

Damages Claim And Supporting Validation Provided To The U.S. Government

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(In on-going edit – this is not the final version)

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Overview

Compensation is demanded by Plaintiff. This case involves the sale and trading of stocks, bonds, mutual funds, and other securities; bribery; election manipulation; monopoly and anti-trust law violation; bodily harm and other criminal matters applicable to every law enforcement and regulatory agency. This case involves, and is under the purview of, most government agencies. This is not a single-agency matter. No agency has the right to seek to shove this case off to another agency or cover-up this matter at the expense of citizen Constitutional and human rights.

Victim witnessed an organized criminal enterprise which affected the entire U.S. Treasury. The crime scheme involved: stock market manipulation, corrupt international mining deals and media company power manipulations. When he reported the crime, millions of dollars of state-sponsored reprisal attacks were launched against him in vendetta.

This is a felony-grade criminal racketeering case. White House, Department of Energy, Department of State and other California State and Federal government agency staff coordinated with their political campaign financier/beneficiaries from Solyndra, Tesla, Fisker, Facebook, Google, YouTube, Netflix, LinkedIn, Alphabet, Kleiner Perkins, Greylock, Goldman Sachs and other PAC-aligned Silicon Valley businesses to operate a RICO-law and Antitrust-law violating illicit business “Cartel”. The operation of this Cartel has been proven by leaked emails, whistle-blowers, lawsuits and FBI-type forensic accounting. This illicit organization had planned to skim trillions of dollars of exclusive profits from government contracts, political payola, foreign rare earth mining operations, internet news and search manipulation deals, revolving-door deals and massive computerized algorithm-based stock market manipulations. The Defendants schemes, particularly, planned to exploit funds from the 2008 and 2021 “Stimulus Bills”. Plaintiff’s, government employee/contractors, competed with these entities, with superior technology at lower prices, and were targeted by this Cartel, for termination. Plaintiff’s became information providers and whistle-blowers for investigators in the examination of this crime. Defendants expended vast amounts of corporate and taxpayer money and resources harming Plaintiffs in reprisal vendetta attacks. Over a million pages of evidence and proof are provided on the case website. Damages and attacks on Plaintiff continue to today.

Blockade of Legal Rights And Blockade of Legal Representation

A. Plaintiffs have been “black-listed” from getting legal representation. Even though the law in California (Cal. Lab. Code § § 1050 to 1053) says that an entity *can't* prevent or attempt to prevent former workers from getting work or representation through misrepresentation, knowingly permitting or failing to take reasonable steps to prevent blacklisting, or make a statement about why an employee

was discharged or left employment, implying something other than what is explicitly said, or providing information that was not requested: ***It is done every day in Silicon Valley.*** The "*Silicon Valley No Poaching Black-List*" class-action lawsuit, the "*AngelGate Scandal Investigation*", and many other notorious scandals and books are about this issue. Federal FAR Section 9.104-1 (d), and related laws, apply. Blacklisting is a key part of the IC Vendetta Cycle attacks. The victims also suffered damage to their rights under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) (29 USC Sec. 621, et seq.); the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 USC Sec. 12181, et seq.); the Civil Rights Acts - (42 USC Sec. 2000, et seq.); the Davis-Bacon Act (40 USC Sec. 276a, et seq.); the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) (29 USC Sec. 1001, et seq.); the Equal Pay Act (29 USC Sec. 206[d]) and other violations.

B. Each and every law firm capable of handling Plaintiffs case has been contracted, paid and/or influenced so that they are "conflicted out" from representing Plaintiffs. Law firm Mofu was threatened if they helped Plaintiffs. Lawyer Amy Anderson was threatened and lost her license for attempting to help Plaintiffs. Every lawyer or law firm who attempts to help Plaintiffs is hired by Defendants, or their agents and threatened or compromised in order to prevent them from helping Plaintiffs because this case affects trillions of dollars of energy industry profits, the White House, billionaire oligarchs and multi millionaire corrupt Senators. In fact, this issue lies at the root of this entire corruption case. Sociopath over-moneyed Silicon Valley oligarchs have hire Morrison Foerster, Wilson Sonsini, Perkins Coie, Covington Burling and every other major law firm and lobbyist and told them to "*kill everyone and destroy everything that I don't like...*". These law firms (controlled by Mark Zuckerberg, Elon Musk, Larry Page, Eric Schmidt, Steve Westly, Vinod Khosla, Laurene Powell Jobs, Nancy Pelosi, etc. All of whom have nearly a trillion dollars of funds at their disposal) have carte blanche and unlimited payments to run coups, character assassination campaigns, money laundering and other crimes for the oligarchs. They have the staffing to do these things and zero incentive to not do crimes. These law firms are the dirty deeds teams for the mobster-like suspects and there is no law enforcement body with the will nor resources to stop them. It is a violation of the U.S. Constitution to tell Plaintiffs to "go get a law firm" when EVERY possible, equitable, law firm works for, and is massively compensated by, the criminals that need to be sued. Both the politicians AND the tech oligarchs charged with these crimes have hired the very law firms that government agencies have told Plaintiffs to go out and hire.

C. There is a precedent that was set in the US Supreme Court case: *Gideon v. Wainwright*, (1963) that clarifies that you have a right to a lawyer even if you don't have money for one. The Sixth Amendment, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause gives one their Due Process rights. One needs to kill someone, though, to most easily get your free lawyer, since the court-appointed lawyer is rarely ever appointed, on citizens behalf, in a case like this. Even if a defendant is represented by an attorney of his or her choosing, he or she may be entitled to relief on appeal if the attorney did not provide adequate representation. A defendant must demonstrate that the attorney's performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and that this was prejudicial to the case. See: [Strickland v. Washington](https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/466/668/case.html) (<https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/466/668/case.html>) , 466 U.S. 668, 688-92 (1984). A few "free lawyers", that victims had tried, turned out to be working for the opposition side.

D. The federal organization: <https://www.lsc.gov> is required to help but has refused because it's administrators were friends with, and appointed by, the public officials charged with corruption in this case.

E. Plaintiffs have personally asked the Attorney General, The Director of the FBI and the U.S. Attorney's office for representation but they have been told not to respond because the case is politically embarrassing to major public officials and their corrupt Silicon Valley financiers.

F. The government agencies who have told Plaintiffs that Plaintiffs should "*hire a law firm and sue them*", in order to resolve this matter, are the same government agencies that have cut-off, or blockaded Plaintiffs income sources in order to prevent Plaintiffs from being able to afford to hire a law firm to sue them.

G. A federal agency provided Plaintiffs with a list of "free lawyers". Upon FBI-level investigation of every "free lawyer" on the list, (via their financial contributions, voting records, leaked emails, social media postings, event attendance, public records, social connections lists online and other surveillance data) they all worked for, or with the opposition interests and could not have possibly provided unbiased services. In fact, multiple lawyers have contacted Plaintiffs who turned out to be working for the opposition. They were sent in to delay, or redirect, Plaintiffs in order to keep the cases from being filed or properly prosecuted in order to protect the suspects. This is a common infiltration procedure widely documented in CIA, British secret service, Russian FSB and Snowden leaks documents on IC dirty tricks tactics.

H. Agency staff were ordered to harm Applicants by manipulating their benefits in order to deny, delay, obfuscate and reduce their income as reprisal for their assistance to law enforcement in a political corruption and money laundering matter. Agency staff, ranging from the lowest level staff and up to the director headquarters offices, participated in this reprisal-vendetta-revenge action to harm Applicants.

Applicant's peers have filed DOJ and FBI criminal referrals, launched federal investigations and the assertions have been proven in numerous IG, FBI, Congressional and major news media investigations. Agency offices have failed to provide responsive FOIA requested data, hearing investigation data and fair responses because some of their staff are STILL operating a criminal cover-up which has now been update-reported to the FBI, Congress, the IG, the AG and investigative reporters.

Other federal agencies have complied, verified and provided the requested deliverables. SSA and DOE have pointed the searchlight of suspicion on themselves, laser-like, by their overt failure to comply, unlike every other agency. Ironically, the political financing of their executives and their personal relationships "happens" to be with the exact same Silicon Valley oligarchs under felony criminal investigations. The stock market brokerage records, family trust accounts, PAC trace-routing, Interpol records and SEC investigation records proves it!

Unfortunately for the crooked agency staff, some Applicants have the authority, law enforcement credentials and training to arrest any person at their home or office and remand them to the FBI, DOJ or Sheriff. For example: Every "unsigned" anonymous government email is tracked to the individual author by their IP address, device IMEI, web camera, building key card, door camera, parking lot use chart, building camera, vehicle tracking circuits, text dba records, keyboard UI/UX patterns, motherboard ID #, DNS routing, stingray read-outs and a vast number of other metrics. Applicant investigation peers know the exact person that wrote every government email or document or file request. There is no no longer such a thing as an anonymous government email. "Transparency is the

Applicants middle name.” The FBI and CIA people that insiders think are their “buddies” may actually be the APPLICANTS buddies as victims have a relationship with the IC!

Agencies And Authorities Previously Contacted

For years, victim/plaintiffs, and their advocates and peers, have contacted every government agency and authority listed in government directories, which may have any jurisdiction over this case. The usual response has been cover-ups, finger-pointing, stone-walling, obfuscation, failure-to-reply or other tactics to delay the inevitable. This has forced victim/plaintiffs to use social media and novel distribution technologies to present their case to every registered voter in the public. Agency officials who were supposed to be helping victim/plaintiffs have been exposed taking bribes from victim/plaintiff’s enemies and adversaries in this case. Certain California State officials, Obama White House Staff and Federal Agency staff accepted bribes from Silicon Valley Oligarchs and Investment Bank Cartels. They were bribed with: Billions of dollars of Google, Twitter, Facebook, Tesla, Netflix and Sony Pictures stock and stock warrants which is never reported to the FEC; Billions of dollars of Google, Twitter, Facebook, Tesla, Netflix and Sony Pictures search engine rigging and shadow-banning which is never reported to the FEC; Free rent; Male and female prostitutes; Cars; Dinners; Party Financing; Sports Event Tickets; Political campaign printing and mailing services "Donations"; Secret PAC Financing; Jobs in Corporations in Silicon Valley For The Family Members of Those Who Take Bribes And Those Who Take Bribes; "Consulting" contracts from McKinsey as fronted pay-off gigs; Overpriced "Speaking Engagements" which are really just pay-offs conduited for donors; Gallery art; Private jet rides and the use of Government fuel depots (ie: Google handed out NASA jet fuel to staff); Recreational drugs; Real Estate; Fake mortgages; The use of Cayman, Boca Des Tores, Swiss and related money-laundering accounts; The use of HSBC, Wells Fargo, Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank money laundering accounts and covert stock accounts; Free spam and bulk mailing services owned by Silicon Valley corporations; Use of high tech law firms such as Perkins Coie, Wilson Sonsini, MoFo, Covington & Burling, etc. to conduit bribes to officials; Payroll W2 and 1099 payments which were actually bribe payments for political work such as character assassinations and internet rigging; and other means now documented by us, The FBI, the FTC, The SEC, The FEC and journalists.

A partial list of such reports filed by victim/plaintiffs to report the crime and demand compensation includes. Certified mail, Fedex receipt mail and digitally tracked electronic communications were used. Hundreds of public officials have been contacted, with documented proof, to date:

National Archives – Case documents, demands and evidence for this case have been filed with the National Archives with reference and tracking numbers so that any member of the public can pull up copies for historical reference and future research about corruption in the 2000’s.

San Francisco Police Department – A case number was issued and the case was referred to the Northern District Station. The case has been stalled for years as San Francisco Public officials are suspects in the crime. Recent arrests by U.S. Attorney Anderson, do indicate some progress but victim/plaintiff has had no recent out-reach.

San Mateo Police Department – Most of the crime organizer/beneficiary/financiers live in San Mateo County and letters have been sent to the SMPD about their actions. One of them: Elon Musk, recently moved from San Mateo, California to the State of Texas in order to delay prosecution.

Federal Bureau of Investigation – Victim/plaintiffs have spoken and met with the FBI on multiple occasions. Some FBI staff, and former employees have assisted but no indication of action has been revealed officially by the FBI. Victim/Plaintiffs have invoiced the FBI for witness and informant fees but the FBI has been non-responsive. Victim/plaintiffs were licensed investigators who participated in past undercover operations.

Congressional Investigation Hearings – Victim/plaintiffs have reported to and caused the launch of numerous Congressional hearings which validated plaintiffs assertions but Congressional hearings do not award damages to victims. Invoices have been filed by victim for witness, whistle-blower and informant compensation. Victim provided much data to **The House Committee On Oversight And Government Reform.**

Federal Court System – Victim/plaintiffs have been witnesses and/or in a plaintiffs group in famous law suits and class actions and while the cases were “won” or proven in favor of plaintiff’s assertions, no compensation has been forthcoming to the victim due to conflicts-of-interest with administration officials and the blockade of victim’s legal representation due to the fear of political embarrassment by Administration officials and their Silicon Valley financiers!

The GAO – Victim/plaintiff was an interviewed witness/whistle-blower for the GAO. The GAO has published multiple reports condemning some of the suspects in this case. Government Accountability Office OIG has submitted questions but has not informed victim of any definitive actions. Invoices have been filed by victim for witness, whistle-blower and informant compensation.

Senator Dianne Feinstein – Reported to yet involved in a conflict-of-interest in this case

Senator Nancy Pelosi – Reported to yet involved in a conflict-of-interest in this case

Senator Jared Huffman – Reported to yet involved in a conflict-of-interest in this case

Jerry Brown’s Justice Department Lead: Ken Alex – Reported to yet involved in a conflict-of-interest in this case

Barack Obama – Reported to yet involved in a conflict-of-interest in this case

U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder – Reported to yet involved in a conflict-of-interest in this case

FBI Director James Comey – Reported to yet involved in a conflict-of-interest in this case

Department of Energy Inspector General – Reported to yet involved in a conflict-of-interest in this case

Secretary of Energy Steven Chu – Reported to yet involved in a conflict-of-interest in this case

White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs – Reported to yet involved in a conflict-of-interest in this case

White House Advisor David Axelrod – Reported to yet involved in a conflict-of-interest in this case

California Attorney General Kamala Harris – Reported to yet involved in a conflict-of-interest in this case

Senator Barbara Boxer – Reported to yet involved in a conflict-of-interest in this case

California Secretary of State's Office – Reported to yet involved in a conflict-of-interest in this case

California Crime Victims Board – vcgcb.ca.gov – Reported to yet involved in a conflict-of-interest in this case

United States Department of Justice – Obama Administration – Reported to yet involved in a conflict-of-interest in this case. On January 29, 2019, the DOJ OIG did cite multiple senior FBI officials were manipulating cases for special interests. The San Francisco head of the FBI that victim's had been communicating with, was recently replaced by a new person (Bennett). FBI agent Dunne told victim that this was a "multi-year investigation...". Invoices have been filed by victim for witness, whistle-blower and informant compensation.

SEC – Obama Administration- – Reported to yet involved in a conflict-of-interest in this case. Invoices have been filed by victim for witness, whistle-blower and informant compensation.

CFTC – Obama Administration - – Reported to yet involved in a conflict-of-interest in this case. Invoices have been filed by victim for witness, whistle-blower and informant compensation.

Secret Service – Obama Administration- – Reported to yet involved in a conflict-of-interest in this case

All news reporters – Over 100,000 news reports, documentary films and articles, proving the victim's assertions have been published and broadcast but such news reports do not provide cash compensation to victim

AbilityOne - OIG

Board of Governors for the Federal Reserve System & Consumer Financial Protection Bureau

OIG

Commodity Futures Trading Commission OIG

Consumer Product Safety Commission OIG

Corporation for National & Community Service OIG

Corporation for Public Broadcasting OIG
Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
Department of Agriculture OIG
Department of Commerce OIG
Department of Defense OIG
Department of Education OIG
Department of Energy OIG
Department of Health & Human Services OIG
Department of Homeland Security OIG
Department of Housing and Urban Development OIG
Department of Justice OIG
Department of Labor OIG
Department of State and Broadcasting Board of Governors OIG
Department of the Interior OIG
Department of the Treasury OIG
Department of Transportation OIG
Department of Veterans Affairs OIG
Election Assistance Commission OIG
Environmental Protection Agency OIG
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission OIG•
Export-Import Bank OIG
Farm Credit Administration OIG
Federal Communications Commission OIG
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation OIG
Federal Election Commission OIG
Federal Housing Finance Agency OIG
Federal Labor Relations Authority OIG
Federal Maritime Commission OIG

Federal Trade Commission OIG
General Services Administration OIG
Government Publishing Office OIG
Intelligence Community OIG
International Trade Commission OIG
Legal Services Corporation OIG
Library of Congress OIG
National Aeronautics and Space Administration OIG
National Archives and Records Administration OIG
National Credit Union Administration OIG
National Endowment for the Arts OIG
National Endowment for the Humanities OIG
National Labor Relations Board OIG
National Science Foundation OIG
Nuclear Regulatory Commission OIG
Office of Personnel Management OIG
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation OIG
Postal Regulatory Commission OIG
Railroad Retirement Board OIG
Securities and Exchange Commission OIG
Small Business Administration OIG
Smithsonian Institution OIG
Social Security Administration OIG
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program
Tennessee Valley Authority OIG
Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration
U.S. Agency for International Development OIG

Bill Cooper, U.S. Department of Energy General Counsel

San Francisco FBI officer Patricia Rich

San Francisco FBI office, 450 Golden Gate, Duty Officer

San Francisco FBI office Director David Johnson

42+ Different officials at GAO per their direct emails

16+ different officials at the SEC per their direct emails

Secretary of Energy Moniz

Margrethe Vestager, EU

Rep. Jackie Speier – She sent a letter saying she had checked and federal authorities were looking into things

U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder

FBI Director James Comey

DOJ - Inspector General

Cecelia Howell, Office of Investor Education & Advocacy, SEC

Department of Energy Inspector General

Secretary of Energy Steven Chu

White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs

White House Advisor David Axelrod

California Attorney General Kamala Harris

Senator Barbara Boxer

California Secretary of State's Office

Social Security Administration, Office of the Inspector General

Rebecca Alery, Staffer to Congressman Emmer

Carly Atchison, Communications Director to Congressman Emmer

Trey Gowdy - U.S. Congress

Anti-trust Office, USDOJ

Whistleblowers.org

Abbey Rime, press organizer for Congressman Tom Rime

Citizen Complaint Center, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice

Premerger & Division Statistics, Office of Operations, Antitrust Division - USDOJ

ATVMIP Staff, Loan Programs Office, U.S. D.O.E.

Representative Kate Barlow

Angelia Bowman, Program Manager, US Department of Energy

Kate Braun, Office of Congressman Tom Emmer

Marc A. Cevasco, Chief of Staff, Congressman Ted W. Lieu

Nate Riggins, Senior Staff, Congressman Ted W. Lieu

Inspector General - Social Security Administration

Jessica Chan, SEC

Director, Oak Ridge Clearinghouse, United States Department of Energy

Multiple Form 95 Federal Claims Forms that were stone-walled and never responded to

Nicholas Banasevic, Head of Unit, EU Investigations

FTC High Technology Task Force

NHTSA Safety Board Chairman

Jennifer Decesaro, United States Department of Energy

Devin O'Malley, USDOJ

Office of the Special Counsel Case ID # DI-19-2009 and other case #'s

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Mart Bailey, Business Partner to the Feinstein Family

Robert Simon - Investigative Reporter, CBS News 60 Minutes

Carol Leonnig - Investigative Reporter - Washington Post

Inspector General - Social Security Administration (in-person and in writing)

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The FTC FOIA Unit

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Chris Morris, FOIA Officer, Department of Energy

Communications Office, CIA

Dhillon Law Group Inc.

Matthew Haskins At the office of Rep. Hurd

Bob Haueter, Chief of Staff, U.S. Congress

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hotline@oig.treas.gov

Hotline Coordinator, U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Inspector General

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Gregory Krauss, Attorney, U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Hearings and Appeals

Kyle Yunaska, United States Department of Energy

Scott Lucarelli, FOIA Liaison, Office of the Chief Counsel, EMCBC, DOJ

Gosia Olczyk, Claes BENGTTSSON, Friedrich Wenzel BULST, Cabinet of M. Vestager

Cheryll Barton, SMA to Justine Johannes, Sandia National Laboratories

Alexander Morris, United States Department of Energy, Obama

Office of Policy and Coordination, Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission

Office for Civil Rights (OCR), 200 Independence Ave., SW, DC

OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT INFORMATION SERVICES, National Archives & Records Administration

Carole Richmond, Special Aide To Rep. Carter

Monique C. Winkler, Associate Regional Director for Enforcement, SEC

Olga E. Santiago Lugo, State Policy Advisor, USDOJ

Sunita Satyapal, USDOE Energy Programs

Sydney Schneir & Jennifer DeCesaro, DOE liaison officers

Agent Carina Schoenberger, US DOJ

Gabriela Sterling & Cody Laliberte at Rep. Walters office

The White House press office

Rick Perry, United States Department of Energy

Office of the Victims' Rights Ombudsman, USDOJ

Roman Vayner, Esq., CIPP/US,OIA, U.S. Department of Energy

California Victim Compensation Board

Judiciary Committee's Oversight and Investigations staff

witness@theguardian.com

Ray Yonkura At The U.S. Congress

And all other known agencies with any applicable authority....

The problem with this process is the internal corruption within agencies who have been allowed to operate without proper regulation or oversight for many years. The "SpyGate" or "FISA Abuse" case in the current White House involves the abuse of public agencies to attack those they are politically opposed to. Average citizen SSA, IRS, HUD and other applicants suffer the same fate.

The San Mateo, California Social Security Administration offices are under investigation because one, or more, of their staff used SSA resources to attack an Applicant because a staff member (erroneously) thought that an Applicant was opposed to that SSA staffer's beliefs on "open-borders". The SSA official ordered up reprisal operations, against the Applicant, simply to vent that SSA officials political angers. That is illegal.

A vast number of agency abuse cases and lawsuits are now on public record in the Inspector General's offices and federal courts.

It is an indisputable fact that some government agencies run "hit-jobs" on citizens on orders from certain corrupt politicians. These actions are felony violations of the law.

Federal and State Agencies including SSA, FEC, DOE, HHS, VA, CIA, HUD, SA, SEC, FBI, DOJ and many others, have been charged, and found guilty, in these crimes against citizens.

In the Congressional investigation published by the United States Congress in review of the U.S. Department of Energy LGP/ATVM programs, it is clearly proven that the U.S. Department of Energy

was used as a slush-fund by some DOE executives in order to pay off campaign financiers by attacking and sabotaging their competitors.

The DOE Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant under contracts with the Department of Energy and the government-owned U.S. Enrichment Corp paid \$5M whistle-blower awards to those whistle-blowers who were attacked, using government agency resources, for reporting a crime.

Dept. of Energy Hanford URS has agreed to settle a lawsuit brought by former employee Walter Tamosaitis for \$4.1 million. The settlement in the whistle-blower case comes almost one year before the case was set for a jury trial in federal court in Richland and compensates Tamosaitis for attacks against him, by DOE officials, in retribution for reporting a crime.

VA officials attacked hundreds of citizens who reported corruption, ie:
<https://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/health-care/item/18610-va-whistleblowers-facing-retribution>.

As shown in this report: <https://www.pogo.org/analysis/2018/08/new-report-confirms-whistleblower-retaliation-is-alive-and-well-at-department-of-veterans-affairs/>

, Agencies attack often and harshly.

CIA and NSA executives have been widely shown to use spy tools to attack domestic citizens they don't like, ie: <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2435011/NSA-employees-used-phone-tapping-tools-spy-girlfriends-cheating-husbands.html> , and hundreds of other news links that can be provided.

Elon Musk and Tesla, as well as Eric Schmidt and Larry Page at Google, have been proven to use the CIA group: IN-Q-TEL, to run government sponsored/financed attacks on business competitors.

In Civil Action No. 1:13-cv-00777-RBW GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WERE CAUGHT BEING USED FOR ATTACKS AGAINST CITIZENS AND PUNISHED IN THE COURT AND THE MEDIA!

The IRS, and hordes of other government agencies have been caught and proven, IN COURT, to target and attack people for presumed political differences.

Why should we assume that the Social Security Administration is not ALSO doing this too to harm citizens who speak out?

The Lois Lerner IRS attacks took many years to resolve. In an unprecedented victorious conclusion to a four year-long legal battle against the IRS, the bureaucratic agency admitted in federal court that it wrongfully targeted citizens, during the Obama Administration, because of their political viewpoints and issued an apology to those people for doing so.

In addition, the IRS is consenting to a court order that would prohibit it from ever engaging in this form of unconstitutional discrimination in the future.

In a proposed Consent Order filed with the Court, the IRS has apologized for its treatment of U.S. citizens including organizations from 20 states that applied for 501(c)(3) and (c)(4) tax-exempt status

with the IRS between 2009 and 2012 -- during the tax-exempt determinations process. Crucially, following years of denial by the IRS and blame-shifting by IRS officials, the agency now expressly admits that its treatment of our clients was wrong and a total violation of our Democracy..

As set forth in the proposed Order:

“The IRS admits that its treatment of Plaintiffs during the tax-exempt determinations process, including screening their applications based on their names or policy positions, subjecting those applications to heightened scrutiny and inordinate delays, and demanding of some Plaintiffs’ information that TIGTA determined was unnecessary to the agency’s determination of their tax-exempt status, was wrong. For such treatment, the IRS expresses its sincere apology.”

Throughout litigation of this case, activists have remained committed to protecting the rights of the public who faced unlawful and discriminatory action by the IRS and other agencies. The objective from the very beginning has been to hold agencies accountable for corrupt practices.

This Consent Order represents a historic victory for the public and sends the unequivocal message that a government agency’s targeting of citizens organizations, or any organization, on the basis of political viewpoints, will never be tolerated and that revenge will be swift and vast.

The Order will put an end, once and for all, to the abhorrent practices utilized against citizens, as the agreement includes the IRS’s express acknowledgment of – and apology for – its wrongful treatment of the public. While this agreement is designed to prevent any such practices from occurring again, rest assured that all public interest lawyers will remain vigilant to ensure that the IRS, SSA, DOJ or SEC does not resort to such tactics in the future.

Per detailed reports, in March of 2012 lawyers began being contacted by literally dozens of citizens and groups who were being harassed by the Obama IRS after submitting applications for tax-exempt status. Their tax-exempt applications were held up for years (over seven years in some cases), and they began receiving obtrusive and unconstitutional requests for donor and member information. That began a now more than five and a half year fight with the burgeoning bureaucracy at the IRS. Then on May 10, 2013, Lois Lerner, the then head of the IRS Tax Exempt Organizations Division, publicly implicated the IRS in one of the worst political targeting scandals of the century.

This is an extraordinary victory against government agency abuse. It sends a powerful warning to the deep state bureaucracy that it will not be allowed to violate the Constitution in order to silence and shut down the whistle-blowers.

In addition to the IRS’s admissions of and apology for its wrongful conduct, the Consent Order would specifically award Plaintiffs the following:

- A declaration by the Court that it is wrong to apply the United States tax code to any tax-exempt applicant or entity based solely on such entity’s name, any lawful positions it espouses on any issues, or its associations or perceived associations with a particular political movement, position or viewpoint;

- A declaration by the Court that any action or inaction taken by the IRS must be applied evenhandedly and not based solely on a tax-exempt applicant or entity's name, political viewpoint, or associations or perceived associations with a particular political movement, position or viewpoint; and

- A declaration by the Court that discrimination on the basis of political viewpoint in administering the United States tax code violates fundamental First Amendment rights. Disparate treatment of taxpayers based solely on the taxpayers' names, any lawful positions the taxpayers espouse on any issues, or the taxpayers' associations or perceived associations with a particular political movement, position or viewpoint is unlawful.

In the Order, the IRS has also agreed that (unless expressly required by law) certain actions against the Plaintiffs— i.e. the sharing, dissemination, or other use of information unnecessarily obtained by the IRS during the determinations process (such as donor names, the names of volunteers, political affiliations of an organization's officers, etc.) – would be unlawful. In addition, the IRS promises not to take any retaliatory action against our clients for exposing the targeting scheme.

Finally, and of crucial significance, the IRS admits it targeted persons and groups based on their viewpoints (i.e., "policy positions") and that such viewpoint discrimination violates fundamental First Amendment rights. This is the first time the IRS has admitted that its targeting scheme was not just "inappropriate" – as TIGTA found – but, as alleged, blatantly unconstitutional.

To ensure consistency and uniformity within the agency's operations going forward, the IRS is required, pursuant to the Order, to inform all employees within the Exempt Organizations Division, as well as the Commissioners and Deputy Commissioners within other divisions, of the Order's terms.

This Order not only validates allegations about their treatment at the hands of the corrupt Obama-era IRS but also provides important assurances to the American public that the agency understands its obligation to refrain from further such discriminatory conduct. As Attorney General Sessions acknowledged in this regard, "[t]here is no excuse for [the IRS's] conduct," as it is "without question" that the First Amendment prohibits the conduct that occurred here, i.e., subjecting American citizens to disparate treatment "based solely on their viewpoint or ideology." Sessions further confirmed his Department's commitment to ensuring that the "abuse of power" in which the IRS engaged here "will not be tolerated."

It is impossible to overstate the importance of this victory. This marks a years-long fight for justice in defense of the constitutional rights of the public.

This is an extraordinary victory against abuse of power and corruption.

It sends a powerful warning to the deep state bureaucracy that it will not be allowed to violate the Constitution and manipulate the IRS, SSA and other agencies in order to silence and shut down those who speak out about political corruption crimes.

In the wake of Wisconsin Watchdog's investigation into SSA staff allegations of incompetence, misconduct, and retaliation in Social Security disability appeals offices, several employees have taken their complaints to a Senate committee led by Wisconsin Sen. Ron Johnson.

An official with knowledge of the complaints said the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, chaired by the Oshkosh Republican, has received emails and other contacts from “certain people” inside the Social Security Administration’s Office of Disability Adjudication and Review.

The initial complaints came from an employee inside the Milwaukee office following Wisconsin Watchdog’s opening investigative report that found some claimants waiting more than 1,000 days for an appeals decision on their disability benefits claim.

Following Wednesday’s story of a whistleblower in the Madison ODAR office, the committee has received more specific complaints about retaliation against employees, the source said.

Committee staff members sent the latest Watchdog piece to SSA administrators hoping they will “cooperate,” the source said. To date, the agency has been less than cooperative.

“This is an ongoing process, and they are not always as forthcoming as we’d like them to be,” the source said. “Hopefully with your continued reporting, this is an issue they can’t duck.”

A Senate committee member said officials there are working with the Office of Special Counsel on “multiple whistleblower retaliation claims.” The committee continues to request information from the SSA.

The whistleblower in the Madison office claims management retaliated against her after she was called to testify in a misconduct case. The incident involved “inappropriate behavior” by an administrative law judge, she said.

“They are so corrupt. It’s absolutely horrible,” said the woman, a lead case technician in the Madison Office of Disability Adjudication and Review.

She spoke on condition of anonymity, fearing more retribution from her supervisors. While she said recounting her particular experiences will more than likely betray her identity anyway, the ODAR case worker insisted she has had enough.

“I’m at point where they don’t care about me, I don’t see why I’m protecting them. This is my last resort,” she said. “I want to do my work without fear of retaliation.”

She said she has contacted the Senate committee.

“I forwarded my information to them and I got an email back from them. They said people are coming out of the woodwork with their complaints (about ODAR) following your story,” the whistle-blower said.

Ronald Klym, a long-time senior legal assistant in the Milwaukee ODAR office, alleges he has been retaliated against by supervisors for going public with his charges of incompetence and misconduct in the agency. The federal employee, who has worked for SSA for 16 years, provided Wisconsin Watchdog with documents showing extremely long wait times for claimants appealing their denied applications for benefits.

Doug Nguyen, SSA regional spokesman, in a previous story said the agency acknowledges that Milwaukee ODAR has a “high average processing time for disability appeal hearings, and we are working to address the issue.”

Beyond the delays is what Klym calls the “shell game,” the wholesale transferring of cases to other parts of the country by administrators to make the Milwaukee office’s numbers look better than they are.

The Madison office whistle-blower confirmed Klym’s allegations, saying at one point she saw 2,000 cases from the Milwaukee office handed off to the Oak Brook operation.

There are over 10,000 SSA disability manipulation charges against SSA executives and staff. There are over 185,000 charges filed by domestic citizens against all of the parties we listed in our **reported-to** list above.

Damages And Harms List

"Applicant A" and his co-workers were cooperating with agency investigations into organized crime operating within government agencies. In order to discourage, threaten and intimidate “Applicant A”, he and his peers were attacked with a \$30M+ state-sponsored reprisal attack which included the following attack tactics, operated by Fusion GPS, Black Cube, Psy-Ops type contractors and White House specialists, which caused quantifiable harms and damages for which “Applicant A” is owed compensation:

- 1.) Defrauding Applicants via fake government requests to invest in rigged government contracts, thus costing Plaintiff’s their life savings;
- 2.) Placing moles in, and spying inside, Applicant’s companies;
- 3.) Blockading legal counsel for plaintiffs;
- [4.\) Character assassination and sophisticated contracted defamation media attacks;](#)
- 5.) Defendants contracted off-shore “click-farm” and “troll-factory” processed social media attacks;
- 6.) Government benefits from SSA, HUD, etc, blockades and manipulations;
- 7.) Jobs and venture capital funding blacklisting;
- 8.) FOIA obfuscation for official government FOIA filings;

- 9.) Arbitrary government deadline manipulation for SSA, DOE, HUD and other applications;
- 10.) Creation of endless fake hurdles in agency applications (ie: DOE) to protect rigged "winners";
- 11.) Toxic workplace poisonings like the Salisbury, Nalvany, Litvinenko poisonings;
- 12.) Workplace sabotage and obstruction of Applicant's companies;
- 13.) Contracted media defamation attacks via Gawker, Gizmodo, Jalopnik, Google, Youtube, etc. Which have now had the payments for the attacks tracked through accounting systems
- 14.) Commercial employment database "Lois Lerner-ing" and red-flagging;
- [15.\) Murders or forced deaths of peers \(ie: Rajeev Motwani, Seth Rich, Gary D. Conley and 120+ others\):](#)
- 16.) Revenue blockades and internet income re-direction;
- 17.) Troll farm attack teams hired from Chinese attack farms;
- 18.) Fusion GPS, Media Matters, David Plouffe attack contracts issued targeting whistle-blowers;
- 19.) Manual search engine lock-in attacks on Google, YouTube, LinkedIn;
- 20.) U.S. patent office manipulation to blockade revenue;
- 21.) Honey-traps sent out targeting the whistle-blowers;
- 22.) Fake news tabloid empires created just for defamation attacks;
- 23.) Housing access and financing blockades created to reprisal harass whistle-blowers;
- 24.) Ongoing hacking of plaintiffs devices;
- 25.) Tech industry black-list coordination within the National Venture Capital Association;
- 26.) HUD and USDA mortgage rights blockades;
- 27.) DNS and IP routing manipulation to prevent victims from selling anything online;
- 28.) Digital attacks designed to put horrific fake news about target in front of 7.5 billion people...

and more spy agency type "dirty tricks" that cost the victims their lives, life savings, income and other disabling losses as detailed in the related support documents on the case website.

Plaintiffs have currently had their rights to legal representation and a trial blocked by government officials who fear political embarrassment in a public trial of this case. In fact, history has proven that those officials have caused a thousand-fold increase in their own public media shame by delaying a settlement of this dispute!

Relief Options Demanded

- Victim/plaintiff demands the provision of a state-sponsored court-provided law firm to represent victim/plaintiff under the variances and human rights laws affording such provision of services.
- The finding that this matter includes a violation of RICO racketeering laws and Anti-trust laws by the combined organized efforts of the Defendants.
- Awarding Plaintiff compensatory including actual, consequential, and incidental damages for malicious defamatory conduct as alleged herein in an amount to be determined at trial and in excess of \$35,000,000 U.S. Dollars.
- Awarding punitive damages for Defendant's malicious defamatory conduct based on the routine and accepted calculation of 5 percent of their invested current net worth of over \$63 billion U.S. dollars. Thus, punitive damages are requested be awarded by the in an amount to exceed \$3 billion U.S. dollars, which amount of punitive damages are designed to sufficiently punish Defendant in order that its illegal conduct not reoccur.
- Awarding Plaintiff attorney's fees and costs.
- Granting any such further relief as the Court deems appropriate including preliminary and permanent injunctive relief.
- Damages in excess of \$225 million against Chu, Axelrod, Podesta, Carny, Biden, Emanuel, Gibbs, Rattner and Seward, jointly and severally, for their violations of Plaintiff's civil rights.
- A declaration pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202 and 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B) that Plaintiff's Loan Program application was wrongfully denied and injunctive relief directing Defendants to reconsider and/or approve same.
- A declaration pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202 and 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B) Plaintiff's ATVM Loan Program application was wrongfully denied and injunctive relief directing Defendants to reconsider and/or approve same without respect for political considerations.

- A declaration pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202 and 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B) that the rejection of Plaintiff's LGP application without recourse was unlawful, and injunctive relief directing Defendants to accept and consider same without respect for political considerations.
- Such costs and attorney fees as Plaintiff's may be entitled to under law.
- Such other relief as this Court deems just.
- Plaintiff's have sent an invoice for "*informant and witness fees*" to the GAO, FBI, FTC and SEC in the amount of \$5,000,000.00 per agency but have not had a response, relative to payment, from those agencies.

Damages Amount Comparatives and Legal Precedents Validations

Reference past payment examples:

- Campbell worked as an informant for federal authorities investigating Vadim Mikerin, a Russian official in charge of U.S. operations for Tenex, a unit of Rosatom. Authorities later accused Mikerin of taking bribes from a shipping company in exchange for contracts to transport Russian uranium into the United States. He pleaded guilty in federal court in Maryland and was sentenced to prison for four years. The Justice Department had also initially charged Mikerin with extorting kickbacks from Campbell after hiring him as a \$50,000-a-month lobbyist. Prosecutors alleged Mikerin had demanded Campbell pay between one-third and half of that money back to him each month under threat of losing the contract and veiled warnings of violence from the Russians. The demand prompted Campbell to turn to the FBI in 2010, which gave its blessing for him to remain part of the scheme as a whistleblower who was compensated for his efforts.
- The FBI has a Congressional docket which documents its annual witness and informant expenditures for the last 20 years. Those financial on-the-record documents show the average payment for a high-ticket case RICO-type informant such as Plaintiff and are hereby placed in this case record as references of payment standards.
- In a similar case, Plaintiff Terry Bollea (AKA: Hulk Hogan) was awarded \$145 million dollars in damages because of character assassination efforts by the same parties. The attacks on Plaintiffs exceeded the resources used against Terry Bollea by many magnitudes and thus, the \$145 million dollar figure would be a minimum damages figure for each Plaintiff in our case as each Applicant was attacked in such a manner. Each of the parties attacked by Gawker/Gizmodo (who worked for White House operatives) received at least \$170,000.00 in damages.

- The DOE Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant under contracts with the Department of Energy and the government-owned U.S. Enrichment Corp paid \$5M whistle-blower awards to those whistle-blowers who were attacked, using government agency resources, for reporting a crime.
- Adam Lovinger, a 12-year veteran of the Pentagon's Office of Net Assessment (ONA), filed a whistleblower reprisal complaint with the Defense Department's inspector general in May against ONA boss James Baker and received compensation for his whistle-blower efforts.
- The FBI's informant in the Uranium One scandal involving the Obama administration gave written testimony to three congressional committees this week in which he accused the Obama administration of making decisions that directly benefited the Russian government and their goals of gaining geopolitical advantages over the United States. The informant, Douglas Campbell, told congressional investigators on Wednesday that Moscow sent millions of dollars to the U.S. with the expectation that it would benefit the Clinton's, while Hillary Clinton "quarterbacked a 'reset' in US-Russian relations" in her role as Secretary of State during the Obama administration, The Hill reported. The FBI found Campbell's undercover work valuable enough to reward him with a \$50,000 check in 2016.
- Dept. of Energy Hanford URS has agreed to settle a lawsuit brought by former employee Walter Tamosaitis for \$4.1 million. The settlement in the whistle-blower case comes almost one year before the case was set for a jury trial in federal court in Richland and compensates Tamosaitis for attacks against him, by DOE officials, in retribution for reporting a crime.
- In Civil Action No. 1:13-cv-00777-RBW, government agencies were caught being used for attacks against citizens and punished in the court and the media! The IRS, and hordes of other government agencies have been caught and proven, IN COURT, to target and attack people for presumed political differences
- Some of the biggest evidence-of-loss examples are found in the financial records from General Motors, Ford Motors, Nissan and Tesla Motors executives for the time-frame from Jan. 1, 2000 to today. Those records validate the income loss to Plaintiff.
- Over 400+ other cases decisions, settlement records and government payment precedents are on file at <http://www.pacer.gov> validating the amount that Plaintiff should be compensated via known and quantified precedents.

Investigation Background Data

Objectives:

This case is about a state-sponsored attack on a technology manufacturer who was promised a level playing field in its applications for funds to government entities, only to be unfairly denied and financially and detrimentally attacked and harmed, in political and anti-competitive reprisal, in the

process. In the course of the investigation, an organized crime Cartel was exposed in operation among Silicon Valley technology oligarchs and well-known political representatives.

- This case has exposed cronyism at government agencies, The White House and among U.S. Senators.
- This case represents the victims of the crime as well as taxpayers who deserve an open, transparent, and fair government process without the current layers of bribery and stock market payola quid pro quo.
- The government should immediately grant Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, retribution fees and other damages to Plaintiff

Key Points:

- 1 Funding granted through, for example: the DOE's Loan Guarantee Program (LGP) and Advanced Technology Vehicle Manufacturing (ATVM) loan programs, and other agencies, are administered in an arbitrary and capricious manner, inconsistently favoring some and disadvantaging other "outsider" non-crony applicants; lacked mechanisms for applicants to administratively appeal its decisions; and re-reviewed rejected applications on an ad hoc and biased basis in order to protect the friends of government staff and harm their competitors.
- 2 Plaintiff's ATVM application was deliberately "set aside", hidden, delayed, stone-walled and substantially "delayed consideration" by DOE in favor of loan applications from politically-connected government cronies like Tesla and Fisker, whose top executives and investors, Steve Westly (Tesla), Tim Draper (Tesla) and John Doerr (Fisker) donated millions to Democrats and the Obama Administration in 2008.
- 3 Many of the loan applications granted by the DOE went to companies that failed to produce the promised results, were not innovative in technology, or ultimately declared bankruptcy (After skimming billions in stock market "pump-and-dump" profits) with the harm going to the American taxpayers (See Solyndra, Tesla and Fisker as examples); while Plaintiff was previously funded by the Department of Energy and was one of the ONLY entities that did deliver on the contract.
- 4 Of the \$25 billion that Congress authorized the DOE to loan, \$16 billion remains un-disbursed. Why was Plaintiff's \$40 million request not granted when it could have been used to immediately create jobs?
- 5 The DOE violated multiple non-disclosure agreements with Plaintiff (and Plaintiff) passing along patented technology to General Motors and other government cronies and that technology, only after that fact, was displayed by Ford, General Motors, Tesla and other competitors who were funded by DOE.
- 6 In the case of Plaintiff, we see another example of the DOE's cronyism, broken promises to American taxpayers, and misuse of executive agency influence.

- 7 This case goes back to the year 2000, and forward, as there were crony political payments between the White House, Department of Energy, Department of State and other State and Federal government agency staff coordinated with their political campaign financier/beneficiaries from Solyndra, Tesla, Fisker, Facebook, Google, YouTube, Netflix, LinkedIn, Alphabet, Kleiner Perkins, Greylock, Goldman Sachs and other PAC-aligned Silicon Valley businesses to operate a RICO-law and Antitrust-law violating illicit business “Cartel” which Plaintiff’s were “outsiders” to.

Expanded Points:

- The Department of Energy engaged in arbitrary and capricious methods when awarding loan guarantees through the Advanced Technology Vehicle Manufacturing (ATVM) loan program
 - The DOE administers the ATVM loan program, in which Congress authorized DOE to provide direct federal government loans supporting the advancement of technology vehicles
 - Congress authorized DOE to make \$25 billion in ATVM loans (DOE currently has approx. \$16 billion of unused lending authority which politicians have been constantly trying to grab for themselves).
 - At all times relevant, DOE knew that the ATVM loans had evaporated the private markets, and that unduly delaying or denying a small, innovative technology company’s ATVM loan likely would scare away other private investors and lenders—meaning a business death sentence.
- Plaintiffs are a small business that has demonstrated innovation, energy efficiency, and provided technology that can advance green energy efforts and create jobs in the United States. They were initially funded by a Congressional award and a Department of Energy commission.
 - In November, 2008 at the request of government officials, Plaintiffs applied for a \$40 million ATVM loan to build a scalable, innovative and efficient electric car.
 - Plaintiff’s design cost less than \$20,000 in base configuration, required no gasoline or extension cords to charge, was easy to repair and build, and used crash effect reduction materials.
 - All of the Plaintiff car’s key parts were built and tested or already existed in off-the-shelf components proven in the industry for over a decade.
 - Plaintiff offered DOE asset collateral of over \$100 million to secure the ATVM loan
 - On December 2, 2008, DOE Director of Advanced Technologies Manufacturing Loan Program Lachlan Seward wrote to Plaintiff acknowledging receipt of its application and requesting certain information, which Plaintiff then provided.

- On December 31, 2008, Seward informed Plaintiff that its application was “substantially” complete, and that DOE would advise Plaintiff if it needed additional information during the application review process.
- At all times relevant, Plaintiff qualified for the ATVM loan based on DOE’s published material (see additional docs).
- We see from the examples of Tesla and Fisker that ATVM loans were massive expenditures that produced few results.
 - Plaintiff’s application was “set aside” by DOE in favor of ATVM loan applications from other companies who have not produced results, therefore wasting taxpayer dollars that were intended to create jobs and promote better technology and innovation. The other companies partnered with Goldman Sachs to produce stock market manipulation profits (like Tesla did) but no consumer market-price products.
- The government stole technology from Plaintiff, violating non-disclosure agreements, and handed that information to General Motors, Ford, and other companies that received DOE funding.
 - Plaintiff had worked with DOE on applied fuel cell research and commercialization for over a decade.
 - Plaintiff obtained a grant in 2005 through the power plant development group which it used to develop a battery 3 times more powerful than lithium batteries according to written research by Sandia National Laboratories based on their validation of Plaintiff’s patented technologies.
 - Plaintiff and Plaintiff signed NDAs with the DOE and Sandia, a government contractor, which were violated and resulted in General Motors and Ford using Plaintiff’s technology.

Facts about Plaintiff

- Key Plaintiff is a technology start-up comprised of multiple divisions including: 1.) The Auto production group and 2.) the powerplant development group. This is the same structure Tesla Motors, Ford and Nissan have., ie: Tesla sells cars to consumers and powerplants to competitor/customers.
- In September 2008, Plaintiff became **the very first applicant** to file with the U.S. Department of Energy for a development loan under the ATVM Program and also filed applications under the

Loan Guarantee Program for Innovative Energy Projects (LGP) established under Title XVII of the Energy Policy Act of 2005.

- A loan application was also filed under the Loan Guarantee Program.
- Plaintiff filed 3 loan applications in total, back then. One under Plaintiff Vehicles in the ATVM Program. One under Plaintiff in the Loan Guarantee Program. Another under Plaintiff in the ATVM program.
- Plaintiff’s application ranked by outside comparison as one of the top company applicants”, was a Forbes top rated company, had top national reviews and press, top issued patents, top staff references, industry leading staff and vast other positive metrics.
- Plaintiff had received funding from DOE via it’s Plaintiff powerplant group before and successfully completed a contract with DOE via it’s vehicle power plant division. DOE staff told Plaintiff that oil companies wanted fuel cell’s minimized in DOE efforts because they competed with oil company interests too effectively.
- Plaintiff had received funding from DOE before and successfully completed a contract with DOE via it’s vehicle power plant division.
- The Plaintiff Vehicles car goes an almost unlimited range via hot-swap fuel cartridges, costs less than \$20,000 in base configuration, uses no gasoline, is easy to repair and build, saves lives better than any other car by using “damp down” crash effect reduction materials like those used in the bumper, dashboard and body of the Prius, is faster than competing solutions, can be recharged as fast as one can pull out an empty fuel cassette and slide in a charged fuel cassette: often in 50% less time than it takes to refill a gasoline vehicle, does not require an extension cord because people living in apartments generally cannot use extension cords, uses electricity and creates green jobs. NO factory needs to be built because Plaintiff was retasking already existing factories and at very low cost. All of the key parts of the car were built and tested or already existed in off-the-shelf components proven in industry for over a decade. Autodesk and other engineering software allowed for full virtual prototyping and operational testing of the design. The company already has thousands of customers lined up who want to buy their unique and very “green” car. The company hand delivered letters from those customers to the DOE ATVM office in Washington DC in 2008. The company currently had no significant debt and the company leaders had been contributing their time and resources for many years based on positive feedback received repeatedly by Department of Energy (DOE) loan reviewers and staff. The company won a semi-finalist position in the prestigious “Forbes: America’s Most Promising Companies” contest.
- Certainly company officials were not claiming that their vehicles will solve all of the world’s energy problems. However with each car that is sold, we will help reduce domestic reliance on imported fuel and reduce environmental CO2 by putting a vehicle on the road that uses absolutely no gasoline and creates American Jobs. This vehicle is truly using “advanced technology” via clever configuration of standard off the shelf components available today. – a

major goal of this loan program and a key stated goal of the Administration. In addition, with a company that has no current debt, several patents, and thousands of interested customers; the company asserts that DOE's financial risk in investing in the technology would be extremely low, and the failures of competitors, as predicted by Plaintiff staff, who already received funding from the same program validates this assertion. Plaintiffs had the best debt ratio of any Applicant, especially Tesla. Tesla was "cooking the books" with Detroit and Middle East cover cash to make it temporarily not look as nearly bankrupt as it was.

Facts about DOE Loans

- The Department of Energy's (DOE) Loan Programs Office (LPO) administers three separate programs: the ATVM Loan Program and the Title XVII Section 1703 and Section 1705 loan guarantee programs. The ATVM Loan Program was established by Section 136 of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, and provides direct loans to support the manufacturing of advanced technology vehicles and qualifying components in the United States.
- The Program provides loans to automobile and automobile parts manufacturers for the cost of reequipping, expanding, or establishing manufacturing facilities in the United States to produce advanced technology vehicles or qualified components, and for associated engineering integration costs.
- In 2010, Section 136 was amended to include ultra-efficient vehicles within the definition of advanced technology vehicles.
- The FY 2009 Continuing Resolution (CR), which was enacted on September 30, 2008, appropriated \$7.5 billion in credit subsidy to support up to \$25 billion in loans under the ATVM Loan program.
- The FY 2009 CR also provided DOE with \$10 million to administer the Program.
- On November 5, 2008, DOE issued the Interim Final Rule for the Program.
- DOE accomplished this effort in approximately half of the 60-day time-frame mandated by Congress.
- The program began receiving applications on December 2, 2008. Plaintiff's application was the first one because Plaintiff had been informed they should apply via Barbara Boxer's, Jackie Spier's and Nancy Pelosi's staff
- The ATVM Program has received numerous applications from both automobile original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and component manufacturers. Most of them have written complaints similar to Plaintiff's, about DOE. (See the Eco-Motors, Zap, Bright Automotive, Carbon Motors, etc. Complaint documents about DOE cronyism and lies)
- The DOE's Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing (ATVM) Loan Program is a direct loan program created by Congress to provide funding to automobile manufacturers and

component suppliers to stimulate the development of new fuel efficient technology, thereby promoting U.S. energy independence by reducing the demand for foreign oil.

- ATVM is authorized under Energy Independence Security Act of 2007
- The Secretary of the DOE established the Advanced Technology Vehicle Loan Program pursuant to Section 136(e) of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Public Law 110-140, 42 U.S.C. § 17013
- Section 129(a) of the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act of 2009, Public Law 110-329, appropriated \$7.5 million to the “Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing Loan Program Account.” Section 136(d) of the 2007 Energy Independence and Security Act authorizes the Secretary to provide no more than \$25 billion in direct loans to individuals and entities determined by the Secretary to be eligible for the program. See 42 U.S.C. § 17013(d)(1).
- DOE promulgated an interim final rule on November 12, 2008, which was published at 73 F.R. 66,721 to 66,737. Comments were accepted until December 12, 2008. The Final Rule was codified at 10 CFR Part 611 (2009).
- DOE reviews applications for the loan program in tranches, with the deadline for the first tranche initially falling on December 31, 2008 and the deadline for subsequent tranches falling at the end of every subsequent quarter, until so long as the available funds and loan authority permit. 73 F.R. 66,721.
- Loans are available under the ATVM Loan Program to two classes of applicants eligible for loans under the program: automobile manufacturers and component manufacturers. See 10 CFR Part 611.100. Eligibility criteria for automobile manufacturers that did not manufacture a vehicle in 2005 are described at 10 CFR 611.100(b)(2). In brief, the applicant must demonstrate that its vehicle’s projected combined fuel economy is “greater than or equal to the industry adjusted average fuel economy for model year 2005 of equivalent vehicles.” *Id.* In contrast, component manufacturers need not demonstrate improved fuel economy. 10 CFR 611.100(b)(3).
- Regardless of their classification, applicants must be financially viable without the additional funding provided by the ATVM Loan Program in order to be eligible. 10 CFR 611.100(a)(2). The Secretary is authorized to consider a number of factors to determine financial viability, including:
 - The applicant’s debt to equity ratio;
 - The applicant’s earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) for the most recent fiscal year prior to the date of the loan application;
 - The applicant’s debt to EBITDA ratio;

- The applicant's fixed charge coverage ratio (EBITDA plus fixed charges divided by fixed charges plus interest expenses);
 - The applicant's interest coverage ratio (EBITDA plus fixed charges divided by fixed charges plus interest expenses);
 - The applicant's liquidity;
 - Statements from the applicant's lenders that the applicant is current; and
 - Financial projections demonstrating the applicant's solvency through the life of the loan.
- LGP program authorized under the 2005 Energy Policy and Conservation Act.

Facts about Plaintiff's Government Applications

ATVM

- On or around November 10, 2008 Plaintiff Vehicles applied to the DOE ATVM program.
- On December 2, 2008, Lachlan Seward wrote to Plaintiff requested further information on Plaintiff's ability to comply with general, financial, technical, and environmental requirements.
- On December 6, 2008, Plaintiff submitted additional clarification to the DOE.
- On December 17, 2008, Plaintiff had a telephone conversation with Matthew McMillen and Walter Eccard of the DOE.
- On December 23, 2008, Plaintiff wrote to Messrs.' McMillen and Eccard providing additional information concerning the asset valuation of its patents as well as an updated NEPA review statement.
- On December 29, 2008 Plaintiff had a telephone conference with Matthew C. McMillen concerning National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) compliance under § 136 of 10 C.F.R. 611.106. Plaintiff Vehicles requested \$40,000,000 through the ATVM Loan Program based on advice from Congressional officials that that amount was "all that would be left in the fund after Detroit got their allocation."
- The application fees for the Loan Gaurantee program cost between \$20,000 and \$100,000. The "fees" for the ATVM program were called a "Co-participation fee." In other words, Plaintiff would have to provide 15-20 % of the loan amount to DOE up front. If Plaintiff were approved, Plaintiff would have to pay another \$15 - \$20 m. or provide in-kind value, and no cash, as the team did in the past

- Plaintiff met with venture capitalists in order to get fee money. One in particular was a real estate developer in Detroit named Patrick Jett.
- Plaintiff also hired Covington and Burling in San Francisco and Washington DC as well as other firms in D.C. in order to get help to watch-dog the application.
- Andrew Beato of Stein Mitchell was one lawyer to Plaintiff in ATVM applications.
- On December 2, 2008, Lachlan Seward, the Director, Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing Loan Program, wrote to the Plaintiff, determining that the submitted application was not substantially complete.
- On or before December 31, 2008, Plaintiff submitted materials relating to the requirements set forth in Section 611.100 of the Interim Final Rule of the Energy Independence and Security Act.
- On December 31, 2008, Lachlan Seward wrote to the Plaintiff informing Plaintiff that it was “substantially complete”.
- At this time other applicants began contacting Plaintiff, who had been on network newscasts, asking if “it seemed like DOE might be rigging the process for favorite friends...”
- The December 31, 2008 letter stated that the DOE will advise Plaintiff if it needs additional information as it continued the application review process.
- Plaintiff alleges that on or after December 31, 2008, Lachlan Seward and Brent Peterson began processing the loan materials to secure Plaintiff funds in January 2009.
- Plaintiff alleges that loan processing was unreasonably terminated due to untoward action by the U.S. Department of Energy, including but not limited to John Doerr, who was appointed as a member of the USA Economic Recovery Advisory Board by President Barack Obama and was a lead investor in DOE application winners; and other members of the “Silicon Valley Cartel” who had quid pro quo deals with the White House.
- At this point, Google had become one of the primary suppliers of staff to the White House and was directing many government decisions. Google was, at that time, in violation of Plaintiffs patents and was a silent partner in Tesla Motors. Google ordered White House staff to fund, or not fund certain projects and Google was considered to be the most powerful member of “The Silicon Valley Cartel”. Had had manipulated most of the internet to put Obama in office. Google’s bosses were at the Obama Campaign HQ on the night of his election win, coordinating internet manipulations. The article “*The Android Administration*” in The Intercept, discussed that aspect of the corruption in great detail.
- On February 1, 2009, Plaintiff submitted its application for a ATVM Loan under the Department of Energy’s Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing Incentive Program. DO
- On April 10, 2009, Lachlan Seward wrote to Plaintiff advising that, as a matter of law, Plaintiff’s proposed project could not be funded under the Program.

- On April 11, 2009, Plaintiff contested the April 10 denial.
- On May 13, 2009, the Department of Energy stated that the April 11, 2009 letter “has not changed our determination that your proposed project can not, as a matter of law, be funded under the Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing Incentive Program (Program).”
- On April 23, 2009, Jason Gerbsman of the ATVM Loan Program at the U.S. Department of Energy notified Plaintiff that
 - Plaintiff has submitted a substantially complete application and has been assigned to both a technical eligibility and merit review team, as well as a financial viability analysis team. The technical team is very close to finishing their evaluations on both eligibility and project merit, and the financial team will be launching a more detailed and interactive due diligence phase of the Plaintiff application review very soon. Following the technical and financial evaluation under the second stage of the process, we will move into the underwriting phase where our goal is to negotiate a conditional commitment, including a detailed term sheet. This will be followed by the fourth phase of the loan process where the final details will be negotiated and the loan will be closed.
- On May 26, 2009, Jason Gerbsman of the ATVM Loan Program at the U.S. Department of Energy wrote to Plaintiff requesting the opportunity to meet, in-person, concerning the ATVM Loan Application process, including “Plaintiff’s next steps.”
- On June 2, 2009, after Plaintiff had written to Jason Gerbsman of the ATVM Loan Program at the U.S. Department of Energy, stating that Plaintiff “is entering financial viability phase” of its ATVM application, Mr. Gerbsman responded to Plaintiff stating “I look forward to continuing the process with Plaintiff.”
- Between June 22, 2009 and July 19, 2009, Brent Peterson of TMS, Inc, a contractor with the ATVMIP at the U.S. Department of Energy, and Plaintiff discussed details of the Plaintiff’s loan application.
- At no point during this time period did the DOE communicate that Plaintiff was disqualified or ineligible. In fact, all members of DOE, Congress and other government offices had said they were “certain” Plaintiff was about to be funded. All of the national news stories indicated approval and the massive out-pouring of consumer support indicated approval.
- On June 15, 2009, Plaintiff informed Mr. Peterson that it was a semi-finalist in the Forbes America’s Most Promising Companies List for 2009.
- At or around June 15, 2009, Mr. Peterson responded to Plaintiff’s June 15, 2009 e-mail with, “Congrats, thanks for sharing.”
- On June 29, 2009, Plaintiff wrote to Jason Gerbsman stating Plaintiff applied for ATVM Loan funding in the beginning of November of 2008 (hereinafter “June 29, 2009 Gerbsman Correspondence”).

- In the June 29, 2009 Gerbsman Correspondence, Plaintiff alleged it was advised, at the time by Senate staff, that the funds were to be released by the end of December 2008.
- In the June 29, 2009 Gerbsman Correspondence, Plaintiff alleged it had a significant challenge in waiting such a vast number of months for a simple loan review that was substantially longer than the commercially reasonable time period exercised by banking institutions.
- Due to the U.S. DOE's delay, plaintiff needed to delay paying staff and had to use Plaintiffs personal and family savings.
- In the June 29, 2009 Gerbsman Correspondence, Plaintiff alleged that when a smaller car company applies for ATVM funding, it reduces the ability of the company to get other funding because other financing entities are aware that they cannot compete with ATVM terms so they forestall decisions until AFTER DOE terms sheets are issued. DOE withheld termsheets in order to cut off all funding options for competitors to the "WINNERS".
- In the June 29, 2009 Gerbsman Correspondence, Plaintiff alleged all other financing options are awaiting the DOE conditional approval letter.
- In the June 29, 2009 Gerbsman Correspondence, Plaintiff alleged applying for an ATVM loan halts funding options for a smaller car company.
- In the June 29, 2009 Gerbsman Correspondence, Plaintiff alleged it appeared unreasonable that a Japanese car manufacturer (Nissan) was awarded funding, especially in the first round of loan awards, and smaller companies, who need the funding more, were bypassed.
 - In the June 29, 2009 Gerbsman Correspondence, Plaintiff alleged that a core objective of Section 136 of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2005 was to put American car manufacturers back in the lead in the green car race, not fund international competitors as a priority.
- In the June 29, 2009 Gerbsman Correspondence, Plaintiff alleged it was informed by the press that other companies who applied later in the process were moved ahead of Plaintiff in the review process because of greater lobby effort expenditures.
- In the June 29, 2009 Gerbsman Correspondence, Plaintiff alleged it was operating at a disadvantage because it simply didn't hire lobbyists or pay any bribes.
- In the June 29, 2009 Gerbsman Correspondence, Plaintiff alleged it had been on time, and ahead of time, in its responses.
- In the June 29, 2009 Gerbsman Correspondence, Plaintiff alleged its application was one of the first deemed, "substantially complete".
- In the June 29, 2009 Gerbsman Correspondence, Plaintiff alleged its technology, price, BOM, TCO and ROI is clearly superior to the other applicants.

- Plaintiff's forwarding its June 29, 2009 Gerbsman Correspondence, stating "This is good and to the point which is maybe what they need right now."
- All government, media and expert sources were telling Plaintiff, Bright Automotive, and Eco-Motors that they were about to receive their DOE funding "any day now".
- On, or about, early August of 2009, White House staff ordered Secretary of Energy Steven Chu not to fund Plaintiff, Bright Automotive, and Eco-Motors because they could put Tesla Motors, The White House financier, out of business if they moved forward.
- On August 21, 2009, Lachlan W. Seward, Director, Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing Incentive Program, wrote to Plaintiff Vehicles, Inc. informing plaintiff that its ATVMIP application for a loan was rejected.
- Plaintiff claims Plaintiff Technology passed the tests for financial viability in its applications from 2008-2009.
- Plaintiff has patents and lists of assets. Tesla, by comparison, had 4,000 % higher debt than Plaintiff and Tesla was awarded loans by DOE, while Plaintiff was not.
- Additionally, the NEPA for Plaintiff Vehicles had been reviewed, edited and approved by DOE National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) staff (Matthew McMillen) at the beginning of 2009
- Plaintiff alleges that it did not pay for a NEPA analysis. Matthew McMillen at DOE both offered to help and did help Plaintiff with drafting its NEPA review material. He edited their drafts and did Plaintiff's NEPA analysis. To see his edits, look in Drop-box file titled "Properties" under file named "McMillen edits." There are documents with the 'track changes' function showing his assistance with the NEPA review documents Plaintiff had to provide DOE.
- On September 21, 2009, Plaintiff wrote to Secretary Steven Chu of the U.S. Department of Energy inquiring about the circumstances for Plaintiff's non-selection for negotiation of a loan with a lengthy list of issues that investigators had uncovered which indicated corruption and cronyism.
- In the September 21, 2009 Chu Letter, Plaintiff alleged no reasons were given for its rejection under the Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing (ATVM) Program.
- In the September 21, 2009 Chu Letter, Plaintiff alleged it was able to receive reasons for its rejection orally, only after several attempts at phoning the ATVM office.
- In the September 21, 2009 Chu Letter, Plaintiff alleged it has still not received the reasons in writing.
- Plaintiff alleges "After multiple demands reasons were finally given by phone call and letter but the reasons appeared to have nothing to do with our company and serves to demonstrate that review data was manipulated."

- In the September 21, 2009 Chu Letter, Plaintiff alleged the reasons for its rejection were not applicable to its loan application and did not reflect what was included in its submission.
- In the September 21, 2009 Chu Letter, Plaintiff alleged that after several more attempts at receiving more clarification from the ATVM office, no one has been in further contact with it.
- In the September 21, 2009 Chu Letter, Plaintiff alleged it has not been able to find out whether there will be another round of loans granted and how it can alter its loan application to increase its chances of success.
- In the September 21, 2009 Chu Letter, Plaintiff alleged that one of the reasons given for its rejection was that Plaintiff's car does not use E85.
 - In the September 21, 2009 Chu Letter, Plaintiff alleged its car uses no gasoline.
- In the September 21, 2009 Chu Letter, Plaintiff alleged another reason provided by the DOE for its rejection was that it was not making millions of cars.
 - Plaintiff alleged its marketing plan did not support that production volume nor did its requested funding levels but that Plaintiff was fully capable and able of producing millions of cars on scale up to market demand, request of DOE or at any reasonable time in manufacturing flow.
- In the September 21, 2009 Chu Letter, Plaintiff alleged that DOE stated that Plaintiff was not planning to sell cars to the government.
 - Plaintiff alleges this is false and that its application clearly stated that the core sales plan of the company is based on government fleet sales.
- In the September 21, 2009 Chu Letter, Plaintiff alleged that DOE asserted its factory cost estimates were too low because the metal body fabrication systems were not calculated high enough.
 - Plaintiff alleges its vehicles use no metal fabrication in their bodies.
- In the September 21, 2009 Chu Letter, Plaintiff alleged that it submitted questions to the DOE ATVM staff the day after it received the rejection and had still not received any response.
 - These questions include: (1) DOE reviewers never even talked to the founder, inventor, engineers, project leads or primary contractors. Plaintiff was told over and over again that everything in its application was good and that no additional information was needed. This is despite the fact that the reasons given for its rejection did not reflect the technology being used and therefore the ATVM reviewers did not understand Plaintiff's concept and product. Plaintiff wrote, "Why was no one at Plaintiff Vehicles contacted?"; (2) After nearly a year of waiting, accompanied by writing, verbal and in-person proclamations that "everything was fine", "everything is on-track", "you appear to meet every criteria", etc. and after staff expended the majority of their personal funds based

on these positive assertions, the application was suddenly and mysteriously rejected. Plaintiff wrote, “Why was staff at DOE during the course of the year, positive about the outcome and never asked for additional information?”; (3) At the start of the application process Plaintiff was told that the review would be very interactive but there was almost no interaction with us while larger players, who applied later, were reviewed earlier, had extensive interaction and have already been awarded their funds. Plaintiff wrote, “Why was the interactivity process never used with us?”; (4) Rejection comments supplied by Chris Foster of DOE and third party press seem to be unrelated to the business of the company and have no foundation in fact. Plaintiff wrote, “Why is that?”; (5) One of the main reasons the DOE gave for the rejection was the fact that Plaintiff’s vehicles do not use E85 gasoline. Plaintiff wrote, “If that was true, why did Tesla & Nissan get approved funding? Their vehicles also do not use E85.”; (6) While it is true that Plaintiff did not wish to use carcinogenic gasoline, at no point was E85 gasoline ever mentioned, discussed, commented on or requested. In fact the topic was particularly avoided by DOE staff. Plaintiff wrote, “Why not?”; (7) Another rejection point was that Plaintiff was not planning to make enough cars. Plaintiff claims this is false. The company would like to build and sell more cars than any other car company. Plaintiff is fully willing to produce millions of vehicles if provided with the appropriate funding as it has quantified millions of fleet buyers for its vehicles. No DOE entity ever asked Plaintiff to adjust, discuss or amend its numbers and Plaintiff was more than willing to adjust those numbers if anyone had even bothered to ask. Plaintiff wrote, “What is the validity of this comment by the reviewers based on?”; (8) Plaintiff provided more than \$100 million of asset collateral opportunity for a \$40 million loan request. This constitutes over twice the collateral of the value of the loan. Plaintiff wrote, “How is this not as secure of a structure as any of the other applicants?”; (9) Plaintiff was told that it was rejected because it was not planning to sell cars to the government. Plaintiff claims this is false. The core sales plan of the company is based on government and commercial fleet sales. Plaintiff wrote, “Why did your reviewers say this? Why did you think this?”; (10) Plaintiff was told that electric motors and batteries were considered by the reviewers to be too futuristic of a technology and not developed for commercial use even though they have been in use in over 40 industries for over 20 years, including by NASA. Plaintiff wrote, “What is the rationale for this argument?”; (11) Almost every other part of the Plaintiff car was to be purchased from existing commercial sources with multiple points of supply, so it is not possible to see how a reviewer might think the vehicle had any significant technical acquisition hurdles. Plaintiff wrote, “Why does DOE assume that the following companies with whom we would be contracting could not perform the following responsibilities: (a). Deloitte & Touche to provide auditing and reporting of financial data. (b). Autodesk or Microsoft to deliver the process and design software. (c). NEC, Intel or the other leading electronics companies in the world to build our controllers. (d). Roush Automotive, one of the most successful automobile electronics groups in the world, to build the electronic module. (e). US National Lab system to

solder a box together. (f). Over 100 other major supplier companies that have been building parts for the auto, aerospace and industry for decades to deliver the component parts for our vehicles.”; (12) The primary purpose of this loan program, Plaintiff was told by its authors, was to develop advanced technology and further reduce American dependence on gasoline. The Plaintiff Vehicles car uses no gasoline and gets over 125 miles per battery charge. Plaintiff wrote, “How is this not a direct conflict with the precepts of the Section 136 law?”; (13) Plaintiff was also told that its factory cost was too low because the metal body fabrication systems were not calculated high enough but the reviewers apparently did not even pay attention to the fact that Plaintiff uses no metal fabrication in its body. Plaintiff wrote, “What was the rationale in making such an erroneous comment?”; (14) Reviewers also stated that the car was a “hydrogen car” which it is not. It is an electric car. Plaintiff wrote, “Why did they say that?”; (15) Plaintiff wrote, “In what ways were the following documents actually reviewed? Your office stated that they ‘lost our documents’ twice. Why?”;

- Plaintiff alleges that applications that have already been approved, have had less plans or hard development data. These awardees also had the same three-year timeframe in their proposals, and one even went into 2013. We also find this contrary to the Administration’s stated goal about electric vehicles. According to a DOE spokesman, the Administration “shares the goal of ensuring that the program (ATVM) is flexible enough to account for the full range of available technologies.” In fact, when Tesla Motors received its DOE cash it had no car design, just some pretty pictures. Nothing in the Tesla car in the showrooms was in a factory engineering drawing at the time Tesla got its DOE funds. Tesla designed the entire car FROM SCRATCH, after it got the DOE money. Anybody could have done that with 50% less money than Tesla spent doing it after the fact.
- Plaintiff alleges that the claim that the project’s impact on fuel economy of the US Light Duty Fleet over time was weak was never discussed with Plaintiff’s team at any point of the process. However, it is surprising to how a vehicle that is lighter than any other applicant by half, safer than any other applicant by many times and beats the metrics of every other applicants could not have exceeded every applicant on any comparison to Light Duty fleet metrics, a market that was core to Plaintiff’s business plan. Their fleet sales were targeted directly at the Light Duty fleet and the Pentagon so the DOE excuse seems to be a lie by DOE staff.
- The third reason cited in the letter was about the use of “advanced fuels.” First of all, at no point did anyone from DOE ask about or discuss with Plaintiff technical staff their fuel plans. The letter further goes on to say that their use of hydrogen was one of the reasons that their application was being rejected. Even though DOE knew that BMW, Toyota, Honda and Hyundai were in factory preparation with hydrogen fuel cell cars which are as common today as any other car. Hydrogen was non-essential to Plaintiff’s vehicle. The hydrogen tank was, rather, an optional and stand-by range-extender system for the electric vehicles. Further everyone of expertise fails to see how DOE could state that hydrogen is an “impractical and unproven

energy source” in light of the fact that Honda and BMW are already shipping cars using that fuel source and large numbers of main stream auto companies have announced production launch plans for 100% hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. To must reiterate: hydrogen was not an essential component of their vehicles and had DOE asked Plaintiff about this fuel source, it could have explained that to them. It should be noted that most of the Obama and DOE staff had invested their money in lithium ion battery mining in Afghanistan and lithium battery production. Thus they had a conflict-of-interest reason to harm fuel cell vehicle production.

- Corrupt rare earth mineral mines were a large part of the scam.

EVERY FEW MINUTES SOMEONE IS MURDERED FOR LESS THAN 50 DOLLARS

Afghanistan: The Saudi Arabia of Lithium?

Lithium, which is from mobile phone nation's economy.

WASHINGTON — The United States has discovered nearly \$1 trillion in untapped mineral deposits in Afghanistan, for billions of years. The discovery is expected to fundamentally alter the region's economic future and could be fundamentally alter the world's lithium supply.

As of late February, the world's largest lithium producer, Inco, is being sold to a British Virgin Islands company whose "ultimate beneficial owner" is Boris Zingarevich, a Russian businessman. Zingarevich has close ties to Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.

Investing in Lithium Mining Stocks

Green power corrupts

Goldman Sachs culture 'toxic'? Letter confirms suspicions about Wall Street.

The Saudi Arabia of Lithium

The gas engine made petroleum the world's biggest commodity. The electric car could do the same for the third element on the periodic table.

U.S. Identifies Vast Mineral Riches in Afghanistan

RUSSIAN OWNED

The problem with lithium

Afghanistan is sitting on mineral wealth worth over \$3 trillion and its future depends on it.

U.S. Identifies Vast Mineral Riches in Afghanistan


The New Oil: Afghanistan's Lithium Mines worth Trillions of Dollars

WORLD'S MINING COMPANIES COVET AFGHAN RICHES


A few high-risk investors are sufficiently intrigued by the country's potential to take an early look. JP Morgan, for instance, has just sent a team of mining experts to Afghanistan to estimate possible reserves.

USGS **USAMRIID**

Preliminary Assessment of Rare-Earth Mineral Resources of Afghanistan, 2007



THIS IS THE "PITCH BOOK" THAT USAID USED TO SELL AN AFGHAN WAR TO THE AMERICAN VENTURE CAPITAL OLIGARCHS FOR THEIR CELL PHONE AND TESLA BATTERY DEALS!



WHAT DO YOU THINK CRAZY POLITICIANS AND BILLIONAIRE OLIGARCHS WOULD DO TO STEAL SIX TRILLION DOLLARS

The men who controlled the White House and the Department of Energy at this time are known as “The Silicon Valley Cartel”, AKA “The Paypal Mafia”, AKA “The Deep State”. They run Google, Facebook, Tesla And The venture capital funds



The entities involved as perpetrators in this case have violated a number of laws and ethical standards including: **The Mail Fraud Act (1872); The Tillman Act (1907); The Hatch Act (1939); The Hobbs Act (1946); The Taft- Hartley Act (1947); RICO and Anti-trust laws; The Federal Election Campaign Act (1974); The Federal Program Bribery Statute (1984); The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (2002);** and many other laws. They all use the same corrupt army of dirty lawyers, corrupt CPA's, unethical lobbyists, character assassination services and covert ex-CIA operatives.

- Finally, the letter states that the Plaintiff Vehicles petroleum use reductions were unrealistic. The whole world is most confused about this point as Plaintiff's car uses absolutely no gasoline. How could their reductions be "unrealistic"? Was that not a goal of the Obama Administration? ..or were DOE staff just a bunch of "lying, deceitful, conniving, manipulative shills that will do anything to protect their friends and harm their competitors.." as other Applicant's stated.
- The company hired famous senior systems engineer to validate the final vehicle numbers submitted in the base response and provided numbers in support of that data produced by Sandia National Laboratories.
 - How could those entities have provided numbers which the ATVM office could have interpreted so negatively for a vehicle which weighs less, goes farther and requires less energy storage than any other submitted vehicle in the entire set of applicants to date?
 - How could the ATVM reviewers never even submit a question to the Plaintiff technical team about any of these metrics?
- In summation, these clarifying reasons for rejecting the Plaintiff Vehicles ATVM loan application are still confusing, not applicable in many cases and unwarranted when considering those applications that have been approved. The listed points appear to have no foundation in facts relative to our design and we again question why there was no communication from DOE with the developers of the vehicle over a year. Clearly, DOE was running a "Slush-Fund" designed to ONLY pay political campaign financiers and shut down those financiers competitors.
- Further, Congressional investigators found that competing larger companies like Tesla were given much counseling, guidance, feedback and opportunity to "tweak" their applications by DOE. These companies submitted their applications later than Plaintiff and were awarded funding. Our question is then why did Tesla lover Carol Battershell, DOE Senior Advisor state during the December 1, 2008 Public Meeting that "And that might lead one to believe that applying earlier is better than apply later." When the program was first announced, that indeed was the guidance given – first come, first served – so scores of smaller, electric car companies and suppliers submitted their applications. Yet the rules were changed mid-way through the process to allow larger automotive companies who did not submit their applications first to send them in and now they are being funded.
- Finally, Plaintiff's were very disappointed to read in the September 23, 2009 issue of E&E News that Secretary Chu had suggested in June that the Administration was hoping that GM and Chrysler would be able to participate in the (ATVM) loan program. "There is money there, I wouldn't say set aside, but let's just say we are trying to stretch those dollars as far as we can." This forces us to ask whether these funds are being set aside at the expense and loss of smaller,

more advanced technology electric car companies and suppliers who are requesting billions less in guaranteed loans and who are offering more forward-thinking and advanced projects to help us move away from our dependence on oil.

- Tesla, Fisker & Nissan did not provide as much collateral offerings in their application, at the same time as Plaintiff's application, and to date, may not have ever provided such collateral offers.
- In the September 21, 2009 Chu Letter, Plaintiff alleged that it submitted to DOE detailed, comprehensive 10-year, person-by-person financials that cost the company almost \$200,000.00 to prepare and that other companies spent more than \$200,000.00 to prepare;
- In the September 21, 2009 Chu Letter, Plaintiff alleged that it submitted to DOE metrics that demonstrated that the Plaintiff car can save millions of lives per year and that it was safer than any vehicle;
- In the September 21, 2009 Chu Letter, Plaintiff alleged that it submitted to DOE metrics that demonstrate that a gasoline/hybrid vehicle is dangerously carcinogenic when filled at a gas station compared to an Plaintiff Vehicle; World Health Organization and leading medical and university studies have substantiated these facts.
- In the September 21, 2009 Chu Letter, Plaintiff alleged that it submitted to DOE engineering and IP metrics that beat every competitor on price, range, safety, TOC, efficiency, toxic safety and hundreds of other points;
- In the September 21, 2009 Chu Letter, Plaintiff alleged that it submitted to DOE examples of work from \$3M of cash and person-hours previously invested by founders, DOE & partners;
- In the September 21, 2009 Chu Letter, Plaintiff alleged that it submitted to DOE lists of top auto and aerospace corporate partners, staff and resources, on stand-by, equaling thousands of people in all groups combined;
- In the September 21, 2009 Chu Letter, Plaintiff alleged that it submitted to DOE validation of a deep team of core staff that have been developing the project and parts of the project for 3-15 years part time;
- In the September 21, 2009 Chu Letter, Plaintiff alleged that it submitted to DOE samples of extensive international positive press coverage;
- In the September 21, 2009 Chu Letter, Plaintiff alleged that it submitted to DOE proof of a market opening timed with tax and national imperative incentives that created a dramatic window for success;
- In the September 21, 2009 Chu Letter, Plaintiff alleged that it submitted to DOE proof that Plaintiff was the lowest overhead car company in the market which equates to the best chance to profit and return funds;

- In the September 21, 2009 Chu Letter, Plaintiff alleged that it submitted to DOE samples of an in-house created online process management architecture; market and marketing studies; CAD designs, engineering plans and manufacturing plans; a detailed website; a detailed path to \$1.5B within 5 years or less from a less than \$100M investment;
- In the September 21, 2009 Chu Letter, Plaintiff alleged that it submitted to DOE examples of dozens of prototypes as seen in the photographs on the BUILDS page of its website;
- In the September 21, 2009 Chu Letter, Plaintiff alleged that it submitted to DOE numerous patents;
- In the September 21, 2009 Chu Letter, Plaintiff alleged that it submitted to DOE a large pending portfolio with third party valuation and validation reports valuing IP at over \$100M;
- In the September 21, 2009 Chu Letter, Plaintiff alleged that it submitted to DOE information concerning senior scientists, chemists and engineers from top university and federal laboratories, including staff that has built and delivered millions of vehicles to the consumer market;
- In the September 21, 2009 Chu Letter, Plaintiff alleged that it submitted to DOE information concerning its partners: Federal, University, Fortune 500, Private Research Organizations;
- In the September 21, 2009 Chu Letter, Plaintiff alleged that it submitted to DOE written Customer inquiries from a massive national customer base of qualified retail leads and 1.2M of commercial unit opportunities equaling a \$1.5B+ opportunity.
- In the September 21, 2009 Chu Letter, Plaintiff alleged that it submitted to DOE contracts: Federal Contract fully executed and MOU's executed;
- In the September 21, 2009 Chu Letter, Plaintiff alleged that it submitted to DOE Awards/Commendations: Congress, DARPA;
- In the September 21, 2009 Chu Letter, Plaintiff alleged that it submitted to DOE Research Data: Over 200+ technical research documents & 15+ years of research;
- In the September 21, 2009 Chu Letter, Plaintiff alleged that it submitted to DOE evidence of over 22,000+ man hours of development;
- In the September 21, 2009 Chu Letter, Plaintiff alleged that it submitted to DOE market data;
- In the September 21, 2009 Chu Letter, Plaintiff alleged that it submitted to DOE over 100+ documents of industry study;
- In the September 21, 2009 Chu Letter, Plaintiff alleged that it submitted to DOE issued trademarks;
- In the September 21, 2009 Chu Letter, Plaintiff alleged that it submitted to DOE information concerning its facilities;

- In the September 21, 2009 Chu Letter, Plaintiff alleged that it provided to DOE unique access to Federal Labs & leased facility options;
- In the September 21, 2009 Chu Letter, Plaintiff alleged that it submitted to DOE other supporting materials.
- In the September 21, 2009 Chu Letter, Plaintiff asked for the opportunity to speak with Secretary Chu in person to discuss its technology and how it can help our country.
- Plaintiff wrote, “I believe there was some confusion about our application and vehicle technology that I would very much like to clear up with you in person.”
- § 611.103 sets forth the evaluation criteria for ATVM loan applicants, outlining the technical merit of the proposed advanced technology vehicles or qualifying components, with greater weight given for factors including, but not limited to: Improved vehicle fuel economy above that required for an advanced technology vehicle; Potential contributions to improved fuel economy of the U.S. light-duty vehicle fleet; Likely reductions in petroleum use by the U.S. light-duty fleet; and Promotion of use of advanced fuel (e.g., E85, ultra-low sulfur diesel).
- Plaintiff alleges that Plaintiff data-sets beat the other applicants on metrics, performance and value.
- Plaintiff alleges ATVM loan approvals lacked appropriate criteria. This is confirmed by multiple GAO reports about corruption and failure to comply AGAINST DOE by the GAO.
- Plaintiff alleges applications offered more collateral than any other applicant or “winner”, more letters of support from waiting customers, a less complex bill-of-materials, with a lower initial volume manufacturing cost, that re-opened more closed factories than any other applicant or “winner” at the time of submission.
- The substantive explanation for why Plaintiff merited the ATVM loan is that Plaintiff was prepared to manufacture a cheaper version of the Nissan Leaf. As of Dec. 28, 2008 Plaintiff had a design more finished and ready than Tesla, Fisker and Nissan. Plaintiff’s model was almost exactly the same as the Nissan Leaf.
- Plaintiff claims DOE staff synthetically manipulated Plaintiff’s results to be low in order to favor others.
- Plaintiff alleges that Plaintiff’s application process was sabotaged, inside and outside, in order to benefit competing interests and disfavor smaller, independent companies who applied.
- Plaintiff alleges DOE officials ordered reviewers of funding applications to change their review criteria, part way through the process, in order to favor certain applicants or “winners”.
 - Many of those applicants would have qualified at the bottom of a proper review in an unbiased review.

- DOE paid outside reviewers for work in the review process under a variety of names, and the work performed, by a company with little experience in the industries it was to review, was produced per DOE officials specifications rather than per the metrics of the actual facts.
- Staff from national labs have stated to reporters that they were directed to manipulate data.
- Plaintiff staff have seen “shoot-out” unofficial, internal, confidential, DOE Excel comparison matrices as of Dec. 29, 2008 and March 2, 2009 and Plaintiff placed in the top 5% in over-all comparison metrics.
- Plaintiff application was first-in-line (which is how the law said applications were to be processed) yet DOE staff changed/violated the law in order to cut Plaintiff, and other applicants, out and favor “special applicants” who didn’t apply properly because they knew they had the money “hard-wired” already.
- Plaintiff alleges DOE officials changed the first-come-first-served published rules and standards of the funding in order to take applicants in order of who they favored and who had purchased the most influence instead of the order in which they applied, as required.
- Plaintiff alleges DOE officials were ordered by DOE senior executives and outside public office executive staff to not respond to non-favored applicants until certain application deadlines had passed in order to remove the non-favored, non-influence purchasing applicants from potential funding.
- Plaintiff alleges “DOE officials personally assisted and hand-held Plaintiff’s competitor’s applicants including site meetings in which they drafted the applicants applications while ignoring competing applicants to those favored applicants.”
- Plaintiff alleges Plaintiff spoke to Carol Battershel, who stated she was the due diligence technical lead, who said she had gotten everything she needed “off our website”. Battershel was later revealed to be an ad hoc advocate for Tesla Motors.
- Plaintiff alleges “DOE reviewers never even talked to the founder, inventor, engineers, project leads or primary contractors.”; “DOE never even contacted our engineers and refused to speak to them even once, although our engineers called them and visited them to see if they could provide any data because they were so surprised that nobody from DOE ever called them.”
- Plaintiff alleges Plaintiff was told that everything in their application was good and that no additional information was needed.
- Plaintiff alleges “reviewers at national labs were ordered to change data, or their data was changed.”
- Plaintiff alleges “standard commercial bank loan processes were not used for each applicant.”

- Plaintiff alleges “Commercial bank officers will testify that all banks process the same loan applications for the same commercial manufacturing purposes in an average 18 days and not in timeframes measured in years. The ‘Loan review process’ was intentionally stalled to keep competitors from competing with the ‘winners’.”
- Plaintiff alleges “The original distribution date for the funds was set to be Dec. 08/Jan. 09. Plaintiff suffered damages because of multiple date manipulations.”
- Plaintiff alleges “Plaintiff and other applicants were given different hoops to jump through in order to go through the application process depending on whether or not they had purchased influence or not.”
- Plaintiff alleges “The process was different for favored applicants vs. unfavored applicants.”
- Plaintiff alleges “DOE staff told multiple independent car company applicants that the fund was out of money and that, that was one of the reasons that those applicants could not move forward. At no time was the fund out of money and, indeed, a ‘carve out’ of money was ‘held out’ for Detroit. DOE gave favored, limited, small cluster ‘carve out’ applicants top-tier status for consideration based on ‘special relationships.’”
- Plaintiff “Leaf’s” would have sold more volume at a higher mark-up than Nissan’s Leaf’s because Plaintiff metrics already exceeded what the customers already demanded so Plaintiff would have had an even higher profit number, by now, than the \$205,000,000.00.
- DOE stated that they “lost our documents” twice. This seemed to Plaintiff’s like a “Lois Lerner” tactic.
- On October 23, 2009, Lachlan W. Seward, Director, Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing Incentive Program, wrote to Plaintiff informing them that critical issues were identified in its application.
 - Plaintiff disputed these critical issues.
- Plaintiff alleges that after months of reassurance from certain DOE staff that Plaintiff’s application was “substantially complete,” the application was denied without explanation in August 2009.
- Plaintiff alleges that the DOE ATVM Director, Lachlan Seward, was improperly influenced to fund Detroit-based “Big Three” projects as well as the politically well-connected Tesla, contrary to the letter and spirit of the loan-enabling legislation. White House car czar: Steve Rattner confirmed this.
- In addition, Plaintiff believes that Seward improperly discriminated against their company’s application after the Company questioned the logic of one of the LGP’s policies in a public hearing and subsequently requested a review of the DOE application process by Senator Bingaman, Chairman of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee.

- Plaintiff alleges in its first meeting with the senior officers of the DOE program and the auto industry at DOE HQ (which was videotaped by DOE) Plaintiff's senior staff asked Lachlan Seward a question about the logic of one of his policies after he had been contradicted by his staff on the stage. It was later reported to Plaintiff that, after the meeting, Mr. Seward said within earshot of his staff something to the effect of "it will be a cold day in hell before I let them get any of this money".
- Plaintiff filed four different complaints on Mr. Seward's office with the Senate Committee in charge of DOE under Sen. Bingaman.
- The misrepresentations and the special treatments of competitors cost the company massive losses in competitive positioning, ramp-up costs based on assertions of favorable loan status, and other damages.
- Plaintiff alleges that the U.S. DOE has failed to reform the application selection process based on recommendation provided in report GAO-10-627 by the U.S. Government Accountability Office in July 2010.
- Plaintiff alleges it used the same power plant as applicants Nissan and Tesla.
- On October 29, 2009, Rebecca M Makar, of the U.S. Government Accountability Office, reached out to plaintiff concerning plaintiff's ATVM application.
- On November 3, 2009, Ms. Makar wrote to Plaintiff to schedule an interview with Plaintiff concerning Plaintiff's experiences with the Department of Energy's ATVM program.
- The application was again deemed substantially complete on November 10, 2009.
- Upon information and belief, on November 10, 2009, Plaintiff completed stage one of the review process.
- On June 9, 2011, Frank Rusco, Director of Natural Resources and Environment at GAO, provided testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Report No. GAO-11-745T, titled "Advanced Technology Vehicle Loan Program Needs Enhanced Oversight and Performance Measures," in which GAO stated, "[t]he ATVM program has set procedures for overseeing the financial and technical performance of borrowers and has begun oversight, but at the time of our February report it had not yet engaged engineering expertise needed for technical oversight as called for by its procedures. . . . However, the program had not yet engaged such expertise. As a result, DOE cannot be adequately assured that the projects will be delivered as agreed."
- Plaintiff alleges DOE has failed to address the 2011 GAO report on the ATVM loan program recommended objective technical and financial criteria to measure program performance.
- The June 9, 2011 testimony also stated, "DOE has not developed sufficient performance measures that would enable it to fully assess progress toward achieving its three program goals."

- Plaintiff alleges that Patent filed May 21, 2004 and granted October 9, 2007 for a Solid-State Hydrogen Storage System was infringed due to untoward conduct by the U.S. Department of Energy.
- Plaintiff alleges that Patent filed August 6, 2008 and granted October 30, 2012 for an Inflatable Electric and Hybrid Vehicle System was infringed due to untoward conduct by the U.S. Department of Energy.
- There is some evidence that DOE shared sensitive scientific information that Plaintiff provided DOE with Plaintiff's competitors. For example, Plaintiff visited the Argonne National Laboratory in California and learned that GM obtained sensitive, patented information about some of Plaintiff's technology. With it, GM built a duplicate of Plaintiff's energy-saver device.
- On May 3, 2005 The U.S. Congress in H2866 in the Congressional Record as part of the "Iraq War Bill" commended the Plaintiff project and directed the DOE to award them funding. The U.S. Congress supported the project in the "Iraq War Bill" because of the teams technology which can reduce U.S. dependence on foreign oil as a value to U.S. security.
- In its application under the ATVM program, Plaintiff stated "Exhibit D provides a copy of Plaintiff Vehicles Business Plan, which is extremely confidential!"
- On March 29, 2009, Plaintiff's counsel wrote to Jason Gerbsman, the Director of External Affairs at the DOE, requesting confidential treatment under 10 C.F.R. §§1004.11 and 1004.10(b)(4) as well as under 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(4).
- In September 2005, Plaintiff received a grant from the Department of Energy for a project with end date of 8/31/2006. In an e-mail dated March 5, 2002 from Scott Vaupen at Sandia National Laboratories to Plaintiff, Mr. Vaupen wrote, concerning hydrogen storage via Fuel Cell, "If you are interested in licensing technologies, please let me know exactly what areas you are interested in and I can try to sort out what technologies we have available."
- In Plaintiff's November 12, 2008 ATVM Loan application, subcontractors were identified as Plaintiff and Sandia National Laboratories.
- Plaintiff alleges there is evidence that DOE shared sensitive scientific information that Plaintiff provided DOE with Plaintiff's competitors. Plaintiff visited Sandia National Laboratories and communicated, via phone and e-mail, with the Argonne National Laboratory and learned that GM obtained sensitive, patented information about some of Plaintiff's technology. With it, GM built a duplicate of Plaintiff's energy-saver device. The "sensitive scientific information" was submitted to DOE by Plaintiff as part of its ATVM loan application, which was protected by confidentiality. This scientific information included fuel cell and hydrogen storage technologies, fuel cassettes and pressure membrane body parts,
- Plaintiff was invited to the Department of Energy Sandia National Laboratories and was given a facility tour. In one room where large glove-boxes and chemical testing equipment was used, he saw a table with a presentation set-up for another group. On that table were duplicates of the

technology he had filed patents on, built, tested and received issued patents on and signage on the devices stated: “General Motors hydrogen vehicle production system” and “NALH General Motors Reversible Hydrogen Vehicle Energy System built by General Motors and Sandia” NALH is one of the exact chemistries, of over 2800+ possible chemistries that might be used, that Plaintiff’s has an issued patent on. Plaintiff’s pointed this out to Chris Moen and Daniel Dedrick, senior scientists at Sandia, who stated that they were concerned that there might be “a problem with that” and said that we “might want to contact GM to seek to make a “partnership” so there was no acrimony. On December 12, 2008, a nondisclosure agreement was made and entered into between Plaintiff and Sandia National Laboratories.

- On or about Jan. 15, 2012, Plaintiff became aware of internet stories about GM productizing alanates solid state hydrogen storage for its fuel cell cars via Sandia and Argonne National Labs
- On or about March 12, 2012 Plaintiff became aware of articles about Ford Motors, Inc., planning to ship inflatable seats, seat belts and inflatable body parts.
- Plaintiff alleges potential patent infringement
 - Currently a number of companies (over 30) are selling Plaintiff’s exact patented technology without paying for it.
 - This is the exact technology Plaintiff designed, proposed, patented and won acclaim for.
 - Some of them were enabled by DOE funding. Some of them were hired as “reviewers” for Plaintiff’s applications, by DOE.
 - Hard evidence has been provided to Plaintiff demonstrating that these parties infringed Plaintiff’s patents during this period.
 - At least two companies acquired Plaintiff technical data through the programs and then marketed that technology as their own, infringing applicants existing, issued, patents.
- Plaintiff included, as Appendix A, in its loan application, its issued energy industry patents and their estimated value valued by outside third party patent analysts. This included a U.S. Patent with an estimated value of \$104,072,538.36; A U.S. Patent with an estimated value of \$17,291,568.64; A U.S. Patent with an estimated value of \$10,524,792.26; and a U.S. Patent with an estimated value of \$5,607,695.94. The total estimated value of these patents is \$137,496,595.20.
- A U.S. Department of Energy Press Release from Thursday, November 6, 2008, titled “Fact Sheet: Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing Loan Program” stated “The FY 09 Continuing Resolution authorized up to \$25 billion in direct loans to eligible applicants for the costs of reequipping, expanding, and establishing manufacturing facilities in the U.S. to produce advanced technology vehicles, and components for such vehicles.”

- In the Fact Sheet, DOE explained that Congress set forth the criteria for projects and costs eligible to receive direct loans. “The key criteria for qualified advanced technology vehicles or qualified components require: Manufacturing facilities be located in the U.S.; Engineering integration be performed in the U.S.; Costs be reasonably related to the reequipping, expanding, or establishing a manufacturing facility in the U.S.; and Costs of engineering integration be performed in the U.S.”
- The Interim Final Rule, 10 C.F.R. Part 611, Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing Incentive Program, clarifies that: “Section 136 provides two categories of projects eligible for direct loans: (1) manufacturing facilities in the United States designed to produce qualified advanced technology vehicles or qualified components; and (2) engineering integration performed in the United States of qualifying advanced technology vehicles and qualifying components. Eligible costs of such projects are: (a) those costs that are reasonably related to the reequipping, expanding, or establishing a manufacturing facility in the United States to produce qualifying advanced technology vehicles or qualifying components; (b) costs of engineering integration performed in the United States for qualifying vehicles or qualifying components. Costs eligible for payment with loan proceeds are costs incurred, but not yet paid by the borrower, after a substantially complete application has been submitted to DOE and costs incurred after the closing of the loan.
- Section 136 of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (“EISA”) authorizes the Secretary of Energy to “make grants and direct loans to eligible applicants for projects that reequip, expand, or establish manufacturing facilities in the United States to produce qualified advanced technology vehicles, or qualifying components and also for engineering integration costs associated with such projects.”
- Plaintiff interpreted EISA, together with the Interim Final Rule, to authorize federal funds to support U.S. production of qualifying components.
- DOE gave Tesla Motors, Inc. a \$465 million loan under the ATVM program. According to a U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement report dated December 22, 2011, the DOE loan to Tesla was to “(1) Reopen an auto manufacturing plan in Fremont, California to produce specially-designed, all-electric, plug-in vehicles and (2) to develop a manufacturing facility to produce battery packs, electric motors and other powertrain components that will power all-electric plug-in vehicles manufacturing by Tesla[.]”
- According to the ICE Report, DHS ICE investigated whether Tesla Motors used foreign made parts in manufacturing their vehicles.
- According to a July 15, 2009 article in Venture Beat, Tesla Motors “recent recipient of \$465 million in low-cost federal loans via the U.S. Department of Energy’s Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing program, won’t have to raise new matching funds to qualify like other recipients.”

- If so, Plaintiff's believe Tesla violated the requirements of both the Interim Final Rule and EISA.

LGP

- In early February 2009, Plaintiff was informed by House Speaker Pelosi's office that the Loan Guarantee program existed and that the company appeared to meet the criteria for a successful application. The company emailed the DOE program office stating their intent to apply for a loan. However, after some additional research, it appeared that the application fees were prohibitive.
- Plaintiff Vehicles company officials were then invited to attend, via webcam, a Senate Energy Committee hearing chaired by Sen. Jeff Bingaman (D-NM) in which dramatic changes and repairs to the program were discussed, including waiving the fees. Also during the hearing, the loan program office was admonished for problematic management and fees, as well as the fact that the process was structured in an exclusionary manner.
- The company was then invited to a conference call with John Podesta, DOE Secretary Steven Chu and Interior Secretary Ken Salazar during which Mr. Chu stated his intention to waive the application fees. Plaintiff Vehicles then submitted their application with a cover letter stating that they understood that Mr. Chu was waiving the application fees.
- Company officials then received a call on February 26, 2009 from Myrtle Gross from DOE stating that they still needed to pay the fees and that funds needed to be wired by midnight February 26, 2009 in order for the loan application to be submitted. Plaintiff Vehicles contacted several investors, but considering the extremely short notice could not complete the transaction with less than 12 hours' notice.
- Plaintiff was in part obstructed in its attempt to procure a Loan Guarantee by the actions of another senior DOE official, Scott Tobin, who refused to respond to plaintiff's requests for instructions on where and how to pay the fees to have the loan disbursed.
- Therefore, on February 27, 2009 the company assumed they had missed the deadline, but then they received a call from another DOE official (Mr. Dan Tobin) stating that there were a few days of flexibility to send the application fees so the company re-contacted its investors. Mr. Tobin promised to get back to the company about where to wire the money. Funding was lined up but no information could be obtained about where to send it. More than six phone calls were placed by the Plaintiff and associates, along with scores of others from other company associates, to DOE but these were never returned.
- The DOE refused to respond to Plaintiff's request for review and explanation of the denial of their application, as well as numerous FOIA requests.

- The GAO undertook a review of DOE’s application policies (in response to Plaintiff’s complaints, among other things), and recently issued findings that (1) DOE’s implementation of the LGP has treated applicants inconsistently, favoring some and disadvantaging others; and that (2) DOE lacks systematic mechanisms for LGP applicants to administratively appeal its decisions or to provide feedback to DOE on its process for issuing loan guarantees. Instead, the GAO found, DOE re-reviews rejected applications on an ad hoc basis. The GAO report issued specific recommendations that DOE take steps to ameliorate these failings.
- Daniel C. Tobin, Senior Investment Officer of the DOE Loan Guarantee Program Office stated that he (Mr. Tobin) would pre-review Plaintiff’s application and call back in order to provide feedback so investors could be informed in order for them to wire the money for the application fee.
- Plaintiff alleges that after numerous calls and letters the DOE response was not the pre-review communication that had been promised by Daniel Tobin, even though Plaintiff application had been received on time, but a dismissal from the program without recourse.
- Plaintiff had a conference call with Secy. Chu who said he’d get the fees waived. The company was then invited to a conference call with John Podesta, DOE Secretary Steven Chu and Interior Secretary Ken Salazar during which Mr. Chu stated his intention to waive the application fees. Plaintiff Vehicles then submitted their application with a cover letter stating that they understood that Mr. Chu was waiving the application fees.
- On April 9, 2009, Dan Tobin of the DOE wrote to Plaintiff (lead investor in Plaintiff Technology), that “due to non-remittance of the required application fee, your application will not be reviewed.”
- This cost Plaintiff its funding opportunity and the associated revenue from such an opportunity.
- Plaintiff demanded to Sen. Bingaman that it be re-entered into the Loan Guarantee Program or receive offset consideration in some other funding opportunity based on this situation.
- DOE’s response completely ignored the Tobin assertion. In other words, Tobin refused to act on his promise until the day after the deadline had passed and then sent a “you are rejected because you missed the deadline” email even though we had the money he wanted ready to wire to him on a moment’s notice. Plaintiff’s application was then rejected even though it had the highest metrics. Plaintiff staff were subjected to punitive and retribution action by DOE staff, and their associates, for “whistle-blowing”.
- Plaintiff alleges that investigators have provided Plaintiff with hard evidence of DOE staff requiring subordinates to break the law and circumvent federal contracting, procedural and standard operating directives regarding communication protocols, documentation and file storage in order to obscure transparency and process and avoid revelation of their true activities.

- Plaintiff claims, “One Senate investigation was stone-walled for a historically long period of time because DOE staff intentionally hid, obscured and sought to destroy requested evidence.”

Recent Results Of Federal And News Investigations

Since this matter began, FBI, SEC and Congressional investigations have revealed much. The latest revelations are:

- **CROOKED POLITICAL INSIDERS** have learned that when a government funded tech company fails, **THOSE INSIDERS** make billions of dollars in unjust profits from tax write-offs, Goldman Sachs services "fees" and stock market pump-and-dump manipulations while taxpayers lose **BILLIONS** on those same companies at Solyndra, Abound, Ener1, etc..... **THAT'S RIGHT**, the crooks make profits off of **PLANNED-TO-FAIL TAXPAYER** funded companies, many of which never even sold anything. It happened in the 2008 pretend "stimulus" and it is happening again, many times more, in the 2021 pretend "stimulus". The Cleantech companies were made-to-fail, as stock scams, by the insiders! Insider friend's at the Dept of Energy get to "jump-the-line", exploit the cash and Trojan horse the tech start-up into oblivion. As with nearly a **thousand** Silicon Valley tech dirty money deals, for example, Netflix tech bosses are now getting caught selling media influence in exchange for bribes! Michael Kail (Netflix IT Boss), and other Netflix executives are under investigation for manipulating which media technologies get to make money. Netflix funds the DNC political campaigns. Netflix board positions and media slots are often traded as political quid pro quo payola for political favors.

'Not only did Mr. Kail deprive Netflix of its money and resources by abusing his position as VP of IT Operations,' [*FBI Special Agent in Charge Craig D. Fair*](#) said in a statement, 'he created a pay-to-play environment whereby he stole the opportunity to work with an industry pioneer from honest, hardworking Silicon Valley companies.' The San Francisco FBI and the United States Patent Office has been asked, by independent [*video-on-demand inventors*](#), to look at how Netflix, YouTube and other tech oligarchs, steal technologies and [*cancel media access*](#) in a coordinated anti-trust violating scheme.

[*Kail was indicted in 2018*](#) on 19 counts of wire fraud, three counts of mail fraud, and seven counts of money laundering. The trial began April 19 in federal court in San Jose, California. The jury found him guilty on 28 of the 29 counts. Prosecutors said that Kail had accepted more than \$500,000 in kickbacks - as well as valuable stock options - in exchange for approving millions of dollars in contracts for nine tech companies seeking to do business with Netflix between February 2012 and July 2014.

In a statement, the the Department of Justice said: 'He used his kickback payments to pay

personal expenses and to buy a home in Los Gatos, California in the name of a family trust.' The Mercury News reports he must now forfeit his \$2.6 million three-bedroom, two-bathroom Los Gatos home to the federal government. Kail created and controlled a limited liability company, Unix Mercenary LLC, to receive the bribes, fund personal expenses and buy a home in Los Gatos, California, prosecutors said. This kind of case is typical of the MAJORITY of Silicon Valley tech executives.

Netflix, Google, and their *Silicon Valley Cartel*, operate secret programs that use data from personal and business records to manipulate business, politics and ideologies. For example, in the company's digital advertising exchange, Google manipulates it's ad-buying system, it's political marketing and it's executives ideology promotions to gain a dramatic advantage over competitors, according to court documents and federal records revealed in new antitrust lawsuits by various Attorney General's. Elon Musk is a mobster yet he used public funds to buy a facade of self-aggrandizement at the expense of the taxpayers.

One corrupt secret [Google program](#), known as "Project Bernanke," wasn't disclosed to publishers who sold ads through [Google's](#) ad-buying systems. It generated hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue for the company annually, the documents show. [Google and Youtube](#), a unit of [Alphabet Inc.](#), always gets an unfair competitive advantage over rivals in business, politics, stock market valuations. In another corrupt program, [Google](#) invested in Tesla Motors, hyped Tesla and Musk and attacked Musk's competitors using nearly a hundred million dollars of equivalent competitor attack marketing. We are some of the victims of those attacks.

"..Over [540 pages](#) including a key set of [four pages](#) of documents from the office of the Secretary of State of California reveal how state officials employ Silicon Valley media companies (Twitter, Facebook, Google (YouTube)) to censor posts about politics. Included in these documents were "misinformation briefings" emails that were compiled by communications firm SKDK, that [lists](#) Biden for President as their [top client](#). The documents show how California state agencies successfully pressured YouTube to censor videos concerning things that [California political Cartel bosses like Harris, Pelosi and Feinstein](#) don't want citizens to see. A [December 2020 report](#) surfaced that shows that the State of California is surveilling, tracking, and seeking to censor the speech of Americans in order to cover-up the political crimes and stock market manipulations that State officials are engaged in. California politicians own portions of Twitter, Facebook, Google (YouTube), LinkedIn, etc. and those social media companies are simply an arm of their political and stock market manipulation efforts..."

SEE ALL OF THE VIDEO EVIDENCE AND BROADCAST NEWS REPORTS ON THIS CASE AT:

<http://san-francisco.biz>

The Victim's Alliance
<http://www.majestic111.com>

May 2, 2021

The Honorable Teri L. Donaldson

Office of Inspector General
Department of Energy
1000 Independence Avenue, SW
Washington, DC 20585

Dear Inspector General Donaldson:

Extensive news reports, Congressional ethics investigations, document leaks and eye-witness testimony have confirmed a pattern of organized crime-type activities involving the Secretary of Energy's office ranging from Secretary Chu to Secretary Granholm. In each case, advisors like David Plouffe, Steve Westly, Steve Spinner, John Podesta, David Brock, John Doerr, etc; prepared the Secretary appointee candidates with advice to purchase certain stock market assets prior to their appointments. We have personal knowledge of the law firm of Covington and Burling preparing Steven Chu and Eric Holder, in this manner, prior to their nominations and lobbying for their nominations. We know Steven Chu's family, sponsor's, lawyers and associates personally. We know Jennifer Granholm's Bay Area business contacts and realty contacts and can swear, warrant and certify that criminal actions have been undertaken by Secretary of Energy staff in order to manipulate profits and political power. White House insiders like Jofi Joseph, Sharyl Attkisson, and hundreds of others, have verified these assertions.

American citizens, and their companies like ours, get raped by The Department of Energy and Their White House handlers so that [crooked politicians](#) can run criminal stock market insider scams and blockade their competitors for those politicians greedy financial and political gain at the expense of the public! That's right: Politicians steer government funds to companies they own stock in (Like Tesla, Solyndra, Google, Facebook, Fisker, Abound, Proterra, Albemarle lithium, etc.) and sabotage, black-list and have [Google shadow-ban](#) their competitors. We have testified to the FBI, SEC, FTC, OSC, Congress and other agencies and regulators. The people we are reporting are violating RICO, anti-trust, FEC and other federal laws.

We write today on behalf of a diverse group of manufacturers and suppliers who have been harmed and blockaded by U.S. Department of Energy and White House officials in order to promote their insider profiteering schemes. We, and millions of voting citizens, are committed to working toward a net-zero carbon transportation future that includes a shift to electric-drive vehicles., who were also harmed.

This shared vision has brought the auto, energy and political industries in the United States to a transformation moment, one that could shape a cleaner future and redefine motor vehicle transportation

for generations to come if the issues of the past are resolved prior to the attempt to drive to the future.

For the U.S. to be a leader in this transformation, we must work collaboratively to develop a comprehensive national vision and strategy. This is not just about the future of the auto industry in the U.S., it is about the nation's global competitiveness, economic security, and the transition of the U.S. workforce.

Nations that lead the development and adoption of innovative technologies will also shape supply chains and job creation, define global standards and, potentially, reshape the international marketplace. However, neither the current trajectory of consumer adoption of EVs, nor existing levels of federal support for supply- and demand-side policies, is sufficient to meet the goal.

The grand vision and plans of an EV future are impossible to achieve until the Administration resolves the crimes of the past in the same program. Nearly 100 automobile manufacturers and suppliers were induced to apply to the government for funding, particularly to the Department of Energy, from 2008 forward. All of those applicant's that had not paid political bribes were cut out of the program, sabotaged and experienced media attacks sponsored by political financiers. We have all complained to the FBI, SEC, FTC, FEC, and every law enforcement and regulatory agency but find that crony investigators at each agency stone-wall the investigation to protect their buddies. We are sick of the quid pro quo crony organized crime that public officials refuse to terminate.

Hundreds of companies were shut down because of the Department of Energy cronyism and abuses of the public trust. The epic trillion dollar 2021 electric vehicle plans will be halted by lawsuits, investigations, RICO reviews and state-of-the-art forensic tracking of every public official and their oligarch buddies unless you order the Government to resolve the issues with the past Applicant's that had state-sponsored attacks and economic equality blockades operated against them by public officials who chose to ***CHEAT RATHER THAN COMPETE in order to profiteer in the stock market.***

Energy Secretary Steven Chu and his staff held stock and business partnerships in Tesla Motors and the rare earth companies used to make his batteries. The Energy Department has lied about their massive conflicts of interest, covered up hundreds of crony insider manipulations of applications and run Lois Lerner-type reprisal attacks on those who compete with Tesla and their crony buddies. In an exact repeat of the 2008 Solyndra "Stimulus" scam: Energy Secretary Jennifer Granholm owns up to \$5 million in the electric battery and vehicle manufacturer President Joe Biden will promote on Tuesday as part of his push for a \$1.9 trillion infrastructure bill. Biden's virtual visit to the electric battery producer Proterra comes days after Vice President Kamala Harris paid a visit to Thomas Built Buses, a North Carolina-based school bus company that counts Proterra as its [main supplier of electric vehicles](#). The back-to-back White House visits to Granholm-connected companies risk at least the appearance of impropriety and demonstrate how lawmakers can use policy initiatives to pad their own wallets.

America can no longer give out taxpayer cash based on who the best friends of crooked Senators

are!

Granholm has taken a leading role in the administration's forthcoming infrastructure package. The president in February tasked her with "identifying risks in the supply chain for high-capacity batteries, including electric-vehicle batteries, and policy recommendations to address these risks." The Department of Energy did not respond to multiple requests for comment.

Granholm [joined](#) Proterra's board of directors in March 2017; internet archives [list](#) her as a board member as recently as February 19, 2021, shortly before her confirmation on February 25. Her financial disclosures reveal up to \$5 million worth of stock options in the green tech company, which went public in January through the special purpose acquisition company ArcLight Clean Transition Corp. Arclight, a NASDAQ-listed company, saw shares shoot up about [55 percent](#) since its September IPO, a spike financial traders [attributed directly](#) to the acquisition of Proterra.

Just recently, numerous media sales published reports raising questions about a potential conflict of interest between Secretary of Energy Jennifer Granholm's significant investment in the Electric bus, battery, and loading company Proteterra, Inc. and President Biden's virtual tour of the company on April 20, 2021. I am concerned about these and other potential conflicts of interest between Secretary Granholm's significant investment in Proterra, Inc. and any activities she may have participated directly or indirectly in the Biden administration to promote Electric vehicles (including electric buses), batteries, and infrastructure contracts.

Reason, rules, processes – these are the foundations of a free society, which is why the Silicon Valley Oligarchs are so dead set against them. A citizen needs to be able to rely on clear rules and fixed processes to vindicate his rights in order to have any rights. But the rights of free citizens – your rights – are an obstacle to the little Silicon Stalins who yearn to rule over us. If the big tech controlled politicians can create a society where you can't appeal to facts, evidence, or law, then – until the peasants' revolt – its California Poobahs can wield undisputed, undiluted authority. That's their dream, a country where you live in terror of them because you can never be sure that what you are doing, or failing to do, is suddenly going to be criminalized, stone-walled and ignored by those who are sworn to uphold the law.

Reason is a bourgeois conceit. The Silicon Valley Cartel has figured out that you can simply deny the existence of law, evidence, and facts. The slobbering media hacks who engage in a perpetual zealot-like media tongue bath of Elon Musk, Larry Page, Mark Zuckerberg, and those kinds of sicko tech overlords, will back them up.

If we can't rely on the law or the evidence, then all citizens are at the mercy of the whims of the sick tech elite. Sure, we did the right thing, and the evidence is indisputable that we did the right thing, but it doesn't matter at all.

The Rule of Law has become the Rule of Power, which the bad guys possess for the moment. They are so arrogant about it that they do not even bother to make a straight-faced argument against the vast evidence against them.

You can't have a society where normal people can't possibly prevail by obeying well-established rules.

This is how our Silicon Valley oppressors like it. But this is not how we like it. Normal people can only take getting stone-walled after "following the rules for reporting a crime" for so long. You cannot have an enduring status quo where one side is firmly bound to rules and obligations while the other gets to make it up as they go along. Eventually, you will inevitably reach a breaking point in society. Then the bad guys are going to miss the rules that they still expect to protect them.

How the main part of the Department of Energy scheme works: 1.) Politician buys stock in company "X" and its suppliers based on insider tip... 2.) Politician rigs government money (ie: via Dept of Energy or HUD) to go to company "X"... 3.) Goldman Sachs & [Google](#) promote (pump via illegal stock market manipulation) company "X" stock and skim fees from the valuation increase...4.) Politician gets profits from the pumped stock value...5.) Politician rigs decision process so that no competitors to Company "X" are allowed to get government funds or resources...6.) Politician gets service's "bills" from lawyers and consultant's that are padded hundreds of times over...7.) Politician pays over-charged bills with government funds and lawyers put the extra money in real estate, search engines, sex brothels and other things that Politician can take secret ownership of later on...8.) Company "X" arranges for Universities and corporations to hire Politician for bloated \$300,000.00 "speaker fees" and Netflix revolving door payola "Board Positions" that are really just [bribery conduits](#)...9.) Goldman Sachs relay's Politicians extra money to off-shore money laundering outlets... Then they run the whole process all over again with another pumped company...

During her nomination process, the Secretary represents Granholm on her public financial Disclosure Report (OGE form 278E), which she signed on December 22, 2020 and what the Designated agency Ethics Officer and the US Office of Government Ethics signed on January 6, 2021, that she:

- Served as board member of Proterra, Inc., for which she received compensation more than \$ 5,000 in a year;
- Has up to \$ 5 million in established stock options in Proterra, Inc. and
- Has 61.042 Output Options of a "Value Not Easily Fixed" that will establish In December 2021 and expired in December 2024.

Secretary Granholm described in her ethics agreement letter dated 16 January 2021 to the Designated agency ethics official steps she will take "to avoid any real or apparent conflict of interest "as Secretary of Energy. Specifically in respect of Proterra, Inc., Secretary Granholm committed to:

- *Resign from her position as board member of Proterra, Inc. upon confirmation;*
- *Forfeit her undivided shares in Proterra, Inc. upon resignation of her position as Councilor of Proterra, Inc.;*
- *Divest her vested stock options (and resulting stock, if she exercises her vested stock options) in Proterra, Inc. “as soon as practicable but not later than 180 days after [her] confirmation;”*
- *“[N]ot participate personally and substantially in any particular matter that to [her] knowledge has a direct and predictable effect on the financial interests of Proterra until [she has] divested it, unless [she] first obtain[s] a written waiver, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 208(b)(1), or qualifies] for a regulatory exemption, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 208(b)(2) ;”*

and

- *“Pursuant to the impartiality regulation at 5 C.F.R. § 2635.502, for a period of one year after [her] resignation from [Proterra], [she] will not participate personally and substantially in any particular matter involving specific parties in which [she] know[s] Proterra is a party or represents a party, unless [she is] first authorized to participate, pursuant to 5 C.F.R. § 2635.502(d).”*

In connection with her nomination hearing, Secretary Granholm was asked the following question for the record: “With respect to your affiliation with and financial interest in Proterra Inc., please confirm in narrative form the practical limitations that the Committee can expect your ethics agreement to impose upon you, especially as those limitations may bear on DOE’s programs that promote or otherwise impact or potentially impact electric transportation, including, for example, the Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing (ATVM) Program. For example, can the Committee assume that you will recuse yourself from matters involving the ATVM Program at least until you can carry out the divestment that you have pledged to make of your interests in Proterra? Should I infer, that you will recuse yourself as appropriate from matters involving electric transportation at least until such time as you divest your interests in Proterra?” Secretary Granholm responded with the following commitment:

- *“If confirmed, I will recuse myself from all particular matters that to my knowledge have a direct and predictable effect on the financial interests of Proterra until I have completed the divestiture.”*

In connection with her nomination hearing, Secretary Granholm was given the following question for the record: “You have disclosed that you are currently a Member of the Board of Proterra, Inc., a company that is active in the fields of electric transportation and electric storage. In the last week, Proterra has announced its intention to become publicly listed through a merger with ArcLight Clean Transition Corp. (ArcLight), a special purpose acquisition company (SPAC). It is expected that the company will be valued at \$1.6 billion. Please describe your involvement in the announced merger.

Assuming the merger is completed, will you recuse yourself from DOE activities that may bear on or involve ArcLight? To what extent, if any, did President Biden’s intention to nominate you as Secretary of Energy impact your participation as a member of Proterra’s Board, including its announced merger with ArcLight? Was your nomination discussed at any board meeting or with any members associated with Proterra?” Secretary Granholm responded with the following commitment:

- “If confirmed, I will recuse myself from all particular matters involving specific parties in which ArcLight is a party or represents a party for two years from the date of my appointment, as required by regulation and the Biden-Harris Administration Ethics Pledge. In December, after being nominated, I informed the General Counsel and President of Proterra that I would resign if confirmed.”

In connection with her nomination process, Secretary Granholm submitted a U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources (Committee) Statement for Completion by Presidential Nominees (Committee Questionnaire), which she signed on January 21, 2021. She responded “Yes” to the following question: “Have you taken appropriate action to avoid any conflict of interest or any appearance of a conflict interest?” She responded “Please see my ethics agreement letter which describes the steps that will be taken to address any conflicts of interest or appearances of a conflict of interest” to the following question: “To the best of your knowledge, do any of your investments, personal holdings, or other interests present a conflict of interest or an appearance of a conflict of interest?” She responded “Yes” to the following question: “If confirmed, will you adhere to the Committee’s recusal policy?” (She reaffirmed her commitment to adhere to the Committee’s recusal policy in a follow-up letter to Senator Lisa Murkowski, then-Chairman of the Committee, in a January 25, 2021 letter.) In agreeing to adhere to the Committee’s recusal policy, Secretary Granholm committed to:

- “Abide by the recusal requirements imposed by federal conflict of interest laws and the Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch;”

- “Seek the advice of his or her designated agency ethics officer before proceeding whenever faced with a situation that may give rise to any actual or apparent conflict of interest;” and

- “Adhere to the principles of ethical conduct and avoid any actions creating the appearance of violating the Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch.”

At her January 27, 2021 nomination hearing, Secretary Granholm responded “There are no conflicts, and I have abided by the Office of Government Ethics’ direction” to the following question asked by Senator Joe Manchin, then-Incoming Chairman of the Committee: “Are you aware of any personal holdings, investments, or interests that could constitute a conflict or create an appearance of such conflict should you be confirmed and assume the office which you have been nominated by the President?”

As an appointee in the Biden Administration, Secretary Granholm was required to sign and, upon signing, be contractually bound by, an ethics pledge pursuant to the Executive Order on Ethics Commitments by Executive Branch Personnel issued by President Biden on January 20, 2021 that required her to commit to, among other things:

- “[D]ecision-making on the merits and exclusively in the public interest, without regard to private gain or personal benefit;”- “[N]ot for a period of 2 years from the date of [her] appointment participate in any particular matter involving specific parties that is directly and substantially related to [her] former employer or former clients, including regulations and contracts.”

Activities that show conflicts of interest:

Secretary Granholm leads the Department of Energy (DOE), which plays a central role in the nation’s development of electric vehicles, batteries, and charging infrastructure. During her

nomination process and now on her official biography published on DOE’s website, Secretary Granholm has highlighted her extensive background and experience with regard to promoting electric vehicles, batteries, and charging infrastructure. Since her confirmation just two months ago, Secretary Granholm has already personally waged an aggressive, wide-ranging, and tireless public relations campaign to promote electric vehicles, batteries, and charging infrastructure. In her appearances, she has consistently promised enormous federal investment and policy support for the electric vehicle marketplace from DOE and the Biden Administration.

Proterra, Inc. is a direct competitor of Department of Energy funding applicant's including Bright Automotive, Zap, Brammo, XP Vehicles, Eco-Motors, Elio, Lordstown Motors and many other companies who have filed conflict-of-interest reports in this matter.

On February 24, 2021, President Biden issued Executive Order 14017, which tasked Secretary Granholm, as incoming Secretary of Energy, with submitting “a report identifying risks in the supply chain for high-capacity batteries, including electric-vehicle batteries, and policy recommendations to address these risks.” On March 29, 2021, DOE’s Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, which Secretary Granholm oversees, issued a Notice of Request for Information on Risks in the High-Capacity Batteries, including Electric Vehicle Batteries Supply Chain.

Secretary Granholm is playing a leading role in promoting President Biden’s American Jobs Plan, including with regard to its proposal to spend \$174 billion “to win the EV market.” Among other things, the proposal provides point of sale rebates and tax incentives to buy electric vehicles. It establishes grant and incentive programs for state and local governments and the private sector to build a national network of 500,000 electric vehicle chargers by 2030.

According to the White House fact sheet, it will “replace 50,000 diesel transit vehicles and electrify at least 20 percent of our yellow school bus fleet through a new Clean Buses for Kids Program at the Environmental Protection Agency, with support from the Department of Energy... These investments will set us on a path to 100 percent clean buses... [It] will utilize the vast tools of federal procurement

to electrify the federal fleet, including the United States Postal Service.”

At an April 8, 2021 White House Press Briefing hosted by White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki, Secretary Granholm explained her belief that President Biden nominated her to be Secretary of Energy because of her previous efforts as Governor of Michigan to diversify the state’s economy by building “car 2.0, which is the electric vehicle — and the guts to that vehicle, the battery.” Secretary Granholm stated: “It is a huge distance that we’ve traveled, and so much of that is thanks to the decision by the federal government to invest in saving the backbone of the manufacturing industry, which was at that point the electric — or the vehicle industry. And the Obama-Biden efforts really made a statement and worked... And so we can do so much more than what we did in Michigan, and this is what the American Jobs Plan is all about.”

On April 19, 2021, Vice President Harris toured Thomas Built Buses, a manufacturer of electric school buses, in High Point, North Carolina. The following is prominently displayed on Thomas Built Buses’ website: “PROTERRA... Want a partner that can go the distance? Meet Proterra, our partner in production. Designed and manufactured by the best minds in battery engineering, Proterra’s lightweight, powerful battery systems have delivered proven performance for millions of real-world miles on transit buses. The battery systems offer unparalleled performance, greater fuel economy and record-breaking range for heavy-duty vehicles. Thomas Built Buses, Daimler and Proterra are co-creating the next generation of school bus operations. Welcome to tomorrow.” The website then links to a document that provides more information about the “product partnership” between Thomas Built Buses and Proterra, Inc. On its website, Proterra, Inc. also extensively celebrates and promotes its partnership with Thomas Built Buses.

At a 2021 meeting of DNC investor Kleiner Perkins, it was said of Ms. Granholm: "She's ours and she will point it all at our investments". This makes it seem as if Ms. Granholm and Silicon Valley Palo Alto venture capital firms are "in bed together" as Steven CVhu was, and is, with those firms.

On April 20, 2021, President Biden virtually toured Proterra, Inc.’s electric bus and battery manufacturing plant in Greenville, South Carolina. According to White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki during the White House Press Briefing that day: “the President will make three stops around the manufacturing plant and speak to employees about different aspects of the company’s work, including battery installation, body assembly, and final inspection of the buses.” Ms. Psaki continued: “The American Jobs Plan includes a total of \$45 billion to accelerate the adoption of zero-emission transit buses and school buses to achieve the President’s goal for all U.S.-made buses to be zero-emissions by 2030. This includes \$25 billion for zero-emissions transit vehicles and \$20 billion for electric school buses.” Proterra, Inc. features President Biden’s virtual tour on its website. We stated that the Proterra situation mirrors the Solyndra situation in shockingly similar ways and people.

Our Request for Review by DOE’S Office of Inspector General. A public response is requested:

According to various media reports, the White House has confirmed that Secretary Granholm still holds up to a \$5 million investment in Proterra, Inc. A White House official was cited as confirming that she has “sold some stock, but has not offloaded any of her Proterra shares.” A White House official was cited as stating that she is “in the process of selling off all stock in the company” and will have it sold “within the 180-day window permitted by the ethics agreement.” A White House official was cited as explaining, “Neither Secretary Granholm nor the Department of Energy were involved in selecting the Proterra plant.” DOE, which Secretary Granholm oversees, reportedly did not respond to multiple requests for comment.

Most parties are concerned that activities Secretary Granholm may have been directly or indirectly engaged in within the Biden Administration to promote electric vehicles (including electric buses), batteries, and charging infrastructure may have violated general commitments she made during her nomination process and as she entered the Biden Administration “to avoid any actual or apparent conflict of interest;” to “avoid any actions creating the appearance of violating the Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch;” and to conduct “decision-making on the merits and exclusively in the public interest, without regard to private gain or personal benefit.” I am furthermore concerned that Secretary Granholm may have violated specific commitments she made, including commitments to:

- “[N]ot participate personally and substantially in any particular matter that to [her] knowledge has a direct and predictable effect on the financial interests of Proterra until [she has] divested it;”
- “[N]ot participate personally and substantially in any particular matter involving specific parties in which [she] know[s] Proterra is a party or represents a party, unless [she is] first authorized to participate;”
- “[R]ecuse [herself] from all particular matters involving specific parties in which ArcLight is a party or represents a party for two years from the date of [her] appointment, as required by regulation and the Biden-Harris Administration Ethics Pledge;”
- “[N]ot for a period of 2 years from the date of [her] appointment participate in any particular matter involving specific parties that is directly and substantially related to {her} former employer or former clients, including regulations and contracts,” pursuant to her Biden Administration ethics pledge.

Proterra, Inc. is a leading manufacturer of electric buses, batteries, and charging stations — and has been described as such by officials within the Biden Administration. Given that status, the up to \$5 million in value of investment that Secretary Granholm continues to hold in Proterra, Inc. is positioned to increase in light of her personal and substantial involvement in an aggressive, wide-ranging, and tireless public relations campaign to promote electric vehicles, batteries, and charging infrastructure; her leadership in promoting President Biden’s American Jobs Plan, including its proposal to spend \$174 billion “to win the EV market” (and, as a subset, to spend \$20 billion to support the electric

school bus market); and her potential direct or indirect involvement in Vice President Harris' tour of Thomas Built Buses and President Biden's virtual tour of Proterra, Inc.

In light of concerns about a potential conflict of interest associated with Secretary Granholm's significant investment in the electric bus, battery, and charging company Proterra, Inc. that have been highlighted in various media reports and outlined in my letter, I request that DOE's Office of Inspector General promptly initiate a review of Secretary Granholm's ethical, regulatory, and statutory obligations; her relationship with Proterra, Inc. (and with any associated entities, such as Thomas Built Buses and ArcLight); and her or her staffs' participation in or promotion of activities by the Biden Administration to advocate for electric vehicles (including electric buses), batteries, and charging infrastructure. I ask that your office determine the facts surrounding any potential conflicts of interest in connection with this matter, including with regard to the following questions:

- Upon confirmation, did Secretary Granholm resign from her position as Board Member of Proterra, Inc.? Please answer the question in the same respect as it applies to Secretary of Energy Steven Chu and his relations with Tesla Motors, Battery makers and lithium, indium and cobalt mining companies and battery processing companies. Please provide full and complete details.
- If Secretary Granholm resigned from her position as Board Member of Proterra, Inc., did she forfeit any of her unvested stock options in Proterra, Inc. upon resignation of her position as Board Member of Proterra, Inc.? Please answer the question in the same respect as it applies to Secretary of Energy Steven Chu and his relations with Tesla Motors, Battery makers and lithium, indium and cobalt mining companies and battery processing companies. If so, on what date(s), and in what amount(s) and value(s)? Please provide full and complete details.
- Does Secretary Granholm continue to hold any of her unvested stock options in Proterra, Inc.? If so, what amount and value? If so, what are the facts and circumstances surrounding her decision to delay her forfeiture? If so, have there been and do there continue to be any impediments to her ability to forfeit her unvested stock options more than two months after her confirmation? Please answer the question in the same respect as it applies to Secretary of Energy Steven Chu and his relations with Tesla Motors, Battery makers and lithium, indium and cobalt mining companies and battery processing companies. Please provide full and complete details.
- Has Secretary Granholm divested any of her vested stock options (and resulting stock, if she has exercised any of her vested stock options) in Proterra, Inc.? Please answer the question in the same respect as it applies to Secretary of Energy Steven Chu and his relations with Tesla Motors, Battery makers and lithium, indium and cobalt mining companies and battery processing companies. If so, on what date(s), and in what amount(s) and value(s)? Please provide full and complete details.
- Does Secretary Granholm continue to hold any of her vested stock options in Proterra, Inc.? If so, what amount and value? If so, what are the facts and circumstances surrounding her decision to delay

her divestment? If so, have there been and do there continue to be any impediments to her ability to divest “as soon as practicable” more than two months after her confirmation? Please answer the question in the same respect as it applies to Secretary of Energy Steven Chu and his relations with Tesla Motors, Battery makers and lithium, indium and cobalt mining companies and battery processing companies. Please provide full and complete details.

- Does Secretary Granholm hold any financial interest in ArcLight? If so, in what form, and what amount and value? Please answer the question in the same respect as it applies to Secretary of Energy Steven Chu and his relations with Tesla Motors, Battery makers and lithium, indium and cobalt mining companies and battery processing companies. Please provide full and complete details.

- Did Secretary Granholm directly or indirectly participate in proposing, planning, or otherwise facilitating Vice President Harris’ tour of Thomas Built Buses, a manufacturer of electric school buses, in High Point, North Carolina? Please answer the question in the same respect as it applies to Secretary of Energy Steven Chu and his relations with Tesla Motors, Battery makers and lithium, indium and cobalt mining companies and battery processing companies. Please provide full and complete details.

- Did Secretary Granholm directly or indirectly participate in proposing, planning, or otherwise facilitating President Biden’s virtual visit of Proterra, Inc.’s electric bus and battery manufacturing plant in Greenville, South Carolina? Please answer the question in the same respect as it applies to Secretary of Energy Steven Chu, Barack Obama and his relations with Tesla Motors, Battery makers and lithium, indium and cobalt mining companies and battery processing companies. Please provide full and complete details.

- Did any other DOE employee directly or indirectly participate in proposing, planning, or otherwise facilitating Vice President Harris’ tour of Thomas Built Buses, a manufacturer of electric school buses, in High Point, North Carolina? Please answer the question in the same respect as it applies to Secretary of Energy Steven Chu and his relations with Tesla Motors, Battery makers and lithium, indium and cobalt mining companies and battery processing companies. Please provide full and complete details.

- Did any other DOE employee directly or indirectly participate in proposing, planning, or otherwise facilitating President Biden’s virtual visit of Proterra, Inc.’s electric bus and battery manufacturing plant in Greenville, South Carolina? Please answer the question in the same respect as it applies to Secretary of Energy Steven Chu and his relations with Tesla Motors, Battery makers and lithium, indium and cobalt mining companies and battery processing companies. Please provide full and complete details.

- Has Secretary Granholm or Secretary Steven Chu directly or indirectly participated in proposing, planning, developing, drafting, promoting, facilitating or organizing attacks on competitors or whistleblowers operated at their behest by deadly economic and character assassination hit job attack services from IN-Q-Tel, Gawker Media, Jalopnik, Gizmodo Media, K2 Intelligence, WikiStrat, Podesta Group, Fusion GPS, Google, YouTube, Alphabet, Facebook, Twitter, Think Progress, Media Matters,

BlackCube, Mossad, Correct The Record, Stratfor, ShareBlue, Wikileaks, Cambridge Analytica, etc; the owners of whom have been proven to have accepted compensation for such hatchet job services.

- Has Secretary Granholm directly or indirectly participated in proposing, planning, developing, drafting, promoting, facilitating, or otherwise advocating for electric vehicles (including electric buses), batteries, and charging infrastructure that would benefit Proterra, Inc. or any of her other holdings? Please answer the question in the same respect as it applies to Secretary of Energy Steven Chu and his relations with Tesla Motors, Battery makers and lithium, indium and cobalt mining companies and battery processing companies. Please provide full and complete details.

- Has Secretary Granholm directly or indirectly participated in proposing, planning, developing, drafting, promoting, facilitating, or otherwise advocating for electric vehicles (including electric buses), batteries, and charging infrastructure? Please answer the question in the same respect as it applies to Secretary of Energy Steven Chu and his relations with Tesla Motors, Battery makers and lithium, indium and cobalt mining companies and battery processing companies. Please provide full and complete details.

- Has Secretary Granholm directly or indirectly participated in proposing, planning, developing, drafting, promoting, facilitating, or otherwise advocating for President Biden's American Jobs Plan? Please answer the question in the same respect as it applies to Secretary of Energy Steven Chu and his relations with Tesla Motors, Battery makers and lithium, indium and cobalt mining companies and battery processing companies. Please provide full and complete details.

- Has Secretary Granholm directly or indirectly participated in proposing, planning, developing, drafting, promoting, facilitating, or otherwise advocating for the \$174 billion investment in electric vehicles proposed as part of President Biden's American Jobs Plan? Please answer the question in the same respect as it applies to Secretary of Energy Steven Chu, Barack Obama and his relations with Tesla Motors, Battery makers and lithium, indium and cobalt mining companies and battery processing companies. Please provide full and complete details.

- Has Secretary Granholm directly or indirectly participated in proposing, planning, developing, drafting, promoting, facilitating, or otherwise advocating for the \$20 billion investment in electric buses proposed as part of President Biden's American Jobs Plan? Please answer the question in the same respect as it applies to Secretary of Energy Steven Chu, Barack Obama and his relations with Tesla Motors, Battery makers and lithium, indium and cobalt mining companies and battery processing companies. Please provide full and complete details.

- Has Secretary Granholm directly or indirectly communicated with any Biden Administration official at any time about Proterra, Inc., Thomas Built Buses, or electric buses? Please answer the question in the same respect as it applies to Secretary of Energy Steven Chu, Barack Obama and his relations with Tesla Motors, Battery makers and lithium, indium and cobalt mining companies and battery processing

companies.

We have been damaged by the actions of the Department of Energy which show a consistent pattern of organized crony corruption and crime. We demand the following offsets from The Department of Energy:

- We Victims demand Government-provided legal counsel, a jury trial and compensation for damages, expenses, back-salaries and monies owed. To be paid by the Defendants. Victims demand payment from the U.S. government and the State of California for their damages, fees, back-pay and state-caused losses from this political corruption and the related cover-ups and proven hit-jobs that government officials operated. These politicians invited victims into their scam project and then defrauded victims out of their life savings through their organized crime activity which used government resources.

- We Victims demand an end to the use of SSA, HUD, DOE, IRS and other government agencies for political reprisal vendettas and demand full retroactive payments of all stalled benefits, rights and resources that were with-held to punish victims for whistle-blowing.

- We Victims demand the arrest and prosecution of the attackers. The attackers have been identified, by name, to the FBI, DOJ, (Because the crimes cross state lines) FTC, SEC, and other enforcement entities. We have also provided their names (Including Nicholas Denton, Adrian Covert, John Hermann, Patrick George, Gabriel Darbyshire, John Podesta, Steve Jurvetson, Larry Page, etc.) to the CIA, NSA, Interpol, DIA and related international agencies because the crimes involve international trafficking, money-laundering, tax evasion, bribery and related criminality. We have demanded that those agencies investigate, place under surveillance, interview and forensically trace each attacker back to the command-and-control top-level financier of their attacks. The evidence in the identification of the attackers compensation providers contains absolute proof of the RICO and Anti-Trust law violating Cartel operations. Nobody else in the world suffered these attacks, by these attackers, who were all financed by, and in partnership with, the same entity. Those forensic connections, from attackers-to-their bosses, expose all of the criminals in the Cartel!

- We Victims demand a class-action lawsuit filing, by the Department of Justice, on victims behalf per the violation of victims human rights and Constitutional rights.

- We Victims demand an end to the cover-ups and stone-walling

Thank you in advance for initiating a DOE Office of Inspector General review of an organized conflict of interest regarding Secretary Granholm's significant investment in the electric bus, battery, and charging company Proterra, Inc. and the past Secretary of Energy's (especially Steven Chu's) schemes to quid pro quo the office of The Secretary of Energy for stock market payola. We look forward to your prompt response.

Thank you,

The Victim's Alliance Group

BCC: FBI, DOJ, OSC, SEC, FTC, Congress

Energy Secretary Steven Chu and his staff held stock and business partnerships in Tesla Motors and the rare earth companies used to make his batteries. The Energy Department has lied about their massive conflicts of interest, covered up hundreds of crony insider manipulations of applications and run Lois Lerner-type reprisal attacks on those who compete with Tesla and their crony buddies. In an exact repeat of the 2008 Solyndra "Stimulus" scam: **Energy Secretary Jennifer Granholm** owns up to \$5 million in the electric battery and vehicle manufacturer President Joe Biden will promote on Tuesday as part of his push for a \$1.9 trillion infrastructure bill. Biden's virtual visit to the electric battery producer Proterra comes days after **Vice President Kamala Harris** paid a visit to Thomas Built Buses, a North Carolina-based school bus company that counts **Proterra** as its [main supplier of electric vehicles](#). The back-to-back White House visits to Granholm-connected companies risk at least the appearance of impropriety and demonstrate how lawmakers can use policy initiatives to pad their own wallets.

America can no longer give out taxpayer cash based on who the best friends of crooked Senators are!

Granholm has taken a leading role in the administration's forthcoming infrastructure package. The president in February tasked her with "identifying risks in the supply chain for high-capacity batteries, including electric-vehicle batteries, and policy recommendations to address these risks." The Department of Energy did not respond to multiple requests for comment.

Granholm [joined](#) Proterra's board of directors in March 2017; internet archives [list](#) her as a board member as recently as February 19, 2021, shortly before her confirmation on February 25. Her financial disclosures reveal up to \$5 million worth of stock options in the green tech company, which went public in January through the special purpose acquisition company ArcLight Clean Transition Corp. Arclight, a NASDAQ-listed company, saw shares shoot up about [55 percent](#) since its September IPO, a spike financial traders [attributed directly](#) to the acquisition of Proterra.

10	Proterra, Inc., vested stock options
11	Proterra, Inc., stock options (value not readily ascertainable): 38,542 unvested shares, strike price \$5.35, vest 12/2021, exp. 12/2024
12	Proterra, Inc., stock options (value not readily ascertainable): 22,500 unvested shares, strike price \$4.26, vest 12/2021, exp. 12.2024

In a January 16 [letter](#) to the designated agency ethics official, Granholm vowed to step down from the board and sell her stock in the company, as well as the steps she will take "to avoid any actual or apparent conflict of interest." The former Michigan governor has sold some stock, but has not offloaded any of her Proterra shares, according to a White House official. Granholm's stake in Proterra represents her largest financial asset outside of a house in Oakland, Calif., that she values as between \$1 and 5 million, according to her [financial disclosures](#). The White House confirmed that Granholm still holds stock in Proterra, but said she played no role in planning the president's visit. Proterra was selected for today's virtual visit because it is the leading U.S. manufacturer of electric buses, employing 600 workers at its South Carolina and California plants," a White House official told the Washington Free Beacon. "Neither Secretary Granholm nor the Department of Energy were involved in selecting the Proterra plant."

In a February 24 [executive order](#), Biden placed Granholm in charge of "identifying risks in the supply chain for high-capacity batteries, including electric-vehicle batteries, and policy recommendations to address these risks." One of Proterra's key products is electric-vehicle batteries. Proterra's website [boasts](#) that "our flexible design enables Proterra® EV batteries to be the best choice for commercial vehicles ranging from transit buses and trucks to delivery vehicles, construction equipment, and more." Nearly 85 percent of Proterra employee campaign contributions went to Democrats, including Joe Biden, according to the [Center for Responsive Politics](#). "You can't win", but that's all part of the politicians crooked plan. These crimes involve well-known public officials and pervert Silicon Valley billionaires who are trying to cover these crimes up. We won't let them get away with this corruption, though! Here is over a million pages of evidence and hours of video against them! Nicholas and Joby Pritzker—members of Illinois Democratic governor J.B. Pritzker's megadonor family—own nearly 12 million shares of ArcLight through their venture capital fund, Tao Capital. ArcLight in January announced a \$1.6 billion merger with Proterra, which will see the electric vehicle manufacturer go public in 2021. Granholm served on Proterra's board for nearly four years and still holds up to \$5 million in company stock.

National Economic Council director Brian Deese is also tied to Proterra through BlackRock, the investment giant where he worked as global head of sustainable investing before joining the Biden administration. BlackRock is one of several investment firms that [pumped](#) a combined \$415 million into the Proterra merger, and Deese reported holding more than \$2.4 million in BlackRock vested restricted stock in his February financial disclosure. These investors are posed for steep gains, as ArcLight's stock price has surged [50 percent](#)—from \$11.90 to \$18 per share—since January.

The revelations come as congressional Republicans demand investigations into potential conflicts of interest between the Biden administration and Proterra, which could receive billions in taxpayer funds through a proposed infrastructure package. Rep. Ralph Norman (R., S.C.), who serves as ranking member on the environment subcommittee of the House Committee on Oversight and Reform, told the [Free Beacon](#) that "the American people deserve to understand the full extent of Secretary Granholm's involvement with Proterra." "Her position of roughly \$5 million in the electric car company Proterra is another unfortunate example of politicians using their position for personal gain," Norman said. "Due to the President's recent unveiling of a \$2 trillion infrastructure package, this matter should be investigated thoroughly." Deese in April [virtually toured](#) Proterra's South Carolina factory with President Joe Biden, [touting](#) a proposed \$45 billion government investment in "clean, zero-emissions buses" such as those produced by Proterra. Just days later, the Biden administration again amplified the bus company, [hosting](#) Proterra CEO Jack Allen at its Leaders Summit on Climate. Administration officials repeatedly praised Proterra at the event, and Allen responded by thanking the White House for its "longstanding support of electric transit buses and zero emission transportation."

"Proterra manufactures half of the U.S.'s electric bus market, which is pretty amazing," Biden national climate adviser Gina McCarthy said at the event. "And as you know, funding for electric school buses is a priority in the American Jobs Plan." McCarthy went on to ask Allen "what role" the federal government can play in "spurring the demand for zero emission electric vehicles, including school buses." Granholm also spoke at the summit. The White House did not return a request for comment on Deese's BlackRock holdings as well as the director's role in planning events with Proterra. As a top BlackRock executive, [Deese led an investment team tasked with identifying "sustainable" investment opportunities](#), according to his online bio. A BlackRock spokesperson said Deese "was not involved" with the Proterra investment. The Pritzkers, meanwhile, will own between 6 and 7 percent of Proterra once the company goes public, SEC documents filed by ArcLight reveal. Nicholas Pritzker is one of two Tao Capital executives with "sole voting and dispositive power" over the Proterra shares. The investment firm, which did not return a request for comment, first backed Proterra through a \$10 million stake in 2014. Granholm joined the bus company's board three years later. During her tenure, Tao Capital co-led another \$155 million investment in Proterra. "We at Tao are proud to support Proterra in its mission to bring forth a clean, electric transportation ecosystem," Nicholas Pritzker said in 2018. The firm's [website](#) touts the likes of Proterra, Tesla, and Bird as part of its "Alternative transportation" portfolio.

Name and Address of Beneficial Owners ⁽¹⁾	After Business Combination					
	Prior to Business Combination ⁽²⁾		Assuming No Redemptions ⁽³⁾		Assuming Maximum Redemptions ⁽⁴⁾	
	Number of Shares	%	Number of Shares	%	Number of Shares	%
<i>Directors and officers prior to the Business Combination:</i>						
Arno Harris ⁽⁵⁾	35,000	*	35,000	*	35,000	*
Brian Goncher	35,000	*	35,000	*	35,000	*
Christine M. Miller	—	—	—	—	—	—
Daniel R. Revers ⁽⁶⁾	6,797,500	19.6%	7,397,500	3.7%	7,397,500	4.4%
Ja-Chin Audrey Lee ⁽⁵⁾	35,000	*	35,000	*	35,000	*
John F. Erhard	—	—	—	—	—	—
Kerrick S. Knauth	—	—	—	—	—	—
Marco F. Gatti	—	—	—	—	—	—
Steven Berkenfeld	35,000	*	35,000	*	35,000	*
<i>All directors and officers prior to the Business Combination (nine persons)</i>	<i>6,937,500</i>	<i>20.0%</i>	<i>7,537,500</i>	<i>3.8%</i>	<i>7,537,500</i>	<i>4.4%</i>
<i>Directors and officers after the Business Combination:</i>						
Amy E. Ard ⁽⁷⁾	—	—	854,847	*	854,847	*
Brook F. Porter ⁽⁸⁾	—	—	2,513,757	1.3%	2,513,757	1.5%
Constance E. Skidmore ⁽⁹⁾	—	—	121,137	*	121,137	*
Gareth T. Joyce	—	—	—	—	—	—
Jeannine P. Sargent ⁽¹⁰⁾	—	—	142,056	*	142,056	*
Jochen M. Goetz ⁽¹¹⁾	—	—	9,408,185	4.8%	9,408,185	5.5%
John F. Erhard	—	—	—	—	—	—
John J. Allen ⁽¹²⁾	—	—	1,981,581	*	1,981,581	1.2%
Michael D. Smith ⁽¹³⁾	—	—	146,239	*	146,239	*
Ryan C. Popple ⁽¹⁴⁾	—	—	3,864,454	2.0%	3,864,454	2.3%
<i>All directors and officers after the Business Combination as a group (12 persons)</i>	<i>—</i>	<i>—</i>	<i>20,807,759</i>	<i>10.5%</i>	<i>20,807,759</i>	<i>12.2%</i>
<i>Five Percent Holders:</i>						
ArcLight CTC Holdings, L.P. ⁽¹⁵⁾	6,797,500	19.6%	6,797,500	3.4%	6,797,500	4.0%
ArcLight CTC Investors, LLC ⁽¹⁶⁾	—	—	600,000	*	600,000	*
Adage Capital Partners, L.P. and affiliates ⁽¹⁷⁾	2,250,000	6.5%	2,250,000	1.1%	—	—
Daimler Trucks & Buses US Holding	—	—	—	—	—	—

Nicholas Pritzker and his wife Susan are prolific donors to Democratic candidates and causes. In the 2020 cycle alone, Susan Pritzker—a Tao Capital director—was the 95th largest donor in America. She contributed more than \$3 million to Democrats in disclosed money, according to the Center for Responsive Politics. Nicholas Pritzker has given at least \$1.9 million to Democrats in direct contributions, including maximum contributions to Biden's campaign and victory fund, [FEC filings show](#). The government should not enable crony insiders while sabotaging their enemies using government money.

Craig D Fair
Special Agent in Charge

Timothy Stone
Deputy Special Agent in Charge
Federal Bureau Of Investigation

San Francisco Office
450 Golden Gate Ave, 13th Floor
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May 2, 2021

[Dear FBI Team:](#)

As know you, our task force has created a large number of public-interest crowd-sourced testimony websites to provide real-time information, about this case, to your agents. We have spoken to your office on multiple occasions as informants, whistle-blowers, witnesses and providers of testimony about this large criminal matter involving well known public figures..

Congress must be forced to eliminate both the appearance and the actual operation of financial conflicts of interest that we have identified going on every day. Americans must be confident that actions taken by public officials are intended to serve the public, and not those officials and their corrupt Silicon Valley big tech leash-holders. Their actions counter-act the law, The Constitution and general morality. A number of our associates are now dead, under mysterious circumstances. It seems like some of them were killed to shut them up.

We experienced all of the damages from each of the abuse-of-power issues listed below. The FBI, FTC, SEC, FEC must become a taskforce that ends these crimes. These are the crimes we saw and suffered from and the solutions to those crimes:

We documented modern bribes being paid through stock market scams. We saw the perpetrators do it. Please help ban individual stock ownership by Members of Congress, Cabinet Secretaries, senior congressional staff, federal judges, White House staff and other senior agency officials while in office. Please prohibit all government officials from holding or trading stock where its value might be influenced by their agency, department, or actions. The perpetrators are TODAY committing crimes and corruption in this manner... [\(READ THE REST AT THIS LINK\)](#)

WHERE'S THE PROOF?

The "Dept Of Energy Leaks" - Aug. 5, 2009 through 2021

The "Panama Papers" Leaks - April 3, 2016

The "Swiss Leaks Papers" - February 15, 2015

The "Paradise Papers Leaks" - November 5, 2015

The "John Doerr & Kleiner Hacks" - April 22, 2020

The "Snowden Leaks" - May 13, 2013

The "Cablegate Leaks - April 15, 2010

The "Sony Pictures Hack" - November 24, 2014

The "Ashley Madison Hack" - July 19, 2015

The "Solarwinds Hack" - December 13, 2020

And hundreds of other leaks and hacks publicly dumped on the internet...

When you cross index all of the public leak data into an AI auditing system, any basic PC computer can FOLLOW THE BRIBE AND PAYOLA MONEY right back to the bank accounts of each corrupt Senator, White House executive and Silicon Valley oligarch! If only the U.S.

Government had a federal enforcement agency whose very job it was to do that sort of investigation....Oh, wait,...the U.S. Government has SIX agencies who are supposed to do that...

- Victims had global character assassination and propaganda-media defamation reprisal attacks operated against them by White House staff and their political financiers: Elon Musk, Larry Page, Steve Jurvetson, Eric Schmidt, Steve Westly, John Doerr, et al. Jury and FBI-compliant evidence proves this as fact.
- All of the offered government money had been hard-wired to political friends ahead of time and there was no possibility that outsider applicants could have received the funds. Applicants were lied to and defrauded.
- Victims were attacked because 1.) they helped law enforcement investigate the attackers, 2.) They competed with the attackers that attacker's products and the Silicon Valley Cartel attackers chose to "cheat rather than compete". Jury and FBI-compliant evidence proves this as fact.
- The attackers spent over \$30M+, part of that using taxpayer resources, attacking the victims as proven in the financial transaction records from Google, Gawker, Gizmodo, Jalopnik, Media Matters, Fusion GPS, et al. Jury and FBI-compliant evidence proves this as fact.
- Victims had been previously funded by the U.S. Government and had a multi-decade relationship with the highest offices of the Government, which provided them with deep knowledge of the crimes that were committed. Jury and FBI-compliant evidence proves this as fact.
- The U.S. Department of Energy is used as a political slush fund to pay back campaign finance millionaires while blockading the competitors of those millionaires from reaching the market or receiving funding. Jury and FBI-compliant evidence proves this as fact.
- The only entities who participated in the global character assassination and propaganda-media defamation reprisal attacks were those entities owned and controlled by the attackers. Jury and FBI-compliant evidence proves this as fact.
- Through corrupt rare-earth mining scams and control of federal contracts and grants, attackers had planned to acquire at least one trillion dollars in unjust gains and illegal profiteering. Jury and FBI-compliant evidence proves this as fact.
- This amount of money they sought, and the "Mafia-like" structure they adopted, caused the suspects to engage in the most extreme crimes, including murder and "Deep State" coup attempts. Jury and FBI-compliant evidence proves this as fact.
- A significant number of person's who were in conflict with the attackers have died in suspicious manners. Jury and FBI-compliant evidence proves this as fact.
- The suspects have hired the largest numbers of lobbyists and corporate manipulation lawyers in U.S. history in order to manipulate political decisions. Jury and FBI-compliant evidence proves this as fact.

- The suspects have spent more money on political bribes than any group of men has spent in the last century. Jury and FBI-compliant evidence proves this as fact.
- The suspects placed top federal law enforcement and agency bosses (ie: Michelle Lee, Steven Chu, Kamala Harris, James Comey, et al) from their own Cartel, into top government positions, with orders to run cover and protection schemes for them. Jury and FBI-compliant evidence proves this as fact.
- California State officials including the Governor, Controller, The Senators, Secretary of State and regional officials participated in these crimes and pocketed the initial profits from these crimes in covert investment banking. Jury and FBI-compliant evidence proves this as fact.
- Tesla Motors, Google, Netflix, Facebook, LinkedIn, Amazon and other tech Cartel members operate with a common goal of psychological mass ideology manipulation and monopolistic profiteering based on government sponsored anti-trust violations and server control exclusivity. Jury and FBI-compliant evidence proves this as fact.
- The attempted cover-ups of these crimes continues to this day. Jury and FBI-compliant evidence proves this as fact.
- Natural-born U.S. citizen Applicant #1 has been employed in the USA for many decades and was a federal contractor/employee. The State of California employment laws now provide that of Applicant #1's "contractor" was actually "employee" work per California law. He worked for his community and his country as a law enforcement and intelligence researcher (law/IC) in which he closed cases that saved Americans billions of dollars. He holds numerous state and federal certifications and credentials to this effect and was certified as an investigator under the State Government at the California Office Of Consumer Affairs. He also worked as a CEO, Inventor and Product Development Director for which the U.S. Government has awarded him dozens of seminal patent awards for products in use by Microsoft, Sony and other major companies to provide products and services to billions of people. He has received commendation letters from U.S. Presidents, Agency heads and Mayors. He is pictured in videos, photographs, articles, meetings and on letterhead government and corporate correspondence with some of the most famous public and White House figures in America for decades. He reported the corruption in a trillion dollar Department of Energy embezzlement scam involving crooked uranium, lithium, indium and other metals, he was attacked by State and Federal employees, many of whom have now been terminated because of their illicit actions. Applicant was also exposed to those toxic materials in his work for the Department of Energy.
- Part of the state-sponsored attack launched against Applicant #1 used the same exact personnel, servers, digital systems, production equipment and other resources that are owned, or managed, by Google/Alphabet/YouTube for national election candidate counter-measures services. Google/Alphabet/YouTube sells these services, under many guises, as offerings to promote any candidate or damage any candidate for a fee, or for an exchange of items of value. Our investigators have acquired some of the billing and banking documents verifying this and the FBI has full access to all such documents proving this assertion. The billing value of the attack against Applicant #1 (in commensurate multiple-billing efforts by Google/Alphabet/YouTube) had a minimum commercial

value of \$30M in billings. This metric is based on records of political election campaign services sold by Google/Alphabet/YouTube since the year 2002. In other words, in a past elections, hard, documented numbers, employee statements, banking records, stock records, billing records and other materials exist, in jury trial acceptable form, to prove that, for example, Google/Alphabet/YouTube spent a certain exact amount of money and resources-of-value to defeat one candidate and to seek to elect that candidates opposition.

- Additionally, relative to the Google/Alphabet/YouTube portion of the attack, Google/Alphabet/YouTube owners are on federal and Congressional record swearing under oath that they do "not manipulate search results in order to harm others", yet investigators for Applicant #1 and over 1000 outside third parties proved that the opposite was true and that Google/Alphabet/YouTube executives lied under oath. The fact that the attack link on Google's front page never moved position for 5 years and other confirming data, proves the assertion that Google/Alphabet/YouTube sells defamation and character assassination services and sold them against Applicant. Applicant helped place sensors on servers globally which used comparative search results from competing global search engines to prove that Google/Alphabet/YouTube was rigging most search results to promote it's friends and harm it's political and business enemies.

- California Senators, White House staff and the owners and executives of Google/Alphabet/YouTube are also the investor/shareholders in Applicants competitors who were government financed.

- The industry metricized standard for person's with, at least, the skills and experience of Applicant, in his demographic, is a minimum of \$10,000 per month in the local technology market for those with less hours, less patent awards, less past work reference letters and less experience than Applicant. Silicon Valley job metrics and census data prove that that is even a low figure for a commensurate worker. Lost work opportunity for Applicant should be valued at a minimum of \$10,000.00 per month.

- Even though Applicant has been an extraordinarily productive, working member of the community and the U.S. Government; and Applicant has organized companies and programs which have paid millions of dollars in taxes, Applicant is currently only afforded the most minimal benefits possible. In other words, Applicant has saved billions of dollars for the Government and the taxpayers and, additionally, has organized companies and programs which paid millions of dollars in taxes and free services to The Government yet Applicant seems to be getting only political reprisals as gratitude.

- State and Federal employee corruption and reprisal actions cost Applicant his savings and nearly a billion dollars of potential income by intentionally sabotaging and terminating his operating, Congressional financed, Congressional commended national service companies featured on NPR, CBS News, and in The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times and hundreds of other mainstream news outlets. Corrupt State and Federal employees engaged in these benefit blockade reprisals because Applicant's companies competed with the stock market holdings of those corrupt State and Federal employees.

- These are the very same public officials who have interdiction capability at state and federal agencies.

It is quite reasonable to assume that these State and Federal employees, who have a court record of using reprisal actions against others, just like they did to Applicant, ordered federal agencies to harm Applicant. These public officials defrauded Applicant by asking and causing him, and his Team, to invest in their program. It turned out they were using Applicant's business ventures to cover (smoke-screen) their crimes at the expense of Applicant and the taxpayers.

- To be clear, Government employees put hundreds of millions of dollars of stock market profits in their, and their associates pockets, part of which they took from Applicant's funding, and then attacked Applicant, in a large number of reprisal actions.

- Applicant reported crimes by public officials which led to the FBI raid of Solyndra, opened the Uranium One investigation and the firing of the Secretary Of Energy for corruption. Part of Applicant's work involved creating America's next national energy solutions.

- Applicant worked with the U.S. Department of Energy, HUD, NAHB and related entities in work with the national weapons and energy labs since 2000. Applicant worked with nuclear, heavy metals, sintered rare earth metals, extreme solvents and nano-particulated exotic chemistries and won a historical Congressional commendation, first-ever seminal U.S. Government patent awards, industry and press acclaim, customer acclaim and a multi-million dollar lab research grant in the Congressional Iraq War Bill.

- Even though Applicant's has worked in service to his country, Applicant has been denied his legal rights. Applicant's U.S. Constitution and California Constitutional rights have been denied because he "did the right thing" and helped law enforcement.

- The most senior FBI and DOJ executives including James Comey, Andrew McCabe, Peter Strzok, David Oh and others are under federal investigation for running character assassinations and working with the economic assassins from Fusion GPS, Google Media, Gawker Media and other illicit attack organizations. Applicant reported to some of these men. Charges of FBI, DOJ, VA and SSA executive reprisal manipulations and attacks against citizens would have sounded hard to believe a decade ago but, in the post-Snowden world, catching those who pervert State and Federal offices has become common-place. It is beyond reasonable to assume that Applicant's charges of government agency reprisal-stonewalling are well founded and have full legal merit.

- The services who charge to perform the support work for such attacks provide a life-time placement of negative attack data on Google and on all of the Axciom, Taleo and other hiring HR and hiring databases, globally; and the locking, on the front top page of Google search results, forever, of the attack and defamation data, as was done because Applicant testified to Congress, the GAO and the FBI.

- The attacks on Applicant were "State Sponsored Attacks" directed, financed and managed by California State public officials and Federal Agency officers.

- Instead of the “Thanks of a grateful nation”, Applicant has received political reprisals, revenge and vendettas using taxpayer financed resources. Applicant has contributed more in the service of his country and community than most citizens. We ask your office to correct the record and bring fairness and justice to the finalization of this case. Applicant, his family, friends, associates and others will pursue this forever, through the media, law enforcement and alternative means ...until it is fairly resolved.
- The suspects in these crimes received over 50 billion dollars in profits from the crimes.
- The suspects received over 50 billion dollars at the expense of the victims because they intentionally, maliciously and in a coordinated manner, circumvented, those monies from the victims and the victim's income streams.
- The amount of money that the suspects acquired from these crimes is confirmed by reports at the Securities and Exchange Commission, The Internal Revenue Service, the FTC and stock market transfer records.
- Each competing company of the Applicant's that the suspects sabotaged had the potential to make as much money, or more money, than the suspects companies did in the same time period. Applicant's companies would have operated competitively had they not been sabotaged by the government officials. These other companies offered lower cost, safer, longer range products which higher volumes of consumers had demanded. This means that, if these companies had not been sabotaged by these corrupt government officials who, owned stock in these insider companies, they would have made even more money than the insider companies.
- Thus, and by extension, the corrupt Senator's and White House staff stock ownership's in Applicant's competitor's, provide a minimum baseline damages amount reference for comparable damages values using GAAP accounting references. Each competing company that suspects sabotaged, had the potential to make as much money, or more money, than known competing company revenues.
- The government officials used character assassination as a vendetta process to seek to destroy the brands, reputations and witness testimony of the victims by manipulating their properties.
- The suspects hired Fusion GPS, Black Cube, Google, Media Matters, Gizmodo and Gawker Media to author and distribute character assassination propaganda to the majority of the world's population via their pre-arranged and contrived control of the vast majority of digital media. For example, Google, the stock of which is owned by the suspects, locked the attacks on the front page on the top line of Google for over five years, without ever moving it, even though Plaintiffs purchased thousands of servers, and take-down requests to attempt to move the attacks even a few lines lower. This proves that Google was manually, and daily rigging the attacks. Thus, the damages award to the Applicant should be much higher than the Terry Bollea award.

- Government funding which was circumvented by suspects from Applicant to themselves was not the largest quantified value of loss. Working with Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, McKinsey, etc., suspects exploited the White House relationship with The Fed and the SEC to create a massive stock market valuation padding scheme which yielded historical profits. By stating government funds as “profit” and switching back and forth from stock skims to government funds in accounting records, tremendous stock market profits were placed in the pockets of the suspects.
- Had Applicant's not been circumvented by suspects then Applicant's would have acquired these same benefits. The stock market loss to the Plaintiffs at the expense of the Plaintiffs is also calculated into the damages consideration.
- The suspects ordered Steven Chu, Lachlan Seward, Carol Battershel, McKinsey and Deloitte Consulting, Kathy Zoi and other executives at the U.S. Department of Energy, to be placed into positions in the U.S. Department of Energy as shills on their behalf, to lie to and defraud the Applicants. All of the ATVM and LGP grant and loan funds from the U.S. Department of Energy had been secretly hard-wired and the distribution of it covertly arranged to go to the suspects stealthed stock ownerships.
- Thus, the applicants, who had superior technology, more customer orders, better value and provided less of a national security risk were defrauded into spending tens of millions of dollars on the applicant process via false promises and assurances of success which were already known to be lies from the first 2007 forward. The losses in time, expenses and time-to-market delays created by these fraudulent promises and assertions by the agents, in public office, covertly working for the suspects are calculated into these damages.
- Applicant's are demanding from the U.S. Government, The California State Government and the individual suspect/Defendants; general damages according to proof; special damages according to proof; exemplary or punitive damages; For a preliminary injunction and a permanent injunction enjoining defendant and their/her agents, servants, and employees, and all persons acting under, in concert with, or for him/her from continuing to publish the above-described private facts about Plaintiffs; for costs of suit herein incurred; for such other further relief as the court may deem proper; and for an award of a percentage of suspect/Defendants gross revenue since inception wherein that revenue was derived from profits made from the use of, or interdiction of, Plaintiffs patented and trade secret products, services and technology which Defendants covertly acquired information about and copied for profit. Forensic accounting based on Subpoenas against the suspects and attack providers, and further FBI support, will be required to finalize the amount but recent leaks and witness testimony confirm the veracity of these assumptions.

Congressional Staff Notes

The DOE's decision to deny Plaintiff's application was arbitrary and capricious. *See Pozzie v. United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev.*, 48 F.3d 1026, 1029 (7th Cir. Ill. 1995).

Stephen Chu, Lachlan Steward, Matthew Rogers, Steve Spinner, and Dan Tobin denied Plaintiff Technology due process of law.

The Government breached confidential information

Plaintiff alleges indirect infringement, e.g. aiding and abetting – *but cf. Decca, Ltd. v. United States*, 225 Ct. Cl. 326, 335-336 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (“Activities of the Government which fall short of direct infringement do not give rise to governmental liability because the Government has not waived its sovereign immunity with respect to such activities. Hence, the Government is not liable for its inducing infringement by others, for its conduct contributory to infringement of others, or for what, but for section 1498, would be contributory (rather than direct) infringement of its suppliers. Although these activities have a tortious ring, the Government has not agreed to assume liability for them. In short, under section 1498, the Government has agreed to be sued only for its direct infringement of a patent.” Though, if there is aiding and abetting or conspiracy to infringe, there might be a federal tort claims act case. *Zoltek III*, which limits the scope of § 1498(a) to direct infringement under § 271(a), is in error, and must be corrected. The Federal Circuit reinstated Zoltek's infringement claim against the United States and reversed the 2006 panel ruling that the United States cannot be liable on a takings theory in a patent case.

Plaintiff seeks open-public re-review of its denied application in hopes of finally obtaining a DOE loan guarantee for its electric car project with all reviewers identified for transparency.

Plaintiff understands that over \$100M of funding is still available for Plaintiff, that a far larger amount of Congressionally approved, yet unused, funding still sits in ATVM and Loan Guarantee cost centers at the U.S. Treasury, that Plaintiff is qualified for those funds on every merit and that the funding can be completed by a competent legal firm as it was for Ford, Fisker, Tesla, GM, Chrysler, Nissan, etc.

Minimum Quantified Damages: \$205,000,000.00

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[This Former Google Executive Was Accused Of Running A "Sex ...](#)

<https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanmac/andy-rubin-court-complaint-lawsuit-rie-divorce-google>

SAN FRANCISCO — **Andy Rubin**, a former Google senior vice president who invented the Android operating system, departed the company after having an "inappropriate relationship" with a subordinate and kept payments by his previous employer secret from his wife for several years, according to documents made public by a California superior court.

[Google exec Andy Rubin faces detailed sexual misconduct ...](#)

¹ <https://www.businessinsider.com/google-andy-rubin-sexual-misconduct-allegations-nyt-2018-10?op=1>

Andy Rubin, the creator of Android, reportedly had bondage **sex** videos on his work computer, paid women for 'ownership relationships,' and allegedly pressured an employee into oral **sex** Nick Bastone ...

[Google employees walkout over handling of sexual ...](#)

<https://edition.cnn.com/2018/11/01/tech/google-employee-walkout-andy-rubin/index.html>

Nov 1, 2018The Times reported that **Rubin** was accused of coercing a female employee, with whom he'd been having affair, into performing oral **sex** in a hotel room in 2013. A Google investigation found her claim...

[Android creator Andy Rubin accused of having a 'sex ring ...](#)

<https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/talkingtech/2019/07/02/android-creator-andy-rubin-accused-having-sex-ring-ex-wife/1634963001/>

Jul 2, 2019According to a sensational lawsuit by soon to be ex-wife Rie Hirabaru **Rubin**, her ex had several mistresses, one of which was "complicit with **Rubin** in running what appeared to be a **sex ring**," ...

[Android Co-Founder Caught In Sex Ring Saga - channelnews](#)

<https://www.channelnews.com.au/android-co-founder-in-pre-nup-sex-ring-complaint/>

Android co-founder, **Andy Rubin**, who Google reportedly paid \$90 million to leave the company after a sexual misconduct investigation, has been accused of running a **sex ring**.

[Google gave top executive \\$90m payoff but kept sexual ...](#)

<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/oct/25/google-andy-rubin-android-creator-payoff-sexual-misconduct-report>

Oct 25, 2018Google gave a \$90m severance package to **Andy Rubin**, the creator of the Android mobile software, but concealed details of a sexual misconduct allegation that triggered his departure, the New York ...

[Andy Rubin - Wikipedia](#)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andy_Rubin

Andrew E. **Rubin** is an American computer programmer, engineer, entrepreneur, and venture capitalist. He is the founder and former CEO of venture capital firm Playground Global, as well as the co-founder and former CEO of both Danger Inc. and Android Inc.. He was nicknamed "Android" by his co-

workers at Apple in 1989 due to a love of robots, with the nickname eventually becoming the official ...

[How Google Protected Andy Rubin, the 'Father of Android ...](#)

📄 <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/25/technology/google-sexual-harassment-andy-rubin.html>

Oct 25, 2018 The woman, with whom Mr. **Rubin** had been having an extramarital relationship, said he coerced her into performing oral **sex** in a hotel room in 2013, according to two company executives with knowledge...

[Google reportedly paid Andy Rubin \\$90 million after he ...](#)

<https://www.theverge.com/2018/10/25/18023364/google-andy-rubin-payoff-90-million-sexual-misconduct-harassment>

Google reportedly paid **Andy Rubin** \$90 million after he allegedly coerced **sex** from employee New, 206 comments By Chris Welch @chriswelch Oct 25, 2018, 2:02pm EDT

[The rise and fall of Andy Rubin, the former Google ...](#)

📄 <https://www.businessinsider.nl/android-sex-ring-leader-rise-fall-google-exec-andy-rubin-2019-7/>

Andy Rubin is the creator of Android and a former Google executive. **Rubin's** career seemed to be on track - software engineering in Silicon Valley in the 1990s, founding Android, being a top ...

[Google CEO Pichai says 48 employees fired for sexual but a cover-up is expected...](#)

<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/10/26/google-ceo-pichai-says-48-employees-fired-for-sexual-misconduct/>

The New York Times report claimed that **Andy Rubin**, ... A spokesperson for **Rubin** has denied the allegations, the New York Times said. ... South Korea court orders Japan to compensate former **sex slaves**.

[Android creator Andy Rubin accused of running a 'sex ring'](#)

 <https://thenextweb.com/business/2019/07/03/android-creator-andy-rubin-is-accused-of-running-a-sex-ring-in-new-unsealed-complaint/>

Android founder, **Andy Rubin**, may have left Google long back in 2014, but his departure is beginning to attract more unsavory attention. According to documents made public by a California superior ...

[George Soros' Right Hand Man Arrested For Rape And Human ...](#)

 <https://newspunch.com/george-soros-human-trafficking/>

Howard **Rubin**, widely known as George Soros' right hand man, was accused of leading a "human trafficking enterprise" in which he allegedly raped, brutally assaulted and enslaved women in a \$8 million Manhattan **sex** dungeon, according to court documents.

[Disgraced Google Exec Andy Rubin Quietly Left His Venture ...](#)

<https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanmac/andy-rubin-playground-global-google-quiet-departure>

Disgraced Google Exec **Andy Rubin** Quietly Left His Venture Firm Earlier This Year. Android creator **Andy Rubin** left Google with a \$90 million exit package after investigations into sexual misconduct. Now he's out at Playground Global, the venture firm he founded, allegedly with another multimillion-dollar payout.

[Former Google exec 'ran a sex ring ... - Daily Mail Online](#)

<https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-7208615/Former-Google-exec-ran-sex-ring-estranged-wife-claims.html>

The co-founder of Android who reportedly received a \$90 million severance from Google in the wake of misconduct allegations is now being accused of running a **sex** ring. **Andy Rubin** is being sued by ...

[Android creator Andy Rubin is accused of running a 'sex ...](#)

<https://www.businessinsider.in/android-creator-andy-rubin-is-accused-of-running-a-sex-ring/articleshow/70049627.cms>

Android creator **Andy Rubin** was allegedly involved in running a "**sex** ring" with at least one woman, and is accused of cheating his ex-wife out of millions of dollars in their prenuptial agreement ...

[Andy Rubin's Essential Gem Isn't Just a New Phone | WIRED](#)

<https://www.wired.com/story/andy-rubins-essential-gem-google-android/>

Andy Rubin's New Phone Thing Isn't Just a New Phone Thing. ... These ranged from pressuring a woman into having oral **sex**, to berating subordinates, to viewing bondage **sex** videos on a work ...

[Google 'gave Andy Rubin \\$90M exit package despite ...](#)

<https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-6317589/Google-forced-Andy-Rubin-sexual-misconduct-claim-gave-90M-exit-package.html>

Google reportedly gave Android's co-founder, **Andy Rubin**, a \$90M exit package despite a credible claim that he had an inappropriate relationship with a woman while working at the company.

[Wife of Android Co-Founder Andy Rubin Accuses Him of Using ...](#)

 <https://www.thedailybeast.com/wife-of-android-co-founder-andy-rubin-accuses-him-of-using-google-paychecks-to-pay-for-sex-ring>

The wife of Android co-founder **Andy Rubin** has accused him of cheating her out of wealth he obtained from Google and diverting funds to make payments to several woman after he left the company ...

['The Lost Women of NXIVM': ID Orders Special on Sex ...](#)

 <https://www.thewrap.com/the-lost-women-of-nxivm-sex-trafficking-cult-allison-mack-keith-raniere/>

Mack had been accused of recruiting young women into the group and manipulated them into branding their bodies and becoming **sex slaves** for Raniere. Mack's sentencing will be decided on Sept. 11 ...

[Andy Rubin biography, age, net worth, wife, career ...](#)

www.learnmorefacts.com/post/andy-rubin-biography-age-net-worth-wife-career-playground-wiki

Andy Rubin was conceived on June 22, 1946 in New Bedford, United States. He is the designer of the Android OS. Since youth, **Rubin** has been accustomed to seeing bunches of new devices. This is on the grounds that his dad, a therapist who swerved into the immediate advertising business, which will store electronic items sold in the room **Rubin**.

[Google asked Andy Rubin to quit for being a sex pest](#)

<https://fudzilla.com/news/47474-google-asked-andy-rubin-to-quit-for-being-a-sex-pest>

But still gave him a hero's farewell and a pile of cash The creator of Android, **Andy Rubin**, was asked to leave Google for being a **sex** pest, but the search engine did its best to pretend ...

[Wayfair shoots down conspiracy theory about child sex ...](#)

 <https://www.msn.com/en-us/finance/companies/wayfair-shoots-down-conspiracy-theory-about-child-sex-trafficking-and-expensive-cabinets/ar-BB16ALHX>

Wayfair shoots down conspiracy theory about child **sex** trafficking and expensive cabinets
hpeterson@businessinsider.com (Hayley Peterson) 7/10/2020 White violence, Black protests during 1918 flu ...

[Who is Rie Hirabaru Rubin? Andy Rubin Ex-Wife; Bio, Wiki ...](#)

 <https://globintel.com/usa/rie-hirabaru-rubin-biowiki-age/>

Rie **Rubin** Bio, Wiki. Rie **Rubin** is the ex-wife of **Andy Rubin**, Android co-creator and former Google Senior Vice-President. She is accusing him of having secretly conspired with her attorney to manipulate the couple's prenuptial agreement by stripping her of all community property rights and also diverting their marital funds so he could pay women involved in his private "**sex** ring."

[** THAT SILICON VALLEY OLIGARCHS RUN A MONOPOLISTIC CARTEL!](#)

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[Permanent Record](https://www.amazon.com/Permanent-Record-Edward-Snowden/dp/1250237238) By Edward Snowden, <https://www.amazon.com/Permanent-Record-Edward-Snowden/dp/1250237238>

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[World Without Mind](https://www.amazon.com/World-Without-Mind-Existential-Threat/dp/1101981113) By Franklin Foer, <https://www.amazon.com/World-Without-Mind-Existential-Threat/dp/1101981113>

[A Journey into the Savage Heart of Silicon Valley](https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/35684687-live-work-work-work-die) By Corey Pein, <https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/35684687-live-work-work-work-die>

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[Vast Deposits Of Fodder For Conspiracy Theorists Discovered ...](#) - Jim Risen has a blockbuster story about a gift and a curse for **Afghanistan's** blighted and ... gold and critical industrial metals like **lithium** — are so big and include so many minerals that are ... The Board of advisors has Stephen Friedman, AIG crook, **Goldman Sachs** crook, Federal Reserve ...[attackerman.firedoglake.com/2010/06/13/vast-deposits-of-fodder-for-...](#)

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[name “Bourkhan”. Owner – oligarch Alisher Usmanov ... -](#) Billionaire Alisher Usmanov acquired the biggest private jet in Russia, ... **oligarch**, percent, president vladimir putin, private flight, private jet,

richest man, roman, roman abramovich, Russia's richest man, sale, seat, spacious ... **John Doerr**; **John** Frederiksen; **John** Paul DeJoria; **John** Paulson ... agent4stars.com/tag/name-bourkhan-owner-oligarch-alishe...

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He raked in a gazillion bucks, give or take a few billion, as the founder of **Kleiner Perkins** Caufield and Byers, a venture capital firm. His letter, published in the Wall Street Journal, ... essentially from Europe west of Russia through North America,
...ironmountaindailynews.com/page/content.detail/id/544658/Scary-sid...

[Kleiner Perkins Co-Founder's Nazi Comment Draws Criticism ...](#)- **Kleiner** Perkins's website lists **Perkins** as one of 14 partner emeriti, a group that includes recent partner Ray Lane and co-founder Eugene **Kleiner**, who died in 2003. **Perkins** has been a director at companies including Hewlett-Packard Co. and Applied Materials Inc. -bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-26/kleiner-perkins-shocked...

[Frank Caufield — Kleiner Perkins Caufield Byers -](#) He is a Co-Founder of **Kleiner Perkins** Caufield & Byers. Mr. Caufield has served on the boards of Quantum Corporation, Caremark Inc., ... He also serves as a director of The U.S. Russia Investment Fund, Refugees International,
...kpcb.com/partner/frank-caufield

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[“Flash Boys” and the Speed of Lies – Proactiveinvestors UK](#)**Flash Boys” and the Speed of Lies .**
Here is the opening of this informative column by Brad Katsuyama for Bloomberg: In the last few months, I have had a strange and interesting experience.-[proactiveinvestors.co.uk/columns/fuller-treacy-money/16720/flash-b...](#)

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