a huge advantage, enabling the company to hire hundreds of engineers, machinists and designers to create cutting-edge aircraft. However, the company faces the same problems as any aspirant in the field: the poor energy density of the current generation of batteries severely limits the flight times and carrying capacity of electric aircraft, and building a functioning prototype is faster and easier than turning it into a reliable product that satisfies aviation regulators’ safety requirements. In the case of urban air mobility, many of the requirements don’t yet exist.

These challenges may explain why a strategic partnership with Boeing announced in June could go much deeper than publicly announced. Public filings and organizational shifts at Kitty Hawk described by former employees indicate that there’s been a change of control of the Cora program, and Boeing seems the likely acquirer. The jetmaker and Kitty Hawk declined to comment.

That would leave Kitty Hawk with two other aircraft: Flyer and [Heaviside](#), an autonomous winged one-seater unveiled in October that, in an attempt to solve the noise problem that has made heliports unwelcome neighbors, was designed to be 100 times quieter than helicopters, as well as faster. The company has shelved the idea of marketing Flyer aircraft as a recreational device and is exploring commercial options, perhaps running it as a kind of aerial ferry.

“We have moved to seeing it as a transportation service and not as a vehicle for individual purchase,” said Daver. “It is going to be a ride sharing model for transportation services.”

Larry Page began dabbling in aviation in 2010, quietly funding a company called Zee.Aero led by a Stanford aerospace professor, Ilan Kroo, near the Google campus. The original vision was to produce a literal flying car, with folding wings so it could fit inside a home garage, but that was quickly abandoned as impractical, and Zee went on to try other designs, including one registered with FAA under the name Mutt because of its marriage of new elements with an older configuration. It tested a piloted electric aircraft that the company considered selling as a kit to be assembled by buyers. Eventually Zee decided the plane should be developed into a pilotless air taxi, now dubbed Cora.

In 2015 Page set up another stealth startup next door to Zee.Aero and called it Kitty Hawk after the tiny coastal village in North Carolina’s Outer Banks where the Wright brothers tested their own flying experiments. The modern-day Kitty Hawk was run by Thrun, who previously directed Google’s moonshot R&D program and founded online education company Udacity. It tinkered with a series of concepts, including a complicated scheme to suspend a pod from aircraft by tethers that could pick up a person or cargo on the ground while the aircraft circled overhead.

Eventually Kitty Hawk, which went on to absorb Zee.Aero, embarked on a mission to be the first to get an electric passenger aircraft to market that could take off and land vertically. Thrun wanted a small team to work fast and creatively, using as many off-the-shelf components as possible, according to former employees. “The term thrown around was we were the cowboys of Kitty Hawk, we were doing crazy stuff,” says one.

Kitty Hawk’s Flyer, as the project came to be called, was intended to be small enough to avoid safety certification altogether, weighing in under 254 pounds so it could qualify under Federal Aviation Administration rules as an ultralight, a category of aircraft that’s long been the province of hobbyists and tinkerers. Operation of ultralights is restricted – they can’t be flown over populated areas or at night — but ensuring the aircraft is safe is left up to the maker.

With an engineering team fewer than 20, Flyer made rapid progress. Kitty Hawk offered a rare peek behind the curtain to the [New York Times](#) in 2017, showing off what appeared to be a motorcycle on a spiderweb with eight downward-facing rotors.

Then in 2018 it started giving a small number of [media test rides](#) at Lake Las Vegas of a more finished vehicle with a composite frame with a constellation of 10 upward-facing rotors around it.

Though Flyer was capped to 10 feet in altitude and 20 mph in speed, and said it was intended to be flown over water, for safety, the company was presenting it as a thrill ride, [putting up web pages to take applications](#) for the first production models from individuals and potential fleet operators like amusement parks or resorts. The YouTube personality Casey Neistat gave it a try, publishing [a video](#) that was watched 2.2 million times in which he shouts happily while banking and spinning Flyer around the lake.

But Flyer wasn’t ready to thrill: the latest prototype was breaking down frequently and needed regular troubleshooting and repair by engineers, three former employees say. “This thing would break every few hours and need service,” said one. Kitty Hawk did not respond to questions about Flyer’s reliability.

Among the failures were a series of fires during its development. To save on weight, two former employees say that engineers dispensed with the protective shielding commonly used between lithium-ion battery cells in cars, bundling cells together with tape, increasing the risk that if one ignited, others would catch on fire, too. Only recently did the Flyer program get its own battery expert on staff, one former employee says.

Over the last six months, the Flyer program has gone through a reset, former employees say. The focus has been on improving reliability rather than iterating on the design, and on finding a use for the vehicles.

“Kitty Hawk doesn’t start from the principle of what’s the economically viable thing we’re going to build. It engineers something to solve a problem and then it’s ‘OK, here’s a cool thing we built, what can we do with it?’” said an ex-employee who was among a wave of departures from the Flyer program this year.

The latest idea: that Kitty Hawk would operate Flyer as a service. The company has scouted out cities where it could offer point-to-point rides across bodies of water, which would make for a more forgiving surface to come down on in the event of a crash, two former employees say. And riders will no longer have the freedom to take Flyer for a joyride, they say: the flight path will be automated. Kitty Hawk has [applied for a permit](#) in Jersey City, New Jersey, to develop a floating dock and hangar for a potential route across the Hudson River to Manhattan, and is [exploring a route across San Francisco Bay](#), according to local media.

It’s unclear how Flyer would be regulated in such a use, with one grey area being whether it would be treated as a boat traveling above the water or a low-flying aircraft.

Kitty Hawk has reached out to the U.S. Coast Guard to ask how it would classify Flyer, a Coast Guard spokesman said. “We are taking a deliberate look at determining what these vehicles are, as that determination will set precedence for years or decades to come regarding their place in the marine transportation system.”

The company’s other major program, Cora, also faces daunting regulatory hurdles. Boeing might be the one to see it through.

In June, Boeing and Kitty Hawk announced a strategic partnership that they said would “bring together the innovation of Kitty Hawk’s Cora division with Boeing’s scale and aerospace expertise.” Public records and changes at the company suggest it goes deeper than that.

In May, Kitty Hawk general counsel Molly Abraham made a filing in Delaware to incorporate a company under the name of Cora Aero at the same address as Kitty Hawk; a November filing lists [Cora Aero’s CEO as Gary Gysin](#), the former head of Liquid Robotics, a developer of wave-powered autonomous watercraft. His [LinkedIn profile](#) states he’s head of a stealth mode startup.

Former Kitty Hawk employees said that around the time the Boeing partnership was announced, access to the Cora building, which had contained a cafeteria and reception area shared by all, was abruptly restricted to workers only on that program, and IT, HR and other back office workers were divided between Cora and Kitty Hawk. Several said they believe Boeing is now in control of Cora.

Hard yards lie ahead for Cora in New Zealand, where Kitty Hawk chose to try to win safety certification due to enticing features of the country’s air safety code, which promises to allow the company to collaboratively define airworthiness standards with that country’s Civil Aviation Authority.

Additionally, a unique provision of the regulations permits “adventure flights” by aircraft that don’t have standard safety certifications, such as vintage warbirds, which could allow Kitty Hawk to launch a revenue-generating passenger service before Cora is fully certified, said James Lawson, an aerospace safety consultant who previously consulted with Kitty Hawk on Cora when the company was considering pursuing certification in the U.S.

With reporting by Biz Carson


[Jeremy Bogaisky](#)

Elon Musk and Larry Page Have the World's Weirdest Friendship

■ <https://www.vice.com/en/article/bmj4zz/elon-musk-and-larry-page-have-the-worlds-weirdest-friendship>

But we are normals, not CEOs running some of the world's most important companies. SpaceX and Tesla founder **Elon Musk** and Google cofounder **Larry Page** are bros. They play video games together, **Musk**...

Billionaire tech mogul Larry Ellison says he and Elon Musk ...

 <https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/technology/billionaire-tech-mogul-larry-ellison-says-he-and-elon-musk-are-close-friends-here-are-8-other-tech-exec-friendships-that-have-thrived-in-the-competitive-world-of-silicon-valley/ss-BB18DNs2>

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In the **Elon Musk** biography by Ashlee Vance, it was revealed that **Musk and Larry Page**, the head of Alphabet (Google's parent company), had a deal for the latter to purchase Tesla, but it fell ...

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<https://www.businessinsider.in/tech/enterprise/news/billionaire-tech-mogul-larry-ellison-has-said-hes-close-friends-with-elon-musk-here-are-six-other-tech-exec-friendships-that-have-thrived-in-the-competitive-world-of-silicon-valley-/articleshow/74496252.cms>

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Billionaire friends **Elon Musk and Larry Page** are reported to have a 'funny' relationship. **Musk** apparently crashes at **Page's** house where they play video games together to pass they time. But the pair also argue about some major issues, including AI.

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<https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/286611>

Larry Page. Larry Page co-founded Google alongside Sergey Brin -- and we all know how that story ended. ... **Elon Musk**. It might be strange ... **Musk** saw the power he could wield through ...

[List of Celebrity Illuminati Members: Confirmed and ...](#)

studioknow.com/2014/03/celebrity-illuminati-members/

Larry Page and Sergey Brin (cofounders of Google; Google often uses next-level Illuminati symbolism within its search iconography. Some insider sources claim that **Page and Brin** were raised by the Illuminati from birth) ... **Elon Musk** (founder of PayPal and Space Exploration Technologies Corporation, among others)

[Larry Page - Wikipedia](#)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Larry_Page

Lawrence Edward **Page** (born March 26, 1973) is an American computer scientist and Internet entrepreneur. He is best known as one of the co-founders of Google along with Sergey Brin. **Page** was the chief executive officer of Google from 1997 until August 2001 (stepping down in favor of Eric Schmidt) then from April 2011 until July 2015 when he moved to become CEO of Alphabet Inc. (created to ...

Reportedly, Google's **Larry Page** has a fortune of \$71.6 billion, while Sergey Brin's is \$69.4 billion. Tesla's **Elon Musk** has a worth of \$68.6 billion. ALSO READ | India WPI Inflation Contracts To 1.81% In June, Falls For Third Consecutive Month

[How Elon Musk Learns Faster And Better Than Everyone Else ...](#)

<https://medium.com/accelerated-intelligence/learn-like-elon-musk-fe8f8da6137c>

Furthermore, the founders of the five largest companies in the world — Bill Gates, Steve Jobs, Warren Buffett, **Larry Page**, ... **Elon Musk** is one of a kind, but his abilities aren't magical.

[The history of Tesla and Elon Musk: A radical vision for ...](#)

<https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2019/03/business/tesla-history-timeline/index.html>

The history of Tesla and **Elon Musk**: A radical vision for the future of autos. By Andrew Greiner, Ivory Sherman, Tiffany Baker, ... Google founders Sergey Brin and **Larry Page** invest in the company ...

[Mark Zuckerberg, Larry Page and Elon Musk play video games ...](https://www.cnn.com/2017/01/26/mark-zuckerberg-larry-page-and-elon-musk-play-video-games-should-you.html)

<https://www.cnn.com/2017/01/26/mark-zuckerberg-larry-page-and-elon-musk-play-video-games-should-you.html>

Jan 26, 2017 **Larry Page and Elon Musk** play video games together. **Elon Musk**, Tesla CEO, addresses a press conference in October 2015. ...

Top Google Lawyer David Drummond Has A Zipper Problem

David Drummond, the legal chief of Google parent company Alphabet, is leaving at the end of the month, following accusations of inappropriate relationships with employees.

Alphabet did not give a reason for Drummond's departure in a short regulatory filing Friday.

The company said last November that it was investigating sexual misconduct cases against executives. Claims against Drummond were included in the investigations.

Last August, a former Google employee, Jennifer Blakely, published a report of her relationship with Drummond. Drummond has acknowledged a relationship with Blakely. But in a statement at the time, he said he "never started" a relationship with anyone else at Alphabet.

The company said Drummond is not getting an exit package as part of his departure.

In a memo sent to employees, Drummond said that with founders Larry Page and Sergey Brin "now leaving their executive roles at Alphabet, the company is entering an exciting new phase, and I believe that it's also the right time for me to make way for the next generation of leaders."

He did not mention the misconduct allegations.

Drummond said Page and Brin asked for his help more than 20 years ago when what became Google and Alphabet was just an unincorporated startup. Drummond joined Google full time in 2002.

A former employee in [Google's](#) legal department [released new details](#) and allegations Wednesday related to her relationship with her former boss and current [Alphabet](#) Chief Legal Officer David Drummond.

Former senior contracts manager Jennifer Blakely published her account of life after Google and her relationship with Drummond in a post on [Medium](#) on Wednesday. Drummond's extramarital relationship with Blakely was previously reported by [The New York Times](#) in its expose of sexual misconduct allegations against another top executive, Andy Rubin. But Blakely's piece reveals new details about her time at Google and contact with Drummond since the two had a child together and later ended their relationship.

In a statement, Drummond said, "It's not a secret that Jennifer and I had a difficult break-up 10 years ago. I am far from perfect and I regret my part in that." Without addressing the specifics of her allegations, he said "there are two sides to all of the conversations and details Jennifer recounts, and I take a very different view about what happened."

Google has faced numerous allegations of misconduct in its ranks and saw a global [walkout](#) of employees from its offices after the publication of the Times' article. Google has since [amended](#) some its policies relating to sexual misconduct, such as removing forced arbitration clauses from employee's contracts in those cases.

Blakely did not respond to a request for comment. Google declined to comment.

In her post, Blakely said she believes “a company’s culture, its behavioral patterns, start at the top.” Blakely said Drummond pointed to an article about former Alphabet executive chairman Eric Schmidt’s notoriously open romantic lifestyle to explain “how things worked” for executives like him.

“Looking back, I see how standards that I was willing to indulge early on became institutionalized behavior as Google’s world prominence grew and its executives grew more powerful,” Blakely wrote. “Women that I worked with at Google who have spoken to me since the New York Times article have told me how offended they were by the blatant womanizing and philandering that became common practice among some (but certainly not all) executives, starting at the very top.”

When Blakely and Drummond met, according to her account, Drummond was married with a child but told her he was estranged from his wife. The two began having an affair around 2004, according to Blakely, and she became pregnant with his child in 2005 but later miscarried. When she became pregnant again a year later, Blakely said Drummond “assured me of his imminent divorce” and their son was born in May 2007. Drummond stayed married and later continued to have other affairs with other people from Google, according to Blakely.

Drummond disputed this claim in his statement.

“Other than Jennifer, I never started a relationship with anyone else who was working at Google or Alphabet. Any suggestion otherwise is simply untrue,” he wrote.

Relationships between managers and their direct reports were banned under a new policy at Google at the time, according to Blakely. Drummond did not disclose their relationship to anyone he worked for, Blakely said, but once their son was born, the HR department told her one of them would need to leave the legal department to abide by the rules. Drummond was chief legal officer at the time, according to Blakely’s account, and she was transferred to sales, in which she had no experience.

Around this time, Blakely said, Drummond was living with her and their son and offered to support them financially so she could leave her new job, where she was struggling and unhappy.

“Since he was living with our son and me, I took this as a further sign of commitment,” Blakely wrote. “I felt confident that he loved us and would protect us and so I quit Google, signing whatever documents they required because likewise, I wanted to protect him.”

In October 2008, Blakely said Drummond abandoned her and their son. Blakely said she left a dinner with Drummond and other Google employees early when a babysitter called to say her son was sick, and later a friend told her Drummond had taken two other women who worked for him to San Francisco.

“Finally, I sent him a text message asking him when we could expect him home,” Blakely said. “He responded, ‘Don’t expect me back. I’m never coming back.’ And he didn’t.”

After that night, Blakely said, Drummond “would go for months or even years at a time completely ignoring my pleas to see his son — not even so much as a text to us, despite living about a mile away.”

Once she filed a custody suit against Drummond, Blakely said he attempted to take their son to be raised by him and his wife, with whom he had a pending divorce. Drummond later told her he never intended for that arrangement to occur, Blakely said, and once their son was 4 and a half years old, their custody arrangement was in place and he provided child support.

“If I objected to his terms, if I didn’t ‘play ball,’ he would punish me by punishing our son,” Blakely wrote. “Months or years would go by where he wouldn’t see him or respond to my calls or texts with updates and pictures of him or even ask how he was doing, let alone how he might help out, knowing full well I was alone and in desperate need.”

Drummond’s full statement is below:

“It’s not a secret that Jennifer and I had a difficult break-up 10 years ago. I am far from perfect and I regret my part in that.

Her account raises many claims about us and other people, including our son and my former wife. As you would expect, there are two sides to all of the conversations and details Jennifer recounts, and I take a very different view about what happened. I have discussed these claims directly with Jennifer, and I addressed the details of our relationship with our employer at the time.

But I do want to address one claim that touches on professional matters. Other than Jennifer, I never started a relationship with anyone else who was working at Google or Alphabet. Any suggestion otherwise is simply untrue.

I know Jennifer feels wronged and understand that she wants to speak out about it. But I won’t be getting into a public back and forth about these personal matters.”

My Time at Google and After



Jennifer Blakely

The #MeToo Movement has been the beginning of a sea change for women, exposing the double standard between women and men in the workplace oftentimes resulting in abuse toward women. I was moved to tears by the walkout of 20,000 Google employees after the New York Times published an article detailing how the company protects its “elite men.” I lived through it first hand and I believe a company’s culture, its behavioral patterns, start at the top. Rarely do we hear about what happens to women after they are forced out of their jobs but I can tell you what happened to me.

I was hired to work in Google’s legal department as a Senior Contracts Manager before the company went public in 2001 and worked for David Drummond who was Google’s general counsel at the time. David was married and had a son but almost none of us had met his wife. The people in Google’s legal department were very close and in 2004, at my birthday party at the W in San Francisco, David reserved a suite to host an “after party.” It was there, that night he told me how he wanted more

children. I urged to him to have one with his wife but he demurred and said that would never happen because he was estranged from her, which admittedly I already knew — he was the only married one in attendance without his spouse.

David and I began an affair shortly after that night and we were together for years. The first time we got pregnant was in 2005. I was traveling in Europe when I miscarried, about 3 months into my pregnancy. I phoned David who was in Hawaii closing on a house we'd found together to give him the sad news. We were pregnant again a year later. David assured me of his imminent divorce and our son was born in May 2007.

David was well aware that our relationship was in violation of Google's new policy which went from "discouraging" direct-reporting-line relationships to outright banning them. Still, he never told anyone he worked for that we were pregnant. After our son was born, I received a call from HR notifying me that one of us would have to leave the legal department where David was now Chief Legal Officer, so I transferred to the sales department despite having **zero** experience in sales. I did my best to keep up but I was floundering and became depressed at work. David was aware of my struggles and unhappiness in sales. But he had moved in with us by now and since I couldn't return to the legal department where only one of us was allowed to work, David offered to help us out financially on a monthly basis so I could leave my job in sales. Since he was living with our son and me, I took this as a further sign of commitment. I felt confident that he loved us and would protect us and so I quit Google, signing whatever documents they required because likewise, I wanted to protect him.

In October of 2008, still living together, David and I attended a dinner in Palo Alto with other Google employees, many from the legal department. During dinner, our babysitter called to say our son was sick so I went home and David said he would be right behind me. Several hours later that same evening, I received a call from Chris Chin, the Associate General Counsel and a friend, who told me that David had taken two other women who worked for him in the legal department to San Francisco. I didn't understand. Our son was very sick and I panicked so I called him several times but he didn't answer his phone. Finally, I sent him a text message asking him when we could expect him home. He responded, "Don't expect me back. I'm never coming back." And he didn't.

"Hell" does not begin to capture my life since that day. I've spent the last 11 years taking on one of the most powerful, ruthless lawyers in the world. From that fateful night forward, David did things exclusively on his terms. Having no job, no recourse, I didn't have a leg to stand on. David would go for months or even years at a time completely ignoring my pleas to see his son — not even so

much as a text to us, despite living about a mile away. He wouldn't mention or discuss any form of formal child support and when I finally filed a custody suit, he fought back by trying to take our son to be raised by his wife and him despite his pending divorce from her, his separate residence and his own warnings of the conflict and danger such a situation would pose. When our son was 4 ½, our custody arrangement was settled and David began providing ample child support. Yet years later, when I reminded him of the terrifying threats I'd endured from him, he admitted to me he'd never had any intention of such an arrangement. The excruciating battle my son and I endured was simply the price I had to pay for standing up to him.

David stayed married, and began an affair with his "personal assistant" who he moved into one of his new homes. He had another affair with my former colleague at Google, the woman he left us for on that night in October 2008. If I objected to his terms, if I didn't "play ball," he would punish me by punishing our son. Months or years would go by where he wouldn't see him or respond to my calls or texts with updates and pictures of him or even ask how he was doing, let alone how he might help out, knowing full well I was alone and in desperate need.

Once in the summer of 2014, David came over to visit our son and we got into an argument about his one-way terms for seeing him at my house at his convenience, especially when he had his own house(s) blocks away. He sat down at our kitchen table and, using my laptop, he pulled up a year-old article from the Daily Mail about Eric Schmidt's philandering lifestyle. He then passed the computer over to me to read. I was so perplexed! I was well aware of Eric's lifestyle, David was even more aware, but none of it was news, we'd talked about it for years. David explained to me how Eric's "personal life" was, in essence, his privilege. The article was apparently a reminder to me of how things worked: David was (and is) a powerful executive. His "personal life" (which apparently didn't include his son) was off limits and since I was no longer his "personal life" it was time for me to shut up, fall in line and stop bothering him with the nuisances or demands of raising a child.

Many years later, when the #MeToo Movement began, I was contacted by several reporters. I'd always felt like my situation was my fault, that I deserved it because David was married. I am regretful on many levels, but I'm also thankful for the growth in character I've had since then — and for my son! What I never understood is why I was the only one bearing the consequences, especially when I knew David's treatment of our son and me was nothing short of abuse.

Looking back, I see how standards that I was willing to indulge early on became institutionalized behavior as Google's world prominence grew and its executives grew more powerful. Women that I

worked with at Google who have spoken to me since the New York Times article have told me how offended they were by the blatant womanizing and philandering that became common practice among some (but certainly not all) executives, starting at the very top. For me, the abuse of power didn't stop with being pushed out. Afterwards I was pushed down, lest I got in the way of the behavior that had become even more oppressive and entitled.

[Google's Eric Schmidt's 'open marriage ... - Daily Mail Online](https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2371719/Googles-Eric-Schmidts-open-marriage-string-exotic-lovers.html)

<https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2371719/Googles-Eric-Schmidts-open-marriage-string-exotic-lovers.html>

Yet today The **Mail** on Sunday can reveal that 58-year-old **Eric Schmidt**, Google's executive chairman, does fiercely protect one thing: his own private life, which is as colourful and complex as ...

[Married billionaire Eric Schmidt's ... - Daily Mail Online](https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-7319869/Married-billionaire-Eric-Schmidts-girlfriend-says-theyll-kids-using-frozen-embryos.html)

<https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-7319869/Married-billionaire-Eric-Schmidts-girlfriend-says-theyll-kids-using-frozen-embryos.html>

Married billionaire **Eric Schmidt's** alleged mistress, 32, 'asked the 64-year-old ex-Google CEO to fertilize her frozen eggs, but he declined' - but she still hopes the pair will have FIVE babies ...

[Google's top lawyer allegedly had affairs with multiple ...](https://www.theverge.com/2019/8/29/20837232/google-david-drummond-chief-legal-officer-cheating-wife-affair-policies)

<https://www.theverge.com/2019/8/29/20837232/google-david-drummond-chief-legal-officer-cheating-wife-affair-policies>

He sat down at our kitchen table and, using my laptop, he pulled up a year-old article from the **Daily Mail about Eric Schmidt's philandering lifestyle**. He then passed the computer over to me to...

The Sick Sex Connections Of These Lawyers And Their Friends

THE TECH OLIGARCH AND SENATOR SEX CULT AND SEX TRAFFICKING NETWORK IS A REAL THING

These tech cartel perpetrators operate a **massive and abusive national sex scheme**. [The perverts](#) in the SandHill Road Venture Capital offices (ie: Kleiner Perkins, Greylock, Andreesen, Khosla, Draper Fisher, etc.) , located between Highway 280 down to Santa Cruz Avenue on Sand Hill Road in Menlo Park, California, are the main perpetrators of this global cartel. They have taken over online dating sites and social media sites and used them to (**SEE THE PROOF AT: <http://www.webco22.com/social>**) spy on the public, harvest photos, put opposing citizens on 'watch-lists', source underage sex, run HONEY TRAP campaigns and other crimes.

Now that ***THE LINCOLN PROJECT has been revealed to be an underage sex ring*** and the [White House is again filled with sex scandal conflicts-of-interest](#), and ***Silicon Valley's*** sex trafficking has only ***gotten worse***, it is impossible to deny the fact that these political manipulators are covering up a sex perversion cult.

They have dozens of executive pimp-like providers who meet with them at their homes, offices and parties and manage the operations of this sex ring.

(<https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2018/01/brotopia-silicon-valley-secretive-orgiastic-inner-sanctum>)

Their executives at Google, Facebook, Netflix, LinkedIn, Twitter, and their related holdings, comprise the rest. The Harvey Weinstein and [Ed Buck](#) sex scandals are well known.

(<https://ktla.com/2019/09/17/dem-donor-ed-buck-arrested-after-3rd-mans-overdose-charged-with-operating-west-hollywood-drug-house/>)

These sex cult actions have been widely covered in the news individually, ie:

- **The Joe Lonsdale rape case**

(<https://europetodaynews.wordpress.com/2017/04/28/joe-lonsdale-rapist-abusive-frat-boy-and-mysoginst-or-gods-gift-to-women/>)

- **The Kleiner Perkins Ellen Pao sex abuse lawsuit**

(<https://www.eandblaw.com/employment-discrimination-blog/2016/02/19/pao-v-kleiner-perkins/>)

- **The Eric Schmidt sex penthouse**

(<https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2377785/Google-CEO-serial-womanizer-Eric-Schmidt-spends-15-million-dollars-private-doorman-Manhattan-penthouse-totally-soundproofed.html>)

- **The Jeffrey Epstein case**

(<https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/article220097825.html>)

- **The Google Forrest Hayes hooker murder case**

(<https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2014/07/09/google-exec-hayes-killed-by-call-girl/12422797/>)

- **The Google Andy Rubin sex slave case**

(<https://conservativedaily.com/android-co-founder-accused-of-running-sex-slave-ring/>)

- **The Sergey Brin 3-way sex romp scandal**

(<https://nexter.org/google-sex-scandal-sergey-brin-playboy-book-alleges>)

- **The Steve Bing Case**

(<https://newspunch.com/steve-bing-clinton-friend-associate-epstein-links-dead/>)

- **The Hydrant investigation**

(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Hydrant)

- **The Elon Musk Steve Jurvetson billionaire sex parties scandals**

(<https://pagesix.com/2018/02/12/elon-musk-sported-interesting-getup-at-alleged-sex-party/>)

- **The NXIVM sexual slave cases**

(<https://www.oxygen.com/crime-time/nxivm-sex-slave-details-horrific-allegations-against-keith-raniere>)

- **The Robert Scoble Sex Crimes**

(<https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/doree/woman-accuses-robert-scoble-of-sexual-harassment#.sxze4kzx18>)

- **The San Francisco 'One Taste' Sex Cult for Tech Elites now under FBI investigation**

(<https://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-8962029/Inside-orgasm-cult-investigation-FBI.html>)

- **The Michael Goguen anal sex slave case**

(<https://www.news.com.au/finance/tech-titan-michael-goguen-of-sequioa-capital-kept-amber-baptiste-as-a-sex-slave-for-13-years/news-story/91012180fc3b23d50c1e6be8105c92e7>)

- **The Tom Perkins Hooker Parties**

(<https://fortune.com/2018/01/02/brotopia-book-silicon-valley-sex-party/>)

and thousands of other cases and federal divorce court filings.(<https://www.pacer.gov/>)

This group of people have proven themselves, over and over, to be sociopath control freaks not fit for participation in public commerce, public policy or media control.

(<https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2017/09/19/551810814/silicon-valley-s-ellen-pao-tackles-sex-discrimination-workplace-diversity-in-mem>)

(<https://nypost.com/2018/01/03/book-details-tech-bros-drug-fueled-sex-parties-in-silicon-valley/>)

The Four Seasons Hotel and Rosewood Hotels in Silicon Valley are estimated to engage in over \$30,000.00 of high-end escort sex trafficking per day, a portion of it managed by Eastern Bloc Mafia operators.

(<https://www.thedailybeast.com/silicon-valleys-sex-workers-are-being-priced-out-of-the-city-by-their-own-clients>)

(<https://escortontop.com/hotel-escorts.htm>)

(<https://www.vanityfair.com/culture/2013/05/silicon-valley-cougar-nights-love>)

(<https://www.quora.com/Do-escorts-really-use-the-Rosewood-Hotel-lobby-bar-in-Menlo-Park>)

- **The Elon Musk sex perversions are the tip of the iceberg.**

(<https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-8426719/Cara-Delevingne-three-way-affair-Amber-Heard-Elon-Musk.html>)

At least 10 Ukrainian escorts fly in and out of SFO and SJO airports every week for these Cartel members. Google boss David Drummond engaged in horrible philandering sexual violations of his wife yet Google covers up every story about it on the web. Google's Eric Schmidt is under massive investigation.

(<http://american-corruption.com/>

[Eric Schmidt Has A Psychotic Need To Control Governments And Society.html](http://american-corruption.com/eric-schmidt-has-a-psychotic-need-to-control-governments-and-society.html))

You hear about the female victims of this sex cult but you rarely hear about the young male victims. One of their vast numbers of prostitutes is quoted as saying that the girls and boys are paid "*not just for sex but for the oligarch's endless need to feel that they can control anyone for any reason...*". Multiple attorney general's controlled by their cartel, ie: Eric Schneiderman and Eliot Spitzer , are involved this these sex rings.

(<https://newspunch.com/eric-schneiderman-nxivm-child-sex-slaves-clintons/>)

(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eliot_Spitzer)

*These are the main influencers of a national public policy and they are all involved in horrific sex perversions and abuses! The associates political figures financed by this sex Cartel include: Illinois State Representative, **Keith Farnham**, who has resigned and was charged with possession of child*

pornography and has been accused of bragging at an online site about sexually molesting a 6-year-old girl; Spokesperson for the Arkansas Democratic Party, **Harold Moody, Jr.**, who was charged with distribution and possession of child pornography; Radnor Township Board of Commissioners member, **Philip Ahr**, who resigned from his position after being charged with possession of child pornography and abusing children between 2 and 6 years-old; Activist and BLM organizer, **Charles Wade**, who was arrested and charged with human trafficking and underage prostitution; Texas attorney and activist, **Mark Benavides**, who was charged with having sex with a minor, inducing a child under 18 to have sex and compelling prostitution of at least nine legal clients and possession of child pornography, he was found guilty on six counts of sex trafficking; Virginia Delegate, **Joe Morrissey**, who was indicted on charges connected to his relationship with a 17-year-old girl and was charged with supervisory indecent liberties with a minor, electronic solicitation of a minor, possession of child pornography and distribution of child pornography; Massachusetts Congressman, **Gerry Studds**, who was censured by the House of Representatives after he admitted to an inappropriate relationship with a 17-year-old page; Former Mayor of Stillwater, New York, **Rick Nelson** who was plead guilty to five counts of possession of child pornography of children less than 16 years of age; Mayor of Clayton, New York, **Dale Kenyon**, who was indicted for sexual acts against a teenager; Former Mayor of Hubbard, Ohio, **Richard Keenan**, who was given a life sentence in jail for raping a 4-year-old girl; Former Mayor of Winston, Oregon, **Kenneth Barrett**, who was arrested for setting up a meeting to have sex with a 14-year-old girl who turned out to be a police officer; The Mayor of Randolph, Nebraska, **Dwayne L. Schutt**, who was arrested and charged with four counts of felony third-degree sexual assault of a child and one count of intentional child abuse. The associates political figures financed by this sex Cartel also include: The Former Mayor of Dawson, Georgia, **Christopher Wright**, who was indicted on the charges of aggravated child molestation, aggravated sodomy, rape, child molestation and statutory rape of an 11-year-old boy and a 12-year-old girl; Former Mayor of Stockton, California, **Anthony Silva**, who was charged with providing alcohol to young adults during a game of strip poker that included a 16-year-old boy at a camp for underprivileged children run by the mayor; Former Mayor of Millbrook, New York, **Donald Briggs**, who was arrested and charged with inappropriate sexual contact with a person younger than 17; The party leader for Victoria County, Texas, **Stephen Jabbour**, who plead guilty to possession and receiving over half a million child pornographic images; DNC activist and fundraiser, **Terrence Bean**, who was arrested on charges of sodomy and sex abuse in a case involving a 15-year-old boy; DNC Party Chairman for Davidson County, Tennessee, **Rodney Mullin**, who resigned amid child pornography allegations; DNC activist, **Andrew Douglas Reed**, who pleaded guilty to multiple counts of 2nd-degree sexual exploitation of a minor for producing child pornography; DNC official from Terre Haute, Indiana, **David Roberts** who was sentenced to federal prison for producing and possessing child pornography including placing hidden cameras in the bedrooms and bathrooms at a home he shared with two minor female victims; Democratic California Congressman, **Tony Cárdenas**, who is being sued in LA County for allegedly sexually abused a 16-year-old girl; Democratic aide to Senator **Barbara Boxer**, **Jeff Rosato**, who plead guilty to charges of trading in child pornography; Alaskan State Representative, **Dean Westlake**, who resigned from his seat after the media published a

report alleging he fathered a child with a 16-year-old girl when he was 28; New Jersey State Assemblyman, **Neil Cohen**, who was convicted of possession and distribution of child pornography; DNC donor and billionaire, **Jeffrey Epstein**, ran an underage child sex brothel for The Commission and was convicted of soliciting underage girls for prostitution; New York Congressman, **Anthony Weiner**, who plead guilty to transferring obscene material to a minor as part of a plea agreement for sexted and sending Twitter DMs to underage girls as young as 15; DNC donor, activist, and Hollywood producer **Harvey Weinstein** is being criminally prosecuted and civilly sued for years of sexual abuse (that was well known “secret” in Hollywood) including underage sexual activities with aspiring female actresses; DNC activist and #metoo proponent, **Asia Argento**, settled a lawsuit for sexual harassment stemming from sexual activities with an underage actor; Mayor of Racine, Wisconsin, **Gary Becker**, who was convicted of attempted child seduction, child pornography, and other child sex crimes; Democratic Seattle Mayor **Ed Murray** resigned after multiple accusations of child sexual abuse were levied against him including by family members; San Francisco Mayoral candidate **John Molinari** had his daughter removed from his home by San Francisco Police for his abuse of her according to SFPD reports; San Francisco Mayoral candidate **Roger Boas** was arrested for running an underage sex brothel which catered to San Francisco political elite; DNC activist and aid to NYC Mayor De Blasio, **Jacob Schwartz** was arrested on possession of 3,000+ child pornographic images; Democratic activist and actor, **Russell Simmons**, was sued based on an allegation of sexual assault where he coerced an underage model for sex; DNC Governor of Oregon, **Neil Goldschmidt**, after being caught by a newspaper, publicly admitted to having a past sexual relationship with a 13-year-old girl after the statute of limitations on the rape charges had expired; Democratic Illinois Congressman, **Mel Reynolds** resigned from Congress after he was convicted of statutory rape of a 16-year-old campaign volunteer; Democratic New York Congressman, **Fred Richmond**, was arrested in Washington D.C. for soliciting sex from a 16-year-old boy; Democratic activist, donor, and director, **Roman Polanski**, fled the country after pleading guilty to statutory rape of a 13-year-old girl - Democrats and Hollywood actors still defend him to this day, including, **Whoopi Goldberg, Martin Scorsese, Woody Allen, David Lynch, Wim Wenders, Pedro Almodovar, Tilda Swinton and Monica Bellucci**; Democratic State Senator from Alaska, **George Jacko**, was found guilty of sexual harassment of an underage legislative page; Democratic State Representative candidate for Colorado, **Andrew Myers**, was convicted for possession of child pornography and enticing children; Illinois Congressman, **Gus Savage** was investigated by the Democrat-controlled House Committee on Ethics for attempting to rape an underage female Peace Corps volunteer in Zaire; Activist, donor, and spokesperson for Subway, **Jared Fogle**, was convicted of distribution and receipt of child pornography and traveling to engage in illicit sexual conduct with a minor; State Department official, **Carl Carey**, under **Hillary Clinton**’s state department, was arrested on ten counts of child porn possession; Maine Assistant Attorney General, **James Cameron**, was sentenced to just over 15 years in federal prison for seven counts of child porn possession, receipt and transmission; Leading DNC boss and financier **Ed Buck** was arrested for killing gay prostitutes and running a sex and drug ring; State Department official, **Daniel Rosen**, under **Hillary Clinton**’s state department, was arrested and charged with allegedly soliciting sex from a minor over the internet; State Department official, **James**

*Cafferty, pleaded guilty to one count of transportation of child pornography; Democratic radio host, **Bernie Ward**, plead guilty to one count of sending child pornography over the Internet; Democratic deputy attorney general from California, **Raymond Liddy**, was arrested for possession of child pornography. There are **THOUSANDS** of other sex crime cases involving associates of the tech Cartel. All of these perpetrators had financing from and social and political direction from the Silicon Valley controlling perpetrators.*

An inordinate number of the [members are closeted homosexuals](#) who seek to use their [media monopolies and massive lobbyist ownership's](#) to [promote child sex](#) and child sex change consideration. They have fake straight wives, called "beards" to help them keep up the appearance of being straight. A large portion of the so-called "Paypal Mafia" are homosexual. They organize to promote Netflix and similar media outlets to produce underage gay sex movies and normalize their deviant interests in a radical political manner.

(<https://nationalnewsnetwork.net/video/the-silicon-valley-mafia-cartel>)

(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PayPal_Mafia)

(<https://nypost.com/2016/10/09/the-sex-slave-scandal-that-exposed-pedophile-billionaire-jeffrey-epstein/>)

Hence the [massive](#), sudden, [promotion of those issues](#) in all of [their media](#) since they took power in 2008 and pretty much ran the Obama White House.

(<https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/20/fashion/silicon-valley-embrace-gay-and-lesbian-community.html>)

(<https://www.wired.com/2007/11/how-paypal-gave/>)

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Just like the Taliban don't give a second thought to cutting off someone's head, the German's don't blink about gassing and cooking Jews, ISIS has no qualms about making young prisoners into sex slaves, *et al...* these tech nut balls live in, and operate, a TED-based brain washing culture that promotes "ANY EVIL FOR THE POWER OF THE CAUSE". The "Cause" is pure yuppie greed and control of society for their own self-satisfaction. Youtube's Ann Wojcicki, Theranos' Elizabeth Holmes and Tesla's Elon Musk are psychologically incapable of seeing the fact that they are sociopath assholes. When they cruise down to Robert's snooty market in Woodside, California; they reinforce each other's fantasy perception of the fake world they have created with their air kisses and their snide comments. Their mutual tunnel-vision has set them on the path to madness. *Thousands of their employees, business partners, neighbors, ex-boyfriends and girlfriends have testified to their mentally unstable conditions. They have no right to run monopolies in America using resources paid for by the taxpayers!*

They assholes of tech are now being systematically hunted down, exposed and terminated using 100% legal AI and Law Enforcement digital forensics!

Why does the Silicon Valley-controlled "Main-stream Media" cover all of these news stories up?
Because they are part of the crimes!

All of these people are socially, politically, financially and genetically connected to each other.

Conclusion

Law enforcement refuses to arrest these cartel tech mobsters. These people can buy their way out of any mess.

They break the law and the moral codes of society yet they operate with impunity.

They harmed others who competed with them.

They harmed all of society for their own personal sick profiteering and manipulations.

In all of recorded history, no society which has allowed that circumstance to exist, has survived.

When a society fails, EVERYBODY loses.

Either arrest and prosecute these people or lose everything.

It is as simple as that!

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[This Former Google Executive Was Accused Of Running A "Sex ...](#)

<https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanmac/andy-rubin-court-complaint-lawsuit-rie-divorce-google>

SAN FRANCISCO — **Andy Rubin**, a former Google senior vice president who invented the Android operating system, departed the company after having an "inappropriate relationship" with a subordinate and kept payments by his previous employer secret from his wife for several years, according to documents made public by a California superior court.

[Google exec Andy Rubin faces detailed sexual misconduct ...](#)

¹ <https://www.businessinsider.com/google-andy-rubin-sexual-misconduct-allegations-nyt-2018-10?op=1>

Andy Rubin, the creator of Android, reportedly had bondage **sex** videos on his work computer, paid women for 'ownership relationships,' and allegedly pressured an employee into oral **sex** Nick Bastone ...

[Google employees walkout over handling of sexual ...](#)

<https://edition.cnn.com/2018/11/01/tech/google-employee-walkout-andy-rubin/index.html>

Nov 1, 2018The Times reported that **Rubin** was accused of coercing a female employee, with whom he'd been having affair, into performing oral **sex** in a hotel room in 2013. A Google investigation found her claim...

[Android creator Andy Rubin accused of having a 'sex ring ...](#)

<https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/talkingtech/2019/07/02/android-creator-andy-rubin-accused-having-sex-ring-ex-wife/1634963001/>

Jul 2, 2019According to a sensational lawsuit by soon to be ex-wife Rie Hirabaru **Rubin**, her ex had several mistresses, one of which was "complicit with **Rubin** in running what appeared to be a **sex ring**," ...

[Android Co-Founder Caught In Sex Ring Saga - channelnews](#)

<https://www.channelnews.com.au/android-co-founder-in-pre-nup-sex-ring-complaint/>

Android co-founder, **Andy Rubin**, who Google reportedly paid \$90 million to leave the company after a sexual misconduct investigation, has been accused of running a **sex ring**.

[Google gave top executive \\$90m payoff but kept sexual ...](#)

<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/oct/25/google-andy-rubin-android-creator-payoff-sexual-misconduct-report>

Oct 25, 2018Google gave a \$90m severance package to **Andy Rubin**, the creator of the Android mobile software, but concealed details of a sexual misconduct allegation that triggered his departure, the New York ...

[Andy Rubin - Wikipedia](#)

Whttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andy_Rubin

Andrew E. **Rubin** is an American computer programmer, engineer, entrepreneur, and venture capitalist. He is the founder and former CEO of venture capital firm Playground Global, as well as the co-founder and former CEO of both Danger Inc. and Android Inc.. He was nicknamed "Android" by his co-workers at Apple in 1989 due to a love of robots, with the nickname eventually becoming the official ...

[How Google Protected Andy Rubin, the 'Father of Android ...](#)

📄<https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/25/technology/google-sexual-harassment-andy-rubin.html>

Oct 25, 2018The woman, with whom Mr. **Rubin** had been having an extramarital relationship, said he coerced her into performing oral **sex** in a hotel room in 2013, according to two company executives with knowledge...

[Google reportedly paid Andy Rubin \\$90 million after he ...](#)

<https://www.theverge.com/2018/10/25/18023364/google-andy-rubin-payoff-90-million-sexual-misconduct-harassment>

Google reportedly paid **Andy Rubin** \$90 million after he allegedly coerced **sex** from employee New, 206 comments By Chris Welch @chriswelch Oct 25, 2018, 2:02pm EDT

[The rise and fall of Andy Rubin, the former Google ...](#)

BI<https://www.businessinsider.nl/android-sex-ring-leader-rise-fall-google-exec-andy-rubin-2019-7/>

Andy Rubin is the creator of Android and a former Google executive. **Rubin's** career seemed to be on track - software engineering in Silicon Valley in the 1990s, founding Android, being a top ...

[Google CEO Pichai says 48 employees fired for sexual but a cover-up is expected...](#)

<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/10/26/google-ceo-pichai-says-48-employees-fired-for-sexual-misconduct/>

The New York Times report claimed that **Andy Rubin**, ... A spokesperson for **Rubin** has denied the allegations, the New York Times said. ... South Korea court orders Japan to compensate former **sex slaves**.

[Android creator Andy Rubin accused of running a 'sex ring'](https://thenextweb.com/business/2019/07/03/android-creator-andy-rubin-is-accused-of-running-a-sex-ring-in-new-unsealed-complaint/)

 <https://thenextweb.com/business/2019/07/03/android-creator-andy-rubin-is-accused-of-running-a-sex-ring-in-new-unsealed-complaint/>

Android founder, **Andy Rubin**, may have left Google long back in 2014, but his departure is beginning to attract more unsavory attention. According to documents made public by a California superior ...

[George Soros' Right Hand Man Arrested For Rape And Human ...](https://newspunch.com/george-soros-human-trafficking/)

<https://newspunch.com/george-soros-human-trafficking/>

Howard **Rubin**, widely known as George Soros' right hand man, was accused of leading a "human trafficking enterprise" in which he allegedly raped, brutally assaulted and enslaved women in a \$8 million Manhattan **sex** dungeon, according to court documents.

[Disgraced Google Exec Andy Rubin Quietly Left His Venture ...](https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanmac/andy-rubin-playground-global-google-quiet-departure)

<https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanmac/andy-rubin-playground-global-google-quiet-departure>

Disgraced Google Exec **Andy Rubin** Quietly Left His Venture Firm Earlier This Year. Android creator **Andy Rubin** left Google with a \$90 million exit package after investigations into sexual misconduct. Now he's out at Playground Global, the venture firm he founded, allegedly with another multimillion-dollar payout.

[Former Google exec 'ran a sex ring ... - Daily Mail Online](https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-7208615/Former-Google-exec-ran-sex-ring-estranged-wife-claims.html)

<https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-7208615/Former-Google-exec-ran-sex-ring-estranged-wife-claims.html>

The co-founder of Android who reportedly received a \$90 million severance from Google in the wake of misconduct allegations is now being accused of running a **sex** ring. **Andy Rubin** is being sued by ...

[Android creator Andy Rubin is accused of running a 'sex ...](#)

<https://www.businessinsider.in/android-creator-andy-rubin-is-accused-of-running-a-sex-ring/articleshow/70049627.cms>

Android creator **Andy Rubin** was allegedly involved in running a "sex ring" with at least one woman, and is accused of cheating his ex-wife out of millions of dollars in their prenuptial agreement ...

[Andy Rubin's Essential Gem Isn't Just a New Phone | WIRED](#)

<https://www.wired.com/story/andy-rubins-essential-gem-google-android/>

Andy Rubin's New Phone Thing Isn't Just a New Phone Thing. ... These ranged from pressuring a woman into having oral **sex**, to berating subordinates, to viewing bondage **sex** videos on a work ...

[Google 'gave Andy Rubin \\$90M exit package despite ...](#)

<https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-6317589/Google-forced-Andy-Rubin-sexual-misconduct-claim-gave-90M-exit-package.html>

Google reportedly gave Android's co-founder, **Andy Rubin**, a \$90M exit package despite a credible claim that he had an inappropriate relationship with a woman while working at the company.

[Wife of Android Co-Founder Andy Rubin Accuses Him of Using ...](#)

 <https://www.thedailybeast.com/wife-of-android-co-founder-andy-rubin-accuses-him-of-using-google-paychecks-to-pay-for-sex-ring>

The wife of Android co-founder **Andy Rubin** has accused him of cheating her out of wealth he obtained from Google and diverting funds to make payments to several woman after he left the company ...

['The Lost Women of NXIVM': ID Orders Special on Sex ...](#)

 <https://www.thewrap.com/the-lost-women-of-nxivm-sex-trafficking-cult-allison-mack-keith-raniere/>

Mack had been accused of recruiting young women into the group and manipulated them into branding their bodies and becoming **sex slaves** for Raniere. Mack's sentencing will be decided on Sept. 11 ...

[Andy Rubin biography, age, net worth, wife, career ...](#)

www.learnmorefacts.com/post/andy-rubin-biography-age-net-worth-wife-career-playground-wiki

Andy Rubin was conceived on June 22, 1946 in New Bedford, United States. He is the designer of the Android OS. Since youth, **Rubin** has been accustomed to seeing bunches of new devices. This is on the grounds that his dad, a therapist who swerved into the immediate advertising business, which will store electronic items sold in the room **Rubin**.

[Google asked Andy Rubin to quit for being a sex pest](#)

<https://fudzilla.com/news/47474-google-asked-andy-rubin-to-quit-for-being-a-sex-pest>

But still gave him a hero's farewell and a pile of cash The creator of Android, **Andy Rubin**, was asked to leave Google for being a **sex** pest, but the search engine did its best to pretend ...

[Wayfair shoots down conspiracy theory about child sex ...](#)

 <https://www.msn.com/en-us/finance/companies/wayfair-shoots-down-conspiracy-theory-about-child-sex-trafficking-and-expensive-cabinets/ar-BB16ALHX>

Wayfair shoots down conspiracy theory about child **sex** trafficking and expensive cabinets
hpeterson@businessinsider.com (Hayley Peterson) 7/10/2020 White violence, Black protests during 1918 flu ...

[Who is Rie Hirabaru Rubin? Andy Rubin Ex-Wife; Bio, Wiki ...](#)

 <https://globintel.com/usa/rie-hirabaru-rubin-biowiki-age/>

Rie **Rubin** Bio, Wiki. Rie **Rubin** is the ex-wife of **Andy Rubin**, Android co-creator and former Google Senior Vice-President. She is accusing him of having secretly conspired with her attorney to manipulate the couple's prenuptial agreement by stripping her of all community property rights and also diverting their marital funds so he could pay women involved in his private "**sex** ring."

[** THAT SILICON VALLEY OLIGARCHS RUN A MONOPOLISTIC CARTEL!](#)

** THAT SILICON VALLEY OLIGARCHS AND THEIR POLITICIANS RUN A SEX CULT AND TRANSACT BRIBES WITH SEX!

** THAT AN EXTRAORDINARY NUMBER OF SUSPICIOUS DEATHS HAVE HAPPENED TO PEOPLE INVOLVED IN THIS CASE

** THAT TECH OLIGARCHS AND CALIFORNIA SENATORS HIRE CHARACTER ASSASSINS AND HIT JOB ATTACKERS TO HARM CITIZENS WHO SPEAK OUT!

Forensics - See Which Senator Or Oligarch Is Lying To You

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Google - The Lies Of Google And Youtube

Musk - Bribes Frauds Safety Cover ups And Stock Manipulations

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[THE DIRTY DEEDS OF SILICON VALLEY - VOLUME ONE By Westin Parker](#)

[THE DIRTY DEEDS OF SILICON VALLEY - VOLUME TWO By Westin Parker And The Wiki Team](#)

[NEWS ARTICLE ARCHIVES ABOUT THIS CASE at http://www.focus-book.com](http://www.focus-book.com)

[The Age of Surveillance Capitalism By Shoshana Zuboff'](#)

[Catch and Kill](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Catch_and_Kill) By Ronan Farrow,
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Catch and Kill: Lies, Spies, and a Conspiracy to Protect Predators](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Catch_and_Kill: Lies, Spies, and a Conspiracy to Protect Predators)

[Permanent Record](https://www.amazon.com/Permanent-Record-Edward-Snowden/dp/1250237238) By Edward Snowden, <https://www.amazon.com/Permanent-Record-Edward-Snowden/dp/1250237238>

[Brotopia](http://brotopiabook.com/) By Emily Chang, <http://brotopiabook.com/>

[Throw Them All Out](http://peterschweizer.com/books/throw-them-all-out/) By Peter Schweizer, <http://peterschweizer.com/books/throw-them-all-out/>

[The Circle](https://archive.org/details/circle00dave) By David Eggers, <https://archive.org/details/circle00dave>

[Companies Targeted For Bankruptcy For Their Crimes Against The Public By The Internet Research Group](#)

[World Without Mind](https://www.amazon.com/World-Without-Mind-Existential-Threat/dp/1101981113) By Franklin Foer, <https://www.amazon.com/World-Without-Mind-Existential-Threat/dp/1101981113>

[A Journey into the Savage Heart of Silicon Valley](https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/35684687-live-work-work-work-die) By Corey Pein,
<https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/35684687-live-work-work-work-die>

[Disrupted](https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/26030703-disrupted) By Dan Lyons, <https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/26030703-disrupted>

[Chaos Monkeys](https://www.antonio-garciamartinez.com/chaos-monkeys/) By Antonio García Martínez, <https://www.antonio-garciamartinez.com/chaos-monkeys/>

[The Creepy Line](https://www.thecreepylines.com/) By Matthew Taylor, <https://www.thecreepylines.com/>

[The Cleantech Crash](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/cleantech-crash-60-minutes/) By Leslie Stahl, <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/cleantech-crash-60-minutes/>

[Congress: Trading stock](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/congress-trading-stock-on-inside-information/) By Steve Kroft, <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/congress-trading-stock-on-inside-information/>

[Peak Energy: Think “peak oil” is a discredited idea ...](http://peakenergy.blogspot.com/2014/01/think-peak-oil-is-discredited-i...) * Electric Vehicles and Peak **Lithium** * Hydrogen and Peak Platinum * Storing Energy In Graphite ... (10) cradle to cradle (10) fabber (10) **goldman sachs** (10) gtl (10) hybrid car ... **afghanistan** (8) big oil (8) ...peakenergy.blogspot.com/2014/01/think-peak-oil-is-discredited-i...

[cobalt goldman sachs](http://breadmakernew.com/tag/cobalt-goldman-sachs/) - Did you know that **Afghanistan** is one of the world’s largest suppliers of **lithium**? All your electronic devices that use **lithium** batteries are dependent on it & only a few countries have ... cobalt gold ring, cobalt golden age club, cobalt **goldman**, cobalt **goldman sachs** Admin. Search for: Recent Posts.- breadmakernew.com/tag/cobalt-goldman-sachs/

[Afghanistan sits on \\$1 trillion worth of mineral deposits. Is ...](http://beforeitsnews.com/power-elite/2013/12/afghanistan-sits-on...) - When you look deeply into it, you find that **Goldman Sachs** is owned by Rothschild, ... **Afghanistan’s** mineral deposits to be worth upwards of \$1 trillion and in fact, a classified Pentagon memo called **Afghanistan** the “Saudi Arabia of **lithium**. ... beforeitsnews.com/power-elite/2013/12/afghanistan-sits-on...

[Why the US wants to stay in Afghanistan - Goldman Sachs](http://lunaticoutpost.com/Topic-Why-the-US-wants-to-stay-in-Afgha...) Director to Join Board of Bitcoin Startup Circle Capturing images of bystanders by zooming in on pictures of corneas (this is huge!) ... Well it does not come from **Afghanistan** . Although **lithium** is widely distributed on Earth, ...- lunaticoutpost.com/Topic-Why-the-US-wants-to-stay-in-Afgha...

[Did Goldman push us into Afghanistan for the Lithium? | DOE ...](http://atvmdoe.wordpress.com/2012/10/29/did-goldman-push-us-into-afg...) From Contributor: JackieNuls: Did **Goldman** push us into **Afghanistan** for the **Lithium**? **Goldman** stood to make billions of dollars along with the Russian mining companies, battery companies and electric car companies they represent. **Goldman** was involved in almost every DOE funding deal and ... atvmdoe.wordpress.com/2012/10/29/did-goldman-push-us-into-afg...

[Carp Libertatum: Massive lithium deposit found in Afghanistan ...](#) Massive **lithium** deposit found in **Afghanistan**. ... **Goldman Sachs** fraud, how they cheated investors wi... The Globalist Treat Earth like It's Their Mafia Em... IRS Fraud: There Is No Law That Requires You To Fi... Federal Income Tax – Why you should not pay; americaisindanger.blogspot.com/2011/04/massive-lithium-deposit-found-i...

[Talison lithium – Wikinvest - Lithium's](#) extremely low co-efficient of thermal expansion makes these products resistant to thermal shock and imparts mechanical strength. ... China, and **Afghanistan** however Bolivia has a backward, ... **Goldman Sachs** Group Inc. and Fortis Investments.-
wikinvest.com/wiki/Talison_lithium

[Afghanistan may be the Saudi Arabia of lithium | Business blog -](#) The New York Times story on the discovery of vast mineral reserves in **Afghanistan** is astonishing, given the unpredictable political consequences. One is that the **Afghanistan** could rival Bolivia as the Saudi Arabia of **lithium** The US US taskforce that is trying to map the reserves of ...- blogs.ft.com/businessblog/2010/06/afghanistan-may-be...

[Kathleen Parker: Mining Afghanistan's future - Afghanistan,](#) it turns out, is rich in minerals – trillions rich. It's going to become the Saudi Arabia of **lithium**, thanks to vast stores of that resource, plus iron, copper, cobalt and gold. ... Masooma Habibi, a graduate of **Goldman Sachs'** “10,000 Women” program at the AUAF, ... - readingeagle.com/article.aspx?id=229781

[cryptogon.com » U.S. Identifies Vast Mineral Deposits Worth ... -](#) U.S. Identifies Vast Mineral Deposits Worth \$1 Trillion in **Afghanistan**; “The Saudi Arabia of **Lithium**”; Eventually “One of The Most Important Mining Centers in The World”; ... And **Goldman Sachs** will arrange the financing.
cryptogon.com/?p=15953

[Vast Deposits Of Fodder For Conspiracy Theorists Discovered ...-](#) Jim Risen has a blockbuster story about a gift and a curse for **Afghanistan's** blighted and ... gold and critical industrial metals like **lithium** — are so big and include so many minerals that are ... The Board of advisors has Stephen Friedman, AIG crook, **Goldman Sachs** crook, Federal Reserve
...attackerman.firedoglake.com/2010/06/13/vast-deposits-of-fodder-for-...

[NYT: Vast Minerals FOUND \(Lithium, Gold\) in Afghanistan](#) - The previously unknown deposits — including huge veins of iron, copper, cobalt, gold and critical industrial metals like **lithium** — are so big and include so many minerals that are essential to modern industry that **Afghanistan** could eventually be transformed into one of the most ... [dailykos.com/story/2010/06/13/875695/-NYT-Vast-Miner...](#)

[Afghanistan Troop Draw-down, Afghanistan, President Barack ...](#) - **Afghanistan** troop withdrawal, President Barack Obama, Prime Time speech, ... We'll need enough troops in afganistan to secure their **lithium**, ... Guess Ghadafi should have cooperated with **Goldman Sachs**. Recently Aired. Listen to today's podcast: [blogs.wsj.com/wsjam/2011/06/23/president-barack-obama...](#)

» [The Afghanistan coincidence Alex Jones' Infowars: There's ...](#) - ... gold and critical industrial metals like **lithium** — are so big and include so many minerals that are essential to modern industry that **Afghanistan** could eventually be transformed ... **Afghanistan's** gross domestic product is only about \$12 billion dollars,” lunch money for **Goldman Sachs**. - [infowars.com/the-afghanistan-coincidence/](#)

[Mining Afghanistan's future – hutchnews.com](#) - Mining **Afghanistan's** future By Kathleen Parker WASHINGTON – Amid all the dark news from **Afghanistan**, every now and then a sliver of light slips through the cracks. - [hutchnews.com/Wirecolumns/Parker-column6-16-1](#)

[Horrors of Afghanistan transformed West Seneca Marine ...](#) - Historically, the name “Afghan” designated the Pashtun people, the largest ethnic group of **Afghanistan**. [33] ... The country's natural resources include: coal, copper, iron ore, **lithium**, uranium, rare earth elements, chromite, gold, ... [article.wn.com/view/2014/01/13/Horrors_of_Afghanistan_...](#)

[Making Lemonade From Failed Afghan Air Force G222 Acquisition](#) - ... General McChrystal General Odierno General Schwartz GFE GISP Global Hawk Global Influence Global Strike Global Zero GLONASS GMD GMR **Goldman Sachs** Google Gordon England Gorgon Stare Government ... Gooden Linda Hudson **Lithium-ion** Batteries ... in **Afghanistan** that the press would ...- [lexingtoninstitute.org/making-lemonade-from-failed-afghan-air-...](#)

[Lithium: The Commodity of the 21st Century \[Global X Funds ... - Lithium](#) is used as a thickener in grease, ... There are also huge **lithium** deposits in Bolivia, China, and **Afghanistan**, ... **Goldman Sachs** Group Inc. and Fortis Investments. These three majors bought in when Talison was still a private company. [seekingalpha.com/article/252920-lithium-the-commodity-of...](#)

[oligarch » Agent4Stars-](#) The **Russian oligarch** has spent the past decade buying up nine flats across two buildings in the exclusive Lowndes Square. ... **John Doerr**; **John** Frederiksen; **John** Paul DeJoria; **John** Paulson; Jon and Karen Huntsman; Jose Mourinho; Joseph Lau; Jr. Julian H. Robertson; Ken Fisher; [agent4stars.com/tag/oligarch/](#)

[name “Bourkhan”. Owner – oligarch Alisher Usmanov ... - Billionaire Alisher Usmanov](#) acquired the biggest private jet in Russia, ... **oligarch**, percent, president vladimir putin, private flight, private jet, richest man, roman, roman abramovich, Russia’s richest man, sale, seat, spacious ... **John Doerr**; **John** Frederiksen; **John** Paul DeJoria; **John** Paulson ... [agent4stars.com/tag/name-bourkhan-owner-oligarch-alishe...](#)

[Rebooted patriot games in ‘Jack Ryan’ – SiliconValley.com - John Doerr.](#) Larry Ellison. Reed Hastings. Reid Hoffman. Mark Hurd. Vinod Khosla. ... He’s covertly embedded at a Wall Street bank where he uncovers a **Russian** plot to buy up U.S. Treasury bonds, ... Ryan’s investigation leads him to the **Russian oligarch** Viktor Cherevin, played by Kenneth Branagh, ...[siliconvalley.com/topics/ci_24918976/rebooted-patriot-gam...](#)

[Facebook’s friend in Russia – Fortune Tech -](#) Left to right: **John Doerr**, Charlie Rose, Michael Arrington, Yuri Milner, and Ron Conway at last spring’s TechCrunch conference. Milner has become an informal **Russian** ambassador to Silicon Valley. - [tech.fortune.cnn.com/2010/10/04/facebooks-friend-in-russia/](#)

[Yuri Milner: Profile – Business Insider -](#) DST says it hasn’t sold any Facebook shares and doesn’t want to, but some people think DST’s main backer, **Russian oligarch** Alisher Usmanov, wants to sell and might get his way. ... **John Doerr** **And** The Rise Of Secondary Private Markets ...- [businessinsider.com/yuri-milner-forbes-profile-2011-3](#)

[The Wall Street billionaire philanthropists – Financial News -](#) • Ann and **John Doerr**, venture capitalist. ... **Russian oligarch** to donate fortune to charity 02 Feb 2010; Story Tags. Blackstone

Group. Citigroup. David Rubenstein. Julian Robertson. Michael Bloomberg. Philanthropy. Renaissance Technologies. Sandy Weill. - efinancialnews.com/story/2010-08-05/giving-pledge-wall-street

[Good Kindle and Newspaper articles for Friday Morning ...](#) **Russian Oligarchs** buying French and British Newspapers. Business Week reports on some rather interesting news – **Russian oligarchs and their sons** are saving French and British newspapers. ... Amazon related News – **John Doerr** leaves Amazon Board.- ireaderreview.com/2010/03/19/good-kindle-and-newspaper-ar...

[Nancy Ann Hunter – This house will exist-](#) ... and Oleg Deripaska, the youngest of the **Russian oligarchs**, 41, “king” of aluminum. ... Other Dolby Labs president of technology titans like **John Doerr and** the founder of Facebook, Mark Zuckerberg, live in nearby Silicon Valley. ... hishousewillextist.org/nancyannhunter.php

[Climateer Investing: Kleiner Perkins Distressed By Lousy Results -](#) Kleiner partner Al Gore is probably not as concerned by the recent results as **John Doerr**. ... Russia Should Create Its Own Tax Havens ... “No, ... Welfare for the **Russian Oligarchs**... Cyprus: ...- climateerinvest.blogspot.com/2013/03/kleiner-perkins-distressed-by-l...

[Market Leader : News :: Bill Gates and Warren Buffett ...-](#) ... and his wife have already donated 800 million dollars.They were joined by venture investor **John Doerr and John** ... It should be noted that V. Potanin was among the first **Russian oligarchs** to go into arts patronage by setting up V. Potanin’s Charity Foundation in 1999mainly focused ... profi-forex.us/news/entry3000000006.html

[Netizen: Vinod Khosla: For Profit Poverty Alleviation-](#) “He was the most visionary of all the **Russian oligarchs**” **John Doerr**; Creating, Propagating; Google Apps: Open The Flood Gates; No More Beer, No More Soda; Dell Duo: Tablet + Netbook; Web 2.0 Summit 2010: Robin Li; **John** Battelle’s Search Hangover; technbiz.blogspot.com/2010/11/vinod-khosla-for-profit-poverty.html

[Forbes Audiobooks -](#)... we’ll tell you about, “**Russian** Billionaire Mikhail Prokhorov: From **Oligarch** to President?” Mikhail Prokhorov is a tycoon in Russia, ... we’ll tell you about, “**John Doerr**’s Plan to Reclaim the Venture Capital Throne” ... audible.com/search?advsearchKeywords=&searchTitle=&...

[Steve Westly – The Huffington Post -](#) ... Google, Steve Westly, Green Jobs, Tesla Motors, Edeniq, **John Doerr**, Amyris Biotechnologies, Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers, Facebook, Recyclebank,

Barack Obama, Apple, Energy ... With billionaire Meg Whitman spending like a **Russian oligarch**, it's inevitable that the race for California ... huffingtonpost.com/tag/steve-westly

[Apple, Steve Jobs, and US Foreign Policy \(CFR\) using Nazi ...](#) - the Stud House, the private home of the Lebedev family – one of the **Russian oligarchs** ... been a long time partner in Silicon Valley venture capital powerhouse Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers whose partner **John Doerr** is a member of the Google board. Another Google director, ... - forum.prisonplanet.com/index.php?topic=207205.0

[rnr | The personal blog of R. Martin Roscheisen](#) - Neither VC **John Doerr** nor entrepreneur Martin Roscheisen has a background in enviro. ... (Then again, just a few decades later, we've got **Russian oligarchs** needing seemingly just that kind of expertise for equipping their yachts.)- tripleyield.com

[Romania arrests suspected hacker of Bush family emails | NDTV.com](#) -Tags: Bucharest Carl Bernstein Colin Powell Corina Cretu Downton Abbey George Roche George W. Bush Guccifer hacking **John Doerr** Julian Fellowes Marcel Lazar Lehel Romania **Russia** Tina Brown.- ndtv.com/article/world/romania-arrests-suspected...

[Scary side to the story – IronMountainDailyNews.com | news ...](#)

He raked in a gazillion bucks, give or take a few billion, as the founder of **Kleiner Perkins** Caufield and Byers, a venture capital firm. His letter, published in the Wall Street Journal, ... essentially from Europe west of Russia through North America, ...ironmountaindailynews.com/page/content.detail/id/544658/Scary-sid...

[Kleiner Perkins Co-Founder's Nazi Comment Draws Criticism ...](#) - **Kleiner** Perkins's website lists **Perkins** as one of 14 partner emeriti, a group that includes recent partner Ray Lane and co-founder Eugene **Kleiner**, who died in 2003. **Perkins** has been a director at companies including Hewlett-Packard Co. and Applied Materials Inc. -bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-26/kleiner-perkins-shocked...

[Frank Caufield — Kleiner Perkins Caufield Byers](#) - He is a Co-Founder of **Kleiner Perkins** Caufield & Byers. Mr. Caufield has served on the boards of Quantum Corporation, Caremark Inc., ... He also serves as a director of The U.S. Russia Investment Fund, Refugees International, ...kpcb.com/partner/frank-caufield

[DST Out and Kleiner Perkins In in Twitter Mega-Funding – Kara ...](#) - According to sources close to the situation, the aggressive **Russian** investment outfit DST Global is out of the running to fund Twitter. Instead, the prize is almost certainly going to **Kleiner Perkins**, the legendary Silicon Valley venture firm of Web 1.0 that has been making a big push ... [allthingsd.com/20101206/russias-dst-out-of-twitter-fun...](#)

[‘Flash Boys’ and the Speed of Lies – Bloomberg View](#) - In the last few months, I have had a strange and interesting experience. In early April, I found myself the main character in Michael Lewis’s book “Flash Boys.” - [bloombergvew.com/articles/2014-08-03/flash-boys-and-the-sp...](#)

[‘Flash Boys’ and the Speed of Lies: Katsuyama – Businessweek](#) - Already a Bloomberg.com user? Sign in with the same account. Don’t have an account? Sign up. Help! I can’t access my account. - [businessweek.com/videos/2014-08-04/flash-boys-and-the-spee...](#)

[Newsalert: ‘Flash Boys’ and the Speed of Lies](#) - The total link site for the news and information junkie: Libertarianism. Property Rights. Government Corruption. Chicago Mob. Struggle Against Socialism. - [nalert.blogspot.com/2014/08/flash-boys-and-speed-of-lies.html](#)

[“Flash Boys” and the Speed of Lies – Proactiveinvestors UK](#) “Flash Boys” and the Speed of Lies . Here is the opening of this informative column by Brad Katsuyama for Bloomberg: In the last few months, I have had a strange and interesting experience. - [proactiveinvestors.co.uk/columns/fuller-treacy-money/16720/flash-b...](#)

[Brad Katsuyama: ‘Flash Boys’ and the speed of lies about my ...](#) - In the last few months, I have had a strange and interesting experience. In early April, I found myself the main character in Michael Lewis’s book **Flash Boys**. It told the story of a quest I’ve been on, with my colleagues, to expose and to prevent a lot of outrageous behaviour in the US stock market - [nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c_id=3&objectid...](#)

[FSN: ‘Flash Boys’ and the Speed of Lies | Gold and ...](#) FSN: Europe’s Tough New Regime For Banks Fails First Test In Portugal; Forex Trading Alert: EUR/USD – Time for Rebound? DoJ Subpoenas GM Over Subprime Auto Loans - [beforeitsnews.com/gold-and-precious-metals/2014/08/fsn-flas...](#)

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[Obama turns to Silicon Valley for fund-raising for Democrats ...](#) - San Jose, California: President Barack Obama warned tech leaders on Thursday to dig deep in their wallets to **fund** Democratic candidates and feel a sense of urgency about congressional elections in November or risk further gridlock in Washington and a failure to move on their priorities. Obama was - firstpost.com/world/obama-turns-to-silicon-valley-for-f...

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